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This study undertakes a critical analysis of measures of environmental and 
sustainable socioeconomic welfare from the perspective of political economy. One 
of the prime motivations for such an inquiry is that Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) provides an inadequate measure of social and ecological waste in the 
economic system. Good measures with solid theory (or theories) can offer vital 
insights where there may be conflict between the various spheres of economy, 
society and ecology. The inquiry centres on measures that may be referred to as 
‘Net Income Indices’ or Sustainable Economic Welfare Indicators (SEWIs), since 
they are designed for assessing aspects of sustainability and welfare. Commencing 
in 1972 and ending in April 2009, there have been forty-five individual studies 
involving construction of a SEWI. SEWIs are worthy of a comprehensive appraisal 
as it is generally accepted that the indices are necessary, workable and adequate 
measures. This study embarks on a systematic, detailed and scholarly examination 
of the conclusions drawn in the relevant literature on SEWIs, focusing on the 
calibre of their theoretical, empirical and technical foundations, historical 
specificity vis-à-vis business cycles and institutional dynamics. 
For any study into sustainable well-being, the key focus is the effects of market 
institutions on society. GDP has many limitations, but GDP is charged with 
significance because it aids our understanding of the capitalist system, however, 
the same cannot be said for SEWIs. It is argued that the net income indices are 
not very good measures of environmental and social welfare: many authors 
provide no major good or detailed advancement in theory and no one provides a 
strong socio-historical institutional analysis. Critically absent from every SEWI 
analysis is a systematic understanding of the political economy and system 
dynamics of capitalism. This led to the major hypothesis, which states: 
understanding the political economy of capitalism will provide vital insights into SEWIs. 
SEWI advocates have started with ceteris paribus assumptions where medium and 
long-term processes are not affecting the socioeconomic system. Because ad-hoc 
commonsensical accountancy prevails, the authors are inadequately accounting for 
the present well-being effects on the social structure, and do not consistently, as 
done for ecological capital depreciation, value the future generational costs (lost 
services) of an (un)sustainable social capital and human-health capital base. SEWI 
restricts the analysis to a few monetary variables and thereby it is too inflexible and 
not very helpful. 
Yet, such social services and disservices are elementary for critically evaluating 
the multiple contradictions of capitalism in a disembedded economy (where the 
‘economy’ tends to dominate other aspects of culture). Multiple contradictions 
assess the complexity of the disembedded economy better than single contradictions. 
SEWI advocates focus mainly on the contradiction (i.e. the trade-off) between the 
natural environment and consumption goods, and their inquiry is, at the most, 
limited to the national level. It is argued that they are in a one-and-a-half 
contradiction world: they see primarily one contradiction and a partial social reality 
from a very nationalistic perspective. In the global disembedded economy, all 
areas of life are both relatively autonomous yet interconnected. There are multiple 
contradictions of capitalism to be explored, but it is hard to link all of them in one 
index. It is necessary to transcend the one-and-a-half contradiction world and have 
a broad view of wealth. 
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It is difficult to determine the true nature of the “service” and its distribution 
to persons-in-community in an exclusive aggregated net-income index. Composite 
net-income indicators inadequately measure distribution. Without fundamentally 
understanding the heterogeneous power relations that define the system’s 
reproduction, applications of ‘Net Income Indices’ are ineffective. It is argued that 
there are major limits to which SEWIs can be transformed or radically redeveloped 
within the context of the political economy critique. The crux of the problem is that 
SEWI advocates fail to incorporate an understanding of the historical socioeconomic 
system of capitalism (as the fundamental background condition), which affects their 
whole project. A tendency for the literature to abstract from real trends in the 
disembedded economy is apparent because of the weak institutional apparatus, 
mechanical applications, and conceptual difficulties. This thesis raises questions 
about the competence of SEWIs to deal with real-world problems. A more detailed 
and broader approach to sustainable well-being is needed to find the root of social 
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When we make choices there are trade-offs involved, since we face 
limitations, such as time, space, finance, knowledge and/or the 
institutional arrangements. Depending on a person’s evaluation system, 
the trade-off may be desirable or undesirable, positive or negative. 
Sometimes the choices the individual makes are socially constructed, 
constrained or restricted. For instance, an individual may not want to 
sacrifice time in the home for childrearing, but finds that s/he needs to 
work extra hours in paid employment to cover living expenses. However, 
it is true that the individual does have an element of free choice and thus 
control over the positive or negative consequences of the trade-off 
endured or expected to endure. But, to a large degree there is a lack of 
control by an individual in modifying society’s choices—this is the source 
of numerous real world problems. 
One of the major problems is the fruitful heritage of ecological beauty 
being systematically and vehemently destroyed. A substantial array of 
heterogeneous species’ populations and habitats (corals, wetlands, 
forests) are either dwindling or becoming extinct over recent decades 
(WWF 2008:40). A reduction in the extent and condition of natural 
habitats largely reflect these declining populations. Species decline is 
happening despite the mounting protection of habitat loss and 
degradation (UNEP 2007). Environmental degradation is happening 
locally, regionally and globally, through the replacement of the natural 
environment by material goods and services. While one can ‘do our bit’ 
to help alleviate ecological destruction in a small way, the powerlessness 
of the individual to radically change society’s choices in the short-to-
medium term is the tangible reality. The consequences of the trade-off 
from natural environment to worldly possessions are thus a more serious 
problem at the global, regional and local macro-level as opposed to the 
individual micro-level. There are powerful market-political forces at work 
with a tendency to destroy forms of wealth such as old growth forests, 
fish stocks, wildlife, and social relationships. 
Another vital concern that requires a global, regional, national and 
local perspective is the health of persons, particularly the poor. With the 
large-scale commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
in the 2000s, poverty and the deplorable health condition of the world’s 
poor have finally reached pre-eminence in the international policy arena, 
and foreign aid for health has greatly increased. But, there is still not 
enough funding to meet poor countries’ basic needs, and the quality and 
effectiveness of existing aid and the efficiency of current public spending 
is deficient (Schieber et al. 2007:925). Today’s global health lacuna is 
entrenched in political economy. In such a framework, health is 
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expendable when other interests, such as national security, are perceived 
to be at risk (Erikson 2007:168, 2008:1230). The prevailing paradigm is at 
odds with global-health trade-off realities: human health is one of many 
competing concerns in preference to it being a featured and privileged 
one. 
Understanding the nature of trade-offs in the market political 
economy is therefore critical. The chief motif and major theme of this 
thesis is to understand the salient factors responsible for the growing 
incidence of external diseconomies (costs) imposed on the public at 
large by market activities. We are thus interested in the activities that 
affect social welfare from the accumulation of capital (à la economic 
growth). In essence, this study centres holistically on the following 
fundamental trade-off question: To what extent do the losses associated 
with economic growth offset the gains? 
When evaluating this basic trade-off, there is a time dimension to 
consider. Kenneth Boulding (1966c:10) in “The Economics of The 
Coming Space-Ship Earth” argues that the social welfare of human 
beings depend on the degree to which they can identify with others, in 
the community through space and time. Boulding realised that genuine 
progress must meet the needs of the individual while being sustainable 
and equitable over time. How do we measure the trade-offs, i.e. the 
positives and negatives of sustainable and equitable welfare attainment? 
A well-devised indicator that measures the costs and benefits of 
economic growth over time may help. 
A socioeconomic indicator is supposed to provide a summary 
measure of the progress or development of the people of a region. 
Indicators of social and environmental welfare can help people 
understand the degree of progress achieved in significant matters (e.g. 
air and water pollution, sociality, morality, etc.). The beneficial outcome 
of a good well-being measure is that it allows for deliberations on areas 
that may need improvement. The extent to which an indicator can 
describe the prevailing socioeconomic system is also a crucial factor 
determining the usefulness of the measure. Good measures with solid 
theory (or theories) can thus offer critical insights where there may be 
conflict between the various spheres of economy, society and ecology. 
However, there is much controversy as to what is a valid measure. All 
indicators are subject to criticisms, because the very nature of their 
construction involves a simplification of a very complex reality. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that indices are not developed 
outside the system; they are the product of lengthy discourse on 
socioeconomic areas of inquiry, and are influenced by vested interests. 
Hence, the key for the critical social observer is to identify the implicit 
value judgements embedded in the indicator’s conceptual framework. 
The research problem in this study thus involves scrutinising social and 
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environmental welfare indicators and offering a critique if the 
assumptions or theoretical foundations or empirical studies are 
unsound. 
Seven critical hypotheses are raised to direct the path of this study. 
Note that the hypotheses are not empirically rejected/accepted per se or 
stringently tested by econometric models. In this study, the ‘hypothesis’ 
is utilised as a tool to guide the critical conclusions of the research. In 
this sense, hypotheses act as general stylised claims derived from critical 
thinking about the literature on sustainability and social welfare. 
Evidence in support of the hypotheses is to be evaluated by means of 
contextual validation (i.e. ‘storytelling’) and the principles of holism. The 
advantage of storytelling over more formal methods (e.g. logical 
positivism) is to espouse concreteness rather than abstraction from 
reality. From the viewpoint of holism, the primary function is to promote 
“understanding” (see Dugger 1977:306-8). Hence, these techniques are a 
procedure for verifying different kinds and sources of facts, and the 
hypothesis serves as an indirect means of evaluating the plausibility of 
one’s initial interpretations (see Wilber and Harrison 1978).1 
The traditional measure of performance is gross domestic product 
(GDP). GDP is simply the gross monetary total of ‘final’ goods and 
services exchanged over time in the home market. The growth rate of real 
GDP per capita is often used to indicate national, regional or global 
‘economic growth’ or the growth in income, output, or expenditure. The 
value of goods and services is formulated in the United Nations System of 
National Accounts (UNSNA), which is generally published by a national 
statistical bureau, such as Sweden’s Statistiska centralbyrån, the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas (Chile), Banco de Moçambique (Mozambique), 
and the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The essential function of the SNA 
is to provide a systematic summary of national economic activity. The 
national accounts are a significant social accomplishment because they 
offer extensive, detailed, and independent scorecards. 
Historically, there is often a positive link between economic growth 
and welfare. For instance, most notably during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
broad population of West Germany was lifted out of squalor as economic 
growth facilitated infrastructural rebuilding (known as 
Wirtschaftswunder). Under a program of state–industry cooperation, a 
strong work ethic, and mastery of high technology, Japan achieved 
spectacular growth during the 1960s–1980s and now is the third-largest 
economy in the world after the US and China (CIA World Factbook 2008). 
During the high growth periods of the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ireland 
overcame its long-standing trend of people leaving the country (CSO 

1 Diesing (1971) remarks: “[t]he holist believes in the primacy of subject matter; he [or she] believes 
that whatever else a method may be, it should at least be adequate to the particular thing described 
and should not distort it”. 
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2004). Growth in China during the 1990s–2000s enabled Chinese in 
urban areas to experience higher standards of living, for example, greater 
quantities and varieties of food (Fishman 2005:127). 
However, poverty endures in regions where income and growth 
performance has been deficient. Poverty and economic stagnation or 
decline are predominant characteristics of Sub-Saharan Africa and parts 
of Latin America. According to UNECA (2008:63), the main challenges 
facing Sub-Saharan Africans in the labour market are the lack of decent 
jobs in the formal sector, underemployment, particularly in rural areas, 
and working poverty. Despite the significant increase in primary school 
enrolments in Sub-Saharan Africa of late, only 60 percent of children in 
Sub-Saharan Africa actually complete the full cycle of primary education 
(UNESC 2008:14). In Latin America, Lopez and Perry (2008) argue that 
the widespread tendency to underinvest in productive durable fixed assets 
and social resources has perpetuated a vicious circle of persistent poverty, 
insecurity and unstable growth, marked by the “lost decade” of the 
1980s, the “lost half-decade” of 1998–2002 and a period of weak 
performance between the two. These initial weaknesses tend to keep 
them stuck on a path of low GDP and productivity growth. Consequently, 
an inadequate level of economic growth over a long period may imply a 
low level of economic welfare. 
The first hypothesis, H1, of this study thereby states that: 
 
H1:  Economic growth provides a good measure of wealth and 
welfare. 
 
Generated by competition and technological innovation, economic 
growth and the accessibility of credit enable a greater range of 
opportunities. Economic growth is often a good proxy for welfare. 
Economic growth offers so many wonderful things, namely, a greater 
range of commodities and services, the opportunity to travel, work and 
study, and so on. Individuals can purchase high-performance shoes, 
cheap digital cameras, quality colour printers and ultra-comfortable 
furniture and bedding. Many people think that economic growth will give 
them ever-increasing economic welfare. H1 is topical as most citizens 
and leaders have a strong tendency to support growth-orientated policies 
(e.g. see Rankin 2006:24-7). 
Human thinking tends to fall back on the popular belief that a per 
capita increase in real monetary income is a good thing in itself. Some 
fundamental questions, however, arise. Can we merely assume that 
output, or output per head, is a measure of economic progress? What is 
genuine economic welfare: GDP, income, production, or consumption? 
What were the earlier judgements of economists (such as Irving Fisher 
and Simon Kuznets) of what constitutes the wealth and welfare of a 
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nation, before the national accounts became first institutionalised in 
1948? Chapter 2 provides an economic, social and ecological historical 
overview of the relevant literature on these questions. A scrutiny of the 
concepts of ‘income’, ‘wealth’, ‘consumption’ and ‘production’ is 
essential for an understanding of the controversies surrounding 
‘economic growth’ and ‘GDP’ (H1). 
Kuznets, for instance, argued that the System of National Accounts 
poorly represented what ‘national income’ as the concept had been 
understood as in its long history, i.e. from a social economics 
perspective (e.g. see Kendrick 1970, Perlman and Marietta 2005). He 
understood national income as a sustained increase in its magnitude of 
services over a long-term trend (e.g. see Kuznets 1947:13, 1948:156,160). 
Hence, in this study, the notion of income in the ‘service’ sense is 
significant. Income can be defined as the flow of services from wealth 
(capital). But the flow of services need not be positive. There can be 
disservices, also known as negative income. Therefore, the concept of net 
income is a vital one because it considers the net positives and negatives 
of economic activity. We argue that “economic growth” was historically 
understood as ‘net income’ (genuine welfare of society) and, therefore, 
only in this context hypothesis one (H1) is acceptable. 
The path in which “economic growth” was heading was indeed a 
prolific one, with possible revolutionary positive implications for society. 
But, with the formal institutionalisation of the US system of national 
accounts in 1948 (1953 at the global level), ‘economic growth’ signifies 
market-based production activities and not ‘net income’. In other words, 
in any case post-1948, economic growth is synonymous with the growth 
rate in GDP. GDP growth relates to the rate at which the marketed value 
of goods and services is expanding in a specific region (e.g. the world or 
a continent). This is an important dimension of capitalism. Markets are 
closely linked to capitalism, which, in the process of creative-destruction, 
requires them to grow in order to expand. GDP growth per capita (short 
and long term) may help comprehend capitalism (even critically). 
A critical approach to GDP growth entails an exploration of the 
system’s conditions. Veblen, for instance, examined the complex 
mechanisms responsible for the rise and decay of social and ecological 
organisations. He argued that real service creation is problematic 
especially when “converting all public wealth to private gain” under a 
system of absentee ownership (Veblen 1923:168). All four of the great 
political economists, Marx, Veblen, Keynes, and Schumpeter understood 
that capitalism as a revolutionary system entails rapid change. As 
continuous instability, conflict and disarray are natural to capitalism, the 
costs (disservice) of this process for capital and society can be large. 
That is, the system has a positive and negative side, where service is 
reproduced along with disservice. 
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However, there are several well-known problems with GDP. For 
instance, transactions that add or reduce welfare are difficult to 
distinguish. At least historically, humanity has treated the economic 
system as if it could enter into uninterrupted exchange with an infinite 
reservoir of ecological assets. GDP usually provides no indication of 
whether we are living off income or capital, and treats the depletion of 
materials such as coal, oil, gas, forests, and soils as positive capital 
consumption. Sustainable production in GDP is treated the same as 
unsustainable consumption. Thus, there is a failure of economic growth 
and GDP to account for destruction of the environment. On this issue, 
the views of prominent ecological economists, Kenneth Boulding and 
Herman Daly, are considered. Maximising economic growth provides no 
indication of the enhancement or deterioration of real wealth and welfare. 
This is because, as argued by Boulding (1949-50:79), the objective of 
economic policy should not be to maximise consumption or production, 
but rather to minimise it while expanding the range of net positive 
services. 
GDP in the national accounts may be a good proxy measure of 
economic growth but not when ‘net contributions to welfare’ are at the 
heart of the inquiry. This is because, as chiefly argued by Daly (1978, 
1991, 1996), the ‘eco-development’ notion of progress in ‘economic 
growth’ and GDP has been misplaced concretely. GDP accounting does 
not differentiate growth from sustainable development. Growth means a 
quantitative increase in the scale of goods and services of the economy. 
Sustainable development means a qualitative improvement in the 
structure, design and composition of the institutions that result from 
greater knowledge and understanding of social progress. Moreover, the 
greener accounting system, the System of Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Accounting (SEEA-2003) (United Nations et al. 2003), is limited 
in measuring net welfare.2 The line of thought in the SEEA-2003 reflects 
the reliance on “asset” (or “capital”) rather than “service” thinking. 
“Economic growth” in the SEEA-2003 is still narrowly defined as real 
GDP growth, not sustainable development, green GDP or net income. H1 
must therefore be rejected, because the ‘development’ notion of progress 
in ‘economic growth’ and GDP has been misplaced concretely. 
The major conclusion in Chapter 2, therefore, is that economic 
growth—the growth of GDP per capita—is not a very good measure of 
wealth and welfare. Utilising GDP as a prime indicator of growth, 
performance and welfare may be problematic. Indeed, much of the 
criticism of economic growth has arisen from the enormous negative 
social externalities (disservices) generated from the ‘growth fetish’ in 

2 The function of SEEA-2003 enables a detailed assessment of the stocks of various natural 
resources, and the flows of expenditures, taxes and subsidies related to environmental protection 
or management by various sectors. 
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human activities. GDP growth incurs costs such as the disturbance of 
ecological life-supporting systems, pollution, alienated labour, lost 
leisure time, and the loss of welfare for future generations. If a high level 
of GDP is the ultimate policy goal, then clearly it is a misused index to 
represent social welfare. Hence, adjusting or modifying GDP to construct 
some sort of ‘net value’ of environmental and socioeconomic welfare is 
potentially important. At the end of Chapter 2, we introduce several 
measures of ‘net income’; there is likely a need to modify or go beyond 
GDP. 
One of the most significant indicators of net income is the Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW). Herman Daly and John Cobb 
(1989) in their groundbreaking book, For the Common Good, pioneered 
early work into developing a more appropriate measure of welfare. They 
devised the very first ISEW; for the US over the 1950–1986 period (see 
Cobb 1989). Their work was significant because it was the first indicator 
assessing economic welfare with attention to income distribution and 
environmental destruction. An adjustment for income inequality in the 
ISEW was based on the premise that the benefits of economic growth 
may disproportionately advantage the rich. It also gave attention to 
environmental sustainability, such as the costs of long-term 
environmental damage, including climate change, air, water and noise 
pollution. They argue that accounting for sustainability is needed in a 
measure of welfare, especially when it affects future generations.3 In this 
study, we seek to understand the ISEW (and other similar indices) in 
detail. Good conceptual foundations are required for the ISEW, and this 
are the focal point of Chapter 3. 
This leads to the introduction of hypothesis two (H2)—viz.: 
 
H2:  The ISEW has strong theoretical foundations. 
 
A primary function of Chapter 3 is to interpret and apply conceptual 
foundations to ISEW. This is needed to establish a level playing field—to 
understand the evolution of similar sustainable economic welfare 
indicators and to present them in their best light. It is not only the 
purpose of this paper to provide insight into the theoretical foundations 
of ISEW, but also to offer a critique, if reasonable. But even if it is not 
possible to fill the gaps completely, it is argued that there are three 
underlying and qualitatively different theories of ISEW (H2). 
The focal point of the three theories is to evaluate the positives and 
negatives of economic growth, with the hope of achieving a practical 
measure of sustainable economic welfare. In order to promote specificity 

3 Note that Daly and Cobb’s ISEW is a more sophisticated measure to earlier measures, such as 
the Measure of Welfare (MEW) (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972) and Economic Aspects of Welfare 
(EAW) (Zolotas 1981). However in this study, we delimit the scope of the analysis to ISEW and 
related measures developed thereafter. 
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vis-à-vis the theoretical foundations of ISEW, Venn diagrams and set 
theory notation are utilised. The purpose of the Venn diagrams is to 
illustrate the similarities and differences between the theories. The 
usefulness lies in the visual comparative analysis, specifically: How well 
does each theory link the spheres of economy, ecology and society? 
Indeed, the conceptual foundation of ISEW depends on the answer to 
this question. 
A scrutiny of Daly and Cobb’s (1989) work reveals a theoretical 
framework—albeit somewhat concealed and fragmented—for ISEW. 
Thus, the first theory explores Daly and Cobb’s conceptual “economics for 
community” model for ISEW, which considers the costs and benefits to 
the whole community, not merely individual agents involved in a 
transaction. The second theory links Fisher’s concept of income to 
entropy: entropic net psychic income. This theory is important because it 
specifies that it is a cost to replacing worn out producer goods such as 
plant, machinery, and equipment. The third theory suggests that ISEW is 
theoretically based on a social welfare function. Utilising some principles 
of welfare economics, the ISEW integrates cost-benefit analysis with 
social choice theory, which incorporates various social concerns about 
welfare that are not adequately captured by individuals within the market 
place. Hence, it is argued that there are several substantive theories to 
support ISEW. 
However, there are major limitations in the approach to sustainable 
development as construed by the advocates of ISEW. In relation to 
hypothesis two, H2, the three theories are not as well developed as they 
should be: they have partial, underdeveloped explanations of the benefits 
(services) and costs (disservices) generated in the system. The system 
not only creates ‘services’ and waste (disservice), but also has a tendency 
to obstruct or destroy progressive service potential. This was clearly 
articulated by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation (1944), who 
argues that sustainable social arrangements are irreconcilable with an 
economy founded solely on a self-regulating market organisation 
(Polanyi 1957:73). This is because the system tends towards instability if 
left alone, and thereby requires the insertion of new forms of reciprocity, 
redistribution and informal marketplace changes to create ‘system 
functions’. 
Under a self-regulating market organisation, the economy tends to 
dominate other aspects of culture. This is known as the ‘disembedded 
economy’. In line with Polanyi’s (1944) thesis, the market system tends 
to destroy the services of existing capitals of taste, tradition, character, 
nature, community and values in its search for expanding markets which 
may yield ongoing (if doubtful) services of new technological institutions. 
It is argued that the theoretical particulars of ISEW abstract from the 
workings of the capitalist system, because the ISEW advocates have not 
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specified a society in the socioeconomic system that we currently have. 
Specifically, there is no underlying linked systems view of the 
disembedded economy. Without a systematic understanding of the 
political economy of capitalism, the ISEW, as expressed by hypothesis 
two, H2, is potentially flawed in design. 
Yet, several questions remain unanswered in chapter three. Is the 
ISEW project simply mistaken or is there some way of transforming it 
within the context of a political economy critique? There are two paths 
that we may take, either abandoning the ISEW approach or finding a way 
to integrate it with the political economy critique. The extent to which we 
can incorporate the challenges posed by the political economy theory is 
the critical factor determining the abandonment or redevelopment of 
ISEW. But, without undertaking a thorough empirical and technical 
scrutiny of the ISEWs (in the existing literature), it is difficult to ascertain 
the complete inadequacy of socioeconomic foundations in the index’s 
construction. Nonetheless, the underlying problems of ISEW should 
become manifest in the critical empirical investigations from the 
perspective of political economy. The result will become evident as the 
critical appraisal continues in chapters four and five. We need to break 
away from the conceptual critique and into the empirical and technical 
scrutiny of ISEW et al. analyses. 
In addition to ISEW, a number of alternatives to GDP that encompass 
environmental and social factors include the Genuine Progress Indicator 
(GPI), Sustainable Net Benefits Index (SNBI), and Fisherian Income 
(YF). Collectively, these composite measures may be referred to as ‘Net 
Income Indices’ or Sustainable Economic Welfare Indicators (SEWIs) 
since they are designed for assessing aspects of sustainability and welfare. 
‘Consumption’ is the welfare base of the indicators and is taken directly 
from the System of National Accounts (SNA). But the authors utilise a 
variety of statistical sources and government reports to include other 
variables. Generally, the authors of SEWIs add the monetary service 
benefits yielded by both the stock of consumer and public durable 
expenditures (while adjusting personal consumption for income 
inequality) and household production, minus the environmental and 
social costs associated with production, distribution and exchange. We 
provide a detailed literature survey of empirical studies of these SEWIs in 
chapters four and five. 
Directing the first literature survey, the following hypothesis (H3) will 
be scrutinised: 
 
H3:  Net Income Indices are good measures of environmental and 
social welfare. 
 
Chapter 4 provides the first review, a comprehensive survey of the 
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literature on Net Income Indices. Thus far (up to April 2009), there have 
been forty-five individual studies in which authors have constructed net 
welfare indicators; and the historical application of indices span more 
than five decades. Each study is chronologically assessed. Additionally, 
studies that provide a non-technical critique or discuss limitations of the 
indicators are reviewed. Generally, this entails the following evaluation 
method: a) an introduction to the study; b) a presentation and 
commentary of the empirical results; c) a discussion of the most 
important conclusions; and d) any advances in theory or methods 
accomplished.4 We scrutinise whether the authors follow or develop Daly 
and Cobb’s oikonomia model, includes the ‘net psychic income’ notion, 
or apply social choice theory. 
Each subsequent study to Daly and Cobb (1989) contributes to the 
literature to varying degrees. Jackson and Stymne (1996), in their 
Swedish ISEW study, for instance, provide a good comparative analysis 
with the UK ISEW over the 1950–1992 period. They argue that different 
social and environmental policies influenced the indicator’s trend, e.g. 
there was a positive influence on Sweden’s trend compared to the UK’s 
level of welfare during the 1980s. The study into the Austrian ISEW 
(1955–1992) by Stockhammer et al. (1997) is also a notable one. The 
authors improved the consistency and clarity in the ISEW’s conceptual 
framework. In addition, some authors have applied the ISEW to newly-
industrialising economies. Clarke and Islam (2004, 2005a), for example, 
provide a detailed account of Thailand’s socioeconomic and 
environmental situation. They construct a Thai ISEW (1975–1999), and 
include significant variables such as costs of corruption and sex work. 
There are other interesting empirical studies. For example, a US GPI 
for 1950–1998 was constructed by Redefining Progress (e.g. Anielski and 
Rowe 1999). The GPI was an attempt to ‘socialise’ the ISEW: including 
volunteer labour and accounting for social breakdown (e.g. divorce) for 
the first time in a single index. In a comparative study of the GPI (1950–
2000), Costanza et al. (2004) found that the GPI trend in the state of 
Vermont (US) was better than the national-level GPI. Vermont had a 
greener policy stance during the 1980s–1990s, e.g. hydro-electricity 
generation. In contrast, the US was reliant on fossil fuels for power 
generation. Another significant study undertaken at the subnational level 
was Pulselli et al. (2006) which compared Siena’s local experience with 
the national Italian economy (see Guenno and Tiezzi 1998). Exploitation 
of non-renewable resources is a typical activity of the local area due to 
quarrying of ornamental stone, gravel and sand for construction. The 
authors argue that a substantial increase in the production inputs of 
energy and non-renewable resources greatly affected the level of net 

4 For practical reasons, a list of tables and figures at the beginning was not included in this 
manuscript because of the large number (and many pages) which would have to be added. 
11
income in Siena. 
However, while there are several good studies, some remarkable 
conclusions emerge out of the literature review in Chapter 4. Firstly, no 
author has specifically and consistently linked their analysis to Daly and 
Cobb’s oikonomia theory—i.e. that the ISEW accounts for pervasive 
externalities affecting the long-term health of the community. Only 
Fisherian psychic income is developed in the literature to provide a basis 
for adjustments in the indicators (à la Philip Lawn 2003). Also, only one 
study employs the principles of welfare economics—by Clarke and Islam 
(2005) in their Thai ISEW. Secondly, there are inconsistencies in the 
authors’ conclusions of their empirical results. For instance, over a 
comparable period in Australia, one study suggests sustainable welfare is 
attained (i.e. Lawn 2001), while the others implies unsustainable welfare 
(i.e. Hamilton 1997, Lawn and Clarke 2006b). Ambiguity in the ‘true’ 
depiction of progress is apparent. 
Thirdly, and more notably, the root of my criticism is that a robust 
socio-historical institutional analysis is lacking in the empirical 
analyses—indexes tend to be mechanically applied. Many studies leave 
the reader uninformed regarding the long-term cyclical nature of the 
economy. A major problem relates to the merging of complex identities 
such as ‘current welfare’ and ‘sustainability’ into a single indicator. For 
instance, utilising Lawn’s (2001) data reveals that including or excluding 
certain variables from the SNBI makes no difference to the trend in the 
indicator. The aggregated-index is thus completely futile without a socio-
historical institutional explanation substantiating the results. Cracks 
begin to surface in the theoretical and empirical underpinning of the Net 
Income Indices. 
Moreover, the majority of SEWIs are geared to the country of origin. 
Their analyses are good when examining the trade-off between natural 
and physical assets, but the problem is viewed in a national-centric 
fashion. The problems of human-induced climate change and species 
extinction, however, are global environmental problems (see Brennan 
2004). For instance, globalisation has encouraged energy intensive 
products such as automobiles, electrical appliances, computers and 
paper. Increases in the volume of trade generates greenhouse-gases (see 
Nijkamp et al. 1998). This especially applies to global shipping (Garman 
2007:23-4), air cargo and the large-scale expansion of industrial 
agriculture. The burning of fossil fuels primarily drives this accumulation 
of greenhouse gases; to serve the ever-growing energy needs associated 
with durable fixed business capital expansion. Therefore a one-country 
level of analysis has limitations: emissions build up as the pure scale of 
the human enterprise grows, as we continue to industrialise in an ever-
more global economy. The chapter concludes that the vast majority of 
net income empirical studies are theoretically vacuous; lacking in social 
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dimensions; mechanical in copying the empirical methods of previous 
studies; and geographically narrow in their application. Such SEWI 
studies, vis-à-vis hypothesis three (H3), are relatively poor measures of 
environmental and social welfare. 
Directing the second literature survey, an additional hypothesis (H4) 
will be scrutinised: 
 
H4:  Net Income Indices are innovative measures of welfare and 
capable of improvement. 
 
Chapter 5 continues with the second literature review on the Net Income 
Indices, and in a similar organised format, each study is chronologically 
assessed, but specifically, it provides a very detailed appraisal of the 
technical differences or similarities within each indicator. A consistent 
approach is utilised to assist the technical analysis. Equations are 
devised for the indicator in each study, and the variables are 
appropriately organised into ‘service’ and ‘disservice’ parts. Which 
variables are common to the original ISEW template? What degree of 
innovatory practices have SEWI authors employed? To aid the 
investigation of this study, Venn diagrams and set theory notation are 
utilised. The purpose of the Venn diagrams is to provide a visualisation 
of the differences between the original templates and their successive 
derivatives. In short, we dissect the inclusions of new variables and 
whether there has been originality in techniques in order to investigate 
hypothesis four in more rigorous depth. 
Several studies provide some very good technical advances. For 
example, Jackson and Marks (1994) criticise the original Daly and Cobb 
ISEW for estimating the costs of air pollution by utilising emissions of 
three priority pollutants (sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and 
particulates) to provide an index of air pollution. They argue that the 
choice of pollutants—emissions which all decreased over the period in 
question—was non-representative, and ignored the impact of certain 
other air emissions, such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and 
carbon monoxide (CO), which tended to increase. This means, in 
particular, that the benefits of reduced particulate emissions are 
(incorrectly) attributed to the total emissions index. They argue that it 
would be more appropriate to account for the costs of each type of 
emission, and then to sum these costs. 
For the first time in the literature, Hamilton and Denniss (2001) in 
their Australian GPI include socially relevant variables such as the costs 
of irrigation water use and problem gambling. They also enhance the 
indicator through ‘time’ specification. The Australian GPI adopts the 
following position: that time devoted to voluntary activities makes a 
positive contribution to welfare while time engaged in involuntary 
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activities diminishes welfare. For example, they account for involuntary 
work, i.e. the time when people are undertaking paid work but would 
prefer unpaid. ‘Overwork’ imposes a cost on workers and their families 
and it is thus deducted from the GPI. They also argue that the 
psychological costs of underemployment are large and should be taken 
into account in any attempt to assess changes in national well-being. 
According to some leading ecological economists such as Philip 
Lawn, the indicators of net income are more comprehensive as a 
measure of income than GDP, because there is recognition of services 
and disservices flowing from the capital stocks. For instance, in the 
development of the Australian SNBI, 1966-67 to 1994-95, Lawn (2001, 
2003, 2005) explicitly separates the indicator (a SNBI) into ‘benefit’ 
(psychic service) and ‘cost’ (disservice) accounts, while adjusting the 
SNBI with an Ecosystem Health Index. Subsequently, he is also the first 
author to construct a ‘Fisherian Income’ index (Lawn 2004b, 2006c). The 
inclusion of Fisherian Income and the Ecosystem Health Index by Lawn 
are major technical advances in the literature. 
However, in relation to hypothesis four, H4, investigating the 
historical, technical and institutional details of these indicators reveals 
that they have many shortcomings. Overall, there is a low degree of 
innovatory practice. In terms of new and innovative dimensions of the 
various alternative welfare indicators (ISEW, GPI etc.) only moderate 
advances are made. The advocates of these measures appear to be stuck 
with a restricted set of variables to conduct their analyses of changes in net 
welfare. The major conclusion drawn in Chapter 5 is that the vast majority 
of net income studies concentrate on accounting techniques rather than 
solving vital theoretical and technical concerns. They use common-sense 
operational procedures anchored in a simple plus-minus technique. 
Commonsensical ad-hoc accountancy prevails. Many studies have merely 
mimicked Daly and Cobb’s (1989) techniques for different areas without 
scrutinising the core theoretical questions. In most cases, they copied 
the popular commonsensical accounting template without adequate 
critical analysis of, or improving upon earlier works. In summary, a 
tendency for the literature to abstract from real trends in the economy is 
apparent because of the weak apparatus, mechanical applications, and 
conceptual difficulties. On balance, then, H4 is rejected; it is doubtful 
that the Net Income Indices in their current form can be (re)developed or 
enhanced in any significant way. 
Furthermore, there are major limitations of the approach to 
sustainable development as construed by the advocates of SEWIs. They 
have a tendency to view ‘capital’ and ‘service’ as largely autonomous of 
any socioeconomic system. This is the crux of the problem for SEWIs. It is 
argued in Chapter 6 that an exploration of the system conditions 
conducive to service and disservice is needed. A holistic vision of the 
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system is required to ascertain the destruction and creation of capitals 
and services. What is needed is a critical analysis of how capitalist 
relations generate material (and immaterial) dynamics that are anti-
ecological, while also potentially engendering new non-capitalist forms of 
development that are pro-ecological, pro-social and pro-individual. As 
Paul Burkett (2006:130) states: “Sustainable development needs to be 
seen as development in, against, and beyond capitalism”. 
Hypothesis five (H5) will be examined: 
 
H5: Understanding the political economy of capitalism will provide 
vital insights into Net Income Indices. 
 
Political economy specialises in comprehending the positive and 
negative forces of the global and regional environment to achieve a 
holistic vision of how the system functions. A strong historical-
institutional apparatus is critical for a proper view of the ecological, 
evolutionary and socio-political dimensions of global and regional 
dynamics. No author in the literature has undertaken a critical analysis of 
Net Income Indices from a political economy perspective. Utilising the 
principles of political economy, this study embarks on such an analysis. 
Chapter 6 develops a fundamental critique of net welfare indicators. 
The ‘multiple capital paradigm’ (MCP) is employed to examine some key 
difficulties in the Net Income Indices. In essence, the MCP recognises 
that there are heterogeneous durable structures (capital stocks or wealth) 
that potentially yield services and disservices (see O’Hara 2001a). Capital 
stocks can provide services in many ways, such as providing friendship, 
relations of marriage, knowledge, skills, organisational solutions, trust, or 
beauty. But, SEWI advocates have primarily considered only two forms of 
capital, artefact (such as consumer goods) and ecological (such as 
natural resources) capitals. But, they have tarnished other critical forms 
of wealth, namely, human-health capital and social capital by superficially 
counting these forms of wealth in their net welfare indicators.5 
Subsequently, it is argued that their conception of capital is simplistic. 
Their restricted view of wealth inhibits conceptual and empirical analysis. 
It leads potentially to the destruction of vital forms of wealth because 
they are abstracted from the analysis. 
The disembedded economy is beset with multiple contradictions. The 
notion of contradiction is defined as something endogenous to the 
system, that is both central to its positive operational dynamics as well as 
being a necessary negative outcome (see O’Hara 2007a). However, the 
SEWI advocates focus mainly on the contradiction (i.e. the trade-off) 

5 However, to some degree the ISEW/GPI accounts for human capital (e.g. defensive and non-
defensive education and health expenditures) and social capital (costs of family breakdown), but 
only monetary-based measures over time are utilised. Monetary measures fall short of the genuine 
meaning of durable human structures. 
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between the natural environment and consumption goods. They are 
obsessed with the natural environment; yet only handle society to a 
limited degree. They are stuck in a one-and-a-half contradiction world; they 
see primarily one contradiction and a partial social reality. Yet, in the 
global disembedded economy, all areas of life are both relatively 
autonomous yet interconnected (e.g. Stanfield 1986:ch.4). The creation 
of markets and new products often occur through the destruction of non-
market relations. The crucial contradiction is the negative effect on 
mutual relationships when consumption rises (markets expand) over 
time. This is because the market extends to all facets of social life. Life 
outside of business life (corporations and markets) is dismantled by the 
incessant transformation and disarrangement of free market capitalism. 
That is, market transactions increase at the expense of reciprocity and 
redistribution. Consequently, the so-called ‘service’ from consumption in 
the SEWIs is not genuine, because culture and tradition are potentially 
being destroyed in the process. It is necessary to transcend the ‘one-and-
a-half contradiction world’ and have a broader view of wealth. 
An additional hypothesis (H5.1) is, therefore, raised: 
 
H5.1: Multiple contradictions assess the complexity of the 
disembedded economy better than single contradictions. 
 
There are multiple contradictions of capitalism to be explored, but it is 
hard to link all of them in one index. While contradictions are relatively 
autonomous, it is problematical to treat one dialectical contradiction as 
completely independent of the others. The notion of the disembedded 
economy is critical to understanding the multiple contradictions of global 
capitalism, and it links to various problems in all areas of the social 
economy (H5.1). 
There are more complications with the SEWIs, especially when the 
relationship between the economy and welfare is complex. Complexity 
prevails because social structures and dominant institutions shape the 
social filters, which include attitudes, beliefs, judgements, values, habits, 
and behaviours. Similarly to GDP, the ISEW and related ‘net income’ 
measures are composite indicators, and are reliant only upon monetary 
imputations. Yet, monetary measures ignore important social, cultural, 
family and community contexts (e.g. O’Hara 2001b:93)—as if the 
‘psychic benefits’ would be the same for executives and indigenes, or for 
mothers and fathers (Salleh 2009:296). In addition, sometimes the actual 
flow of the disservice is not known with certainty, because of imperfect 
information. Many people are not fully informed about the health 
implications of a whole range of environmental toxins (see Thomas 
2003), such as fluoride (e.g. Bryson 2004) and pesticides (Pimentel et al. 
2004). Therefore, the validity of the link between price, money, value and 
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the services/disservices is challenged. 
Questions are thus raised about the competence of SEWIs to deal 
with real-world problems in an environment of uncertainty and lack of 
information. Drawing on Keynes and post-Keynesian perspectives it is 
argued that monetary-based net welfare indicators insufficiently explain 
the problems of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘lack of information’. It is not very 
meaningful to construct aggregated or composite measures where price 
is the leading measure of welfare. Utilising monetary estimates would 
never reliably infer an ‘optimal value’. There must be a rejection of 
welfare economics theory based on optimality. There is imperfect 
knowledge not only about ecological systems, but also about unexplained 
phenomena and uncertainty in all forms and aspects of life processes. 
Hence, net welfare cannot simply be measured purely in monetary terms. 
It is difficult to manage aspects such as independent and dependent 
variables, because interdependency is more usual in experiential 
actuality.6 On the other hand, contradictions are intended to handle 
especially the complex workings of the institutions, groups and 
processes (see O’Hara 2007b). There is a pragmatic advantage in 
studying multiple contradictions (H5.1). 
Additionally, we cannot consider the sum of incomes (services) 
flowing from commodities as the most important quality. Foremost, we 
must decipher under what conditions who receives the service, because 
of moral or institutional constraints. That is, one cannot simply consider 
the service flowing from a commodity without interpreting distributional 
aspects. For instance, there is a potential trade-off between individual 
and social welfare, where the interests of the individual are satisfied at 
the expense of societal welfare. Yet, the SEWIs prevent fruitful net welfare 
analysis of heterogeneous agents. The principle of heterogeneous agents 
states that there are multiple positions and diverse roles in which 
individuals and species function in the economy (O’Hara 2007a:114-7). 
For example, the ability of parents to influence the intergenerational 
transfer of resources to their children is a crucial determinant of the 
material and cultural advantages they will bring to bear on the future 
(Bourdieu 1997). High levels of education among the community and key 
job and economic connections (social linkages) are common for people 
from families with more control of wealth (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). 
Merely summating the income of individuals in an index would therefore 
trivialise important distributional problems in the market economy. 
The sub-hypothesis, H5.2, is also raised: 
 
H5.2: Composite net income indicators inadequately measure 
distribution. 

6 For example, see Lawson (2006:494) and Resnick and Wolff (2001, 2005) who argue that the 
social realm is highly interconnected and organic. 
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H5.2 says that we need to scrutinise the moral and social implications of 
the generation of services/disservices. This is because resources offered 
by families, friends and relations necessarily shadow the value of parental 
guidance, school attendance and occupation. For instance, in Latin 
America, there are a large number with low-status occupations lacking 
various types of capital such as education and contacts/networks—i.e. 
social exclusion is very high (see ECLAC 2007a:ch.3).7 They are victims of 
inequity and discrimination because of path-dependent neighbourhood 
and school segregation influences, which have reinforcing effects since 
setbacks early in one’s career impact throughout one’s lifetime (see 
ECLAC 2007b:17-22,46-8). Hence, welfare may be unevenly distributed 
amongst people of a particular class, ethnicity and/or gender. The SEWIs 
are restricted to an impartial measure of these problems. 
Often a first mover advantage and cultural modernity are better than 
the disadvantage of not making the first effort at change. In the global 
system, such rapid changes leave many nations comparatively backward 
as they struggle to keep up with the rest of the world. As O’Hara 
(2006c:xviii) argues, uneven development is thus a necessary part of the 
motion, whether caused by colonial and imperial dislocation and 
oppression, the excessive pace of change, the hegemonic rules of the 
game, geographical and spatial factors, or a lack of social or human 
capital. Therefore, there are processes at work that help explain the 
relative success of the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ and the reinforcement of 
inequality between them (at many levels). The rate of growth of the core 
(advanced capitalist) nations tends to promote uneven patterns of 
income, productivity and quality of life. The periphery lags behind as 
poverty, lack of human capital and inadequate investment generate 
underdevelopment. We thus cannot assume future convergence (e.g. 
between core and periphery) because the world is a complex association 
of multiple processes including geographical diversity, different histories, 
asymmetric accumulation of various capabilities, and so on. 
There are endemic system problems when only several regions 
belonging to the periphery grow and develop. For instance, China’s 
growing importance in the global market is aggravating (i.e. 
disembedding) other social economies in the periphery. The combination 
of endowments, scale, fast productivity growth and an omnipresent state 
makes China a formidable competitor to Latin American manufacturers 
(Jenkins et al. 2008:243, Moreira 2007:372). The threat from China is 
greatest in the most dynamic products but also in those sectors that 
have proved to be important stepping-stones for industrial development 
in other countries. It is very difficult for producers in Sub-Saharan Africa 

7 Public financing for tertiary education is highly regressive in all countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (see ECLAC 2007b:28,38-48).
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to produce items for higher-margin rapid-response markets because of 
the weakness of their transport systems (e.g. bureaucratic hold-ups 
leading to considerable delays) (Kaplinsky and Morris 2008:258,270). 
China’s emergence has thus raised pointed questions about the future of 
manufacturing in a world market already congested by three generations 
of Asian Tigers and others, such as India, to come. The implication is 
that by limiting the inquiry to national or subnational levels, SEWI 
advocates gloss over the more important regional and global 
distributional elements of the disembedded system (H5.2). 
The real world is complex, but SEWI advocates gloss over the more 
important regional and global elements of ‘human capital’. In general, a 
healthy, passionate and well-educated person functions relatively 
smoothly in society since they have high individual capacities realised 
(i.e. they are in a suitable occupation). This is chiefly because of the high 
accessibility of well-developed structural capacities. High-quality 
university institutions, extensive R&D projects and patents are typical 
characteristics of advanced capitalist economies. They have a superior 
stock of ‘creative-cultural capital’ (UNCTAD 2008), but the Asian Drivers 
are rapidly catching up. In contrast, there is a relatively low stock of 
individual and underdeveloped structural capacities (exacerbated by chronic 
or prolonged non-extreme poverty) in many poorer countries. Evidence 
for this hypothesis is there is a substantial brain drain of skilled medical 
staff from Sub-Saharan Africa to affluent nations (e.g. Canada, US, UK) 
(see Garrett 2007:15). For example, Zimbabwe trained 1,200 doctors 
during the 1990s, but only 360 remain in the country today. In Zambia, 
only 50 of the 600 doctors trained over the last 40 years remain in the 
country at present. There could be further drain of medical personnel 
unless domestic training facilities and teachers’ salaries expand 
sufficiently in the developed countries. These examples raise serious 
questions about the narrow empirical approaches of SEWIs in relation to 
the wider economy and distribution of human-health capitals (H5.2). 
There is a need to transcend the national; the nation is imbedded in 
the global, regional and local system. Capitalism has a predilection for 
major technological innovations and rapid penetration of the global 
system, not just in the national economies. It is revolutionary by its very 
nature. A dialectic, formulated by competition and innovation facilitates 
potential growth and development in more geographical areas and 
nations than previously. As a result, profitable openings irrespective of 
the confines of a regulatory or cultural environment are unveiled. Only a 
perspective that examines the global system within a regional and (where 
relevant) national and local environment is appropriate to finding the 
roots of social and environmental problems. Thus, I argue that the 
aggregated national (or subnational) indicators do not get to the heart of 
solving real issues (vis-à-vis H5, H5.1, and H5.2), because there is an 
19
inadequate understanding of the political economy system. A more 
detailed and broader approach to sustainable well-being is needed to find 
the root of social and environmental problems. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and summarises each chapter vis-à-vis 
the hypotheses developed. We make an overall evaluation of the 
significance of this study for the literature. We conclude that there is a 
need to go beyond the veil of Net Welfare Index construction. Foremost, 
this study seeks an understanding of the political economy of capitalism 
and of sustainable economic welfare indicators. The promotion of a 
realistic dialectical analysis is the basis of pragmatic enquiry in political 
economy. There is a great advantage in exploring the long-term motion 
of capitalism from a historical-institutional perspective. It provides a way 
of understanding how we have come to where we are and what we are, 
and, therefore, how people might be better stewards of the common 
good (i.e. sustainable welfare). We argue that explaining why there might 
be problems is useful, practical and therefore very important for political 
economy research. 
However, there is much need to develop the analysis—indeed, this 
study is only a first attempt to solve some of the problems. This study 
took an ‘entry point’ and proposed to examine the SEWIs through the 
lens of political economy, rather than developing a definite alternative. 
Areas of future research are thus put forward, and much work lies ahead. 
Obviously, the gamut of contradictions would need to be explored to 
understand the complex and inherently unstable nature of capitalism. It 
is hoped that this study will stimulate interest and energise debate in 











A socioeconomic indicator of welfare is supposed to provide a summary 
measure of the progress or development of the people of a nation. 
However, there is much controversy as to what is a valid measure. The 
traditional measure of performance is gross domestic product (GDP). 
GDP is simply the gross monetary total of ‘final’ goods and services 
exchanged over time in the home market. The growth rate of GDP per 
capita is often used to indicate national, regional or global ‘economic 
growth’ or the growth in the income, output, or expenditure. 
Historically, there is often a positive link between economic growth 
and welfare, enabling a fuller expression of human individuality and 
creativity (e.g. UNCTAD 2008:16,51). Part of being a ‘free’ individual is to 
express oneself and communicate to others. When communication 
technology advances, for instance, individuals are able to develop their 
“selves” more productively with lower transaction costs and thus 
potentially enhance sociality and interactivity. Recent information and 
computing technology (ICT) advances have provided such avenues for 
individual development and therefore higher standards of living. The 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008) present a trove of such 
data for aiding our analysis of the ‘positives’ from economic growth.8 
Even when the world growth rate of real GDP per capita has been 
historically low (i.e. 1974–2005 vs. 1950–1973)9, there has been 
substantial global communications progress in phone accessibility, with 
the number of fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 100 people) 
increasing from 6 in 1975 to 69 in 2007. There has been exponential 
growth in the number of Internet and computer users (per 100 people), 
rising from 2.5 in 1990 to approximately 38 in 2007. In 2007, the 
advanced capitalist economies enjoy a superior ICT advantage over all 
other regions. Newly industrialising countries are quickly catching up, yet 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia lag well behind. For instance, 
the number of broadband subscribers (per 100) during 2007 in high 
income OECD nations was 22.6, compared to 0.25 in South Asia and 
0.03 (2005) in SSA. However, no region suffered reversals over the data 
periods, and greater access and private ownership of ICT is improving in 
all areas, albeit at an execrably slow pace in SSA (but there is great 

8 Because of space limitations, the empirical evidence from The World Bank (2008) is evaluated in 
general terms with less specificity. 
9 World growth of real GDP per capita in 1950–1973 was 3.25% compared to 1.45% in 1973–2007 




The strong growth in global transportation in freight (and people) 
exemplifies our fixation on goods and services. All variables (measured in 
average annual percentage changes) have consistently risen from 1973 to 
2006: freight (million ton per km) transported across the globe (7.1%), 
the number of passengers carried (5.2%) and the number of registered 
carrier departures (2.9%)—in spite of four major “global” recessions and 
the escalating international spread of terrorism. Individuals can 
effortlessly travel by plane to many destinations on Earth, which was 
much dearer and less possible in the 1950s and 1960s. Travel, for 
business or leisure, allows one to experience and participate in different 
cultures. 
Resembling the first phase of globalisation between 1870 and 1913, 
the present phase coincides with a technological revolution in transport 
and communications that brought about a remarkable lessening in cost 
and speed time. Culturally, the present existence of large diasporas, the 
Internet, open-source software, the circulation of video and audio 
players/recorders/files are also bridging distances and connecting people 
together once unheard of. The transnational expansion of businesses has 
also led to cultural exchanges on several levels such as the popularity of 
Indian movies across the Middle East and Asia, the spread of Ethiopian, 
Korean and Thai restaurants, Latin music and dance (Palat 2008). 
Increased trade with China has led to greater prominence for local 
Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and strengthening of ties 
between Asia and Africa. At the global level, the system is promoting 
fantastic opportunities for most individuals. The individual is principally 
freer to travel, be educated, buy and sell commodities without much 
government or social restriction, and be technologically communicative 
in the 2000s than the 1970s. This is thanks to overall long-term increases 
in economic growth over real historical time. 
The first hypothesis, H1, of this study thereby states that: 
 
H1:  Economic growth provides a good measure of wealth and 
welfare. 
 
Generated by competition and technological innovation, economic 
growth and the accessibility of credit enable a greater range of 
opportunities. Economic growth is often a good proxy for welfare. 
Economic growth offers so many wonderful things, namely, a greater 
range of commodities and services, the opportunity to travel, work and 
study, and so on. Individuals can purchase high-performance shoes, 
cheap digital cameras, quality colour printers and ultra-comfortable 
furniture and bedding. Many people think that economic growth will give 
them ever-increasing economic welfare. H1 is topical as most citizens 

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and leaders have a strong tendency to support growth-orientated policies 
(e.g. see Rankin 2006:24-7). 
A fundamental question, however, arises. What is genuine “economic 
growth”, is it GDP, wealth, income, welfare, production or consumption? 
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine this question vis-à-vis 
hypothesis one (H1). Numerous sub-hypotheses are employed to 
enhance the analysis, which provide specificity to H1. In this chapter, 
which is divided into five sections, a historical overview of accounting for 
income and welfare is provided. 
Section 2.2 provides a general overview of GDP in the System of 
National Accounts. This outline of GDP provides the basis for the 
calculation of (what is commonly known today as) economic growth. 
Section 2.3 looks at the earlier judgements of political economists such 
as Irving Fisher and Simon Kuznets of what constitutes the wealth and 
welfare of a nation, before the national accounts (in the US) became 
institutionalised in 1948. The notion of ‘service’ becomes important. We 
also critically evaluate GDP from a systems perspective, gaining insight 
from Marx, Veblen, Keynes and Schumpeter. The main purpose of 
Section 2.3 is to give a balanced evaluation of ‘economic growth’ and 
‘GDP’. Firstly, it is argued that economic growth was historically 
understood as the service, i.e. as the genuine welfare of society. Secondly, 
historical trends of GDP provide a good understanding of the workings of 
the capitalist system. In these ways, we argue that GDP growth is 
potentially constructive. 
However, there are many unresolved problems with GDP. In Section 
2.4, we discuss the failures of ‘economic growth’ and GDP to account for 
various socio-ecological problems, such as conspicuous waste and the 
destruction of the environment.10 On the social problems of GDP, such 
as conspicuous consumption, fashion and the destruction of community, 
we refer to Veblen, E. J. Mishan and Clive Hamilton. On ecological 
sustainability, the views of prominent ecological economists, Kenneth 
Boulding and Herman Daly, are considered. We argue that GDP is 
problematic when it becomes a single indicator fetish, because of the 
various problems identified with GDP. We then discuss the advantages 
and limitations of the greener accounting system, and its usefulness in 
measuring services. Ultimately, we suggest that potentially there is a need 
to account for the benefits and costs of economic growth to formulate a 
measure of net welfare (or net income). 
GDP may need to be modified as it provides an inadequate measure 
of social and environmental waste in the economic system. In Section 
2.5, it is suggested that an alternative measure, which attempts to solve 

10 The environment represents the integration of living (biotic) and nonliving elements in the 
environment; and the locus of the entire material support of humanity. It encompasses the 
physical world and its natural resources, such as water, land, air, and forests; and the environment 
implicates human interventions and impacts. 
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some of the inherent problems of GDP, is possibly needed. We provide an 
overview of an indicator that attempts to measure net income, the Index 
of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW). Section 2.6 concludes the 
chapter and provides the overall assessment of H1. 
2.2 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
The traditional measure of economic welfare of the people of a nation 
has been Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. GDP represents the 
total output of market economic activity over time. There are three ways 
of measuring GDP: the income (GDPI), expenditure (GDPE) and 
production (GDPO) approaches. Each approach utilises different data 
sources, but in theory they should equate to the same estimate of GDP. 
Consider, for example, the typical components of GDP from the national 
statistical agency in Australia. GDPI summates the incomes accruing 
from production: compensation of employees (their earnings, wages and 
salaries plus employers’ social contributions); gross operating surplus 
(profits); gross mixed income (income from unincorporated businesses, 
including a return to the owners of these businesses for their labour); 
and taxes less subsidies on production and imports (see ABS 
2005b:770). For the expenditure approach, GDPE involves the adding up 
of all final expenditures on goods and services (i.e. those goods and 
services that are not developed any further), summing the contributions 
of adjustments in inventories and the value of exports minus imports. 
Finally, the production approach (GDPO), which is most commonly 
referred to as GDP, is defined formally by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) (2005b) as: 
 
The total value of goods and services produced in Australia 
after deducting the cost of goods and services used up 
(intermediate consumption) in the process of production, 
but before deducting allowances for the consumption of 
fixed capital (depreciation). [ABS 2005b:770] 
 
In other words, the three approaches equal each other as represented by 
the following equation, 
GDPI=GDPE=GDPO       (2.1)
The importance of this straightforward illustration (in Eq. (2.1)) is to 
show that GDP, income, expenditure, and the value of goods and 
services are all interrelated in the System of National Accounts.11 

11 As of 1991, GDP has replaced GNP as the preferred measure of the countries product index. 
Unless stated otherwise, both GDP and GNP will be used interchangeably in this study to mean 
gross output. The GDP for the United States, for instance, includes the goods and services 
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Continuing with the example of the ABS, “[t]he essential function of 
the national accounts is to provide a systematic summary of national 
economic activity” (ABS 2005a). The statistical agency holds that the 
performance of the economy can be represented in the national accounts 
by such measures as growth in GDP: 
 
[M]ovements in the chain volume of GDP (from which the 
direct effects of price changes have been removed) are an 
important indicator of economic growth[.] [However,] there 
is no single measure which can describe all aspects of well-
being of a country’s citizens. There are significant aspects of 
the quality of life which cannot be reflected in a system of 
economic accounts, just as there are significant aspects of 
an individual’s well-being which are not measured in the 
conventional concept (or any other concept) of that 
individual’s income. Notwithstanding their limitations, 
especially in relation to uses for which they were never 
designed, the national accounts provide important 
information for a range of purposes. [ABS 2005b:770, 
emphases added] 
 
Two closely related points need to be noted from the above-cited 
passage. The first is that the statistical organisation believes that we 
cannot rely upon single indices (such as GDP) to represent overall well-
being. There are multiple dimensions to life quality, but they hold the 
view that GDP is a good measure of economic growth. The second 
message relates to the “uses for which [the national accounts] were never 
designed”. By ‘design’, they probably mean ‘intention’, ‘structure’ and/or 
‘purpose’. Whatever the actual meaning given here by the prominent 
statistical organisation, the socio-historicity of this key claim needs to be 
scrutinised—i.e. we want to gain an understanding of how these 
statements were constructed. 
The following questions are imperative for an understanding of the 
in-built limitations of the national income accounts, especially vis-à-vis 
welfare (H1). What are the implications of such a design in the national 
accounts for income, economic growth and GDP as it has been 
historically understood? Is GDP an appropriate measure of welfare or 
economic growth? And, how does the rate of GDP growth, the main 
indicator of economic growth, relate to welfare? Who uses GDP as a 

produced by labour and property located in the United States, regardless of nationality. Whereas 
US GNP includes the goods and services produced by labour and property supplied by US 
residents. Labour and property either may be located in the United States or abroad—provided 
they be supplied to U.S. residents. In reality, in the United States (for example) the difference 
between both the dollar value of the GDP and GNP is small (see BEA 1991), and the same is true 
also for Australia and other nations who follow the System of National Accounts. 
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general guide to the economic welfare of the nation? How closely does 
the objective of “economic growth” truly resemble the goal of meeting 
needs and satisfactions of the society in the national accounts? Does any 
extension of opportunities facing a person either presented to them 
through the market or directly by the government always contribute to an 
increase in welfare? To attempt to respond to these matters, a scrutiny of 
the concepts of ‘income’, ‘wealth’, ‘consumption’ and ‘production’ is 
essential for an understanding of the controversies surrounding GDP 
and economic growth. We begin with Section 2.3 below. 
2.3 The Historical Significance of GDP 
The first sub-hypothesis, H1a, states that: 
 
H1a:  Economic growth or levels of income (GDP) have historically 
been good concepts for understanding (changes in) net 
welfare. 
 
H1a is very significant, as the mystery of the link between “economic 
growth” and ‘net welfare’ will unfold in the chapter. Here, we discuss the 
history of what some scholars thought was significant to their nation’s 
income, wealth and welfare. We are especially interested in views 
expressed before the United Nations System of National Accounts 
(UNSNA) was formally institutionalised in 1953 (at the global level). 
Towards the end of the historical inquiry into net welfare, we will review 
the implications of H1a. 
Before the creation of the SNA (as it is referred to today), inquiry into 
human socioeconomic performance centred on the recording of various 
social dimensions related to living conditions. Up to the 1800s, in 
England and France, many political economists were interested in tax 
reform for which they required national-income estimates. Consider the 
contributions by Sir William Petty (1623–1687) and Gregory King (1648–
1712) in England and Pierre Boisguilbert (1646–1714) and Marshal 
Vauban (1633–1707) in France. These authors attempted to complete the 
missing data for their country. Utilising basic methods, they calculated 
average income, expenses, and consumption of a number of families in 
occupational or social groups. Boisguilbert was the first to develop the 
notion of “national income” in France and attempted to develop a rough 
measure. Many of his concepts of national income closely resembled that 
of Petty (see Hull 1899). Although a poor statistician in comparison to 
Vauban, Boisguilbert declared ‘consumption’, which is a function of 
money-income, to be the foundation of all wealth. He argued that the 
world’s wealth must be ‘consumed’; otherwise, it is useless for society. 
Both Vauban and Boisguilbert concluded that an inequitable tax system 
caused many of France’s social problems. Consequently, Vauban argued 

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that yearly records would help tax collection and formulation of policies 
to foster welfare. Specification of the distribution of national income was 
sustained during the period of the early 1800s in France and England 
(e.g. see Studenski 1961). 
In the United States, important original works on the distribution of 
national income and wealth were researched in the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century. One of the major attempts to 
measure the national wealth was by Charles B. Spahr (1896) in An Essay 
on the Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States: America’s 
Working People. Spahr’s income and wealth estimates during the 1880s 
included services (such as barbershops), labour (i.e. number of paid 
workers) and physical capital (e.g. residential housing and material 
goods). His investigation of these economic aspects was more 
comprehensive than previous works in the US. He gathered material 
from various sources, e.g. census, private information, and state labour 
bureaus. After reorganising his estimates by class-size, he found a trend 
towards greater income inequality (mostly borne by the working 
classes)—due to regressive taxation. Spahr’s empirical work is highly 
valuable, as it illustrates the significance of distribution; but a clearer 
definition of ‘income’ and ‘wealth’ was needed. 
Income and wealth are different concepts, and their distinction is 
important. Hewett (1925:239), for instance, distinguishes between two 
distinct groups of income: as a flow of services from wealth and human 
beings; and income as a flow of commodities and services (that is, the 
wealth itself; as in Spahr’s work). The general practice considered income 
as a gain above acquisition cost, i.e. the net earnings (also known as net 
profit). The concept of “net income” most common to accountants, 
economists and statisticians was (and is) that of ‘money income’.12 
According to Fisher (1906:103), a business person’s ‘money income’ 
means “the money receipts from [their] business, less the money 
expenses of obtaining them”. However, Fisher’s concept of income, the 
‘service’ definition, is different from the meaning quite commonly 
understood as ‘income’ and should not be confused with the 
conventional understanding of the term. 
In The Nature of Capital and Income (1906), Irving Fisher (1867–1947) 
argued that a proper accounting of ‘income’ must reflect an enjoyable 
flow of services from capital and human beings. He says that the services 
are enjoyed in the “stream of consciousness” by a person, during an 
appropriate time period. Fisher claims that all ‘wealth’ (or ‘capital’) bears 
income, for income consists simply of the services of wealth. Hence, 
income can be defined as the flow of services from wealth (capital). Note 
that, according to Fisher, the service is otherwise known as the ‘psychic 
income’, which is a person’s desirable satisfaction received from the use 

12 For example, see Bangs (1940). 
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value of goods.13 In “The Concept of Income: A Rebuttal”, Fisher says 
that “[a] service rendered by an asset belonging to a given person is an 
event desirable to that person and occurring by means of the asset” 
(Fisher 1939:359, emphasis added).14 This implies that the desirability of 
services is inherent in objects of capital. That is, services are potentially 
brought about from the stock of capital. Therefore, for Fisher, the growth 
of service (or ‘income’) is the essence of welfare, not necessarily the 
wealth itself. 
However, the flow of services need not be positive. There can be 
disservices, also known as negative income or “psychic outgo”. 
Disservices are best thought of as undesirable after-effects of subjective 
experiences. They include “[the] … undesirable events occasioned, or 
desirable events prevented, by an article of wealth” (Fisher 1906:119). 
Finally, the summation of the positive and negative flows of income gives 
the ‘net income’ of an individual (or economy) through a period, such as 
a year. In Equation 2.2 below, “[n]et income is the difference between the 
value of all the services flowing from an article of wealth through any 




=NetWelfare       (2.2)
The simple identity (Eq. 2.2) shows that net welfare is the summation of 
net flows of ‘desirable benefits’ and ‘undesirable costs’ as well as 
‘services’ and ‘disservices’, which is equal to net income. Therefore, to 
gauge the welfare performance of a nation, it would be wise to undertake 
a comprehensive view of ‘income’, one that accounts for the benefits and 
costs of economic activity. Fisher’s concept of net income (services 
minus disservices) possibly resolves much of this problem. That is, he 
distinguishes between the “[s]ubjective events which are desirable ... and 
those that are undesirable” (Fisher 1906:168). The proposition that net 
income is equated to net welfare has much relevance for H1a. 
Willford King (1925), 1880–1962, in The American Economic Review, 
for instance, was well aware of the importance of including household 
services in the calculation of net national income. Household or caring 
labour can potentially contribute to a living environment that is loving, 
compassionate and secure. For example, the services potentially 

13 Fisher provided no clear guidelines to distinguish between ‘psychic income’ and ‘service’. It is 
debatable as to whether ‘psychic income’ and ‘service’ are synonymous. Does the psychic income 
potentially emanate from the “enjoyment of the service” or from the “wealth”? We examine these 
issues and detail the concept of ‘psychic income’ in Chapters 3 and 6. 
14 He defines capital as a stock of wealth existing at an instant of time, and the income as a flow of 
services through a period of time (Fisher 1906:52). Fisher considered both ‘money income’ and 
‘yield income’ important (see Fisher 1939:357). 
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provided include a functional family from child rearing, sanitation and 
health from cleanliness, energy and nutrition from meal preparation—as 
well as many other activities such as counselling and discipline.15 In 
“Income and Wealth”, King (1925) knew of the potential benefits of 
household labour to people’s welfare; investing time in the household 
potentially produces societal good and enhances human development. 
Moreover, he was aware that a long-term reduction in the number of 
hours worked in the household was detrimental to socioeconomic 
welfare. He argued that the large changes over the past century in society 
were seeing many activities transferred to the market economy—
misguidedly, the changes would tend to show up as an increase in 
national income (see King 1925:469-70). He concluded, “[o]n the face of 
it, therefore, there seems to be no logical reason for excluding an 
estimate of this sort from the total income of the United States” (King 
1925:470). 
Reinforcing the need to analyse net welfare (H1a), King (1925) also 
argued that welfare requires a sufficient level of economic goods, but 
also adequate public or ‘free’ goods, such as environmental assets: 
 
It is easy to fall into the error of assuming that an increase 
in the supply of economic wealth necessarily means an 
increase in general welfare. In a country like the United 
States, however, an increase in the supply of scarce or 
economic goods has been accompanied by a great 
diminution in the supply of free goods. Forest and … 
grounds [untouched wilderness] have given way to farms 
and city lots. By what extent do the losses offset the gains? 
[King 1925:470-1] 
 
Overall, King’s inquiry analysed the significance of household labour, 
income, and natural wealth from the standpoint of net national welfare 
(see also King 1915, 1930). 
Prominent economist Simon Kuznets (1901–1985) was also 
interested in the dialectic of welfare gains and losses in developed and 
developing economies.16 He was an authoritative voice on empirical 
analysis of economic data; engrossed in the relationship between social 
change, economic growth and income inequality.17 For example, he 
included one of the first discussions of the relationship between income 
distribution and national income (Kuznets 1933:205). To him, the 

15 For a good overview of ‘household labour’ see Rhoda O’Hara and Phillip O’Hara (2001:457-9) 
and their list of cited references. 
16 For example, see Kuznets (1955). 
17 Angus Maddison asserted that in comparison to many other comparative growth analysts, 
Kuznets had an ingenious method of prescriptive policy recommendations and theoretical 
generalisations (see Maddison 1981:1049). 
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summary and appraisal notion of national income estimates required an 
appreciation of the “end goals” and some mechanism for defining and 
evaluating “net income”. Hence, Kuznets argued that striving for a 
collective goal of net income in the national accounts was necessary. His 
goal centred on the provision of goods and services to citizens qua 
ultimate consumers. That is, similarly to Fisher, he understood that 
economic growth is a sustained increase of income (services) over a long-
term trend (e.g. see Kuznets 1947:13, 1948:156,160). 
During the early/mid 1940s, Kuznets was a key advisor at the U.S. 
Department of Commerce on the System of National Accounts, e.g. see 
Survey of Current Business; Gilbert et al. (1947, 1948). However, his notion 
of ‘net income’ differed from that proposed by the Department of 
Commerce. Kuznets argued that the goal of economic activity centres on 
services to society, such as the satisfaction of human needs, activities 
ensuring internal peace, external integrity and familial reproduction (see 
Kuznets 1947:15). Accordingly, the system of income and product 
accounts should centre on observing how well economic activity is 
achieving this welfare-based goal. But the Department of Commerce 
argued that the system of accounts should focus on monetary exchange 
(market-based) “production activities”. 
He did not agree with Gilbert et al. (1947, 1948) as the series 
disregarded the ‘service goal’ of economic activity.18 For instance, he was 
critical of the 1947/1948 Department of Commerce income series, 
especially of the items in “personal consumption expenditures” that did 
not contribute to well-being (Kuznets 1948:157). In addition, omitting the 
services of “housewives” is a large oversight for the national accounts 
(see Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman 1995:1532). According to Kuznets, 
the problem with the 1947/1948 series is that application of the accounts 
were merely designed for “business enterprises and other economic 
institutions”. Therefore, because “the corpus of accounts” are for use in 
the business world, “many conceptual and classification problems ... in 
defining national income [in the service sense]” are unresolved (Kuznets 
1948:153). In other words, it is difficult to “determine the proper scope of 
national income and the observable flows that represent net yields” 
(services) in the system of accounts (Kuznets 1948:153, emphasis 
added). Kuznets essentially argued that the national accounts 
overemphasise market production relations rather than household, social 
welfare and ecology. 
In relation to hypothesis, H1a, in its long history the concept of 
‘national income’ had been understood by Kuznets, Fisher, Spahr, King, 
Petty, Vauban and others19 from a social economics perspective. We argue 
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18 See also Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman (1995), Perlman and Marietta (2005). 
19 For example, the works of Scott Nearing (1915), a socialist economist at the University of 




that “economic growth” was historically understood as ‘net income’—
genuine welfare progress of society—and, therefore, only in this context 
is H1a acceptable. The path in which “economic growth” was heading 
was indeed a prolific one, with possible revolutionary positive 
implications for society. However, because a ‘business’ worldview was 
enshrined in the foundation of the system of national accounts, 
“economic growth” now chiefly signifies market-based production 
activities. 
On the other hand, in practice it is very difficult to make the idea of 
‘service’ (welfare) operational in a system of accounts. The economists 
and statisticians opted for a measure of prices only, with the inference 
that higher prices (tend to) signal greater value and therefore welfare. For 
instance, Fisher wanted to measure changes in the price level as a 
distinct entity from other factors such as changes in quality. He 
recognised that the prices of new goods are not directly comparable to 
the prices of old ones, so some adjustment must be made to the index 
number formulae. Prices were seen by Fisher as satisfactory for most 
welfare measurements, but he made no attempt to measure quality (of 
the service) itself or to adjust for it (see Banzhaf 2001:348). 
Imperfect quality differentiation and adjustment are recognised 
weaknesses of existing National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). 
Quality change and new (disappearing) goods were a continual source of 
difficulty in this process.20 Currently, the national accounts selectively 
apply hedonic quality adjustments only in certain product categories. The 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and other national statistical 
agencies frequently rely on proxies for difficult-to-measure service 
outputs (see Griliches 1992 for discussion). GDP weights outputs 
(quantities of goods and services) by their prices.21 This is well known to 
be far less advantageous than weighting outputs by their overall 
contribution to welfare (i.e. net surplus, in economic parlance). Prices 
(and quantities) are used only because they are easy to collect (Banzhaf 
2004:611). A physical change in the item can be thought of in terms of 
quantity. Adjustments for quality, when done at all, amounted to 
adjustments for quantity. In other words, due to reasons of simplicity (of 
multiplying prices by their ‘physical’ quantities) the raw measure of 
marketed production was born—quite the contrary to that initially 
envisaged by the great social economists. This makes the sub-
hypothesis, H1a, less significant since inescapable practical problems are 
entrenched in the system of national accounts. 
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20 In the U.S. accounts, for instance, GDP counts computers, but because of technological 
innovation a computer in 1989 is clearly not the same as one in 2009. 
21 Quantities and prices must be measured separately to track real income flows over time, i.e. 
nominal GDP can be adjusted with an appropriate deflator (and thus removing the direct effects of 
price changes). If prices and quantities are both allowed to change, a variety of problems arise 
(known as the “index number problem”). 
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Changing the focus on to ‘production’ from ‘net welfare’ was also due 
to other very important reasons. Fundamental uncertainty and instability 
were characteristic of the major capitalist economies during the early-to-
mid twentieth century, which gave the impetus to develop sophisticated 
measures of ‘production’. Issues of the distribution of income were 
pushed down the agenda during the “roaring 1920s”. The stability of the 
economic system became a principal issue as industrialisation matured 
and national markets displaced local markets. Naturally, heterodox 
economists wanted to understand this complex system. For example, 
Wesley C. Mitchell (1927), in his work at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), was the pioneer of the study of business 
cycles. He was guided by the theoretical work of Thorstein Veblen who 
raised the question of the consequences of the domination of the rising 
industrial system by pecuniary logic and institutions (Mitchell 
1947:42,62,65-6). Kuznets was a leader at the NBER in developing 
quantitative accounts required to probe these problems. As Glen 
Atkinson (2008:306) argues, the connection of theory and measurement 
came together in the work of Veblen, Mitchell, and Kuznets, and this was 
a significant contribution made by institutional economists. Yonay 
(1998:53-61) observes, it was not quantification for the sake of 
quantification. Institutional theory guided the statistical work. 
Traditions, customs and mores of the community and economists of 
the 1920s–1940s shaped the dominant value judgements of what kinds 
of ‘productive’ activities are included in the ‘National Income’. With the 
beginning of World War II in Europe, the concern over an excess of 
savings turned to the concern over insufficient funds to finance the war 
effort and the inflationary potential of the war. By 1941, American 
economists at U.S. Department of Commerce devised the concept of 
“Gross National Product” to answer such concerns (see Gilbert and Jaszi 
[1944] 1951:44-5, cited in Atkinson 2008:308-9).22 Expenditure accounts 
would be a more effective tool to answer these questions than the 
existing (money-) income accounts. To wage war, resources would have 
to be diverted from consumption expenditures to support the war effort. 
This would also require business enterprises to divert production from 
civilian goods to military objectives. Thus, according to Gilbert and Jaszi 
[1944] (1951:46), it was necessary to think of ‘total production’ as 
consisting of the output of the private business system plus the output of 
Government. Though the concept of Gross National Product (GNP) was 
developed for the purpose of war planning, the authors believed it would 
be useful for business planning in peacetime. 
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22 Colin G. Clark (1905–1989) was a British economist and statistician who worked in both the 
United Kingdom and Australia, and who also pioneered the use of the gross national product 
(“GNP”) as the basis for studying national economies. His Conditions of Economic Progress (1940) 
prompted the revival of interest in the causes of differences in economic performance across 
countries and time. 
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For the reasons above, it makes sense that we need to start with GNP 
growth for comprehending the dynamics of capitalism. GNP or GDP is 
simply equal to ‘consumption demand’, plus ‘investment demand’, 
government expenditures and net export demand. According to François 
Lequiller (2005), Gross Domestic Product is defined as the sum of all 
goods and services produced in a country over time, without double 
counting products used in other output. The letter P stands for 
“Product”, the result of production. GDP is a comprehensive measure, 
covering the production of consumer goods and services, even 
government services, and investment goods. GDP flow is in effect a raw 
measure of the production and (in part) consumption of marketed 
commodities and services. 
A limitation of GDP is that it does not differentiate between creation 
of genuine service and ‘consumption’ (as the literal destruction of 
specific capitals). We cannot directly tell the degree of destruction (e.g. of 
the natural environment) over time from ‘GDP growth’. The measure is 
far from perfect and probably needs to be supplemented or modified to 
some extent (as discussed below in the next sections). Still, a 
comparative analysis of the changes in real GDP growth per capita is 
useful for comprehending the expansion of market relationships. Real 
GDP is a measure of quantity, in which prices are held constant over 
time. When prices are held constant, movements in the output index 
tellingly describe changes in quantity produced and consumed. A faster 
rate of GDP growth over time is equivalent to ‘more market-based 
production’ over time, and the reverse is true (a slower rate leads to less 
production). In the global capitalist system, distribution of GDP levels or 
growth rates are thus significant to an area that has more market-based 
creation over real historical time. 
Hypothesis, H1b, thereby states: 
 
H1b:  Historical trends in GDP provide a good understanding of the 
workings of the capitalist system. 
 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), “the basic 
criterion used for distinguishing an activity as economic production is 
whether it is reflected in the sales and purchase transactions of a market 
economy” (Eisner 1988:1612, emphasis added). All potentially 
marketable activities are considered “production activities”. The 
fluctuations of the growth rate of real GDP per capita can give an 
indication of system abnormalities. In this single number, we acquire an 
idea of whether the economy is expanding or contracting. In this context, 
long-run historical trends in GDP provide a good understanding of the 
workings of the capitalist system (H1b). 
As understood by Marx (1818–1883), Veblen (1857–1929), Keynes 
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(1883–1946) and Schumpeter (1883–1950), capitalism is revolutionary by 
its very nature—a dialectic, formulated by competition and innovation, 
facilitates potential growth and development in more geographical areas 
and nations than previously. As a result, profitable openings irrespective 
of confines of a regulatory or cultural environment are unveiled. 
Capitalism’s “universalising tendency”, technologically and 
geographically, radically distinguishes it from all previous societies 
(Foster 1999). But as periodic instability, conflict and disarray are natural 
to capitalism, the costs (disservice) of this process for capital and society 
can be large. That is, the system has a positive and negative side, where 
service is reproduced along with disservice. The analytical works of 
Veblen, for example, examined the complex mechanisms responsible for 
the development (and stagnation) of productive forces, and the rise and 
decay of social and ecological organisations. In short, the four greatest 
economic minds of all time realised that there is a positive and negative 
side to economic growth (‘GDP growth’) under capitalism.23 
In the Grundrisse (1857-58), Marx emphasises the destructive and 
creative propensities of capitalism—the negative and positive essence of 
capital. Capitalism, he argues, destroys the old pre-capitalist way of life, 
“and constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down all the barriers which hem 
in the development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs, 
the all-sided development of production, and the exploitation and 
exchange of natural and mental forces” (Marx 1857-58:410). The 
“constant revolutionising of production” entails creation that spells the 
obsolescence and consequent destruction of any industrial structure of 
society’s production that exists at any moment (cited in Elliot 1980:47). 
In Capital, he also wrote of bringing development of the forces of 
production and the world market “to a certain degree of perfection” as 
capitalism’s “historical mission” (Marx 1909:522) and developed 
reproduction schemas as a means for systematically outlining the 
capitalist growth process of destruction-creation (Marx 1867:chs.20-1). 
The great “historic quality” of capital is to create surplus labour 
(labour in excess of that necessary for subsistence) and thereby surplus 
value, investment, and economic growth (Elliot 1978-79:150,153). In 
Marxian terminology, the flow of production is equivalent to the income 
or production approach to GDP found in the SNA. For the economy as a 
whole, the aggregate value of output is the sum of constant capital (value 
of depreciation charges, raw materials and fixed means of production 
used up in an accounting period), variable capital (all wage payments) 
and surplus (total profits, interest and rents) (Klein 1969:158).24 (In the 
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23 We do not discuss separately Veblen’s contribution vis-à-vis H1b here, even though it is relevant. 
The reason is that his works are more significant to the overall hypothesis one (H1), and 
subsequently require more detail. In Section 2.4, we look at his works linking the system to 
conspicuous consumption, waste and leisure. 
24 This assumes that values are equal to prices and thus eliminates the ‘transformation problem’. 
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Australian SNA, for example, GDPI includes the “gross operating 
surplus”, i.e. profit.) These Marxian aggregates are divided into two 
sectors of the producers’ goods and the consumers’ goods, which serve 
to illustrate the nature of interdependence among the various categories 
in the circuit of social capital of the capitalist economy (Tsuru 1969:198). 
Concerning ‘GDP growth’ (H1b), Marx studied various aspects of the 
gross national income well before the formalisation of the UNSNA. 
In Capital (Volume I, III), he examined the role of industrial and 
financial profits and capitalist investment through an analysis of the 
reserve army of labour, the distribution of income between workers and 
capitalists and the nature of technological change. Marx was also 
interested in the time it takes a commodity to realise its value through 
sale—known as the ‘turnover time of capital’. A faster turnover time is a 
key system requirement for sustaining long-term capital accumulation 
because it exerts upward pressure on the rate of profit (surplus value 
divided by constant plus variable capital). The ‘turnover time of capital’ is 
comparable with the effective demand function of GDP growth, since the 
activities in the sphere of circulation indicate sales and purchase 
transactions. But the separation of buying and selling provides the 
potential for a crisis as the sphere of circulation may temporarily seek to 
surpass the limits of production, thus generating excess fictitious capital 
and prices out of line with fundamental values (see Kettell 2006:26-39). 
There are thus contradictions within the sphere of circulation (and 
elsewhere in the competitive market-system). 
Marx said that the major contradiction of capitalism lies in the 
incessant global drive to accumulation and profitability while the social 
fabric is subject to instability and destruction (O’Hara 2006d:3). Crises 
and recessions are thus endogenous to the system, because the 
expansionary paths of the cycle set in motion processes that eventually 
reduce profit rates. The very nature of a downturn in the economy would 
manifest in a declining circulation time of capital-goods, stagnating 
wages (less profits to pay the workers) and hence limiting production 
(output), distribution and consumption-demand (Sherman 2003:622). 
Industrial investment soon falls when the profit rate declines and the 
economy moves into recession, as would be indicative of low (or 
negative) real growth rates of GDP per capita. This is because profits are 
the crucial factor determining production and investment in expansion 
and in contraction of production. Long-term historical trends in GDP 
growth are thus a good proxy of how effective the system is working to 
accumulate capital and make sufficient profit (H1b). 
In a similar vein, Keynes also understood that the relationship 
between investment and effective demand is dynamic. In The General 
Theory (1936), he was concerned about the effects of consumer durable 
goods on household spending and saving behaviour, and the 
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macroeconomic effects of a build-up of durables. The situation and 
effects are similar to spending on business durable equipment (Keynes 
1936:98-106). Consumers tend to stock up on durable household goods 
in boom times. For example, the relatively prosperous 1920s was a 
period of rapid accumulation of houses and other consumer durables as 
well as durable fixed capital equipment. Then for a mixture of reasons 
(pessimism, satiation, etc.) consumers make their existing stock last a 
while longer. There would be dislocation in the economy if consumers 
simply shift their spending from durable goods to non-durable goods 
and services; and firms that produce or sell durable goods are harmed 
(Atkinson 2008:313). However, the overall economy may adjust relatively 
quickly. Alternatively, if households decide to save the money not spent 
on durables, then a downward spiral of the ‘multiplier process’ would be 
evident (such as during the Great Depression). To the extent that the 
stock of these goods allowed consumers and investors to postpone 
spending, there was a drag on production and income (i.e. output 
growth). 
But the critical argument of Keynes is that the level of output (i.e. 
GDPO) and employment as a whole depend on the amount (quantity) of 
investment, given the social-psychological level of uncertainty. Since private 
profit is the goal of capitalist institutions of enterprise, the basis of 
strategic investment decisions is linked to the state of expectations about 
the prospective (future) yields of capital assets. The expectation of profit 
motivates investment (as well as present and past profits) providing the 
funds to invest or the assets on which to borrow for investment. 
Expectations are based on subjective probabilities (e.g. perceived risk) 
and confidence. However, uncertainty is different from risk in that the 
investor does not always have a high confidence in these subjective 
probabilities and cannot easily calculate them. The world is 
fundamentally uncertain in the sense that we know nothing of the future, 
yet we are required to plan different courses of action for the life process 
(Keynes 1937:216-7). 
Keynes said that investors pay close attention to the state of 
confidence (such as in lending institutions and ratings agencies of 
private-sector securities) because it helps to determine the decision to 
invest. But as the global credit crunch of the late 2000s reveals, the 
institutional arrangement is not capable of endorsing a stable 
environment for more certain decision-making. In Keynes’ system, the 
clue to crises is found in variations of the inducement to invest, which 
depends primarily upon the prospect of future profit from new 
investment—but “the actual character of which we know nothing” 
(Keynes 1937:214). In relation to sub-hypothesis H1b, Keynes highlights 
the usefulness of output growth to understanding the system: changes in 
the level of uncertainty lead to changes in investment demand, which in 
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turn affects aggregate output. 
That the capitalist process is marked by endogenous change was also 
articulated in Schumpeter’s The Theory of Economic Development (1911) 
and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943). The evolutionary 
dynamic of capitalist development has three striking characteristics: It 
comes from within the economic system and is not merely an adaptation 
to exogenous changes. It occurs discontinuously rather than smoothly. It 
brings qualitative changes or “revolutions”, which fundamentally displace 
old and create radically new conditions. In relation to sub-hypothesis 
H1b, economic development is accompanied by output growth, i.e. 
sustained increases in national income. But basic quantitative growth 
does not constitute development by itself. “Add successively as many 
mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby” 
(Schumpeter 1911:64). The immediate stimulus to development 
emanating in the system is “innovation”. There are five main types of 
innovations that can bring about growth and development: process and 
product innovation, new origins of raw materials, new market openings, 
and changes in industrial organisation (Schumpeter 1911:63-6). Single 
entrepreneurs, small business groups or large corporations can activate 
these combinations of factors in new processes and outputs. The 
principal benefit society gets from market organisation of economic 
activity and competition is innovation and economic progress—this is 
the positive side of capitalism. 
But the positives are inextricably linked to the negatives. The 
innovational process “incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure 
from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about 
capitalism” (Schumpeter 1943:83). The formation of few barriers to entry 
can cause dynamically competitive markets, and this competition will 
make high degrees of innovation out of pure necessity for firm survival 
(e.g. Cantwell and Santangelo 2000:134). The competitive accumulation 
process can lessen the super-profits that spur entrepreneurial action. An 
inability to create new products, processes, sources of raw material, 
reorganisations and markets will drive some firms out of the market 
(Schumpeter 1943:84-5). The recent multinational corporation, a product 
of capitalist development and technology, renders the economic and 
social position of the small-scale, competitive firm and its associated 
small bourgeoisie increasingly obsolete. Thus, there are fundamental 
uncertainties involved in innovation under capitalism because of the 
inability of economic actors to see perfectly the best things to be doing. 
Innovations that are carried out require the monetary creation of 
purchasing power by the banking system (Schumpeter 1911:69-70). Since 
entrepreneurs, backed by bank credit, appear in groups or clusters, 
capitalist growth and development exhibits a cyclical pattern. 
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Schumpeter (1939:Volume 1, 169-70) utilised Kitchin (3–5 years), Juglar 
(7–11 years) and Kondratieff (40–60 years) cycles in his empirico-
historical analyses. Entrepreneurial action gives way to the “prosperity” 
phase, in which innovations emerge, and the “recession” phase, a lapse 
of time during which the system adapts to ‘creative destruction’. 
Fluctuations in economic activity are thus seen as endogenous over the 
cycle because each phase of the cycle determines the next phase, e.g. 
crises are caused by the trends that occur during the expansion of 
capitalism. 
Summing up, in addition to Marx, Veblen, and Keynes, Schumpeter 
also saw the economic system as being potentially unstable, with 
recession (or depression) as likely as sustained periods of output 
growth.25 Marx, no less than Schumpeter, perceived capital accumulation 
as occurring irregularly, in bursts, with cyclical consequences (Marx 
1867:672,693-941). Output (i.e. GDPO) growth must therefore be 
scrutinised in the context of the cyclical movements and long waves by 
having a detailed historical analysis (H1b). Indeed, the concept of GDP 
has aided our understanding of the Great Depression in particular and 
business cycles in general. Capitalist institutions include production only 
for market exchange, a monetary economy, and production motivated 
mainly by profit. All of these institutions make possible the business 
cycle—because if there is insufficient monetary demand to buy the 
supply at a price including a profit a contraction may occur. As Howard 
Sherman said in The Business Cycle (1991), “GNP is the broadest 
aggregate variable, so it normally reflects the business cycle, moves 
smoothly upward in the expansion and smoothly downward in the 
contraction, and neither leads nor lags” (Sherman 1991:13). 
In conclusion, the task of political economy is to continue exploring 
the modus operandi of capitalism with a view to ascertaining the 
changing forms in which the system manifests itself. The growth rate of 
GDP in a historical context is relatively good at both depicting the stage 
of the business cycle and any effective demand problems emanating 
within the system. Victor Lippit (1992) noted,  
 
[G]ross national product (GNP) excludes housework, do-it-
yourself projects and indeed all productive activities that 
are not associated with markets, materially understating a 
nation’s production of goods and services ... and so forth. 
Despite these shortcomings, however, the national income 
accounts provide valuable information concerning the 
functioning of national economies ... that are not otherwise 
gained. [Lippit 1992:81-2] 
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25 Veblen is discussed further below. 
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In other words, GDP has many limitations, but the usefulness of the 
indicator is in its efficacious understanding of the dynamics of the 
business cycle. In this context, we argue that sub-hypothesis H1b can be 
accepted: GDP is charged with significance because it aids our 
understanding of the capitalist system. However, the “shortcomings” of 
GDP growth make it a weak indicator of net welfare. That is, there are 
many unresolved socio-ecological problems of GDP, which we now turn 
to in the next section. 
2.4 Unresolved Socio-Ecological Problems of GDP 
Section 2.4 critically evaluates the socio-ecological problems of GDP, 
linking the analysis with hypothesis one (H1) that “economic growth 
provides a good measure of wealth and welfare”. Note the problems of 
GDP are simultaneously social and environmental. For example, step-
families resulting from divorce and remarriage create complicated 
intergenerational relationships, as well as putting added pressures on the 
natural environment (e.g. two sets of clothing, toys and the like are often 
required when children are living in two households). In another case in 
point, the existence of the private motor car encourages the geographical 
dispersion of housing, shops, entertainment, and a variety of consumer 
“services”, which in turn increases the indispensability of the private 
automobile. This can foster a long-term economic dependence on the 
motor vehicle industry and the various implications that follow from this 
(e.g. air and noise pollution, congestion). The path of radical innovation 
is obstructed when it threatens profitability and further growth of the 
automobile industry, since barriers to entry are relatively low (due to its 
oligopolistic basis). Because of a high degree of interdependence 
between social and ecological spheres, the analysis of the problems of 
GDP is somewhat complicated. 
In order to study the problem in some detail, social and 
environmental problems of GDP will be treated as relatively autonomous 
(yet we recognise that the spheres are interdependent). Two critical sub-
hypotheses will guide the analysis: the first sub-hypothesis, H1c, deals 
with aspects that are more social; and the second sub-hypothesis, H1d, 
especially deals with ecological sustainability. As in hypothesis 
H1c(i,ii,iii), a significant difficulty relates to the theoretical and practical 
nature of ‘consumption’ in GDP: 
 
H1c:  The operation of GDP concepts in practice generates 
problems, especially in relation to consumption: 
(i) Conspicuous consumption, waste and fashion are not 
specifically identified in GDP accounting. 
(ii) An abundance of choice of marketed goods and services 
(GDP) can negate sociality, community, family, and therefore 
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social welfare by promoting individualism. 
(iii) GDP excludes the durability of artefact capital. 
 
We begin the analysis of H1c in view of Veblen, who recognised that 
“ecological problems are social problems” (Boles 1998:155). Veblen was 
a real pioneer in environmental sociology; albeit, he is not that well 
known in the literature. Here, we examine some of his major works and 
put them into the context of H1c(i). We look at Veblen’s critical analysis 
of land expropriation by absentee owners, wasteful natural resource 
extraction, and rapid deterioration of the productive land base. 
Veblen was a critical theorist of conspicuous consumption and 
wasteful extractive processes of natural resources. One of the main 
consequences of capitalism has been the transformation of consumption 
and waste into an endeavour to be respected. Consumption becomes a 
defining feature of any culture under corporate capitalism, when it is 
pursued for itself with all the waste that it encompasses. Ross Mitchell 
(2001) argues that the strength of Veblen’s analysis is in the 
contradiction between the capitalist system, devoted to predatory, 
pecuniary ends, and the required engineering or technology to transform 
raw materials into consumable goods, or production of use values (the 
‘service’). 
As detailed in The Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen (1899) believed 
that social development sprang from the growth of technical knowledge 
and the use of tools. There was an emerging elementary distinction 
between two classes of persons: the industrious class (or workers) and the 
predatory class (the pecuniary or business class). Workers, engineers, and 
technicians produce the actual wealth (the useful potentially service-
giving goods) of modern society. Industry was thus viewed as the 
production of useful wealth, and business as the accumulation of profit. 
In contrast, the predatory class is fabricated from “parasitic” business 
members living off the innovation and productiveness of the rest of 
society. Veblen stressed that such persons do not produce anything of 
service to the welfare of society—i.e. they generate disservice. In its 
place, they rely on competitive manipulations to gain their own personal 
wealth and impede the coordinated operation of an advanced industrial 
society. According to Veblen, the two classes are further distinguished: 
the industrious class comprises the mass of society’s population, while 
the predatory class forms a small-in-number, privileged, upper-class 
segment including business owners, politicians, lawyers, accountants, 
and managers. 
Veblen’s (1899:99) expenditure test of “goodness” (the ‘service’) is 
“whether it serves directly to enhance human life on the whole—whether 
it furthers the life process”. However, Veblen considered two types of 
non-service (‘disservice’) bearing activities. He asserted that the 

41
conspicuous consumption of artefact capital is held to be a symbol of 
high status that exemplifies the upper, predatory class. He related 
‘conspicuous leisure’ to those who spend their time working not 
productively or yielding no service to society. ‘Conspicuous waste’ was 
considered a blend of conspicuous consumption and conspicuous 
leisure. He argued that domination by the upper, predatory classes is 
sustained when consumption is envied and emulated by other classes. 
These wasteful behaviours demonstrate an incompetence in stimulating 
a healthy and equitable economic output for all community members to 
share. 
By waste, in The Theory of Leisure Class, Veblen (1899) was not 
alluding to pollution and refuse generated from industry and other 
human activities, since economic inefficiencies and societal consumption 
patterns may also be negative externalities (to some degree). However, 
there is much significance in Veblen’s work of natural resource 
exploitation in Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: 
The Case of America, in which he intelligently positioned environment and 
society. In several chapters, Veblen (1923) provides an insightful 
explanation of all that he found erroneous with the American economic 
system. Both hypotheses, H1 and H1c(i), apply to the uses of property 
“that were speculative, unproductive, wasteful, and/or exploitative”.26 
Veblen (1923:119) maintained that “absentee ownership has become 
the master institution in American civilisation”. Such absentee ownership 
was founded not by virtue of workmanship “but on the ancient feudalistic 
ground of privilege and prescriptive tenure, vested interest, which runs 
back to the right of seizure by force and collusion” (Veblen 1923:51). The 
problem of absentee ownership is people who did not rightfully own the 
land exploited natural and human resources (or land, capital, and labour) 
for financial gain. He was indignant that the plentiful natural and public 
resources of the nation were being calculatingly wasted on the 
opportunistic principles of “sound business” as laid out in the American 
plan. For example, 
 
[Absentee ownership] is not particularly American, except 
in the sense that it has been worked out more consistently 
and more extensively here than elsewhere, and that it has 
been worked into the texture of American life and culture 
more faithfully. ... This American plan or policy is very 
simply a settled practice of converting all public wealth to 
private gain on a plan of legalised seizure. [Veblen 
1923:168] 
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26 See Vaughn (1999:716). On natural resources, see Veblen (1923:119-201) in “The Case of 
America”, and the subchapters, “The Independent Farmer”, The Country Town”, The New Gold”, 




In the chapter entitled “The Timber Lands and the Oil Fields”, Veblen 
(1923:186-201) delineated the historical development of the lumber 
industry to illustrate “how absentee ownership functions in taking over 
the country’s natural resources and uses them up” (Veblen 1923:187). 
The destruction of the eastern and Midwest forests of America in the 
quest of net gain by “enterprising” lumbermen was criticised by Veblen. 
As he depicted it, most of the evergreens east of the plains (i.e. cedar, 
spruce pine, and hemlock) were “run through and virtually exhausted 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century” (Veblen 1923:188). He 
considered the production of lumber more than any other natural 
resource typified “how absentee ownership functions in taking over the 
county’s natural resources and using them up” (Veblen 1923:187). 
Referring to his small-scale farming and forestry experience, Veblen 
was an early advocate of sound forestry stewardship (Mitchell 2001:396). 
He affirmed the justification for a sensible utilisation of forest resources. 
In particular, he spoke against uneconomical use of forests using 
“dubious practices ... [which] carr[y] through the cost of the community at 
large” (Veblen 1923:189). Veblen (1923) wrote that what transpired with 
the case of America’s timberlands similarly applied to other natural 
resources; “these others, too, show the characteristic traits of the 
American plan—initial waste and eventual absentee ownership on a large 
scale and on a quasi-monopolistic footing” (Veblen 1923:194). Veblen 
(1923:129-165) also described the predicament of American farmers as 
being manipulated by “background vested interests”. Veblen’s principal 
criticism of farmers was their often wasteful agricultural practices to 
satisfy pecuniary interests. Modern farmers were wedged between 
merchants who paid them little for their agricultural produce but sold to 
unsuspecting consumers at inflated prices. According to Veblen, 
 
[T]he margin of benefit that comes to [the modern farmer] 
from his work is commonly at a minimum. He is 
commonly driven by circumstances over which he has no 
control, the circumstances being made by that system of 
absentee ownership. [Veblen 1923:130, emphasis added] 
 
In other words, Veblen (1923:124) viewed natural resources as having to 
serve some productive end useful to society; however, he spoke against 
the “American Plan of seizure and conversion ... [and] of hurried 
exploitation instead of economical use [of the service]” (1923:186-8). 
In summary, Veblen’s critical discourse on conspicuous waste, 
leisure, and consumption as immaterial status symbols, and of resource 
scarcity caused by corporate and state wastefulness is relevant in today’s 
rapid environmental and socioeconomic change. The significance of 
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Veblen’s (1923) Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise is shown by 
Schnaiberg and Gould (1994:60), who state that “firms are increasingly 
owned by ‘absentee’ investors: actors who neither live in nor particularly 
care about the community in which the firm is located”. Mitchell 
(2001:392) believes that Veblen’s treatment of a consumer-orientated 
society entrenched in reckless waste by product-hungry corporations 
underpins the root causes of environmental ruin and pollution. 
Therefore, with respect to hypothesis one (H1), the extent to which 
conspicuous waste comprises GDPE, economic growth is not a good 
measure of additions to welfare (in the service sense). Economic growth 
is also a poor measure of real welfare progress (H1), when “converting 
all public wealth to private gain” (Veblen 1923:168) under a system of 
absentee ownership. On the other hand, economic growth is probably a 
good proxy for the growth in conspicuous waste, because the social 
preference of Veblen goods is largely reflected in the ‘personal 
consumption expenditure’ item of GDPE. In practice, then, GDPE is a 
possibly a good proxy of conspicuous waste. However, conspicuous waste 
is theoretically loose in GDPE. Thus, H1c(i) is the more appropriate 
conclusion: that conspicuous consumption and waste are not specifically 
identified in GDP. 
Fashion is another item not that well structured in GDP accounting 
(H1c(i)). Striving to be fashionable relates to the perceived well-being 
derived from the variety of choice in consumer goods. The basic 
assumption of so-called ‘consumer sovereignty’ in a capitalist culture is 
to vindicate that a reduction (or rise) in economic growth contributes to 
a diminution (or enlargement) of social welfare. Namely, any lessening 
(or expansion) in the range of opportunities contributes to a diminution 
(or enlargement) of social welfare. This means that one of the 
fundamental assumptions is that human welfare is positively linked to 
GDP growth and the range of opportunities and choices that it brings. 
However, it should not be too difficult to reveal flaws in the assumption 
of a positive correlation between GDP growth and real welfare progress 
beyond “essential consumption” (H1). We primarily examine two 
commentaries on the relationship between economic growth and social 
malaise: E. J. Mishan’s (1967) The Costs of Economic Growth; and Clive 
Hamilton’s (2003) Growth Fetish. These popular works are significant, 
because the authors have scrutinised problems associated with the 
expansion of choice in consumer goods.27 
In an affluent and growing economic system, the market is a wants-

27 Mishan and Hamilton’s accounts are interesting, as both are devastating critiques of economic 
growth. Hamilton is critical of the costs of growth experienced since the Second World War, but 
principally since the 1970s to the present; whereas Mishan does not think too happily of the growth 
experienced in the 1950s and 1960s, let alone a century or two ago (Mishan 1967:175). Mutually, 
they have revealed a clear connection between the symptoms of social malaise and the processes 
that are generated by economic growth. 
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creating mechanism rather than a wants-satisfying mechanism. A wants-
creating mechanism is where a creation of new dissatisfactions is made 
to ascend from old satisfactions.28 The market system endeavours to 
elevate the fashionable and deride the trendy idlers. Mishan (1967:150) 
argues that the economic order is accommodating itself to an 
“indigestible flow of consumer gadgetry by converting the rationale of its 
existence: ‘scarce wants’ have somehow to be created and brought into 
relation with rising industrial capacity”. Hamilton (2003:ch.4) adds that 
the marketing system has one of the most important roles in influencing 
one’s identity. Consumers, according to Hamilton (2003:65), have less 
choice because the corporations manipulate consumer behaviour, which 
in turn helps people derive their identities from what they consume. This 
is at odds with persons understanding what is in their real or social 
interests. It is economic growth and the omnipresent influence of 
modern technologies and advertising that have become imbedded in the 
culture of our society. 
Therefore in relation to hypothesis one (H1), the extent to which 
consumption of fashion goods comprise GDPE, economic growth is not 
a good measure of the genuine satisfaction (psychic service) experienced. 
The problem is that we do not know the level of fashionable goods 
purchased in the ‘personal consumption expenditure’ item of GDPE—
and thereby it is difficult to ascertain its net welfare effects on society. 
Similarly to conspicuous consumption and waste, fashion is not 
specifically identified in GDPE accounting; this is sub-hypothesis, H1c(i). 
But in practice, a substantial fraction of GDPE involves these types of 
consumption, as the wants-creating mechanism and the marketing system 
dominate consumer culture (à la Mishan and Hamilton). In this case, H1 
is problematic: economic growth, especially as growth in GDPE per 
capita, is not a very good measure of net welfare. 
Real GDP growth is a good indicator of the quantity of marketed 
goods and “services” purchased, but problematic as a measure of net 
welfare. Simply, economic output is not the real source of social welfare. 
The critical point developed by Mishan and Hamilton is that social 
welfare is ultimately rooted in people’s closeness to each other and the 
degree to which they live in community. However, the organised pursuit 
and realisation of markets based on absentee ownership inhibits a 
fruitful community. Mishan in The Costs of Economic Growth proficiently 
summarises the missing link between welfare and GDP growth: 
 
The frantic self-seeking for material achievement, being the 
most glaring social characteristic of those countries that 
have benefited most from the advance of science ... is 
abundant to the point of embarrassment. ... It is not so 

28 The corporations, the consuming public, and the state facilitate this complex process. 
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much that feeling is ‘drying up’ within us, but that with so 
much of it being channelled into the aptly-called ‘rat-
race’—into the pursuit of material success, into the pursuit 
of new knowledge, into the pursuit of fashion, prestige 
pastimes, and new sensations29—little is left to flow directly 
between people. [As] ... the ... flow of [relationships] between 
people [deteriorates] the more impatient a man may be to 
seek immediate relief in the external world of glamour and 
fashion—a world wherein other people play an incidental 
role in his schemes of personal triumph, but otherwise do 
not matter to him. ... [A]n open, easy and full hearted 
relationship with one’s fellows, for instance, is not 
something that can be bought or contrived or willed into 
being. The indispensable ingredient of such a relationship is 
mutual trust, a quality nurtured in a small agrarian society 
based on mutual dependence, and one of the first 
casualties in any society whose energies are drawn into the 
competitive scramble for material ends. [Mishan 
1967:189,210, emphases added] 
 
This is why H1c(ii) is significant: that an abundance of choice of 
consumer goods (GDP) negates sociality, community and family, that is, 
the various forms of social, cultural and familial–communal capitals are 
being degraded over real historical time. 
Many empirical studies confirm the strong falls in ‘social capital’ 
such as trust and community from increased individualism and the 
profusion of conspicuous goods, especially in US (see O’Hara 
2006c:ch.9). Robert Putnam (2000) describes the declining trend to a 
recipe of reduced voter turnout, lower trust in government, less church 
attendance, a smaller interest in participating in public meetings, 
declining union membership, reduced membership of parent–teacher 
associations, fewer volunteers for non-profit activities, and a 
disinclination of people to join clubs such as bowling associations. There 
is less civic engagement, and dwindling space for civil society. Evidently, 
not all types of associations are equally beneficial in promoting trust. 
Pamela Paxton (2007) found that at the country-level, a high level of 
isolated associations is indicative of the presence of many unconnected 
groups. A large number of unconnected associations in a country would 
therefore suggest a lack of common norms and/or common feeling 
across society. 
Global capitalism’s quest for rapid GDP growth and migration, 
principally from rural to urban areas has been a contributing factor to the 
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decreasing importance of community and the extended family.30 It is 
becoming increasingly difficult for many developing countries to 
maintain the current forms of informal long-term care arrangements, 
especially for older persons because of the lack of availability of 
institutional care—formal support systems remain limited. Informal 
protection mechanisms (largely based on family support) have been 
under increasing stress recently, owing not only to such factors as 
demographic trends, greater female labour participation and higher 
economic risks for families, but also to shifts in paradigms of filial support 
and reciprocity (Gomes da Conceição and Montes de Oca Zavala 
2004:246). 
On the other hand, it is important to note the counteracting forces to 
welfare damage from GDP growth that can have a positive impact on 
‘cultural capital’. That is, the historical institutional arrangement may 
promote sociality and community that to a degree offsets the destruction 
of non-market relations from GDP growth. Hypotheses H1 and H1c(ii) 
must be seen in light of the dominant economic, social, cultural and 
moral institutional structures. For example, according to data from the 
World Values Survey over 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999–2001, Nordic countries 
featured a comparatively high trusting environment, and the proportion 
of that trust has been increasing.31 The area has been relatively shielded 
from the global onslaught of neoliberalism; Scandinavian countries are 
renowned for their universalism stance on the share of social wealth, 
developed welfare-state and strong participatory culture of local and 
central governments. Campbell and Pedersen (2008:317) argue the 
policies that set apart the Nordic approach to “regulating capitalism” are 
motivated by egalitarianism rather than resistance to market-driven 
economic restructuring. High levels of trust and educational achievement 
at the lower end of the skill hierarchy have made it possible to achieve 
significant productivity growth across a wide range of public as well as 
private services. 
But generally, at the global level, there is simply not enough familial 
stability, trust, community and sociality for the provision of positive 
services and public goods such as stability and relative equality. For 
instance, being ‘constantly connected’ means more work for many and 
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30 Economic insecurity has put pressure on young and able family members to increase their 
participation in wage-earning activities outside the home, including through migration (to 
domestic and international destinations) (Aboderin 2004). 
31 We can roughly describe the quality of relationships of society (in general) by observing 
qualitative changes or average levels in ‘trust’ over real historical time. The unweighted average 
percentage of respondents who said that ‘most people can be trusted’ during 1981–2001 for Nordic 
countries (Finland, Norway, Netherlands, and Sweden) was 57%. This is high in comparison to an 
average trust of 39% during the same period in the neoliberal capitalists (Austria, Australia, 
Belgium, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Switzerland, US, and West Germany). 
From 1981 to 1999–2001, trust in the Nordic countries increased by 24.2% compared to a decline 
of 11.7% in the neoliberal capitalists. Source: Data adapted from various ‘Waves’ (1981, 1990, 1995, 
and 1999–2001) of the World Values Survey Database (2006). 
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less time with the family (see Cheng 2007). Contrary to blissful 
advertisements suggesting that people can do more in less time, the 
evidence suggests that people simply do more, more of the time. Doubts 
are raised about the extent to which ICT brings about real individual 
freedom and social welfare. This is an interesting quandary because we 
introduced the chapter by hypothesising that ‘economic growth’ may be a 
relatively good measure of wealth and welfare (H1).32 Yet, we did not 
specify any distinction (that may arise from GDP growth) between 
‘individual’ or ‘social’ welfare. A part of the response is that there needs 
to be a good balance between individual and social interests. 
A person should be able to make decisions freely to utilise their gifts 
(capabilities), develop their character, and pursue material autonomy to 
create, play and have fun with things. Potentially, these are all good 
things that economic growth can provide, and the elements of material 
creation are typically captured in ‘GDP’. Reduced liberty can hinder a 
person’s creative pursuits and retard business innovation, which, for 
example, is apparent in Sub-Saharan Africa because of insufficient long-
term regional GDP growth. But, too much ‘freedom’ is problematic if it is 
twisting goodness, life and love (especially). 
Love is a relational and continual activity, where the deepest needs 
and longings of persons in the community are being met. One way of 
loving someone better is to spend quality time with them through 
‘connected knowing’, someone who is forging their identity from the 
relationships with others, i.e. deeply learning from others’ experiences 
(see Fincher 2007:118-22). A fine place for the cultivation of real agapĤ 
(self-sacrificial or ‘unconditional’ love) is in marriage relationships—but 
enhanced especially by love that is being encouraged by persons-in-the-
community seeking things that are honest, good, and lovely. In other words, 
self-sacrificial love in the community is often reflected back into a loving 
durable relationship and vice versa (Clark 2006:264-5). 
However, as the system motivates individuals in what Doug Brown 
(2004) calls their Be-All-They-Can-Be self-actualisers, family is destroyed in 
the process. Generally, family love is traded-off the more “free” and 
individualised we become. The system and the individual-in-society are to 
be blamed for social malaise, most evident in recent decades. Agents are 
to a degree free to choose their own lifestyle because they are ‘relatively 
autonomous’ (see Davis 2003). In the West, people’s views of marriage 
became more individualistic after the 1960s (Cherlin 2004). Also, the 
decline in religious influence leading to privatisation of conviction is 
likely to have undermined people’s beliefs about the sacred nature of 
marriage and its importance as a religious commitment (Zacharias 
1997:105). Because of these historical and cultural trends, obtaining a 
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32 Sub-hypothesis H1b, is significant in this context in addition to H1 and H1c(ii), since we are also 
hypothesising that GDP is a good measure of market expansion for capitalism. 
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divorce is less stigmatising, costly, and time-consuming today than in the 
recent past.33 Evidently, the socio-institutional arrangements in America 
since about the mid-1960s are supporting self-rule of the “Individual”, 
which suits many agents who follow a pragmatic existentialist style of 
‘living for the moment’ (Zacharias 2008). Economic activity is not being 
motivated by social obligation nor regulated by the moral and religious 
context that governs social life in general. 
Economic growth (i.e. the growth of GDP per capita) as a measure of 
material achievement is, with reference to H1c(ii), a self-defeating 
measure of real welfare progress. The forces of economic growth—with 
the abundance of choice and the promotion of the Self that it brings—
negate positive social interactions such as mutual trust; in the process, 
community and family are destroyed (Hamilton 2003, Hirsch 1976, 
Mishan 1967). Hypothesis one, H1, must therefore be rejected because 
sociality, good community and a loving family are truer forms of social 
welfare, not simply economic growth (GDPI,E,O). We cannot merely 
assume that output (GDP), or output per head, is a measure of 
socioeconomic progress: “[a]n increase in output, statistically measured 
by a weighted index of physical outputs, may easily be accompanied by a 
decline in economic welfare” (Mishan 1967:147). 
Under the existing institutional arrangement and the rise of 
individualism, particularly in the West, the evidence above suggests that 
the durability of social, cultural, familial–community and moral capitals is 
being destroyed by GDP growth. Hence, the question of durability vis-à-
vis GDP becomes important. But what hope is left in ‘GDP’ as a 
potentially good measure of welfare and wealth? The supposed strength 
of ‘GDP’ is a measure of material (marketed) output; after all, a major 
component of GDP is “personal consumption expenditures”. GDP 
captures at least the well-being that results from the production of goods 
and services. Indeed, when statisticians quantify the goods and services 
produced, they try to take into account the utility to the consumer 
(Lequiller 2005). In relation to H1c(iii), a critical question arises, to what 
extent does GDP measure the durability of ‘artefact capital’? The short 
answer is that GDP excludes the durability of artefact capital (H1c(iii)). 
The works by Kenneth Boulding (1910–1993) on wealth and welfare 
reveal a key technical problem of ‘consumption’ in GDP. 
Boulding was animated by Fisher’s suggestion that ‘wealth’ should be 
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33 It is suspected that the greater social acceptance of divorce, along with the greater ease of 
obtaining a divorce, has increased the proportion of divorces that occur among couples with 
average (rather than low) levels of marital quality (Amato and Hohmann-Marriott 2007). The 
implication is that the path-dependent effects on children’s marital behaviour are magnified, where 
divorce leads to more divorce. Hence, the global destruction of family may become more 
permanent over time. However, this is a complex problem: in some contexts, for example, when the 
separation or divorce brings about an end to prolonged violence, and the wellbeing of children and 
mothers improves substantially, this outcome is positive. 
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studied more clearly and linked to economic welfare.34 In “Income or 
Welfare”, Boulding (1949-50:81) saw the ‘psychic income’ notion as a 
superior welfare indicator to money or real income (GDP). He argued 
that we might have, for instance, an increase in national money income 
(such as GDPI) that reflects simply a decline in the durability of assets, 
with no subsequent increment of welfare.35 It is not the durability of 
“consumption” that matters but the durability of the wealth itself: 
 
[W]ere we possessed of unbreakable china, widow’s cruses, 
waters of life, undying fires, immortal garments and 
inexhaustible energy we would presumably be better off, 
economically. ... Any discovery which renders consumption 
less necessary to the pursuit of living is as much an 
economic gain as a discovery which improves our skills of 
production. Production—by which we mean the exact 
opposite of consumption, namely, the creation of valuable 
things—is only necessary in order to replace the stock pile 
into which consumption continually gnaws. [Boulding 
1945:2] 
 
That is, Boulding (1945:2) considers ‘consumption’ as the “destruction 
of ... valuable things—in the way in which they were intended to be 
destroyed”. With this definition, there is no necessary desirable quality in 
“consumption”. 
In A Reconstruction of Economics, Boulding (1950:139-41) reaffirmed 
that real welfare is derived from the increase in services that gives society 
a capital stock with a smaller amount of consumption and production. A 
house lasting 150 years is much better than one that lasts only 50 years, 
for example. That is, we need to concentrate on the growth of real services 
rather than to maximise the growth rate of GDP, while reducing 
consumption as destruction. The smaller the rate of depreciation of 
artefact capital—that is, the more durable the stock of wealth—the 
longer the source of the potential satisfaction lasts. Thus, “consumption 
is a nuisance, a real “cost” of maintaining the stock of goods” (Boulding 
1949-50:83). People would be better off if they had houses that did not 
devalue; automobiles and bicycles that would not require repair or 
updating; floor surfacing that would not get dirty or require replacing; 
footwear that never needed restoring; clothing that would not wear or 
plates that would not break. We would be enjoying the services of these 
things; not consuming or producing them.36 Therefore, maximising 
“economic growth” in the consumption (GDPE) or production (GDPO) 
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34 See Fisher (1937). 
35 Also, he regards “durability” not just of things but of people (e.g. see Boulding 1966c:13). 
36 Thus, he argued that the objective of economic policy should not be to maximise consumption 
or production, but rather to minimise it (Boulding 1949-50:79). See also Boulding (1957:27-8). 
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sense provides no indication of the enhancement or deterioration of real 
wealth and welfare—as H1c(iii) says, GDP excludes the durability of 
artefact capital. 
The operation of GDP concepts in practice thus generates major 
problems, especially in relation to consumption (H1c). When developing 
his consumption theory, Boulding made some important points about 
the dynamics of a mature market system. In “The Consumption Concept 
in Economic Theory” and “What is Economic Progress?”, Boulding 
(1945, 1961) provides some insights into single composite indices 
representing economic growth. He argues that growth is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon. It involves many dimensions, and cannot be 
expressed adequately by any one-dimensional index due to its complexity 
(Boulding 1961:148). He recognised that economic progress in the 
modern world is actually a transitional process from civilisation to post-
civilisation. This process potently affects all features of human life, and is 
very complex. To limit it within the borders of a single index would be 
“remarkable” (Boulding 1961:150). The complications of ‘consumption’ 
viz. H1c—conspicuous waste, fashion, sociality, community, family 
durability—illustrate the inadequacy of a single index. Indeed, the heart 
of the problem is when GDP becomes a single indicator obsession. 
As a result, the following sub-hypothesis is put forward with specific 
attention to the three ecological problems associated with GDP 
(H1d(i,ii,iii)): 
 
H1d:  GDP is problematic when it becomes a single indicator fetish: 
(i) GDP does not distinguish between growth and sustainable 
development. 
(ii) GDP leaves out ecological capital depletion. 
(iii) An adjusted-GDP measure of net welfare is not specified in the 
green national accounts. 
 
When you measure something it ultimately has an effect on people’s 
behaviour; and as a measure of gross output of the economy, GNP has 
had an enormous impact on behaviour (see Boulding 1970:159). For 
instance, the term ‘growth potential’ is laden with limitations, as failure 
is inevitable whenever we do not reach a set growth target, however 
constructed. And since growth can be measured statistically as GDP 
growth, it follows that more is better. Boulding (1961, 1966b) was well 
aware of the consequences of the single indicator, namely GNP, and its 
misuse (H1d): 
 
[W]e should accept these measures for what they are worth 
and it is particularly important that we should not take 
them literally. A measure is only as good as its use is 
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sophisticated. ... [A great] ... danger is that the measure 
measures something other than what we really want to 
measure [i.e. net welfare]. ... GNP can rise because of arms 
races, because of stupid dam-building, or even through the 
building of presidential palaces. It can be rising because a 
small proportion of the population is getting better or 
while the vast majority is remaining in stagnant misery. 
Valuable as the GNP is, therefore, a rough overall measure 
of economic success, it can easily become a fetish and a 
quite misleading statistic. Economists certainly should be 
the first to issue warnings against its misuse. [Boulding 
1961:155, 1966b:11, emphases added] 
 
Because of this growth ‘fetish’, Boulding was increasingly concerned 
with the technological and extractive processes that have given rise to 
extreme rates of consumption. He was particularly alarmed that these 
practices have resulted in a long-run dissimulation and irreplaceability of 
the geological capital stock, e.g. the falling durability of the soils 
(Boulding 1949-50:82, 1966a:232). For example, human beings dedicate 
superfluous effort and resources to cleaning up pollution and mining 
poorer mineral deposits, yet these extra expenses add to GNP—he 
frequently referred to GNP as “GNC”, the “gross national cost” (e.g. 
Boulding 1971:159). 
Herman E. Daly is another author critical of GNP growth, who gained 
from the perspectives of Boulding. He scrutinised growth from an 
ecological perspective and developed the idea of the “steady-state 
economy” in Steady-State Economics: The Economics of Biophysical 
Equilibrium and Moral Growth (1978) and Steady-State Economics: Second 
Edition with New Essays (1991). A steady-state economy is defined as: 
 
an economy with constant stocks of people and artifacts, 
maintained at some desired, sufficient levels by low rates 
of maintenance “throughput”, that is, by the lowest 
feasible flows of matter and energy from the first stage of 
production (depletion of low-entropy materials from the 
environment) to the last stage of consumption (pollution 
of environment with high-entropy wastes and exotic 
materials). [Daly 1978:17]37 
 
Daly’s steady-state economy is a material idea, meaning that it is defined 
in terms of invariable stocks, not flows (quantity measured at a point in 
time, like an inventory—a stock change). The steady-state economy is 
not static nor zero growth in GNP. It is in continuous renewal in relation 

37 Entropy is a measure of the quality of energy. 
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to qualitative progression of the stocks of persons and artefacts. The 
main theme in Steady-State Economics is that a steady-state economy is a 
required future state of affairs and to reach it there needs to be 
fundamental changes in principles and values. We need to replace ‘more is 
better’ with ‘enough is best’. There is a need to change the GDP growth 
model and its moral/social values, otherwise no amount of ability will 
solve our problems but will increase them. 
The very notion of a steady-state economy involves a distinction 
between growth and sustainable development.38 This is important for 
H1d(i), since GNP accounting does not differentiate growth from 
sustainable development. Growth means a quantitative increase in the 
scale of marketed dimensions of the economy. Therefore, GNP is a value-
based index of an aggregate of goods and services, which is normally a 
‘physical’ quantity (e.g. the construction of buildings or a lawn mowing 
service takes up physical space). With GDP growth, there is some 
confusion about what is supposed to grow. On the other hand, 
sustainable development means a qualitative improvement in the 
structure, design and composition of the institutions that result from 
greater knowledge and understanding of social progress (à la 
reminiscent of Schumpeter). Sustainable development allows more stock 
maintenance per unit of throughput (matter and energy), and more 
services per unit of stock. For example, at the microeconomic level the 
newer generations of computers utilise less energy and mass relative to 
computers in the past as they can perform more complex processing 
threads. The non-renewable matter and energy for services decrease, 
while the value of services increase.39 
There is much practical relevance in Daly’s proposal for addressing a 
serious global environmental problem. The multifarious array of flora and 
fauna is at risk with possible onslaught of climate change from too much 
greenhouse gases (GHGs). The dilemma seems to be in extra 
contributions of GHGs by human activity, particularly carbon dioxide 
(CO2) since industrial times (IPCC 2007).40 Marland et al. (2008) have 
estimated that since 1751, the consumption of fossil fuels and cement 
production has released roughly 321 billion tons of carbon into the 

38 See Daly (1996:69) in Beyond Growth and Daly (1999:6) in the Ecological Economics and the 
Ecology of Economics. 
39 According to Daly, the service (or net psychic income) is the benefit of economic activity while 
the throughput (entropic physical flow) is ‘the final cost’. The throughput flow does not yield 
services directly; it must be accumulated and fashioned into a stock of useful artefact capital. In 
one sense, it is true we are “ultimately” constrained by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, 
especially in a system reliant on non-renewable resources. 
40 There is sufficient evidence that building up GHGs is contributing in some way to global 
warming. Hansen’s (2007) et al. evidence of the global temperature anomaly shows that 
temperature deviations during 1890–2006 have been rising on average over time (albeit levelling 
off in 1950s–1960s). Temperatures rose at a more rapid pace after the major global economic 
slowdown of 1975, exactly when GHGs increased to its highest recorded level (from 4615 to about 8000 
million metric tons of Carbon in 2006). 
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atmosphere. Half of these emissions have transpired since the mid-
1970s. Globally, liquids (e.g. natural gas) and solid fuels accounted for 
77% of the CO2 released from fossil-fuel burning in 2005. Emissions 
from cement production have more than doubled since the mid-1970s. 
All of these forms of energy are necessary for durable fixed business 
capital expansion, ‘GDP growth’ (the foundation of capitalist growth). 
There is a major difficulty (but not an impossibility) in achieving a 
massive cutback in GHGs because GDP (rates or levels) is historically 
linked to CO2 emissions under a fossil-fuel based global capitalist 
system. To illustrate empirically the link between GDP levels and CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels in the global economy, data are adapted from 
Maddison (2006) (where available) and Marland et al. (2008) over 1820–
2005.41 There is a robust relationship throughout the twentieth century 




In the above figure, the simple correlation between the two variables 
during 1900–2000 is +0.97. The force of inertia entails that current 
emissions could potentially define future stocks. Long time-lags between 
today’s actions of reducing CO2 and tomorrow’s outcomes are thus built 
into the system because of cumulative (and fairly irreversible) processes 
of GDP and GHG stocks (UNDP 2007:22,36).42 A major dilemma of the 
twenty-first century facing humankind is in restructuring the global 
capitalist economy on a more “sustainable” basis, viz. the curtailment of 
excessive fossil fuel use and finding suitable renewable energy sources. 

41 The warming effect is far greater than that simply produced by CO2. However, longer historical 
time-series data are more readily available for CO2 than other types of GHGs. 
42 Atmospheric concentration of CO2 (stock variable) has been constant at around 280 parts per 
million by volume (ppmv) for many centuries, but since the industrial revolution in the early 1800s 
they have risen by a third to 380ppmv in 2007. There are no straightforward quick-fix solutions to 
the ‘climate change’ problem because of the uncertain nature of the business–environment trade-
off. Consider the climate scenario of a pro-environmental model: CO2 concentration (ppmv) is 
predicted to increase from 383 in 2005 to 465 in 2030, with a respective mean global temperature 





















































































































Figure2.1. GDPandCO2 Emissions intheGlobalEconomy, 1820–2005*
GlobalRealGDPLevel
TotalCO2EmissionsfromFossilͲfuels
Sources: Data adapted from 
Maddison (2006) and 
Marland et al. (2008)
*DataforWorldGDPonlyavailabe for
1820, 1870, 1900, 1913, 1950–2001

54
Evidently, as a single indicator, GDP does not aid policy prescription for 
climate change because it does not differentiate between growth 
(throughput) and sustainable development (service) (H1d(i)). 
By itself, GDP provides no indication of unsustainable processes 
(H1d(ii)), i.e. whether we are living off income or capital, and treats the 
depletion of materials, such as coal, oil, gas, forests, and soils as positive 
capital consumption.43 Daly (1996) summarises the broken link between 
sustainable welfare and GNP in Beyond Growth: 
 
GNP is not only a passive mismeasure but also an actively 
distorting influence on the very reality that it aims only to 
reflect. GNP is an index of throughput, not welfare. 
Throughput is positively correlated with welfare in the 
world of infinite sources and sinks, but in a finite world 
with fully employed carrying capacity, throughput is a cost. 
To design national policies to maximise GNP is just not 
smart. It is practically equivalent to maximising depletion 
and pollution. [Daly 1996:41] 
 
GDP growth incurs costs such as the disturbance of ecological life-
supporting systems, pollution, alienated labour, lost leisure time, loss of 
restorative and recreative capacity, and the loss of welfare for future 
generations. The national income statistics series tend to ignore the 
costs of GNP expansion—this is referred to as ‘growthmania’ (or growth 
fetish as in H1d), not counting the costs of growth.44 
Furthermore, if we add to GNP the real costs, as measured by 
‘defensive expenditures’, instead of subtracting them, then the real costs 
are counted as “benefits” and show up as an increase in GNP. For 
instance, if pollution occurs in our drinking water, GNP will increase 
because more purification plants will be required. Other significant 
defensive costs or expenditures could be categorised in the following 
groups45: (A) Induced by the abuse of natural resources in economic 
growth, such as the costs of all environmental protection activities and 
compensation expenditures for environmental damages. (B) Brought 
about by production centralisation, spatial concentration and associated 
urbanisation, such as urban sprawl. (C) Caused by the risks generated by 
the system, such as increased expenditures for protection against crime, 
accidents, and technical/technological failures. (D) Induced by waging 

43 However, this does not mean that GDP ignores nature completely.A part of nature’s value is 
already captured in GDP. For example, the value of housing embodies the value of visual amenities 
enjoyed by residential owners. Likewise, the value of commercial fish, crop, and timber harvests 
partially “captures” the value of goods and services used to produce the harvests, i.e. some of the 
value of marine fish stocks, irrigation water, and forests is already captured in GDP.
44 See Daly (1991:99). 
45 The categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. 
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war (foreign policies). (E) Encouraged by the negative side effects of car 
transportation, such as traffic accidents with associated repair and 
medical expenses. (F) Arising from unhealthy consumption patterns 
(habits), from poor working and living conditions. Costs generated by 
drug addiction, gambling, smoking (both active and passive), and 
alcohol. With reference to hypothesis one (H1), real welfare progress is 
thus distorted in GDP growth due to the prevalence of defensive 
activities. 
Daly (1996:98) argues that any GDP index of welfare is a standing 
invitation to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness—an index which is a 
“distorted reflection of reality … instead of directly serving the reality 
itself”: 
 
Had [the] national accounts developed in accordance with 
Fisher’s concepts, their extension to cover environmental 
services and ecological and geological capital depletion 
would have been obvious and easy, except for valuation 
problems for services without markets. As it is now, 
incorporation of ecological services and natural capital 
must be very ad hoc, and in fact it may ultimately be 
necessary to adopt Fisher’s approach. [Daly 1996:109]  
 
In other words, GDP in the national accounts does not distinguish 
between growth and sustainable development, and on a technical level, it 
excludes the depletion costs of ecological capital (H1d(i,ii)). 
In light of the above discussion, how much has the global system of 
national accounts changed in the sixty years since their development in 
1948? Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman (1995) conclude in their critical 
assessment of the development of the national accounts that: 
 
Although the Gilbert version of the accounts has been 
refined over time, their essential structure has remained 
unchanged since 1948. While revisions of the national 
accounting structure to account for new questions and 
problems have periodically been suggested, such revisions 
would make consistent comparison difficult. The 
accounting structure is not fluid or flexible enough to 
answer questions regarding [net welfare]. [Kapuria-
Foreman and Perlman 1995:1532] 
 
For instance, the United Nations System of National Accounts 1993 
(SNA93), a widely used revision, does not explicitly allow for a calculation 
of disservices from the economic process due to measurement 
difficulties. A similar situation exists with ABS Section 7.20 from the 

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Australian National Accounts: Sources and Methods (ABS 2000): 
 
Externalities ... or ‘disservices’... are not market 
transactions into which institutional units enter of their 
own accord, and there is no mechanism to ensure that the 
positive or negative values attached to them by the various 
parties involved would be mutually consistent. For this 
reason, SNA93 recommends against recording the values 
of externalities in the national accounts. [ABS 2000] 
 
By not revealing many of the environmental costs of the consumption 
that is measured, the current economic accounts passively encourage 
over-consumption. 
Nonetheless, there have been significant efforts put forward to 
modify the national accounts by including multiple dimensions of 
welfare. The ABS as well as other statistical organisations, e.g. Central 
Statistics Office Ireland (CSO 2004) and Statistics Canada (2005), 
developed measures of economic, social and environmental progress to 
supplement GDP. Most statistical agencies provide various headline and 
supplementary progress indicators. For example, they investigate (a) 
health—life expectancy at birth, incidence of all cancer and heart attacks, 
and burden of disease; (b) financial hardship—average real weekly 
disposable income of households in the second and third deciles of the 
income distribution; (c) the natural landscape—threatened birds and 
mammals, annual area of land cleared and the net water use; and (d) the 
human environment—fine particle concentrations, and recycling 
activities. The function of these supplementary indicators is to provide 
specificity vis-à-vis the national progress of net welfare. Note that these 
indicators are yet to be formally integrated within the SNAs. 
However, it was clear that a revision of SNA93 (United Nations et al. 
1993) to include the environment was necessary. The result of a decade 
of effort is the 2003 edition of the Handbook of National Accounting, also 
referred to as SEEA for the System of Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Accounting (SEEA-2003) (United Nations et al. 2003).46 The 
function of SEEA-2003 is to provide a detailed assessment of the stocks 
of natural resources, plus the flows of expenditures, taxes and subsidies 
related to environmental protection or management by various sectors. 
The SEEA-2003 gives a comprehensive image of various accounts, such 
as the ‘energy accounts’ that determine energy use by industry, as well as 
‘water accounts’ (see Smith 2007). In relation to sub-hypothesis H1d(iii), 
we investigate the extent to which an adjusted-GDP measure of net 

46 At the time of writing (April 2009), no country has implemented the complete system, although 
a few countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, New Zealand and Norway) have 
implemented accounts that cover many of the system’s categories. 
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welfare is imbedded in the system of green national accounts. 
The SEEA framework embraces a parallel system of physical accounts 
(“natural resource accounts”) and monetary accounts (“environmental 
accounts”). Collectively, these are referred to as the “hybrid flow 
accounts”. The physical accounts are significant, because they were 
developed to give expression to the objective of a steady-state economy, 
in which the scale or material throughput of the economy should be held 
constant. Any raw material (or energy) input or waste material (or 
energy) output for which physical statistics are available can be evaluated 
through hybrid flow accounts. The monetary accounts are also 
significant. Political economists want to articulate trade-offs, measure 
performance, and enhance social well-being. “The rationale for monetary 
accounts is that a consistent basis of valuation may be applied precisely 
so that aggregation across asset classes is possible and comparison can 
be made with non-environmental assets in terms of their respective 
contributions to the nation’s wealth” (United Nations et al. 2003:246). 
This line of thought reflects the reliance on “asset” (or “capital”) rather 
than “service” (welfare) thinking in SEEA 2003.47 The hybrid flow 
accounts in the SEEA-2003 are potentially useful tools for understanding 
the trade-off between ‘economic’ assets and ‘natural’ assets.48 
However, there are criticisms of the SEEA-2003, several of which are 
important for H1d(iii). The SEEA-2003 does not explain the need to 
define ecological sustainability appropriate to specific levels of 
dematerialization—i.e. How much dematerialization do we need? What 
is ecological sustainability? Neumayer (2003:7) says that an apparently 
simple intergenerational rule is that development is sustainable “if it 
does not decrease the capacity to provide non-declining/per capita utility 
for infinity”. The capacity to provide welfare is conceptually embodied in 
(at least) four forms of capital: produced, natural, human and social. 
Hence, there is a need to establish specific rules allowing non-declining 
welfare over time based on some maintenance of the capital stock, 
including natural capital. 
There are two types of concepts of sustainability, one is weak-form 
the other is strong-form. The weak sustainability rule requires the rate of 
change of total net capital not be allowed to be persistently negative. The 
assumption of weak sustainability entails that natural capital is similar to 
produced capital and could easily be substituted for it. However, 
advocates of strong sustainability (SS) argue that natural capital is to a 

47 A subject addressed in their Section 5, “Implications of SEEA 2003” (United Nations et al. 
2003:257). 
48 There are many cases where the SEEA are important. For example, the results of Langea et al. 
(2007), show that the physical accounts enhance the ability to manage particular natural resources 
and pollutants. Material flow accounts of material inputs and outputs (of wastes and emissions) 
can assess the dematerialization of the economy [see SEEA-2003 3.197; 11.35,36]. In particular they 




greater or lesser extent non-substitutable. There may be considerable 
substitution possibilities between the first category of natural capital 
functions—raw materials for production and direct consumption—and 
produced capital. However, basic life support systems are almost 
certainly impossible to substitute. This global ecological system provides 
us with the basic functions of food, water, breathable air and a stable 
climate. They should hence be subject to a SS rule. Protecting the 
physical integrity of critical natural capital is a more promising 
sustainability rule. In this case, it is necessary to define for each capital 
function what the critical level is to set the SS constraint. 
However, Dietz and Neumayer (2007:624) argue that although the 
SEEA commences with a discussion of sustainability, this discussion is 
not carried through consistently and no clear guidelines are provided for 
measuring sustainability in either its weak or strong version, especially 
with respect to critical natural capital. For example, the potential negative 
costs of GDP growth on the natural environment are poorly scrutinised. 
The authors of the SEEA-2003 strike a pessimistic note, suggesting that 
the challenge to adjust GDP for “depletion”, “defensive expenditures” or 
“degradation” may be too great (see Chapters 9 and 10 of the Handbook 
of National Accounting). In relation to sub-hypothesis, H1d(iii), the major 
question is, can we calculate a measure of GDP that adequately accounts 
for demands placed on the environment? The answer is that there is no 
consensus on how “green GDP” could be calculated and still less 
agreement on whether it should be attempted at all (United Nations et al. 
2003:415).49 The counter-argument is that societies should be able to see 
how the market system affects the consumption of public goods such as 
beautiful views, clean air, and unsoiled water (see Boyd 2007:717). 
Destruction of the environment is, of course, simply one aspect of net 
welfare. 
 Bartemulus (2007:616) is critical of SEEA-2003 and argues that the 
“capital approach” [e.g. SEEA-2003 1.22] seems to focus on the 
sustainability of economic activity and growth, rather than sustainable 
development. In accounting terms, economic growth is the rate of 
increase of a country’s final output, usually measured as real (price-
deflated) GDP. Sustainable development encompasses social, ecological, 
cultural and political objectives, besides narrowly economic ones. Other 
capital categories such as human, social or institutional capitals and 
their possible deterioration are not accounted for. In other words, the 
welfare-orientated variables of ‘service’ and ‘disservice’ are not explicated 
in the newer system of green accounts. “Economic growth” in the SEEA-
2003 is still narrowly defined as real GDP growth, not sustainable 
development, green GDP or net income (H1d(i,iii)). 

49 Presumably, green GDP captures all final goods and services (the end-products of nature), 
where “final” refers to the point directly enjoyed, consumed, or used. 
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Modern systems of national accounts are thus principally a set of 
interrelated calculations that attempt to cover different aspects of the 
functionings of market economies. According to Shaikh and Tonak 
(1994:6-7) in Measuring the Wealth of Nations: The Political Economy of 
National Accounts, the most fundamental of these are the production 
accounts (national income and product and input-output accounts), 
which attempt to measure the creation and use of new national wealth. 
When constructing production accounts, one must distinguish between 
production and nonproduction activities, and hence between their 
corresponding actual or imputed transaction flows. Many transactions 
associated with so-called “nonproduction” activities are excluded from 
the measure of national product (i.e. GDP). “[N]ational-income-and-
product accounts … focus solely on production-related flows. As such, [it] 
leave[s] out two important aspects of the overall economic picture: 
transactions that are not directly related to production; and stocks of real 
and financial wealth” (Shaikh and Tonak 1994:7). As such, narrowly 
defined “production” (GDPO) activities inhibit a holistic understanding of 
sustainable economic welfare. 
Ultimately, GDP may need to be modified as it provides an 
inadequate measure of social and environmental waste in the economic 
system. We reject the conscious pursuit of economic growth as a prime 
goal of economic policy, especially when GDP growth becomes a fetish 
(see also Hamilton 2003:220, Mishan 1967:219). In addition, GDP 
provides little indication of any ecological barriers or limitations under 
capitalism. GDP growth, thus, does not provide a very good direct 
measure of additions to welfare (H1). Better indicators, which take into 
account the benefits and costs of economic growth, are probably needed. 
The next section looks at some of the alternatives to GDP that attempt to 
measure net income, which is scrutinised in more detail in a few chapters 
that follow. 
2.4 Attempting to Improve on GDP: Net Income Indices 
An indicator that looks at the trend in the original sense of “economic 
growth” (net income) over time is the Index of Sustainable Economic 
Welfare (ISEW). Herman Daly and John Cobb (1989) in their 
groundbreaking book, For the Common Good, pioneered early work into 
developing a more appropriate measure of welfare. They devised the very 
first ISEW; for the US over the 1950–1986 period (see Cobb 1989). Daly 
and Cobb (1994) revised their book for a Second Edition in which they 
modified the United States ISEW somewhat after accounting for various 
criticisms raised by scholars (Cobb 1994, Cobb and Cobb 1994). Their 
work was significant because it was the first indicator assessing 
economic welfare with attention to income distribution, household 
production and environmental destruction. An adjustment for income 
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inequality in the ISEW was based on the premise that the benefits of 
economic growth may disproportionately advantage the rich. The authors 
argue that by disregarding transfers of production between market and 
household sectors, the comparability of national income estimates for an 
economy over time is diminished. It also gave attention to environmental 
sustainability, such as the costs of long-term environmental damage, 
including climate change, air, water and noise pollution. They argue that 
accounting for sustainability is needed in a measure of welfare, especially 
when it affects future generations. 
A succinct and workable identity of a real ISEW per capita is 
summarised in Eq. (2.3) below: 









Eq. (2.3) reads as follows: the ISEW (per capita) at constant prices is 
equal to the services (ƒ) derived from the final consumer capital 
(adjusted via an index of income distribution, CK/D), durable fixed capital 
(FK) and from non-market labour activities (Lt); subtracting the 
disservices (dš) generated from economic activity in order to receive the 
services; and minus the depreciation of ecological capital (ɷEK). This 
basic equation can be expanded to include the relevant variables. For 
example, the services flowing from final consumer capital, durable fixed 
capital, and non-market activities encompass, respectively, ‘personal 
consumption expenditures’ (including consumer durables), government 
roads and highways, and household labour. Economic activity also 
generates negative activities, e.g. crime, lost leisure time, pollution. 
These types of disservices (or costs) of the economic process are thus 
deducted. Finally, the net positive services of the current generation and 
the well-being of future generations depend on the condition of 
ecological assets. Hence, Eq. (2.3) says that the ISEW is equal to the 
services generated in an economy after subtracting the disservices 
endured, including a deduction for the lost services of ecological capital. 
The ISEW in Eq. (2.3) appears to overcome many of the problems of 
GNP, since it accounts for the benefits of non-market production and 
consumer goods while adjusting for income inequality, but also the 
environmental and health costs related to consumption activities. Briefly, 
we consider the historical context and conflict of interest between the 
ISEW and GNP/GDP. ‘GDP’ was brought to the fore when the status quo 
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developed it primarily as a planning tool to guide the massive production 
effort after World War II (see Section 2.3). The ISEW was developed 
because of the growing opposition to natural environmental degradation 
and negative health effects from pollution in the 1970s and 1980s. Each 
indicator was created in different social contexts: ‘GDP’ became 
established after the Second World War where increased ‘production’ 
was seen as vital to well-being because of so much death and destruction 
during war times. The ‘ISEW’ developed in relatively more peaceful 
circumstances, but in the midst of an apparent environmental crisis in 
the 1970s/1980s. Also, a growing ecological consciousness, largely 
attributable to the environmental movement, spurred opposition to the 
GDP indicator, the primary indicator of economic growth. 
These incidences made way for better indicator alternatives that 
accounted for the environment and the economy. In terms of 
measurement advancement from a historical perspective, the objective of 
Daly and Cobb (1989) was to build on two previous studies, Nordhaus 
and Tobin’s (1972) Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW) and Zolotas’ 
(1981) Economics Aspects of Welfare (EAW), which attempted to 
measure the trend in economic welfare for the United States compared 
to the trend in GDP. The ISEW is, on the surface, a redevelopment from 
the original MEW and EAW frameworks, but there are some noteworthy 
differences,—albeit somewhat elusively discussed—namely, the 
inclusion of ‘sustainability’ and the recognition of the ‘service’ notion to 
the community. However in this study, we primarily delimit the scope of 
the analysis to ISEW and related measures developed thereafter. 
There are several other indicators of net income similar to the ISEW 
that need to be scrutinised. A number of alternatives to GDP that 
encompass environmental and social factors include the Genuine 
Progress Indicator (GPI), Sustainable Net Benefits Index (SNBI), and 
Fisherian Income (YF). Collectively, these composite measures may be 
referred to as ‘Net Income Indices’ or Sustainable Economic Welfare 
Indicators (SEWIs) since they are designed for assessing aspects of 
sustainability and welfare.50 ‘Consumption’ is the welfare base of the 
indicators and is taken directly from the SNA. But the authors utilise a 
variety of statistical sources and government reports to include other 
variables. Generally, the authors of SEWIs add the monetary service 
benefits yielded by both the stock of consumer and public durable 
expenditures (while adjusting personal consumption for income 
inequality) and household/unpaid production, minus the environmental 
and social costs associated with production, distribution and exchange. 
This leads to the introduction of sub-hypothesis, H1e,—viz.: 

50 N.B. GDP uses proxies for value (prices) to create an index of the market economy’s ‘value’. This 
means that GDP cannot be said to equal ‘the social benefit of the market economy’, which cannot 
be practically calculated (Boyd 2007:717). In the same way, these adjusted-GDP net income indices 




H1e:  Alternatives to GDP are possibly needed, such as Net Income 
Indices. 
 
The crux of Cobb and Cobb’s (1994) main argument in The Green 
National Product is that there would be no tendency to use GNP as a 
surrogate measure of economic welfare if an alternative were developed 
that performed that function more adequately than GNP. The alternative 
indicator of welfare they are referring to is ISEW: 
 
As long as GNP continues to be misused by politicians and 
newspapers as a comprehensive measure of well-being, 
there will be reason to broaden the definition of economic 
health to include categories that have been left out of the 
national accounts. ... Policies are [usually] debated in terms 
of what is “good for the economy”, where “the economy” 
means GNP. … When GNP is used, explicitly or implicitly, 
for purposes of measuring well-being or national prestige, 
it is just as value laden as any other index. [Cobb and Cobb 
1994:23,251] 
 
Thus, Cobb and Cobb (1994) deem it vital to develop an indicator that 
measures the genuine net positive contribution of economic activity 
(broadly defined) to well-being (H1e). The alternative they wish to 
enhance and modify is the ISEW. 
On the other hand, these authors (specially) note that the ISEW is not 
a comprehensive indicator because it is only a one-dimensional summary 
measure. Indeed, they argue that no single measure can grasp the full 
complexity of the benefits and costs of life in a modern society: 
 
A measure of social welfare, as opposed to economic 
welfare, would necessarily have to include factors that 
cannot be valued in monetary terms. Even an economic 
welfare measure must account for features of life that are 
difficult to quantify. But that should not deny the value of 
formulating alternative measures of economic welfare that go 
beyond GNP and include estimates of nonmarket activities. 
[Cobb and Cobb 1994:23, emphasis added] 
 
However, they conclude that it is important to combine the benefits and 
costs of production in a single account, so that the net effects can be 
discerned (see Cobb and Cobb 1994:250). The authors also hold that 
there are advantages of counting all activities in the same unit of value, 
money, since “[t]his allows the valuations by millions of individuals to be 

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combined into a single number without having to survey them or assign 
arbitrary weights to their choices” (Cobb and Cobb 1994:10). Therefore, 
composite monetary indicators, i.e. Net Income Indices or SEWIs, as 
alternatives to GDP are possibly needed (H1e). 
What could be at stake is the choice between an ethics based on 
unlimited wants (indicative of GDP) in which “more” is the objective and 
an ethics of “enough” which is based on needs, as in the ISEW. One, 
implicitly assuming the ‘maximisation principle’, sees no limits to 
individual acquisition; the other, recognising some social and ecological 
aspects, counsels’ responsibility, sharing and moralistic restraint by 
accounting for costs. Thus, each indicator is value-laden. But the ISEW 
seems far more interesting than GDP, as it specifically attempts to 
recapture the original and the most significant meaning of “economic 
growth”, net welfare. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, economic growth is not a very good measure of true 
welfare progress. Historically, the national income was understood as a 
sustained increase in its magnitude of services over a long-term trend. We 
argue that “economic growth” was historically understood as ‘net 
income’ (genuine welfare of society) and, therefore, only in this context 
hypothesis one (H1) is acceptable. But, with the formal 
institutionalisation of the US system of accounts in 1948, ‘economic 
growth’ signifies market-based production activities and not ‘net 
income’. In other words, post-1948, economic growth is synonymous 
with the growth rate in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP growth 
relates to the rate at which the marketed value of goods and services is 
expanding in a specific region (e.g. the world or a continent). 
The usefulness of the economic growth indicator is in its efficacy of 
understanding the dynamics of the economic system, especially the 
effective demand function in the business cycle. Nonetheless, utilising 
GDP growth per capita as the single indicator of growth, economic 
performance or welfare may be problematic. GDP growth incurs costs 
such as the disturbance of ecological life-supporting systems, pollution, 
alienated labour, lost leisure time, and the loss of welfare for future 
generations. If a high level of GDP is the ultimate policy goal, then clearly 
it is a misused index to represent a high level of social welfare. On this 
basis, hypothesis one (H1)—that economic growth is a good measure of 
welfare progress—is rejected. 
There are several primary reasons why H1 is rejected. Firstly, the 
complications of ‘consumption’ in relation to conspicuous waste, 
fashion, the destruction of community, sociality, family and the rise of 
individualism illustrate the inadequacy of GDP. Maximising “economic 
growth” in the consumption or production sense provides no indication 
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of the enhancement or deterioration of real wealth and welfare. This is 
because the objective of economic policy should be that of expanding a 
durable range of net positive services. 
Secondly, GDP may be a good proxy measure of economic growth but 
not when ‘net contributions to welfare’ are at the heart of the inquiry. The 
reason for this is that the ‘eco-development’ notion of progress in 
‘economic growth’ has been misplaced concretely; that is, GDP 
accounting does not differentiate growth from sustainable development. 
There is a major limitation to the green national accounts (SEEA-2003) in 
measuring net welfare. “Economic growth” in the SEEA-2003 is still 
narrowly defined as real GDP—not ‘sustainable development’ or “green 
GDP”. H1 is rejected because it is difficult to ascribe a level of 
‘sustainable development’ in the green national accounts. 
As a single indicator, GDP does not portray how much is invested in 
expanding net positive service; how much is consumed (destroyed) in 
various forms; and how much is wasted and in what ways (sustainably or 
unsustainably). Hence, GDP—purely as a measure of output, income or 
expenditure—is a problematic indicator of social and environmental 
problems. There is no specification of how the productive capacity is 
utilised, e.g. waste versus investment. Also, GDP leaves out ecological 
capital depletion. The heart of the problem is when GDP becomes a 
single indicator fetish, as there are too many unresolved socio-ecological 
problems of GDP. 
However, adjusting or modifying GDP to construct some sort of ‘net 
value’ of environmental and socioeconomic welfare is potentially 
important. Therefore, effective measures of net welfare (or net income) 
may be required. A well-devised indicator that measures the costs and 
benefits of economic growth over time may help. An interesting 
indicator, which attempts to measure net income, is the Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW). The purpose of the next chapter is 
to see how closely the ISEW encapsulates the original meaning of 
“economic growth” (the net of services and disservices). But, more 
importantly, we critically evaluate the theoretical framework of the ISEW. 
Chapter three will detail the conceptual foundations of the ISEW, where 
the purpose is to interpret the ISEW and apply theory. This is needed to 
establish a level playing field—to understand the evolution of similar 








In the previous chapter, we gave a historical overview of accounting for 
income and welfare. It is widely recognised by political economists that 
the growth rate of GDP (gross domestic product) per capita is not a very 
good measure of welfare. GDP may need to be modified as it provides an 
inadequate measure of social and environmental waste in the economic 
system. Hence, adjusting or modifying GDP to construct some sort of 
‘net value’ of environmental and socioeconomic welfare is potentially 
important. Good measures can offer critical insights where there may be 
conflict between the various spheres of economy, society and ecology. A 
well-devised indicator that measures the costs and benefits of economic 
growth over time may help. We introduced an indicator that attempts to 
measure “net income”, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare 
(ISEW) by Daly and Cobb (1989). We now want to investigate the ISEW in 
more detail. 
An imperative question arises: are there any good theoretical 
foundations for the ISEW? Guenno and Tiezzi (1998:11), authors of the 
Italian ISEW, stated that the “main limitation of indices such as the ISEW 
is ... their lack of theoretical foundation”. Eric Neumayer (1999) also 
argues that the ISEW is not a theoretically sound indicator. For instance, 
he says that the corrections in ISEW are simply undertaken without 
giving any theoretically sound justification for doing so (Neumayer 
1999:82). Hitherto, there have been several efforts to provide such a 
foundation, particularly, by Philip Lawn (2003, 2006a) as a response to 
Neumayer’s (and others’) critique. Amongst the ISEW advocates, the 
emerging debate surrounding the ‘net income’ indices appears saturated 
in methodological (i.e. measurement) limitations, not in the theoretical 
underpinning. For instance, in response to recent criticisms, Lawn and 
Clarke (2006:300, emphasis added) argue that “its apparent 
shortcomings … are methodological and not theoretical in nature”. 
Nevertheless, Neumayer (2004, 2007) argues that there are conceptual 
problems for an all-in-one indicator that accounts for present well-being 
and future well-being (sustainability). In other words, the conceptual 
foundation of ISEW and related indicators is chiefly unresolved in the 
literature.51 Also, the tacit knowledge amongst critics and advocates alike 

51 A shorter version of this chapter is published in the journal of Ecological Economics (Brennan 
2008). Most of the content republished here is in accordance with the Elsevier end-user licence 
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is that there has been no adequate theoretical foundation in the ISEW 
since its humble beginnings. 
However, these conclusions may be premature because careful 
inspection of several key works reveals certain theoretical frameworks for 
ISEW. This leads to the introduction of hypothesis two (H2) – viz.:  
Chapter 3 will detail the conceptual foundations of ISEW by attempting to 
expand on the critical themes and fill any thematic gaps. A primary 
function of the chapter is to interpret and apply theory. This is needed to 
establish a level playing field—to understand the evolution of similar 
sustainable economic welfare indicators and to present them in their best 
light. It is not only the purpose of this chapter to provide insight into the 
theoretical foundations of ISEW, but also to offer a critique, if reasonable. 
But even if it is not possible to fill the gaps completely, it is argued that 
there are three underlying and qualitatively different theories of the ISEW 
(H2). 
The three ISEW theories will be made cogent in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 
3.4. In Section 3.2 a scrutiny of Daly and Cobb’s (1989) work reveals a 
theoretical framework—albeit somewhat concealed and fragmented—for 
ISEW. Thus, the first theory explores Daly and Cobb’s conceptual 
“economics for community” model for ISEW, which considers the costs 
and benefits to the whole community, not merely individual agents 
involved in a transaction. The second theory links Fisher’s concept of 
income to entropy: entropic net psychic income. This theory, discussed in 
Section 3.3, specifies that it is a cost to replacing worn out producer 
goods such as plant, machinery, and equipment. The third theory, 
examined in Section 3.4, suggests that ISEW is theoretically based on a 
social welfare function. Utilising some principles of welfare economics, the 
ISEW integrates cost-benefit analysis with social choice theory, which 
incorporates various social concerns about welfare that are not 
adequately captured by individuals within the market place. 
In order to promote specificity vis-à-vis the theoretical foundations of 
ISEW, Venn diagrams and set theory notation are utilised. The purpose 
of the Venn diagrams is to illustrate the similarities and differences 
between the theories. The usefulness lies in the visual comparative 
analysis, specifically: How well does each theory link the spheres of 
economy, ecology and society? Indeed, the conceptual foundation of 
ISEW depends on the answer to this question. If ISEW is to be a 
meaningful indicator, a solid conceptual foundation that describes the 
prevailing socioeconomic system is essential. 

agreement. 
H2: The ISEW has strong theoretical foundations.
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However, we are going to show that the three theories are not as well 
developed as they should be. The heart of the inquiry rests in Section 
3.5—where we critically evaluate the theoretical frameworks of ISEW. It is 
argued that without a systematic understanding of the political economy of 
capitalism, ISEW is potentially flawed in design. At the very least, 
“society” must be historically placed vis-à-vis a specific socioeconomic 
system. Under a self-regulating market organisation, the exchange 
economy tends to dominate other aspects of culture—opportunities for 
individual development are obtained mainly at the expense of others. 
This is known as the ‘disembedded economy’. It is argued that the 
conceptual foundations of Daly and Cobb’s vision of community, 
entropic net psychic income, and the social welfare function are 
problematic, because there is no underlying linked systems view of the 
disembedded economy. 
Thus, the chapter is structured into two major segments. The first 
part will supply the three theoretical foundations of ISEW. The second 
part furnishes a political economy critique of the theories. In both 
segments, we will use table headings to guide the analysis. This makes it 
easier for the reader, as each major heading (sub-hypothesis) 
summarises the essential points at the beginning of each section. In 
Section 3.6, we conclude with reference to the main hypothesis, H2, and 
comment on the findings. Here are the three theories, introducing the 
“economics for community – oikonomia” in Section 3.2 below: 
3.2 Economics for Community – Oikonomia 
According to Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb (1989:6,8), ISEW plays a 
small part in a necessary process that leads to a paradigm shift in 
Economics. Orthodox Economics has a tendency to treat the negative 
effects from the production and consumption of copious goods and 
services as secondary (Daly and Cobb 1989:6), and subscribes to vast 
abstractions that relate little to reality itself (e.g. ‘Homo Economicus’, a 
requirement to find models and laws applicable to all human beings). 
The authors argue that the paradigm shift entails describing how the 
world is. “The [paradigm] change will involve correction and expansion, a 
more empirical and historical attitude, less pretense to be a “science”, 
and the willingness to subordinate the market to purposes that it is not 
geared to determine” (Daly and Cobb 1989:8). Economics must be 
ordered to the needs of the real world (Daly and Cobb 1989:7,20), and 
H2a: The ISEW is conceptually rooted in “Economics for Community”:
(i) A realistic paradigm based on the principle of internalization. 
(ii) In principle, income is based on strong sustainability. 
(iii) Service to the community is founded on the oikonomia model. 
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ISEW is set out to measure, albeit limitedly, how well the needs of the 
world are met.52 ISEW is a necessary progression for the paradigm shift 
because of perceived ecological limits of economic expansion; the latter 
is commonly signified by the annual growth rate of gross domestic (or 
national) product (GDP/GNP). 
The current paradigm of Orthodox Economics seeks to find out what 
makes the market function well. GDP is frequently utilised as a sign of a 
healthy market: 
 
But it is rightly held that the economic element in welfare 
is very important, and that the stronger the economy the 
greater the contribution to human welfare. ... [T]here is 
little consensus on any other measurement, so that none 
of the others that have been proposed exert a remotely 
comparable influence on public policy. [Daly and Cobb 
1989:63] 
 
The tendency to overlook the fact that GDP measures only some aspects 
of welfare and to treat it as a general index of national well-being is an 
archetypal instance of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness—“whenever 
thinkers forget the degree of abstraction involved in thought and draw 
unwarranted conclusions about concrete actuality” (Daly and Cobb 
1989:36). 
Hence, ISEW is essentially a fundamental critique of orthodoxy’s 
strange abstractions from reality, a shift from the deductive to the 
historical model (Daly and Cobb 1989:93,141). Trying to circumvent the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness means strongly adhering to the 
principle of internalization: 
 
[t]he principle of internalization is not only equitable (who-
ever causes the cost should pay for it) but also socially 
efficient (the one who pays the cost is also the one who is 
in a position to reduce the activity that causes the costs 
and will benefit from doing so). ... It is not a question of 
choosing whether to pay or not pay external costs. The 
costs are there and will be paid by someone. [Daly and Cobb 
1989:56, emphasis added] 
 
There is need for “collectivism of totally socializing the costs”, such as the 
social costs of pollution, inequality, commuting, automobile accidents, 
regrettable health and education expenditures, and long-term 
environmental damage for future generations. In relation to hypothesis 
H2a(i), the ‘theoretical’ foundation of ISEW is to describe reality by 

52 The compilation of ISEW was actually done by John Cobb’s son, Clifford W. Cobb. 

69
agreeing with the principle of internalization: internalising localised 
‘spillover effects’ and “pervasive externalities” that negatively affect social 
welfare. 
With this underlying principle available, one can derive a better 
indicator of welfare from a conceptual foundation of income. 
Operationally, however, this is fraught with difficulties. Firstly, “in 
measuring welfare one cannot avoid to a large extent implicitly defining 
the concept by one’s very measure of it” (Daly and Cobb 1989:69). 
Secondly, “any measure of welfare abstracts from many features of actual 
economic welfare and its use would lead to ignoring the degree of 
abstraction involved. The very existence of a measure invites the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness” (Daly and Cobb 1989:84). In practice, the 
welfare concept is incomparable with the income notion (i.e. income 
does not directly measure welfare). 
Nevertheless, the authors utilise Hicks’ (1948:172) definition of 
income in Value and Capital as an opening point for the indicator of 
welfare: “the practical purpose of income is to serve as a guide for 
prudent conduct”.53 
 
A person’s or a nation’s income is defined as the 
maximum value that can be consumed during some time 
period, with the expectation of still being as well-off at the 
end of the period as at the beginning. [Hicks 1948:172] 
 
While Hicks was thinking at the individual level, income can be conceived 
at the national level and for annual periods. The authors of ISEW state, 
 
[i]ncome is not a precise theoretical concept but rather a 
practical rule-of-thumb guide to the maximum amount that 
can be consumed by a nation without eventual 
impoverishment. ... Note that the central defining 
characteristic of income is sustainability. The term 
“sustainable income” ought therefore to be considered a 
redundancy. [Daly and Cobb 1989:70] 
 
However, because of the self-fulfilling need to “identify and understand 
the contingent features of reality” (H2a(i)), they want to connect the 
growth of the economy and the physical limits of the biosphere in a 

53 Hicksian income may be defined as the maximum monetary value of final goods and services 
that can be consumed over a given period without reducing the capacity to sustain the same 
consumption stream over time. It is a significant measure of income because, as Hicks 
emphasised, the central criterion for defining the concept of income is “to give people an 




welfare indicator (Daly and Cobb 1989:28).54 This is because the 
economy is coextensive with the total system whilst the economic 
subsystem is infinitesimally small relative to the total system (Daly and 
Cobb 1989:59). 
In relation to hypothesis H2a(ii), they undertake two adjustments to 
arrive at a good approximation of Hicksian income to be a better guide to 
prudent behaviour. One important adjustment is an extension of the 
principle of depreciation to cover consumption of natural or ecological 
capital stocks. The other is to subtract “defensive expenditures”, which 
are regrettably necessary expenditures made to defend ourselves from 
the unwanted side effects of economic growth.55 They subtract defensive 
expenditures because these, as a proxy, represent the principle of 
internalization. Defensive expenditures are ‘intermediate goods’ which 
are the costs of production, in contrast with the final products available 
for purchase that enhance welfare. The conjectural focus on this ISEW is 
thus the distinction between final and intermediate causes. Therefore, to 
gain a better approximation to the central and well-established meaning 
of income (Daly and Cobb 1989:71), they summarise the extended 
version of Hicksian income (YH) as the net national product (NNP) 
minus both defensive expenditures (D) and the depreciation of ecological 
capital (ɷEK), in Eq. (3.1) below: 
YH=NNP–D–ɁEK       (3.1)
These two adjustments for including defensive expenditures and the 
depreciation of ecological capital in Eq. (3.1) are relevant for ISEW. This 
ISEW embodies the idea that “[w]e should never sacrifice more value to 
produce an extra amount of product that is of less value than what was 
sacrificed” (Daly and Cobb 1989:58). 
In addition, they argue that it is necessary to consider welfare and 
income within the context of ‘sustainable development’. Daly and Cobb 
(1989:71) distinguish between growth and development. ‘Growth’ refers 
to the quantitative expansion in the scale of the physical dimensions of 
the economic system, while ‘development’ refers to the qualitative 
change of a physically non-growing economic system with the 
environment. They note that the key operational implication of Hicksian 
income is to keep capital intact.56 They define capital functionally, “as a 
stock that yields a flow of goods or services” (Daly and Cobb 1989:72). 
However, the two forms of capital they explicitly embrace are natural and 

54 The biosphere is where living organisms occupy the regions of the surface and atmosphere 
(ionosphere, stratosphere, and troposphere) of Earth. 
55 “Defensive expenditures” are examined in Section 3.4 below. 
56 Nordhaus (1998:315) notes that the underlying definition in Hicks is different from that cited by 
Daly and Cobb above. Nonetheless, the “capital intact” definition of income presented by Daly and 




humanly created capital. They advocate the strong sustainability approach 
to operationalising sustainable development, which means maintaining 
different types of capital stocks intact (i.e. that there are no substitution 
possibilities between a degraded stock of ecological capital and produced 
capital). For example, farming capital equipment cannot replace 
(substitute) the fertile soils lost from intensive cultivation. In other 
words, the authors utilise the extended notion of Hicksian income to act 
as a pragmatic guide to avoid impoverishment by overconsumption, and 
thus attempt to measure maximum sustainable consumption in ISEW 
from a strong sustainability perspective (H2a(ii)). 
But for hypothesis H2a(iii), the sine qua non is that a core theory 
guides the measure of sustainable consumption. That is, ISEW is 
embedded in oikonomia, the management of the household to increase its 
use value to all members over the long run. In essence, oikonomia is 
stewardship. “If we expand the scope of household to include the larger 
community of the land, of shared values, resources, biomes, institutions, 
language, and history, then we have a good definition of “economics for 
community”” (Daly and Cobb 1989:139, emphasis added). ‘Oikonomia’ 
contrasts to ‘chrematistics’, which is the branch of economics relating to 
the manipulation of property and wealth in order to maximise short-term 
monetary exchange value to the owner (e.g. see Stahel 2006:371). 
Oikonomia differs from chrematistics in three ways. Firstly, it takes the 
long-run rather than the short-run view. Secondly, oikonomia considers 
costs and benefits to the whole community, not merely the costs/benefits 
limited to agents involved in a transaction. That is, beneficial or costly 
transactions between persons do not simply pertain to the parties 
directly involved, but rather, affect the total social matrix. Thirdly, it 
focuses on concrete use value and the limited accumulation thereof, which 
contrasts with the notion of abstract exchange value and the impulsion 
toward unlimited accumulation. ‘Use value’ is concrete: it has a physical 
dimension and a need that can be “objectively satisfied”. “True wealth is 
limited by the satisfaction of the concrete need for which it was designed 
[e.g. a gift intended for love rather than envy]. For oikonomia, there is 
such a thing as enough. For chrematistics, more is always better” (Daly 
and Cobb 1989:139). 
Therefore, “oikonomia” views the market from the perspective of the 
total needs of the community:  
 
The management of the community so as to increase use 
value to all members over the long run requires that the 
market be of the right size to make its positive 
contributions while minimizing its harmful effects. For 
economics for community, the question of optimal scale is 




To deal with pervasive externalities or ‘disservices’, such as global 
warming and ozone depletion problems, they argue that the economy 
must have a proper scale relative to the ecosystem (Daly and Cobb 
1989:144-5).57 
The “optimal scale” is linked to the notion of service (H2a(iii)). 
Interpreting Daly and Cobb’s theory, ISEW loosely follows Irving Fisher’s 
(1906) notion of service, i.e. “psychic income”. In Fisher’s view, nearly all 
consumer goods are classed as capital or as wealth, and their 
consumption represents depreciation. “For Fisher, welfare is the service 
(the psychic sense of want satisfaction) rendered by this wealth, and for 
the most part would have to be imputed” (Daly and Cobb 1989:67). 
However, the authors give no theoretical ‘psychic income’ framework for 
the indicator. For instance, after the inclusion of personal consumption 
expenditures adjusted for income distribution, they 
 
add ... [the] streams of services that are not counted as 
part of personal consumption in the national income 
accounts. Next, [the authors] subtract ... items intended to 
compensate for implicit overestimates of welfare in the 
measure of personal consumption [i.e. types of 
“disservices”]. [Daly and Cobb 1994:465-6] 
 
Thus, only the “flow of services” is recognised, but no formal conceptual 
framework is devised, and there are no formal ‘service’ and ‘disservice’ 
accounts. Nonetheless, ‘disservice’ is not mentioned either, but it is 
obviously implied under the “cost columns”. 
In summary, with respect to sub-hypothesis H2a, the conceptual 
model of ISEW centres on a historical increase of use values over time, 
i.e. services to the community over the long-run (H2a(iii)). This requires 
that the market be of the right size—via an optimal scale—to make its 
positive contributions while minimising its harmful effects (H2a(i)). 
ISEW describes the relationship between the services and disservices 
over time, as well as the path taken to arrive at a particular point. The 
ISEW follows the non-substitutability paradigm, i.e. ‘strong 
sustainability’, maintaining the different types of capital stocks intact 
(H2a(ii)). In other words, ‘for the common good’ entails redirecting the 
economy toward community, the environment, and a sustainable future, 
where, over time, the services are predominantly increasing and the 
disservices are diminishing. With these qualities, we are ideally achieving 
sustainable economic welfare. 
Sustainable economic welfare (SEW) can be represented in simple 

57 It is important to position the ‘optimal scale’ in terms of the steady-state economy, an important 
idea developed by Daly (1991:99). 
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algebraic terms. Eq. (3.2) below portrays SEW equal to the net sum of 
services (ƒ) over the current period (t) which is greater than the net sum 
of disservices (dš) compared to the past (t-n): 
SEW=υ(å–dš)t>υ(å–dš)tǦn      (3.2)
In Eq. (3.2), SEW is enhanced in the long run when services-to-the-
community are equitable and sustainable; whilst waste (i.e. disservices) 
is minimised from harmful activities. The trend of ISEW would increase 
over time. However, when the net of services over the current period is 
less than the net of disservices in the past period(s), unsustainable 
economic welfare transpires. It is unsustainable for future generations as 
the community is being destroyed; there are too many disservices 
generated over the long run. The trend of ISEW would decrease over 
time. But, achieving ‘SEW’ is the heart of Daly and Cobb’s theoretical 
oikonomia model, economics for community (H2a). That is, the services 
and disservices are anchored in value judgements that society should 
encourage the higher values (service) and purposefully discourage the 
lower (disservice). 
Finally, Daly and Cobb call for the oikonomia model (H2a(iii)), as part 
of the ‘new paradigm’, which recognises that the well-being of a 
community as a whole is constitutive of each person’s welfare. “[T]his 
model of person-in-community calls not only for provision of goods and 
services to persons, but also for an economic order that supports the 
pattern of personal relationships that make up the community” (Daly and 
Cobb 1989:165, emphases added). The person-in-community notion is 
critical because each human being is constituted by relationships to 
others, and this pattern of relationships is at least as important as the 
possession of commodities.58 “The goal of an economics for community 
is as much to provide meaningful and personally satisfying work as to 
provide adequate goods and services” (Daly and Cobb 1989:165, 
emphasis added). These relationships cannot be exchanged in the 
market. Therefore, rather than giving pre-eminence to the market 
economy, the community takes the centre stage in the oikonomia model 
(see Daly and Cobb 1989:165). 
By the term “community”, the authors suggest that people are bound 
up with one another, sharing, despite differences, a common identity. 
‘Community’ necessitates that people participate together in shaping the 
larger grouping of which all are members (Daly and Cobb 1989:170,172). 
Daly and Cobb reason that the degree of community depends on the 
following attributes concurring: (a) there is extensive participation by its 
members in the decisions by which its life is governed; (b) the society as 

58 Ziegler (2007) is the only other author who notes that Daly and Cobb (1989) had the persons-in-





a whole takes responsibility for the members; and (c) this responsibility 
includes respect for the diverse personality of these members. 
Specifically, the economics for community depends on the extent to which 
the following conditions are democratically defined: decentralisation of 
political and economic power; worker ownership and participation of 
management decisions; and the subordination of the economy to social 
goals. That is, implied in the oikonomia model is participatory democracy 
in the economy; and hence the significance of person-in-community. 
Figure 3.1 below portrays the oikonomia model, where the community 




















There are dynamic processes in Figure 3.1 above, albeit portrayed 
statically.60 The economy reproduces both service (`) and disservice 
(dš). But, when there is economics for community, the disservices 
generated are minimal and, therefore, depletion of the biosphere is not a 
significant problem. When the community grows and develops, 

59 N.B. In set theory, the ‘set’ (or the ‘system’) is italicised, and the elements (or members) in the 
universal set are non-italicised, where: 
t = the universal set, containing everything within the outer boundary area. 
Ӣ =  the union of sets, including everything within the boundary area of the combined sets. 
ӡ =  the intersection of sets, including everything within the area of overlap between the sets. 
Է =  a subset (or subsystem) of another set (or system). This type includes the members of the other subset(s), 
but the subsets are mutually exclusive (i.e. not equal to). 
Ӈ  =  member(s) (or element(s)) of the set and any of the subset(s). 
60 In Figure 3.1, r = Biosphere. Economy Է Community Է Biosphere. In other words, ‘Community’ and 
‘Economy’ are subsets of the ‘Biosphere’. The ‘Community’ comprises the number of people living in 
an area (e.g. nation or region) receiving the services. Community = {Person, Service}. The dashed 
circle delineating the elements in the ‘Community’ (i.e. ‘Person’ and ‘`’) illustrates a representative 
and unique member of many members in the three sets. The ‘Person’ resides in all three systems. 
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sustainable economic welfare is attained. That is, implied in Figure 3.1 
are the conditions set in Eq. (3.2) for ISEW: an economic order based on 
services to the person-in-community, which is equitable and sustainable; 
whilst waste is minimised from harmful disservice activities. Thus, the 
oikonomia model expresses harmonious social community and biophysical 
interdependence. 
However, the ISEW falls short in capturing the essence of the 
authors’ hearts, an appropriate measure of the community expression of 
love. That is, the amount, quality, and character of that love, and all that 
go with it, which affect the entire person. Chapter 8 in For the Common 
Good contrasts much of what should be measured to how much one can 
measure. Apparently, the missing element within ISEW is accounting for 
social capital. The authors note that ‘oikonomia’ suggests that no 
quantifiable features of the community can measure its actual health 
(Daly and Cobb 1989:141), and thus they would probably agree that it 
would not be practicable to include a measure of social relationships. 
Yet, the authors acknowledge the weakness of their ISEW: 
 
The arguments for the ISEW are not based on the 
discussion of economics for community that constitutes 
the bulk of [our] book. They are based on contemporary 
mainstream economic discussion. Of course, on disputed 
issues we have taken sides, and the side we take is the one 
that regards equitable distribution of income as an 
economic desideratum and pollution and resource 
exhaustion as economic liabilities. Further, we believe that 
policies directed to improvement as measured by the ISEW 
would lead in directions that economics for community 
calls for. [Daly and Cobb 1989:379, emphasis added] 
 
In other words, according to Daly and Cobb (1989:379), the ISEW is 
derived from “contemporary mainstream economic discussion”. The 
theoretical foundation should be discussed in light of this claim, as 
endeavoured in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 below. 
Nonetheless, the vision they have of a ‘redirected community’ must 
bring about the fundamentals of the theoretical framework for ISEW, and 
therefore include the flow of services from social capital, indeed all forms 
of capital. As they said, “all economic decisions should serve the common 
good” (Daly and Cobb 1989:105, emphasis added). This means that the 
success of policies designed to increase the aggregate of goods and 
services must not destroy or weaken the existing patterns of social 
relationships:  
 
Our dependence on others is not simply for goods and 

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services. ... People also have some freedom to constitute 
themselves. Personal responsibility is based on that 
freedom. But this transcending of relationships does not 
introduce something separable from the social 
relationships. It can be only a partial transcending of just 
those relationships, and it is the quality of those 
relationships that makes real freedom possible[;] ... there is 
no reason to suppose that the quality of relationships 
constituting the society has been improved by the increase 
of commodities. [Daly and Cobb 1989:161] 
 
Therefore, it is argued that the crux of ISEW is to determine whether the 
economy is supporting or destroying a healthy community. Community 
is more important than ever. ISEW is also a challenge to orthodox 
economics hegemony and the fetishism of GDP. But it does not ridicule 
existing institutions; rather it calls for the paradigm shift in which the 
“market can continue to play an important role within a context that sees 
the purpose of the economy as the service of community” (Daly and Cobb 
1989:19). 
3.3 Entropic Net Psychic Income 
In The Nature of Capital and Income (1906), Irving Fisher argued ‘income’ 
is the enjoyable flow of services from capital and human beings. He defines 
capital as a stock of wealth existing at an instant of time, and the income 
as a flow of services through a period of time (Fisher 1906:52). The 
service is a person’s desirable satisfaction received from the use value of 
goods. Services are potentially brought about from the stock of capital. 
Hence, for Fisher, service (or ‘income’) is the essence of welfare, not 
necessarily the wealth itself. 
As income is the flow of services that emerge from the use of capital, 
according to Fisher, in what sense is income the more elementary 
concept? It is in the widest economic sense; Fisher considers income to 
be the fundamental concept because as psychic income it refers to the 
“desirable events” that give “meaning to all economic phenomena”. 
Hence, psychic or “subjective income” consists of psychic satisfactions, 
H2b:  The ISEW is conceptually based on “Entropic Net Psychic 
Income”: 
(i) Psychic income and outgo flow from the capital stocks. 
(ii) The notion of Fisherian Income is based on minimising 
consumption and maximising the service. 
(iii) Depletion of the finite stock of ecological capital is an entropic 
process. 
(iv) Sustainable economic welfare rests on the optimal scale. 

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namely those derived from the stock of final consumption; more 
accurately, the utilisation of artefacts. Here, we mean the ordinary 
meaning of ‘consumption’, durable and non-durable consumer goods as 
defined in the System of National Accounts (SNA).61 Of course, other 
forms of capital/wealth potentially yield services or disservices. 
Yet, a major part of the positive yield in today’s production culture is 
ultimately derived from the stock of final artefact capital. For example, 
the leisure time engaged in listening to music usually involves a digital 
compact disc, an audio player and speakers. Under Fisher’s conceptual 
framework of capital and income, the service is yielded when the use 
value of the item(s) is initiated. In this case, the psychic income is the 
final expression of enjoyment of the service, music. Leisure time is often 
needed to enjoy the service from artefacts, but if there is less leisure time 
then there is less enjoyment of the useful service. 
Hence, the final personal uses of wealth, usually referred to as 
“consumption”, are the only items that count towards the psychic 
income. In other words, the subjective services constitute the gross final 
income: 
 
The ultimate result is not finally received until it emerges in 
the stream of consciousness. ... [For example,] the final 
income consists of the subjective satisfactions of appetite 
and the other satisfactions which the intake of food 
enables the body to yield to the mind. [Fisher 
1906:167,168] 
 
However, there are negative income flows, i.e. the psychic outgoes, which 
need to be calculated. Under Fisher’s accounting framework, “psychic 
costs” (e.g. Fisher 1937:30) or “psychic disservices” of the economic 
process can be separated into the worker’s dissatisfaction of labour (and 
overwork), and all other disagreeable elements in a person’s stream of 
consciousness (e.g. see Fisher 1906:170-5), such as stress or fear of 
crime. They are deducted from the gross (psychic) income to arrive at 
“net psychic income”. 
Net psychic income is the total subjective positive satisfactions from 
the use of food, clothing, furniture, dwellings (shelter), transportation, 
telephone communications, Internet services, the use of theatres, use of 
books and the uses of services of every other artefact, minus the 
undesirable subjective efforts put forth by human beings in order that 
these satisfactions may accrue (Fisher 1906:174, 1937:34). As in Eq. (3.3) 
below, net psychic income is equal to the sum of the ‘psychic income’ 

61 Nonetheless, we utilise the more neutral term, ‘artefact’, as in the stock of ‘final artefact capital’ 




(ʌǊ) minus the sum of the ‘psychic outgo’ (ʌʍ): 
NetPsychicIncome = υ(PsychicIncome–PsychicOutgo) = υ(ɏþ–ɏɐ)
= υ(PsychicServices–PsychicDisservices)
= υ(PsychicBenefits–PsychicCosts)   (3.3)
Eq. (3.3) illustrates the different ways of expressing the “psyche”—i.e. all 
the corresponding terms (e.g. psychic income and psychic service) are 
equal. The key for hypothesis H2b(i), is that the nature of the income 
transactions are psychic based. 
He considered both ‘money income’ and ‘yield income’ important 
(see Fisher 1939:357).62 But obviously, the psychic definition of income is 
the most significant for ISEW. It is somewhat problematic when 
developing a set of national accounts based on so-called “objective social 
income” (i.e. money income available for society) to measure welfare. For 
money income, the net benefits of the economic activities would be 
difficult to calculate as all ‘objective costs’ are, always, ‘objective income’, 
and hence disappear in the final summation.63 As Fisher says, 
 
every rent and interest payment, while it is a cost to the 
payer is income to the payee. The total objective income of 
society consists wholly of positive items[,] ... [t]here are no 
negative items in the account of social income which survive 
in the form of ‘costs of production’. [Fisher 1906:174, 
emphases added] 
 
That is, depending on the angle taken, the “costs of production” are 
equivalent to money income. A welfare measure conceptually founded on 
so-called objective (i.e. non-psychic) income is inherently biased 
upwards, because the negative psychic forms of income (outgoes, 
disservices, costs) are not included in the final transaction. According to 
Fisher (1906:174), the subjective income provides the correct 
interpretation of society’s potential net welfare, as the costs are psychic 
dissatisfactions and the income flows are the psychic satisfactions. 
Therefore, the ISEW is conceptually sound (H2b) because, in 
principle, it centres on psychic service adjustments, rather than non-
psychic transactions. For example, psychic services flowing from final 
artefact capital, durable fixed capital, and non-market activities in the 
ISEW encompass, respectively, ‘personal consumption expenditures’ 
including consumer durables, government roads and highways, and 
household labour. But economic activity also generates irksome 
activities, for example, air and water pollution. The psychic 
outgoes/disservices/costs of the economic process are thus deducted in 

62 His meaning of income is ‘services’ or ‘yield income’ or simply ‘yield’. 
63 Unless all costs to society were embedded in the production process, which is seldom the case. 
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ISEW; this is the second amendment. In essence, ‘net psychic income’ is 
the total satisfactions received from the use value of goods minus the 
undesirable or unwanted side effects from the production process. For 
other examples, see Philip Andrew Lawn (2003)—the first author linking 
the components of the ISEW to the net psychic income. Hence, the 
summation of the positive and negative flows of subjective income 
provides a good conceptual foundation for calculating the ISEW of a 
population through time (H2b(i)). 
But there is a further important aspect of ISEW, ‘sustainability’. The 
sustainable part of ISEW is the welfare a nation enjoys at a particular 
point in time given the impact of past and present activities (see Lawn 
2006a). With respect to sub-hypothesis H2b, an important question 
arises: to what extent is this adjustment of sustainability vis-à-vis 
‘income’, theoretically sound? An important point is that the measure of 
income based on the strong sustainability principle entails that both 
ecological capital and human-made capital must be kept intact.64 This 
principle is critical because it implies that any increase of the quantity of 
human-made capital is unable to offset the depletion of ecological capital 
sufficiently to maintain a constant stream of income, or consumption, 
over time.65 
However, Lawn (2006b) argues against Hicksian income even if it is a 
strong sustainability version, and focuses on Fisher’s concept of income 
and capital to develop the Sustainable Net Benefit Index (SNBI), 
providing theoretical support for ISEW and the Genuine Progress 
Indicator (GPI). In short, according to Lawn, the problem is that Hicksian 
income wrongly associates economic welfare with the rate of production 
and consumption. By keeping capital and income separate, Fisher’s notion 
forces one to recognise that since the stock of human-made capital 
depreciates and wears out through use, its continual maintenance is a 
cost not a benefit because:66 
 
the maintenance of human-made capital requires the 
production of new goods that ... can only occur if there is 
an ongoing throughput of matter-energy (the input of low 
entropy resources and the output of high entropy wastes). 
This … results in the inevitable loss of some of the source, 
sink and life-support services provided by natural capital—
the uncancelled cost of the socioeconomic process. [Lawn 

64 Human-made capital refers to all producer and consumer goods but also “labour” in Lawn 
(2003). 
65 That is, ecological capital (resource assets, ecosystem services etc.) and physical capital 
(producer goods such as plant, machinery, and equipment) are perfect or near-perfect 
complements. For various reasons, according to Lawn, ecological and human-made capital are 
non-substitutable (see Lawn 2006b:20-1). 






The distinction between income and capital via Fisher has an important 
result: that the production to replace worn out human-made capital is a 
cost; this is because throughput is a cost-inducing physical flow.67 
The implication for the sustainable part of ISEW is that the 
‘maintenance cost of human-made capital’ is not a “psychic” cost per se, 
but a different type of cost, the depreciation flow of ecological capital 
(H2b(iii)). Why? Lawn and Sanders (1999:215) argue that the process of 
transforming a portion of ecological capital into artefact wealth is a 
perpetual task, because the capacity of an individual item to satisfy 
human desires is eventually lost, i.e. the artefact is either consumed or 
through use, wears out. Consequently, according to Lawn, satisfaction of 
human needs—the psychic income—ultimately depends on the original 
source of all economic activity, ecological capital.68 Lawn (2001:80), in 
agreement with Boulding (1966c), says that only the service-yielding 
qualities of human-made capital, not the rate at which human-made 
capital is consumed, should be maximised. If the same level of service 
can be enjoyed from less consumption, this would be a gain because it 
would require less production to maintain the stock of human-made 
capital intact. While it is necessary to consume human-made capital to 
enjoy the net psychic income, consumption should be viewed as “a 
necessary evil” and something to be minimised. 
Therefore, consistent with Lawn and Sanders, there are two major 
types of final transactions in the ISEW: 1) the “uncancelled benefits” (the 
net psychic income); and 2) the “uncancelled costs” (the depletion of 
ecological capital). Firstly, the cancelling out of psychic disservices or 
‘psychic outgo’ from psychic income enables one to obtain a measure of 
net psychic income—the final or the so-called ‘uncancelled’ benefit of 
economic activity: 
 
Net psychic income is the uncancelled benefit of economic 
activity because, in tracing the course of economic activity 
from its source (natural capital) to its final, psychic 
conclusion, every intermediate [monetary] transaction 
involves the cancelling out of a receipt and expenditure of 
the same magnitude [i.e. the seller receives what a buyer 
pays]. Only once an item of wealth is in the same 
possession of the final user or consumer is there no 
additional exchange and, therefore, no further cancelling of 
transactions (Daly, 1979: p. 81). [Lawn and Sanders 

67 The throughput flow does not yield services directly; it must be accumulated and fashioned into a 
stock of useful artefact capital. 
68 “This is because natural capital is the sole source of low entropy matter-energy and the ultimate 





Secondly, the loss of ecological capital services constitutes the final or 
“uncancelled cost” of economic activity: 
 
[N]o matter how benignly human beings conduct their 
activities, the subsequent disarrangement of matter-energy 
always has some deleterious impact on the natural 
environment. ... [H]uman beings have ... to ... accept some 
loss of the free source-sink and life-support services 
provided by natural capital[;] as some portion of the low 
entropy it provides is transformed into physical 
commodities and returns, once they have been consumed, 
as high entropy waste. [Lawn and Sanders 1999:216] 
 
Hence, the ISEW is equal to the uncancelled benefits minus the 
uncancelled costs. 
In summary, apart from artefact capital itself, what remains at the end 
of the process is the uncancelled exchange value of the psychic income 
the consumer expects to gain from the artefact, plus any psychic 
disbenefits associated with the artefact’s production (H2b(i)).69 In 
addition, there are the ecological capital services sacrificed in the process 
of accumulating the artefact capital—the “final or ‘uncancelled’ costs” of 
economic activity to keep the stock of human-made capital intact 
(H2b(iii)). Therefore, ingrained in the Fisherian notion of income and 
capital (H2b(ii)), ISEW is theoretically a measure of entropic net psychic 
income (H2b). That is, ISEW is equal to the net psychic income (żʌǊ) 
minus the depreciation of ecological capital (ɷEK), as in Eq. (3.4) below70: 
ISEW = EntropicNetPsychicIncome
 = υ(UBenefits–UCosts)






In relation to sub-hypothesis H2b, the ISEW is conceptually sound as it 
interweaves sustainability and service to arrive at a measure of entropic 
net psychic income. 
The entropic net psychic income (ISEW) can be portrayed below as 

69 If the psychic costs are subtracted from the good’s final selling price, the difference constitutes 
the ‘use value’ (see Lawn 2005:189,192). 
70 An additional assumption employed in Eq. (4) is that the value for consumption expenditure is 




follows. The production process is dependent on the durability of the 
capital stocks, especially ecological capital. Capital stocks are open 
systems whose maintenance requires a continual exchange with the 
environment, a continual throughput of matter-energy. Figure 3.2 below 
illustrates the economy as an open subsystem in the larger biophysical 
system subject to entropic processes, and that the economic growth is 
inextricably linked with ecological capital for services including 


















In Figure 3.2 above, ‘net psychic income’ (żʌǊ) flows from the stock of 
‘Human-made capital’ in the ‘Economic Growth Subsystem’.71 The 
economy is reliant either directly or indirectly on ecological capital such 
as natural resources, biodiversity and sinks for its continuance and 
reproduction. But, growth of economic activities generates high entropy 
(waste, degraded form of energy) and can disrupt biological 
relationships, i.e. as the economy expands there is loss of ecological 
capital services (ɷEK). (The purple arrow on the corner angle of the 
economic growth subsystem illustrates this.) This happens because the 
ecosystem and economy are interdependent, i.e. in relation to hypothesis 
H2b(iii), the economy is entrenched in an ultimately finite ecosystem. 
In order to measure the entropic net psychic income, it might 
therefore be necessary to base the ISEW on some sort of optimal scale. 
Thereby leading to hypothesis H2b(iv). Lawn adopts Daly and Cobb’s 
(1989) ISEW notion of ‘optimal scale’, albeit without an “economics for 
community” framework.72 Sustaining the optimal stock of human-made 

71 r = Ecological System = {Low entropy, Degraded high entropy, ɷEK}. ‘Human-made capital’ is the 
‘Economic Growth Subsystem’ minus ‘żʌǊ’. Economic Growth Subsystem Է Ecological System. 
























capital requires the following: 1) A continued source of low-entropy 
resources; and 2) the continued availability of a high entropy waste-
absorbing sink. In effect, according to Lawn, the ecosphere has a limited 
carrying capacity—the ecosphere is both the primary source of low 
entropy as well as the sole high entropy waste-assimilating sink (see 
Lawn 2001:49). In view of hypothesis H2b(iv), there is simply a need to 
ensure that in attempting to increase or maintain the structural 
organisation of macroeconomic systems, the ecosphere’s source and 
sink functions remain intact. The conclusion with respect to sub-
hypothesis H2b is that ISEW is based on a strong theoretical foundation, 
entropic net psychic income. 
3.4 Social Welfare Function – Maximising the Net 
Benefits of Economic Growth 
Welfare economics is concerned with ordering different social states and 
determining whether people are better or worse off over time. Welfare 
has economic and non-economic components. “The economic welfare of 
the country is intimately associated with the size of the national dividend, 
and changes in economic welfare with changes in the size of the 
dividend” (Pigou 1932:50). Outside the market place is “non-economic 
welfare” such as the character and passion of a human being, love and 
the beauty of nature (Pigou 1932:11-4). Hence, ISEW depends on the 
provision of welfare components from the market and non-market 
contexts. The principle of maximising social welfare is essential to the 
ISEW (Clarke and Islam 2004:11). 
ISEW (version three) is based on some of the principles of welfare 
economics.73 One of the fundamental assumptions of welfare economics 
is that “[t]he economy is geared mainly towards improving human 
welfare, primarily through increases in the consumption [expenditures] of 
goods and services. ... Economic progress is evaluated mainly in terms of 

73 For example, the assumptions of the “fundamental theorems” are not incorporated in the ISEW. 
This is a good thing (e.g. see Blaug 2007). 
H2c: Utilising some principles of welfare economics, the ISEW is 
theoretically based on a “Social Welfare Function”: 
(i) Decision utility is a function of consumption expenditures 
(GDP). 
(ii) (A) Social choice, (B) partial comparability, and (C) cost-
benefit analysis can be fused together to construct a workable 
social welfare function. 
(iii) Negative social and environmental externalities can be 
calculated by compensatory or defensive expenditures. 
(iv) Systems analysis is imbedded in the adjusted-GDP indicator to 
assess the net benefits of economic growth. 
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welfare (or utility)—measured as willingness to pay for goods and 
services consumed” (Islam et al. 2003:150,152). The authors argue that 
there are legitimate economic reasons for using GDP as a limited 
measure of social welfare (see Clarke and Islam 2003:3, 2006:221). At an 
aggregate level, GDP is the summation of all individuals’ revealed 
preferences for particular consumption bundles. “Just as revealed 
preferences can indicate whether the welfare of an individual has 
increased or decreased, thus, so too can GDP indicate this for the entire 
economy” (Clarke and Islam 2004:49). When people buy goods or 
services, they generally do so because they believe that their purchase will 
leave them in some way better off. That is, after deducting the actual 
purchase price, there will be some residual or net value. The revealed 
preference is known as “decision utility”.74 Decision utility is the starting 
point of the ISEW (H2c(i)). 
However, individual preferences are not necessarily welfare (or utility) 
enhancing choices. “Choices are not made within a framework of stable, 
pre-existing, limitless cognitive capacity, certainty, and full knowledge of 
the choices faced by others[.] ... [I]t cannot be assumed that individual 
preferences revealed within the market place can be aggregated to reflect 
socially optimal outcomes in terms of social welfare” (Clarke and Islam 
2004:13). There are valid reasons for doubting the worth of individual 
valuations. Mishan and Quah (2007:245-6) say that within a modern 
growth economy in which the ‘Joneses effect’ is discernible, there is an 
“[i]ncipient fragmentation of a consensus about the propriety of 
consumer goods and activity”. Similarly, as noted by Clarke and Islam 
(2005b:184), “newly acquired affluence (particularly in developing 
countries) may lead to less healthy diets based on conspicuous 
consumption of fatty or high cholesterol foods, increased rates of 
smoking and alcohol use, etc., which all may reduce health outcomes—
despite higher levels of income”. Much evidence suggests that society 
can have little confidence that the valuations people place on goods have 
a close association to their decision utility or subjective wants (Ng 2003, 
Sagoff 2003). That is to say, the individual choice and their decision 
utility can be at odds with the welfare optimising social choice 
(H2c(ii)(A)). 
“Social choice” is about relating social judgements to the views and 
interests of the individuals who make up the society. Evaluating the 
“social choice” is critical for the theoretical and methodological 
foundations of the ISEW, albeit it is somewhat controversial. Arrow 
(1951) demonstrated that it was impossible to satisfy a set of axioms of 
reasonableness to make a non-dictatorial social choice. He proved that a 
social welfare function could not be constructed, because there would be 
failure in one of four “reasonable” assumptions of transitivity; the Pareto 

74 For a good literature review on the different types of “utility”, see Daniel Read (2007). 
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Criteria; independence; and democracy. However, these “reasonable 
restrictions” were unreasonable as they ruled out by assumption 
interpersonal comparisons of welfare, i.e. the ability to weigh the gains of 
winners against the losses of losers (see Sen 1966, 1970a, 1970b, 1997). 
The strict extremes of “full comparability” and “no comparability” are not 
that useful. This demands “partial comparability”, which will be effective 
for making social decisions or generating an ‘optimal’ choice 
(H2c(ii)(B)).75 “We may be able to make interpersonal comparisons to 
some extent, but not in every comparison, nor of every type, nor with 
tremendous exactness” (Sen 1999:356). With the use of interpersonal 
comparisons in social welfare judgements, Arrow’s impossibility 
disappears. Hence, the empirical exercise for the ISEW need not be as 
daunting as it is sometimes believed. 
Undertaking social judgements in welfare economics has theoretical 
roots (H2c(ii)(A,B)). Abram Bergson (1938) noted that a socially optimal 
mix of goods and services would need to personify social welfare 
judgements of distributional justice, or, fairness. Similarly, others, such 
as John Rawls (1971), also questioned the utilitarian neglect of 
distributional issues. Therefore, incorporating principles of equity is 
imperative for the social welfare function based on a social choice 
framework (Slesnick 1998:2149). An unequal distribution has 
implications for social welfare (ISEW). Thereby, the social choice of 
adjusting consumption for inequality and accounting for 
intergenerational equity is acceptable. At a conceptual level, the social 
welfare function for ISEW embodies relating social preference (or 
decisions) to the set of individual preferences. Individual preferences will 
not achieve optimal social welfare outcomes, e.g. with regard to certain 
concepts, such as sustainability, because the environment is a public 
good (see Clarke 2006a:153). The use of interpersonal comparisons 
allows public decisions to be sensitive to inequalities in well-being and 
opportunities, here, we are “emphasizing the possibility of constructive 
social choice theory” (Sen 1999:365). 
Normative social choice theory incorporates the various social 
concerns about welfare that are inadequately captured using individual 
preference satisfaction techniques in the market place (Clarke 2006a:153, 
Clarke and Islam 2005a:86). For ISEW, social choice extends this 
consensus from the individual/household to the society: 
 
By operationalising social choice theory, society’s choices, 
preferences and value judgements on issues of economic 
equity and efficiency, intergenerational equity, aggregation, 
value judgements, justice, poverty, measurement and 

75 Yet, even when an optimal alternative does not emerge, it can help to limit the set of 
undominated alternatives to which a ‘maximising choice’ can be confined (Sen 1993). 
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market perspectives versus social perspectives are 
considered. [Clarke and Islam 2004:14] 
 
The conceptual/methodological framework for estimating ISEW is thus a 
social welfare function derived from the principles of normative social 
choice theory, where undertaking widely-acceptable value judgements. 
Social choices are made through institutions, such as parliamentary 
democracy or the free market, not abstract mathematical aggregations 
(e.g. Just et al. 2004:8-10,579). They can be estimated by many methods, 
such as by using expert (or analyst) opinion, government formulated 
public policy, or willingness to pay, hedonic prices and contingent 
valuation methods. This clarifies the problem of designing a workable 
social welfare function. 
With social choice theory, an optimal social outcome is possible by 
imbedding social preferences within a cost-benefit analysis 
(H2c(ii)(A,B,C)). Boadway and Bruce (1984) argue that cost-benefit 
analysis is a useful framework to rank social states (or projects) when the 
forces of private profitability are unable to rank according to social 
orderings (see Clarke and Islam 2004:61). Cost-benefit analysis in ISEW 
entails assigning monetary values (such as shadow prices) to the various 
“economic” and “non-economic” costs and benefits of economic growth 
(Clarke and Islam 2003:5). The economic transactions are market-based, 
while the non-economic are the effects that are not captured elsewhere in 
the economy. All these impacts are summed for each period and all these 
current values are converted into a present value. This is achieved with 
time preferences and social discount rates (see Boadway and Bruce 
1984). Note that the ISEW is predominantly concerned with 
socioeconomic and environmental costs (and benefits) to society. 
These costs are also referred to as negative externalities or external 
diseconomies (H2c(iii)). In the 1920s, Pigou (1932:183-92) effectively 
developed the concept of “externality” by arguing that there is a disparity 
between private economic production and public economic product—
alluding to child labour, maternity leave for working mothers, alcohol, 
war and factory production. The problem of externalities is those 
unintended consequences of choice, i.e. choices that bring benefits only 
at the expense of certain (often-unanticipated) costs. All external effects, 
positive or negative, have two properties: interdependency and lack of 
compensation (see Barkley and Seckler 1972:7,101). For example, the 
major theme of Mishan’s (1967) essay in The Costs of Economic Growth 
was the salient factors responsible for the growing incidence of external 
diseconomies imposed on the public at large by modern industries, 
which thereby increase pressure on life. These are large enough to be 
obviously in need of remedial correction. He was critical of economists 
engrossed in mathematical models of growth while ignoring the events 
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taking shape around them, such as the social tensions generated from 
the production process, poisoned rivers from chemical effluent, or the 
‘uglification’ of coastal towns. He could not see private enterprise 
embedded in the existing institutional framework solving growth 
problems. For instance, the firm does not take into account the overflow 
effects on the city’s traffic when it decides to construct additional floor 
space or demolish old buildings in order to build taller ones while 
settling in a crowded city. Mishan (1967:110) notes how strange our kind 
of civilisation is which leaves initiative in designing our cities, 
fragmentary, for the most part to commercial interests, and their 
approval to frugal councillors. And we do so at a time when, with more 
evidence than before in history, pecuniary instincts are dominant—e.g. 
the ascendancy of financial capital in the various stock markets since the 
1970s, manifesting speculative bubbles during the 1980s–2000s. 
Given these widespread negative externalities, the longer-term 
development of net income or net product in an industrial economy is of 
significance for welfare theory: Does the growth of national product arise 
parallel to the growth in consumption opportunities? Or: Has the 
production process made possible over time an increase in net 
consumption? The notion of compensatory expenditure can aid our 
understanding of the ‘net income’ or ‘net consumption’ of the 
economy—i.e. estimating the negative externalities with reference to the 
rise in consumption expenditures. Christian Leipert explains the theory of 
compensatory expenditures: 
 
The production and consumption process has, over time, 
unequal positive and negative effects on the living, 
environmental, and working conditions of the people. 
Some of these negative side-effects now lead to economic 
activities aimed at eliminating, reducing, or neutralizing 
them. ... The associated expenditures are, seen in the 
longer term, additional costs, which, in contrast to the 
initial period on which the comparison is based, are 
essential for the production of the actually desired 
consumption and investment goods. [Leipert 1986:115] 
 
The time–space consideration is important here. In the short term, 
compensatory expenditures are both necessary and useful. But in the 
longer-term, the additional external costs and expenditures must be 
accepted by society when a particular development and settlement 
pattern has become established. 
Note that compensatory or regrettable expenditures are effectively 
“defensive expenditures”. These are welfare-maintaining outlays that are 
necessary to defend and protect ourselves from the unwanted side 
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effects, or the costs, of production and consumption (see Leipert 
1989a:844). He provides many examples of compensatory/defensive 
expenditures that correspond well to ISEW. For example, the clean-up 
and repair costs associated with automobile accidents, and the 
expenditures resulting from increased levels of pollution causing ill-
health and stress.76 “Seen from a dynamic perspective, defensive 
expenditures are additional macroeconomic costs incurred by a specific 
growth and development pattern” (Leipert 1989b:28). With a “welfare-
orientated revision of the GNP, a more comprehensive and refined 
measure of the real net consumption of private households may be 
obtained” (Leipert 1986:119). This “real net consumption” indicator is 
the ISEW. Finally, the critical thing, “[c]ompensatory expenditure 
categories ... permit... qualitative judgments” (Leipert 1986:120). In 
relation to hypotheses H2c(ii,iii), this is significant for the ISEW 
enshrined in social choice theory/cost-benefit analysis. 
It is argued that the ISEW is theoretically based on a social welfare 
function (H2c). Social welfare (SW) is a function of only part (d) of 




That is, consumption is a major positive component of economic welfare. 
Islam and Clarke (2002:202,203) effectively say that tastes and 
preferences are considered unchanged over time.77 This means that 
conspicuous consumption is not significant in the conceptual framework 
of the ISEW, but it may be taken into account indirectly. Besides, in 
theory, only a certain fraction of consumption is utilised because of the 
inclusion of non-welfare-increasing compensatory expenditures. The 
actions that destroy the range of consumption-expenditure choices are 
the focal point of the ISEW. Accordingly, social welfare can be considered 
a function of the positive (B) and negative (C) aspects of economic 
growth (EG): 
SWt =ƒ(B{EG}–C{EG})     (3.5)
GDP is normally a criterion of a social welfare function, yet GDP 
calculates the impacts of all economic activities, positive or negative 
(Clarke and Islam 2003:6). However, this particular social welfare 
function considers the benefits and costs of GDP. “The use of cost-
benefit analysis allows the new measure of welfare to increase and 

76 Economic growth causes health externalities (see Clarke and Islam 2005b:182,183, 2006:224). 
The preferences or utility of agents do not internalise the costs or externalities of economic 
choices. 
77 But, endogenous preferences are critical for welfare analysis (e.g. see Bowles 1998). 
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decrease as both costs and benefits of economic activity are now 
included, rather than just the benefits” (Islam and Clarke 2002:212-3). 
Hence, Eq. (5) is not the sum of individual welfare but a function of the 
costs and benefits of economic growth.78 
The per capita ISEW is also known as an “adjusted-GDP” measure 
(H2c(iv)). Islam and Clarke (2005:293) argue that “by utilizing social 
choice theory and systems analysis, it is possible to adjust GDP so that it 
does become an indirect indicator of sustainability and social welfare”. 
(The assumption by the authors is that the national accounts are useful 
and valid for measuring welfare.) The key thing is that “sustainability is 
reliant upon a functioning and robust socio-economic environment 
system” (Clarke and Islam 2006:225). Hence, the interest is the “social, 
economic and environmentally adjusted GDP (SEE AGDP)”. SEE ADGP is 
the ISEW, as shown in Eq. (3.6) below: 
     T
ISEWt= SEEAGDP = υăBt(Ect,Envt,Soct,Polt,Spirt)
     t=1  (1+r)t    (3.6)
In Eq. (3.6), the maximisation of present value of the net benefits (żB = B 
– C) of economic growth—i.e. benefits from decision utility minus the 
costs of the SEE damages caused by economic growth.79 According to 
Clarke and Islam (2004:49,63), the social welfare function includes five 
components of a SEE system. The components of a SEE system include 
the economic (Ec), social (Soc), political (Pol), environmental (Env) and 
spiritual (Spir) sub-systems (see Clarke and Islam 2003:7,9). As social 
welfare is a function of the entire SEE system, ISEW takes into account 
changes within each subsystem. 
More specifically, what is the relationship between the system and the 
ISEW? According to the authors of SEE AGDP, society is made up of 
many subsystems that inter-relate in a dynamic manner80: 
 
[S]ociety is systems based[,] ... one sub-system of many 
that in total make up society. ... Society is a complex 
system, of which the economy is only one sub-system. ... 
By implementing a systems analysis view of society a more 
developed understanding, and consequently measure, of 
welfare can be achieved. [Clarke and Islam 2004:22,33,71] 

78 The authors provide interesting examples of the market and the social choice perspectives vis-à-
vis the various subsystems in Chapter 4 of Economic Growth and Social Welfare. 
79 Note that in the Thai ISEW, “[t]he reference set is endogenous in the sense that the decisions 
made by the present generations will impact on whom future generations will actually be” (Clarke 
2003:97). For pragmatic reasons, Clarke (2003:99) uses a social discount rate equal to zero. This 
means that the needs of the present generation are explicitly made equal to the needs of the future 
generations. 





In other words, sustainability cannot be measured in static terms. “A 
divergence between the GDP and SEE AGDP indices is an indirect 
indicator of unsustainability, as the robustness and health of the socio-
economic and environmental system is decreasing” (Islam and Clarke 
2005:289). The trend of SEE AGDP provides a partial measure of 
‘sustainability’, as “sustainability is a property of the path the economy is 
on and not of the state of the system at any given time” (Atkinson et al. 
1997:62). Therefore, ISEW or SEE AGDP is potentially useful for 
intertemporal and interspatial comparisons of welfare (H2c(iv)). 
However, the actual relationship between the system and ISEW 
remains unclear. For instance, Sustainability: A Systems Approach by 
Clayton and Radcliffe (1996) is a key reference frequently cited by Clarke 
and Islam to justify—albeit without much explanation—the “systems-
analysis” in SEE AGDP. Hence, to make this theory somewhat coherent, 
the authors’ work is supplemented. A systems approach to sustainability 
entails considering the various agents interacting in the world as systems 
(Clayton and Radcliffe 1996:13,17). In this case, the key system is 
‘society’, which comprises the economic, social, political, environmental 
and spiritual sub-systems (i.e. Ec, Soc, Pol, Env, Spir spheres in Eq. (3.6)). 
And the delineation of the system boundary of ‘society’ is the 


















The point of intersection determines the net benefits of economic growth 
(żB) in Figure 3.3 above, where all the benefits and costs of the 
subsystems are aggregated.81 When net benefits of economic growth are 

81 ‘Society’ is the union of the five subsystems in Eq. (6): Society = Ec Ӣ Soc Ӣ Pol Ӣ Env Ӣ Spir. r = 
















increasing over time, the area of żB is larger. When they are decreasing 
over time, żB-area is smaller. A functioning and robust SEE system is 
partly determined by the interconnectedness (or proximity) of the 
spheres. And the extent of the interconnectedness is signified by the 
degree of divergence between the GDP and SEE AGDP indices. Society is 
making progress when the spheres are becoming more ‘connected’ or 
‘closely knitted’: żB-area is larger (increasing) and ultimately the 
ecosystem is less exploited over time. Society is regressing when the 
subsystems are becoming disconnected: żB-area is smaller (decreasing) 
while the ecosystem is being depleted. Hence, in Figure 3.3, the ultimate 
constraint of societal development is the ecosystem, as ‘society’ is 
embedded in the ecosystem.82 
Disaggregating the spheres into a subsystem (of society) is useful 
and thereby the discrete contribution of each aspect to social welfare can 
be identified. However, an influential assumption in the SEE AGDP is 
that the division of the aggregation does not affect the operation of the 
parts. That is, the summation of the various subsystems constitutes the 
whole.83 This can be a problematic assumption. Moreover, the 
subsystems of society are drawn in similar dimensions at inert positions. 
But the real disposition of the society is determined by factors that are 
much more complex: the subsystems are of uneven spatial size and are 
continually moving in multiple directions. The important thing, as 
Clayton and Radcliff (1996:22) state, is that the “essential system 
structure” is captured in the model (e.g. Figure 3.3), and that the 
structure of the model reflects the rudiments present in reality. A 
preliminary question arises. How well do the ISEW theories describe the 
real makeup of society, i.e. the “essential system structure”? Indeed, this 
is a critical question as the conceptual foundation of the ISEW depends 
on it. The following section elucidates this matter. 
  

(‘Benefits’ minus ‘Costs’) is equal to the intersection of the five subsystems of ‘Society’. ‘Society’ = 
Benefits – Costs = Ec ӡ Soc ӡ Pol ӡ Env ӡ Spir. Interconnectedness of the subsystems = Society – 
area of żB. 
82 Apparently in Clarke and Islam (2005a:85), the social sub-systems of the “ecological parent 
system” are the economic, social, environment, political and spiritual. Overall, however, in Clarke 
and Islam (2004), society is the primary sub-system vis-à-vis the “ecological parent system”, 
mentioned on p.16 (three times), p.22 (twice under section “2.2.4.3 Systems Approach”); and p.33 
(three times). Note that the “optimal well-being of society” is referred to “human” or “social” well-
being (Clarke 2006a:158,162). 
83 To approach the problem of complexity, so-called sophisticated reductionism is employed. 
Simplicity in ISEW construction involves dealing with aggregates and averages, and by treating 
units (e.g. monetary) as equivalent and interchangeable. 
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3.5 Conjectural Problems of the ISEW: Abstracting from 
the Disembedded Economy? 
Now that the three underlying theories of ISEW have been presented, it is 
time to critically evaluate—as referred to by Schumpeter (1911)—the 
“preanalytic vision” of each analysis. The preanalytical vision informs our 
perceptions and interpretations of the reality. That is, the things deemed 
desirable and the things deemed possible were invariably preselected by 
our (their) own place of analysis. Of interest is the different ways in which 
the theories attempt to describe the relationship between the spheres of 
economy, society and ecology. Evidently, the link between economy and 
ecology is well developed by ISEW advocates. Generally, the theories are 
consistent in portraying economic activity as a dominant and 
contradictory subsystem of the ecological system. But the descriptions of 
society or the social sphere are contrasted and the explanations are 
somewhat vague. In the oikonomia model, the economy is a subsystem 
of community. In the social welfare function, the social and economic 
systems make up (in part) the dynamics of society. In the entropic net 
psychic income version of ISEW, society and community are 
underplayed, i.e. communicated less importantly than they really are.84 
Why are there gaps in the theory of society/the social system? Indeed, 
how large are the gaps? These are surprising results, given that the 
advocates of ISEW espouse concreteness, i.e. “being real, being identified 
by experience, not abstraction” (O’Hara 1995:540). It becomes necessary 
to consider the “real” relationship between economic activity and its 
ecological and social context. 
Social factors are interwoven with economic growth (see Hagen 
1972:53). Successful social growth in any society depends on a set of 
qualitative standards of (sustainable) development. Any society needs a 
certain amount of special force, energy, and insight to put forward a new 
technical, artistic, social or technological combination. It is the role of the 
entrepreneur to actuate these combinations. Furthermore, not only does 
society need resources, labour, knowledge, savings, investment, and 
enterprise, but a social ideology that will permit all these factors to operate 
together. As David Wright (1951:37) argues, “[a] favourable cultural 
atmosphere is one of the most important and one of the most usually 
overlooked requirements for economic growth”. However, the basic 
problem of change constantly recurs: “it is the task of balancing sets of 
qualities never wholly harmonious yet all indispensable for successful 
civilization” (Wright 1951:38, emphasis added). 

84 There is an argument that social and communal dimensions are indirectly captured in psychic 
income, since in theory it captures subjective dimensions of entropic income that go beyond 
objective measures of environmental impact. Even though valuations may be individually based, 
they are not completely devoid of collective values and goals. Instead, the ISEW (version two) 
simply captures quantitative valuations of such impacts. 
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According to Sabine O’Hara (1998:177), sustainability is defined as 
“economic activity which sustains the material world and the biological, 
ecological and social processes which describe it”. Sustainability requires 
that no less than three types of material constraints be considered: (1) 
sustaining individual physical needs; (2) sustaining social relationships; 
(3) sustaining biological and ecological services. Each of these three 
areas of sustainability requires at least three types of services: 
technological services, relational services and ecosystem services. She 
writes, “[t]he challenge is that their provision is not mutually compatible 
but in tension. Consideration of the material context of economic activity 
thus requires seeking a balance between the technological, relational and 
ecosystems services which can both support and undermine it” (O’Hara 
1998:178, emphasis added). 
Therefore, a major qualification for sustainable economic welfare 
entails the moderation of discordant forces within and between the 
spheres of economy, society and ecology—but this ‘balancing act’ is 
ultimately constrained by the dominant social ideology. Yet these 
prerequisites are disembodied in the ISEW analyses, because in their 
preanalytical vision the authors are embracing the things deemed 
desirable over the things deemed possible. Conceptually, that is, ISEW 
advocates focus on describing what society wants (e.g. service, psychic 
income or social welfare) more willingly than on how society works (i.e. in 
tension with economic activity). Describing society in the system that we 
currently have is the critical thing in political economy. We are going to 
show that the theoretical particulars of ISEW are not as well developed as 
they should be, viz. sub-hypothesis H2d below: 
The theories of ISEW need radical reconstruction. There are major 
limitations in the capital/income approach to sustainable development 
as construed by ecological economists, i.e. Daly and Lawn. They have a 
tendency to view ‘capital’ and ‘service’ as largely autonomous of a 
specific socioeconomic system (H2d(i)). In these two theories, the basic 
institutions of capitalism remain unchanged, as do the fundamental 
relations of power. Their notions require a shift in lifestyle and consumer 
orientation; the economy is no longer geared to economic growth and 
the enlargement of profits, but to efficiency, equity, and qualitative 
H2d:  The theoretical particulars of the ISEW misplace concretely the 
workings of the capitalist system: 
(i) ‘Capital’, ‘service’ and ‘society’ are viewed largely as separate 
from a specific socioeconomic system. 
(ii) Economic relationships tend to dominate other aspects of 
culture in the disembedded economy. 
(iii) The political economy of the disembedded system provides an 
alternative theoretical approach to the ISEW. 
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improvements in life. A capitalist society formerly driven to expanded 
reproduction through investment of surplus product (or surplus value) 
has been replaced by a system of simple reproduction of service or 
psychic income, in which the surplus is consumed rather than invested. 
John Bellamy Foster (2005) writes, “[t]he vision is one of a cultural 
revolution supplementing technological revolution, radically changing the 
ecological and social landscape of capitalist society, without 
fundamentally altering the productive, property, and power relations that 
define the system” (Foster 2005:9, emphasis added). 
Similarly, as put forward by Martin O’Connor (1994:126), instead of 
nature being “treated as an external and exploitable domain”, it is 
conceived as “self-management and conservation of the system of 
capitalized nature closed back on itself”. In this fashion, “the reproduction 
of capital [becomes] synonymous with saving nature—[t]he planet as a 
whole is our capital, which must be sustainably managed” (O’Connor 
1994:32-3). The ‘sustainable development’ issue is thus structured in 
terms of the ontological predominance of the economy (mainly the 
market) or nature. The tension between capitalism’s specific material 
requirements and the requirements of a healthy coevolution of humanity 
and nature is not considered. That is, the ISEW theories do not realise 
that capitalism is a multifarious socioeconomic system with contesting 
ideologies, values and beliefs—made the more difficult with 
contradictory relations and vested interests deeply-rooted (O’Hara 2005). 
More specifically, capitalism is not a distinct homogeneous and 
transferable arrangement, and does not offer a plain definition of 
material requirements and their conflict with co-evolutionary human 
social and environmental systems. Instead, capitalism has numerous 
manifestations, with the US and UK on one end of the spectrum and the 
Scandinavians on the other. For instance, neoliberal market economies 
(e.g. Australia, Iceland, UK and US) coordinate economic activity through 
markets and corporate hierarchies, whereas coordinated market 
economies, such as Germany and Sweden, coordinate economic activity 
more through nonmarket mechanisms, such as informal networks or 
corporatist bargaining (Campbell and Pedersen 2008:307-8). Their 
different manifestations of capitalism and their market vs. public sector 
vs. civil society economic components result in varying degrees of 
material impact (resulting from different degrees of regulatory 
boundaries to the market and capitalist system). This is precisely why 
capturing institutional, context specific arrangements in the ISEW 
theories is such as a challenge. 
According to Paul Burkett (2006), the problem is that the ecological 
capital synthesis—especially the notions of entropic net psychic income 
and the social welfare function—does not attempt to connect itself to the 
social relations of particular economic systems (H2d(i)). It also does not 
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attempt to elucidate the systemic reproduction requirements of 
sustainability in some broader ecological and human developmental 
sense. Burkett (2006:121) insists that “[o]utside a social-relational 
vacuum, the issue is not how natural we want to be, but whether we are 
willing to fight for the kind of social system that promotes a healthier, 
more well-rounded form of human-ecological cultivation and renewal, 
that is of human development”. Therefore, a holistic vision of the system 
is required to ascertain the destruction and creation of capitals and 
services. What is needed is a critical analysis of how capitalist relations 
generate material and immaterial dynamics that are anti-ecological, while 
also potentially engendering new non-capitalist forms of development 
that are pro-ecological, pro-social, pro-moral and pro-individual (of the 
person). “Sustainable development needs to be seen as development in, 
against, and beyond capitalism” (Burkett 2006:130). 
Moreover, the paradox of “sustainable development” must be 
understood in the milieu of the integrated global, regional and national 
capitalist system. Accounts of the transition to a “knowledge economy” 
tend to understate the degree to which material production and pollution 
have migrated around the planet, rather than disappearing from it. For 
example, high-growth of Asia’s “brown cloud” and emerging energy 
problems chiefly suggest that the West’s relatively cleaner air and lower 
fuel costs are due more to heavy industry’s migration than its de-
materialization (see Nolan et al. 2004). So there is a tendency for only 
moderating environmental problems to the extent that they do arise in 
the short term, which cannot be at the expense of much less growth and 
consumption (Foster 2002). 
We are in an age of globalisation characterised by global 
interdependencies. A fundamental power shift toward China is resulting 
in a transition from a unipolar, United States and Western dominated 
world order, to a multipolar power constellation with the US and China 
as the main foci (Gu et al. 2008:275). As noted by Chan et al. (2008:292), 
what China does or does not do in the environmental field will 
increasingly exert a global impact owing to its sheer aggregate size and 
increasing integration with the rest of the world. This suggests an 
intimate relationship between China’s ecology and the global ecology, 
and between China’s domestic governance and its global governance in 
environmental affairs. The advanced capitalists are fully implicated in 
China’s ascendancy, i.e. Chinese exports are fuelled by developed-world 
investment and consumer demand. 
Given the above complexities of the workings of capitalism at the 
world-system level, one must question the supposition that an integrated 
systems analysis in national “adjusted GDP” indicators is conceivable. 
Certainly, there has been a good attempt to justify the inclusion of the 
numerable social and environmental components of ISEW from a 
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systems view. For instance, the choice of variables in Clarke and Islam’s 
Thai ISEW is based on so-called ‘social choice theory’.85 This enables one 
to narrow the scope of variables in ISEW that are specifically important 
for the welfare of the individual (from a social net welfare perspective), 
e.g. to cover the societal costs of corruption and commercial sex work. 
‘Social choice theory’ embodying the ISEW sounds impressive, and one 
may, therefore, be tempted to discount Atkinson’s (1995:29) and 
Neumayer’s (1999:82-3) ‘ad-hoc adjustment’ critiques. But, their “social 
economic and environmental (SEE) system[s] [approach to welfare]” 
(Clarke and Islam 2006:225, Islam and Clarke 2005:286-7) rooted in 
social choice theory is severely lost in translation once the “adjusted GDP 
SEE” is constructed. As for Clarke and Islam’s (2005a) Thai ISEW study, 
the “system” is only recognised on a prima facie level. The “systems 
analysis” is in effect separated once the aggregated indicator has been 
computed.  
Additionally, Clarke and Islam have not embedded enough the 
connection between the individual and social choice in the underlying 
capitalist system. They purport to understand “society as a system” and 
the dilemma between individual and social choices, but how close do 
they come? They fail to critically evaluate the linkages between the 
various ‘sub-systems’ of their aggregated measure of “social welfare”. 
Besides, Clarke and Islam (2005a) and Clarke (2006b:172-3), for example, 
effectively replicate practically all of the other sensible bookkeeping 
procedures adopted in Daly and Cobb’s (1989) ISEW, but make it appear 
(misleadingly) attractive by dividing the various ISEW components into 
different sub-systems or domains.86 For instance, their “social sub-
system” merely encompasses the following: ‘public expenditure on 
health and education’, ‘private expenditure on health’; and the problems 
of ‘urbanization’ and ‘commuting’ (evaluated by money) (see Clarke and 
Islam 2003:7, 2005a:83-5). If (their use of) social choice theory is correct, 
then the inclusion of the benefits of volunteer and household labour and 
the costs of crime and family breakdown would render the Genuine 
Progress Indicator (for instance) useless in this area—since Clarke and 
Islam exclude these items in their version of the “social sub-system”.87 
Leaving out these non-market items is at odds with many who argue that 
the contributions of good motherhood and fatherhood are just as 
valuable as nature’s contributions to the economic productiveness (e.g. 
Mellor and Langley 2002:54-7). Women, for example, “birth children, 
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85 See Section 3.4 above. 
86 However, Clarke and Islam do improve the methodology and realise the value of a disaggregated 
account. Thus, my critique primarily applies to the “adjusted-GDP” measure and not to their 
decomposed systems analysis for Thailand (in Clarke and Islam 2004:ch.4). 
87 N.B. In the latest version, Clarke and Shaw (2008:273) have incorporated ‘household labour’ 
under the umbrella of the “Spiritual Domain” in their Thai GPI. Of course, this does not necessarily 
solve the problem, since the whole idea of ascribing monetary values to ‘unpaid work’ is 
controversial, and, in particular, the ISEW stumbles on this issue (see Waring 2009:170). 
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teach, and nurture them, ... they grow and protect shade plants that 
make their communities liveable, and much, much more” (O’Hara 
2009:183). Therefore, “partial comparability” has limitations, in 
particular, when a specific socioeconomic system is unspecified (H2c(i)). 
A person is mostly accountable for their ‘service’ and ‘disservice’ 
towards themselves and society. However, as argued by Paul Baran in 
The Political Economy of Growth, “his behaviour is [partly] determined by 
the social order in which he lies, in which he was brought up, which has 
molded and determined his character structure, his categories of 
thought, his hopes and his fears” (Baran 1957:137). In other words, we 
are all accountable for our individual actions to a certain point, but many 
of these actions are not entirely freely chosen, but are brought about and 
constrained by the particular social structures within which we operate. 
The quandary is that this impersonal, profit-driven market process tends 
systematically to expropriate wealth from other people and debase the 
environment (Foster 2004:7-8). On linkage between the individual 
utility/satisfaction and society, Baran makes the following assessment: 
analysing “social welfare” outside a specific socioeconomic system is 
useless (Baran 1957:139). What is needed is an exploration of the 
conditions that are conducive to service (welfare) along with a study of 
the degree to which the economic and social institutions and 
relationships of capitalist society further or impede the welfare of people. 
Hence, depending on the institutional arrangement, economic growth 
may or may not provide a good measure of real welfare progress. If the 
institutions are working progressively to promote ‘service’, then 
economic growth is conducive to real net welfare (H2d(i)). 
However, the system tends to reproduce waste (i.e. disservices) and 
obstruction of productive service potential, rather than a progressive 
response to the system-problems. The production of “superfluities and 
spurious goods” or “useless, wasteful, or positively destructive” output 
become rife under monopoly capitalism (Baran and Sweezy 
1966:ch.5,11).88 The notion of ‘economic scarcity’ is not convincing when 
one considers waste, idleness and the frantic effort to find consumers—
as well as dubious design innovations and packaging. Potential 
abundance affirms itself inadvertently and continual human deprivation 
and ecological destruction have a two-fold unsettling effect. An 
“ideological wasteland” subsists in which “work and consumption share 
the same ambiguity” and “increasingly lose their inner content and 
meaning” (Baran and Sweezy 1966:346). Ultimately, the system becomes 
inveterately dysfunctional even on its own terms. The implication of this 
result is a distorted picture of sustainable economic welfare, especially 
when the irrationality of the system moves into the forefront of critical 
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88 However, from the perspective of the 2000s, the capitalist world appears far different than it did 
when Monopoly Capital was written in the early 1960s. 
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thought. Monopoly Capital was a significant literary treatise on the costs 
of capitalism—not simply, as implied by ISEW advocates, the costs of a 
vague form of (un)systematised development. ‘Capital’, ‘service’ and 
‘society’ are viewed largely as separate from a specific socioeconomic 
system (H2d(i)). A simple adjustment of GDP would be meaningless, 
unless a specific socioeconomic system is connected to ISEW theoretical 
foundation. 
With respect to hypothesis H2d(ii), capitalism as a revolutionary 
socioeconomic system entails rapid change; this was articulated by Karl 
Polanyi (1886–1964) in The Great Transformation (1944). In pre-capitalist 
formations, social customs and the economy were not seen as separated 
and potentially conflicting forces. For the vast majority of societies in 
human history, the ‘economy’ is mostly unseen. In these societies, 
economic behaviour was interwoven with the general fabric of social, 
political, and religious life. Economic activity was motivated by social 
obligation and regulated by the moral context that governs social life in 
general. However, according to Polanyi, the idiosyncrasies of the social 
economy matured in the nineteenth century as markets were extended to 
all aspects of cultural life.89 This had the effect of reducing all of social 
existence to an exclusive ambition, the desire for gain (Polanyi 1957:30). 
“Economic” became the same as “market”, and the “economy” changed 
into a system that can somehow be understood as distinct from the 
political processes, cultural norms and history. He defines a market 
economy as a socioeconomic system founded on a self-regulating market 
organisation, or an economy where all aspects of life are “directed by 
market prices and nothing but market prices” (Polanyi 1957:43). 
He affirms that sustainable social arrangements are irreconcilable 
with an economy founded solely on a self-regulating market organisation 
(Polanyi 1957:73-6). This is because the system tends towards instability 
if left alone, and thereby requires the insertion of new forms of 
reciprocity, redistribution and informal marketplace changes to create 
‘system functions’. The dynamics of capitalism can be understood as the 
production of a “double movement”. These are protective responses 
involving the safeguarding of social existence against the imperatives of 
the spreading market. Polanyi’s drift is that certain institutions, 
contracts, and governance systems, rules, and conventions are needed 
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89 Polanyi showed that although the market preceded the nineteenth century, it had a very 
secondary and incidental role in pre-capitalist formations: “markets were merely an accessory 
feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated more than ever by social authority” 
(Polanyi 1957:46,67). Reciprocity and redistribution were the overriding forms of integration in 
these societies (Polanyi et al. 1971:ch.5). These were societies having the economy embedded in the 
general framework of social, political, religious and moral life, and because of that, human 
aspirations in these societies are reckoned to be considerably varied. Thus, an embedded economy 
signifies that broader social goals and values such as reciprocity in social behaviour or obligations 
to community and state subordinate the motive of gain (instead of gain being central to the 
economic process) (Champlin and Knoedler 2004:896). 
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by market society to provide system-functions or “services” for the 
continuum of the economic process.90 Without these system functions, 
major instabilities and conflicts would impinge upon the system, 
problems which encroach upon the operation of market society. The 
dominance of a self-regulating market organisation created “fictitious 
commodities” for land, labour and money. 
Extra awareness is needed in the case of ‘fictitious commodities’ such 
as land, labour and money (Polanyi 1957:68-76), by an array of 
institutions, relationships, agreements, contracts, and rules to 
adequately regenerate them through successive periods. Firstly, a system 
of property rights and heritage listings, the protection of vulnerable 
species, regulation against pollution to enable sustainable development, 
and rules to prevent global climate change and ozone depletion are 
needed by land. Secondly, institutions of gestation, schooling and 
socialisation are needed by labour, and protection is needed against 
workplace accidents, underemployment and destruction of skills. In 
addition, certain accords between capital and labour must exist to reduce 
uncertainty. And thirdly, adequate institutions are required for money 
(and credit) to produce legal tender, protect the value of the currency, and 
also provide (inter)national lender of last resort facilities in case of crises 
and depressions. Completely free markets cannot supply these system-
functions, and so there is a need for collective action via governments, 
communities, local groups and corporate representatives. The vast 
majority of contradictions of contemporary capitalism work under the 
canopy of the disembedded economy. 
In the disembedded economy, economic relationships tend to 
dominate other aspects of culture (H2d(ii)). That is, ‘society’ and the 
‘economy’ are separated so much that the ideology of disembeddedness 
now dominates our understanding of social life—the economy is 
conceived to be “working without the conscious intervention of human 
authority” (Polanyi et al. 1971:68). Bearing in mind that the base of 
Polanyi’s “substantive view” of the economy implies a methodological 
perspective according to which the economy cannot be separated from 
the analysis of the social totality. As ‘society’ is the starting point for 
Polanyi, the economy can be understood only as a sphere structurally 
related to all other spheres such as the ‘community’ and ‘biosphere’ 
(determining and being determined by them) (Polanyi 1992:34).91 But, 
because of the pervasiveness of disembeddedness in society, the 
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90 Protective responses to the market are needed to provide resources for reproduction of essential 
relationships and processes. To put it another way, the market imperative toward extending 
commoditisation generated a protective imperative to safeguard social organisation from the 
effects of commoditisation (see Stanfield 1986:ch.4). 
91 “The human economy then is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-
economic. The inclusion of the non-economic is vital. For religion and government may be as 
important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the 




community and biosphere are being substituted for the economy—i.e. 
formal market relations replace non-market relations of reciprocity and 
redistribution. When these processes emerge, the “services” received by 















In Figure 3.4, the arrows indicate that an agent is increasingly reliant on 
the system for “services” (from fictitious commodities).92 But as the 
market forces encroach on life, the community and biosphere shrink 
relative to the (disembedded) economy.93 Thus, the critical point in The 
Great Transformation is that the market system tends to destroy the 
services of existing capitals of taste, tradition, character, nature, 
community and values in its search for expanding markets which may 
yield ongoing (if doubtful) services, `(?), of new technological 
institutions. 
It is clear that the ISEW advocates do not want to understand the 
system from the perspective of the disembedded economy.94 They are sui 
generis—each theory is unique enough to be qualitatively different but 
they are too obsessed with the natural environment; yet handle society to 
a limited degree. In the global disembedded economy, all areas of life are 
both relatively autonomous yet interconnected. The three theories 

92 r = Biosphere. Society = Community Ӣ Economy. ‘Society’ is a subset of the ‘Biosphere’. The ‘Agent’ 
is a representative agent of many (heterogeneous agents or species) who live in ‘Society’, and ‘`(?)’ 
is a distorted service to the ‘Agent’. n(Society) = the number of people living in the capitalist 
system. 
93 Note that when the system moves towards the community and biosphere, it is typically working 
out of embedded processes—i.e. a relatively embedded form of capitalism is possible. 
94 There are limitations to the above Venn diagrams. The abstraction into three or four entities 
underplays the constant change and promotes a static worldview. In the real world, societies, 
economies and communities exist at different spatial scales (Giddings et al. 2002:192). Drawing 
boundaries between each sphere is haphazard (Dolfsma et al. 2005). However, the purpose of 
Figures 3.1–3.4 is to illustrate the similarities and differences between the four “pre-analytic visions”. 
Thus, the usefulness lies in the visual comparative analysis of the placement of the primary 
spheres of economy, ecology and society (as well as the relationship between individual, person, 








include some major aspects, but have partial, underdeveloped 
explanations of the benefits/costs generated in the socioeconomic 
system. In other words, they only have parts of the total theory and have 
not realised the importance of the whole—much more theory is needed. 
Therefore, as a point of departure, it is better to have a political economy 
theory, toward a more critical approach to sustainable economic welfare 
(H2d(iii)). Political economy specialises in comprehending the positive 
and negative forces of the global and regional environment to achieve a 
holistic vision of how the system functions (see O’Hara 2006c, 2007b). 
Marx, Veblen, Keynes and Schumpeter, the four greatest political 
economists, argue that continuous instability, conflict and disarray are 
natural to capitalism. In short, their analytical works examine the 
complex mechanisms responsible for the development (and stagnation) 
of productive forces. Marx argued that economic development has 
historically meant a far-reaching transformation of society’s economic, 
social, and political structure. He was deeply concerned with capitalism’s 
tendency for “sapping the original sources of all wealth, the soil and the 
labourer” (Capital Volume 1 1867:507). Veblen examined the complex 
mechanisms responsible for the rise and decay of social and ecological 
organisations. He argued that real service creation is problematic 
especially when “converting all public wealth to private gain” occurs 
under a system of absentee ownership (Veblen 1923:168). In The General 
Theory, we learn from Keynes (1936:chs.11,12) that instability, 
uncertainty, and a strong tendency towards stagnation are inherent in the 
capitalist system. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter 
(1943:83) argues that the very nature of capital creates a movement for 
the expansion of markets, the introduction of new methods and 
products, and the constant disruption of established lines of business. 
Hence, capitalistic processes engender “creative destruction”, because 
business is always looking for economic rents or economic surplus made 
by degrees of monopoly power, through institutionalising innovation. We 
discern from the four giants—and the fifth greatest political economist, 
Polanyi—that critical analysis (and critique) of the system stems from 
our understanding of the anomalies of capitalism. 
A critical principle of political economy is that one must assess the 
multiple contradictions of the disembedded economy. The concept of 
contradiction states that there are positive and negative features of 
socioeconomic systems that are endogenously ingrained in the fabric of 
various processes, institutions and relationships. These positive and 
negative elements are fused together in the structure of the system, and 
help promote dynamics and change. In other words, a contradiction is 
defined as something endogenous to the system, that is both central to 
its positive operational dynamics as well as being a necessary negative 
outcome (see O’Hara 2006b, 2007a). Central to the principle of 
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contradiction is the notion of trade-off. Trade-off means that resources 
are being redistributed from one side of a contradiction to the other: 1) 
from community to market; 2) from the natural environment to durable 
fixed business capital; and 3) from society to individual. These trade-offs 
are seen as endogenous processes. In relation to hypothesis H2d(iii), the 
political economy of the disembedded system provides an alternative 
theoretical approach to the ISEW. The essence of the three theories, 1) 
community, 2) entropy, and 3) individual–society are inextricably linked 
to the systematic contradiction of the disembedded economy, as 
examined below. 
Capitalist culture places too much emphasis upon the vagaries of 
adjusting the pattern of resource allocation, to secure increased 
efficiency and growth of commodity production. This attempt of GDP 
growth leads to more neglect of non-commodity needs articulation (e.g. 
sociality and community), exacerbating the feeling of chronic 
dissatisfaction.95 Capitalism requires sustained productivity and demand 
even if it destroys community (and society) in the process and creates useless 
forms of consumption. There are multitudinous examples of community 
disembeddedness reducing sustainable economic welfare. The loss of 
the peace and balance provided freely by the darkness of night because of 
artificial city lights (Smith 2005). And the loss of local distinctiveness and 
sense of place: such as (in the UK) churches turned into pubs; family 
shops and independent cafes bankrupted by large supermarket chains 
(Kingsnorth 2005, Stones 2006, The Ecologist 2003); and historic 
breweries turned into luxury flats (Kingsnorth 2006). Finally, belief in 
change and the compulsion of being up to date or the fear of being out of 
date (“left behind”) become the indispensable essentials of Western 
culture. This never-ending change makes it difficult for people to 
maintain a systematic model of the world and their place in it, i.e. to keep 
shared meanings or traditions to which human emotions are guided. In 
the process of creative-destruction and destruction-creation, concrete 
wealth or ‘psychic income’ symbols such as childhood areas, historic 
buildings, small businesses, labour skills and wildlife habitats continue to 
vanish with “progress” (i.e. effective moneymaking). 
Linked to the systemic general contradiction is the entropy problem, 
which specifically relates to the business capital for natural environment 
trade-off. Production—which is based on energy (including solar) and 
matter flows and transformations—depends not only on labour, but also 
on non-renewables. In addition to these entropic processes, production 
is based on ecological systems of amazing complexity. Thus, nature and 
economy are inseparable. In a production system that regenerates itself 
by creative-destruction, ecological problems emerge dynamically on a 
grander scale. The process whereby capital creates buildings, factories 
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95 For example, see Stanfield and Carroll (1997:485). 
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and transportation, and destroys ecological capital to such an extreme 
degree is associated with the so-called “second contradiction of 
capitalism” (James O’Connor 1998). 
There are two parts to the second contradiction. The first part relates 
to the antagonistic social relationships between business capital, the 
state and environmental movements, which may raise the costs of capital 
and make capital less flexible, and in other ways limit profitability.96 This 
becomes a problem when profit, investment-demand and growth are 
restricted more than any critical mass needed for long-term interests of 
business and employment. Under these situations, where profit, 
investment and growth are restricted, it is not likely that market 
capitalism could increase. However, there are real limits to capitalism (as 
distinct from barriers). This is the other side of the contradiction. 
Capitalist production and accumulation—which are dependent on the 
expansion of investment in manufacturing capital—have destructive 
effects on the quantity and quality of land, water, air, ecosystems, forests 
and so forth, which, in turn, limit the range of possibilities open to 
capitalist accumulation in the future. This results in withdrawals of 
current and future use values, leading to major problems of maintaining 
global biodiversity. 
In the disembedded economy, the tendency is that the more wide 
scale business capital is the greater is the exploitation of low-entropy 
resources. For instance, globalisation has encouraged energy intensive 
products such as automobiles, electrical appliances, computers and 
paper (see Li 2008:32). Increases in the volume of trade generates 
greenhouse-gases. This especially applies to global shipping (Garman 
2007:23-4), air cargo and the global expansion of industrial agriculture. 
The burning of fossil fuels primarily drives this accumulation of 
greenhouse gases; to serve the ever-growing energy needs associated 
with durable fixed business capital expansion. In this scenario, we 
experience higher rates of pollution when more people transform 
commodities into waste; and when the populace transforms more raw 
materials per person into commodities, we incur higher rates of 
depletion of low entropy. Current environmental policies and institutions 
are not keeping pace with the global spread of capitalism. International 
cooperation on adaptation has been characterised by chronic under-
financing, weak coordination and a failure to look beyond project-based 
responses (see UNDP 2007:167). The nature of the contradiction 
between business capital and the environment is thus highly 
disembedded. 
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96 This could involve technologically-led restructuring (such as resource planning and toxic waste 
disposal planning, engaging in mass recycling and so on) to deal with ecological problems, which 
may or may not be in capital’s interest. However, capital has the ability to restructure itself in light 
of ‘natural scarcities’, and also to conserve resources and to prevent or clean up pollution 
(ineffective as these measures are) (O’Connor 1998:124). 
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Possibly at the root of community and ecological destruction is the 
unnerving nexus between agency and structure (Davis 2003). That is, the 
contradiction between individual and society. In any system, but 
particularly in a commodity-driven system, it is important for agents to 
involve themselves at least in social issues, relating to the local 
community, household or family and workplace. Some trust, friendship, 
and sociality are necessary not only to promote one’s character but also 
to provide services for society or ‘system functions’ of knowledge, 
communication and trust. Still, the individual motives elevate the 
interests of specific people and their particular microeconomic affairs—
fulfilment of private wants could involve such things as having a diversity 
of food and owning a home, and sufficient time for achieving personal 
aims, enjoyment and worship. However, too much individualism leads to 
societal breakdown, and thus, greater degrees of transaction costs, 
crime, stress, anomie and alienation (O’Hara 2004). Too much social 
(particularly familial or state) bonding may repress the individual, reduce 
social intercourse (‘anti-social capital’) and restrain their creative self-
direction. Hence, both social and individual relations need some balance. 
However, there is an increasing tendency toward individuation, 
independence and individual ‘rights’ in an increasingly disembedded 
economy. For instance in the West during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
family was a more organic type where women mostly engendered familial 
capital for everybody. But the style and constitution of the family has 
changed significantly in the 1970s–2000s to a type where the ego is 
dominant and families are expected to contribute services for individuals 
who desire to achieve in the broader world. Kirby (2006) argues that a 
homogenising change of social relationships is experienced across 
national and cultural divides. Much of this change is associated with 
considerable shifts in material demand. But also, there are the more 
subtle material impacts of changes in human support systems providing 
security, nurture and care. Market spread is eroding the family because 
most families require two wages to pay for debt (usually for mortgage 
and credit card purchases), eating out frequently, and are preoccupied 
with conspicuous consumption. Time is no longer available for the 
caring, support, nurturing, networking and communicative services 
necessary to sustain families and communities as the time demands of 
individual and technological services grow. 
The logic of the market is always tending toward “ideals of emulation 
and status” (à la Veblen 1910:185), and the reason is that the market, as 
a social institution, upholds the ethics of self-interest at the expense of 
competing ethical values. Interestingly, Adam Smith argued that self-
interested actions, balanced by the workings of competition, helped to 
create economic order—e.g. “it is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
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their regard to their own interest” (Smith 1776:13,22,26-7,456). The key 
to Smith’s belief that the economic self-interested actions of individuals 
will lead to the public’s benefit is encapsulated in the notion of “the 
invisible hand”. However, Smith’s framework also requires sufficient self-
control on the part of individuals. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1759), Smith already lays the groundwork for subsequent institutional 
and ethical critiques of the market—the self-interest–driven agent we find 
in The Wealth of Nations (1776) had to be placed in the context of social 
institutions that socialise the individual to take into consideration how 
their actions will affect others. In short, Smith argues that the market 
must be constrained by an ethical framework of compassion, and it is 
only when working within such a framework that the market will render 
efficient and desirable outcomes (see Smith 1759:7, 1776:61-2).97 This 
offers an interesting conception for context specific dimensions of 
expressing personal, social, ecological and global responsibilities. But 
markets do not generate the self-controlling individuals necessary for 
markets to work efficiently, thus requiring more and more interventions 
and regulations into market outcomes (Clark 2006:273). 
‘The invisible hand’ therefore not only encourages fresh baked bread 
early in the morning, but ecological and social costs as well, if left 
uninhibited. As Polanyi (1944) reminds us, the reality is that there has 
always been a continuous need to engender environmental, social and 
even economic political reactions and controls (e.g. protection laws), 
which hold back the entrepreneurs’ chrematistic self-interest. Hence, for 
Polanyi, disembedded means divorced from the social controls of 
religion, the state, traditions, and customs. The individual is free to 
pursue gain and self-interest, and to get ahead. A core principle that 
guides their existence is to insatiably improve and realise insatiable 
potential. Beth and Doug Brown (2005) argue that when we are trapped 
in the economic race we live like “bogans”, i.e. not having a lot of time 
for being aware and responsible. People become bogans to the extent 
that people in a market economy are forced to focus on themselves and 
their performance: 
 
Driven by our condition of insecurity, competing as 
individuals, we generally have to accept the reality of the 
market even though people have also fought for protective 
legislation that has led to the welfare state and social 
democracy. ... With everyone on his or her own to either 
get ahead or be left behind, boganism is the logical result. 
How so? The individualized competitive race promotes a 
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97 Actually, for Smith, Christian morality formed the backdrop for market behavior. However, Clark 
(2006:269-74) argues that “the main weakness of Smith’s system of ethics is that he assumed that 
economic actors would enter the market place socialized by Christian ethics, yet the market 
generates a contrary system of ethics”. 
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narrowing of consciousness and channeling of attention 
on one’s individual situation. This narrowing of 
consciousness, like blinders, occludes our social vision 
and perspective. [Brown and Brown 2005:634-5] 
 
The crux of the issue is that: the structure of the system of insecurity and 
competition induces the agent into being “ambitious, self-motivated, high 
achievers—the Be All You Can Be self-actualizers” (Brown and Brown 
2005:635). 
In essence, the problem with disembedded capitalism is that it 
creates a society in which people are increasingly dependent on markets 
to meet basic needs—the market economy is one that pits each 
individual and business against one another in a competitive struggle. 
Connected to the dogma of an autonomous market is the destruction of 
ecological capital and community abandonment. This is why the political 
economy of the disembedded system thesis encompasses the root of the 
problem: there are multiple contradictions that are seen as endogenous to 
the system. The essence of the three ISEW theories, 1) community, 2) 
entropy, and 3) individual–society is inextricably linked to the systematic 
contradiction of the disembedded economy. But specifically in relation to 
sub-hypothesis H2d, the theoretical particulars of the ISEW abstract from 
the workings of the capitalist system, because the ISEW advocates have not 
specified a society in the socioeconomic system that we currently have. This 
is the critical factor in political economy. 
3.6 Conclusion 
On a positive note, we have seen that there are several substantive 
theories to support ISEW. It is argued that three underlying theories of 
community, psychic income, and welfare economics cement theoretical 
foundations for ISEW. Contrary to the wisdom of critics, ISEW has certain 
theoretical foundations (H2). The focal point of the three theories is to 
evaluate the positives and negatives of economic growth, with the hope 
of achieving a practical measure of sustainable economic welfare, as 
summarised below: 
Firstly, ISEW is conceptually rooted in economics for community. Daly 
and Cobb (1989) want to connect the growth of the economy and the 
physical limits of the biosphere in a welfare indicator. The ISEW attempts 
to describe reality by agreeing with the principle of internalization: 
internalising localised ‘spillover effects’ and “pervasive externalities” that 
negatively affect social welfare. With this underlying principle available, a 
measure of sustainable consumption can be derived from an extended 
notion of Hicksian income. This notion of income is, in principle, based 
on strong sustainability, i.e. that there are no substitution possibilities 
between the durable stocks of capital. This means that the success of 
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policies designed to increase the aggregate of consumer durables to 
individuals must not destroy or weaken the existing patterns of social 
relationships. Hence, the heart of ISEW is an economic order that 
supports the pattern of personal relationships that make up the 
community. Theoretically, ISEW is embedded in oikonomia, the 
management of the household to increase value (service) to all members 
over the long-run. The oikonomia model expresses social community and 
biophysical interdependence. It is argued that the heart of ISEW is to 
determine whether the economy is supporting or destroying a healthy 
community in a sustainable manner. 
Secondly, the ISEW is conceptually based on entropic net psychic 
income. In The Nature of Capital and Income, Fisher (1906) theorised that 
a proper accounting of ‘income’ must reflect only the flow of services of 
‘wealth’ (or ‘capital’) enjoyed by people, during an appropriate time 
period. Hence, service (or ‘income’) is considered the essence of welfare, 
not necessarily the wealth itself. However, the flow of services need not 
be positive. There can be disservices, also known as negative income or 
“outgo”. In essence, ‘net psychic income’ is the total satisfactions 
received from the use value of goods minus the undesirable or unwanted 
side effects from the production process. This major component 
provides the theoretical underpinning of ISEW. ‘Sustainability’ is also a 
critical aspect of the ISEW, which Philip Lawn has well set out in his 
writings. The stock of human-made capital (producer goods such as 
plant, machinery, and equipment) depreciates and wears out through 
use. But the production to replace worn out human-made capital is a 
cost, as there is an ongoing throughput of matter-energy (the input of low 
entropy resources and the output of high entropy wastes). That is, the 
depletion of the finite stock of ecological capital is an entropic process. The 
important point is that less production and less consumption over time 
leads to a lower rate of depletion of the ecological capital stock (resource 
assets, ecosystem services etc.). The summation of the positive and 
negative flows of income minus the lost services of ecological capital is 
the entropic net psychic income. 
Thirdly, utilising some principles of welfare economics, the ISEW is 
theoretically based on a social welfare function. A workable social welfare 
function (ISEW) can be constructed by fusing together the concepts of 
(a) social choice, (b) partial comparability, and (c) cost-benefit analysis. 
The social welfare function embodies relating social preference (or 
decisions) to the set of individual preferences. This is because the 
preferences or utility of agents do not internalise the costs or externalities 
of economic choices. That is, an individual’s choice is at odds with the 
welfare optimising social choice. “Social choice” is about relating social 
judgements to the views and interests of the individuals who make up 
the society. By emphasising the possibility of constructive social choice 
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theory, as Amartya Sen skilfully argues, the use of interpersonal 
comparisons allows public decisions to be sensitive to inequalities in 
well-being and opportunities. This demands partial comparability, which 
will be effective for making social decisions or generating an ‘optimal’ 
social choice. This means accounting for the salient negative externalities 
in ISEW, which can be calculated by compensatory or defensive 
expenditures. A cost-benefit analysis with social choice theory is 
appropriate for welfare planning, because it incorporates various social 
concerns about welfare that are not adequately captured by individuals 
within the market place. This is the original contribution for ISEW by 
Matthew Clarke and Sardar Islam. Hence, the social welfare function 
involves the maximisation of net benefit of economic growth (the 
benefits from the utility provided by goods and services) minus the costs 
of the damages caused by growth. 
However, there are major limitations in the approach to sustainable 
development as construed by the advocates of ISEW. They have a 
tendency to view ‘society’, ‘capital’ and ‘service’ as largely autonomous of 
any specific socioeconomic system. The three theories include some major 
aspects, but have partial, underdeveloped explanations of the 
benefits/costs generated in the socioeconomic system. This is the crux of 
the problem for ISEW. It is argued that the ISEW advocates fail to 
understand the system—from the perspective of the political economy of 
the disembedded system. A critical approach to sustainable economic 
welfare entails an exploration of the system conditions conducive to 
service and disservice, i.e. the disembedded economy is beset with 
multiple contradictions. This links to various problems in all areas of the 
social economy. A holistic vision of the positives and negatives 
endogenously generated is needed. It is argued that the political economy 
of the disembedded system provides the holistic foundation. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a comprehensive 
critique of ISEW. Yes, this study raises fundamental questions about the 
ISEW approaches, demonstrating that they themselves fall into a kind of 
fallacy of misplaced abstractions, in failing to incorporate an 
understanding of the historical socioeconomic system of capitalism, as 
the fundamental background condition. But many questions remain 
unanswered. How could acknowledging capitalism’s particular 
characteristics constitute a real questioning of the ISEW per se? To begin 
with, we have not evaluated the inherent limitations of measuring welfare 
with ‘income’, nor have we provided an exact solution to the problem of 
sustainable economic welfare indicator construction. Without 
undertaking a thorough empirical and technical scrutiny of the ISEWs 
and other related indicators (in the existing literature), it is difficult to 
ascertain the complete inadequacy of socioeconomic foundations in the 
index’s construction. Nonetheless, the underlying problems of ISEW 

109
should become manifest in the critical empirical investigations from the 
perspective of political economy. 
Is it possible to bring ISEW and the political economy critique 
(concerned with the entire socioeconomic system) discourses more 
closely together? How might the obvious failure of ISEW schools to 
confront the socioeconomic system be addressed? After all, Daly and 
Cobb embrace within their larger work (extending beyond their ISEW 
analysis) some aspects of the political economy critique. For instance, 
embracing the oikonomia solution within the context of the political 
economy of a disembedded system might be useful and help to ‘prepare 
the ground’ for more detailed analyses. As a minimum, there needs to be 
a critical examination of the dialectic of service and disservice. Separating 
those services in the ISEW that improve community well-being from 
those that are ‘commoditised’ would be necessary (and an empirical 
challenge). Modifications to the ISEW components of personal and 
public consumption expenditures vis-à-vis the degree of 
disembeddedness over real historical time are vital. It would be useful to 
examine Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ when treating defensive responses 
(à la ‘defensive expenditures’). It also might be a question of showing 
that these characteristics (unfavourable to sustainability) tend to increase 
pollution and/or increase the cost of defending against pollution, 
showing in particular an increased divergence between GDP and ISEW. 
Regrettably, a notable problem is that the advocates of ISEWs have 
not really developed the oikonomia model. Daly and Cobb’s (1989) 
notion of an “economics for community” apparently disappears in the 
construction of their ISEW (and the studies undertaken in the last twenty 
years). At the time, the authors of For the Common Good did not feel 
competent to develop a new multi-dimensional empirical measure of 
welfare congruent with the person-in-community vision. Daly and Cobb 
(2007:288) agree that, against their wishes, more attention has been paid 
to ISEW (in the appendix) that has probably deflected attention from the 
more basic person-in-community argument. 
Therefore, even if the oikonomia approach provides the grounds for 
discrediting the interpretation of GDP as an indicator of welfare, it does 
not necessarily imply the need for one alternative, monetary indicator. As 
Simon Kuznets (1947:29) said half a century ago, “[o]ne source of doubt 
is ... that these over-all quantities, no matter how well defined and closely 
articulated, must ... gauge ... a wide variety of forces[, which] ... is 
extremely difficult”. In other words, he argued that total national income 
should be measured in as many ways as possible. It is likely that an 
alternative set of non-monetary, multi-indicators measuring the political 
economy of the disembedded system is the next step forward. 
Is the ISEW project simply mistaken or is there some way of 
transforming it within the context of a political economy critique? There 
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are two paths that we may take, either abandoning the ISEW approach or 
finding a way to integrate it with the political economy critique. Some 
critical questions for further research might need to be addressed. How 
is the ISEW congruent with Marx (capital accumulation), Veblen 
(absentee ownership), Keynes (effective demand), Schumpeter (creative 
destruction), Baran and Sweezy (the penetration of the sales effort into 
the production process), Martin O’Connor (the contradictions of “natural 
capital”), James O’Connor (“the second contradiction”), Burkett/Foster 
(metabolic rift), and Polanyi (double movement)? The extent to which we 
can incorporate the challenges posed by the political economy theory is 
the critical factor determining the abandonment or redevelopment of 
ISEW. The result will become evident as the critical appraisal continues 
in the next few chapters. We need to break away from the conceptual 
critique and into the empirical and technical scrutiny of ISEW et al. 
analyses. Chapters four and five provide a comprehensive survey of the 










4.1 Introduction – Overview of the Net Income Indices 
In the previous chapter, we showed that there are three major theories to 
support the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW): economics 
for community, entropic net psychic income, and a social welfare 
function. However, the critical analysis also demonstrated that there are 
major limitations in this approach to sustainable development as 
construed by ISEW advocates. Conceptually, that is, they failed to 
incorporate an understanding of the historical socioeconomic system of 
capitalism, as the fundamental background condition. Some imperative 
questions arise. How will this underlying problem of ISEW manifest in 
their (the authors’) empirical analyses and the technical particulars of the 
index’s construction? Which studies attempt to incorporate a specific 
theory? How are the trends between ISEW and GDP analysed in relation 
to the system? What variables are excluded and included in the authors’ 
measures? Chapters four and five search for meaningful answers to the 
underlying assumptions behind the empirics and techniques of the net 
income studies, with the aim of determining whether these are superior 
measures of ‘sustainable economic welfare’. 
It is often postulated that Sustainable Economic Welfare Indicators 
(SEWIs) are good measures of social and environmental welfare: for 
instance, they provide convincing evidence for the “threshold 
hypothesis”—that economic growth improves quality of life up to a 
point, but eventually erodes environmental and social quality, reducing 
quality of life (Max-Neef 1995:117). One of the leading advocates argues 
that: 
 
Irrespective of whether the ISEW, GPI, or SNBI has been 
calculated for a particular country, the trend movement in 
the chosen index consistently reveals that, up to a point, 
the growth of macroeconomic systems is beneficial to 
human well-being. Beyond this point, growth appears to be 
detrimental. Although ecological economists openly admit 
that the ISEW, GPI, and SNBI are not without their 
imperfections, they nonetheless believe that these indexes 
offer solid support for the threshold hypothesis and the need 
for countries to abandon the growth objective in favour of 





What Lawn and other authors typically do is compare the trends of their 
adjusted-GDP per capita measure with GDP per capita over real historical 
time. For example, all seven national ISEW studies in Figure 4.1 below 
illustrate that the growth in economic activity since about the mid-1970s 
has been producing not an improvement in welfare, but a general 






The relationship between GDP and ISEW over the last 30–50 years of the 
twentieth century seems to reveal that, up to a point, the growth of 
macroeconomic systems was favourable to human well-being. 
However, this consensus view amongst SEWI advocates is not 
without controversy. Moreover, we have to be cautious about accepting 
the empirical claims made by the SEWI supporters at face value, given 
the problematic of the three theories (Brennan 2008). That is, there is 
more evidence to investigate before we can ascertain the complete 
inadequacy of ISEWs and other related indicators—some important 
matters were consciously not studied. A critical review of the literature is 
thus necessary and significant, as to our knowledge no such document 
exists. Because the scale of the inquiry is enormous, the literature review 
is divided into two chapters. 
Directing the primary literature survey, the following hypothesis three 
(H3) will be assessed: 
 
H3:  Net Income Indices are good measures of environmental and 
social welfare. 
 
There are six variants of the net income indices: the Measure of 
Economic Welfare (MEW), Economic Aspects of Welfare (EAW), Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Progress Indicator 
(GPI), the Sustainable Net Benefits Index (SNBI) and Fisherian Income 
(YF). Subject to existing data availability, each analyst has obtained 
GDP
ISEW
Source: Costanza et al. (2004:141) 
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estimates of the variables required to compute their indicator for the 
nation/place of interest, utilising multiple sources such as government 
reports and the System of National Accounts. Commencing in 1972 and 
ending in April 2009, there have been forty-five individual studies 
involving construction of a net income indicator. The empirical (and 
technical) aspects of these measures are worthy of a more detailed 
appraisal because it is generally accepted that the net income indices are 
necessary and adequate measures of sustainable socioeconomic welfare 
(H3). 
Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive survey of the net income indices 
from the perspective of political economy. Our approach in this 
chapter—which is a broad one—is obviously limited to providing a very 
detailed technical analysis. Hence, for a realistic appraisal we have 
elected to split the literature survey into two chapters. We will touch on 
the technical accomplishments in this current chapter but the mechanics 
of the SEWIs are critically evaluated in chapter five. This ensures an 
adequate reflection and appreciation of the complexity, diversity and 
technical scope of the net income studies. 
The heart of the literature review is critically evaluating the net 
income indicators in relation to empirics, methods and (our) criticisms. 
In general, each study is chronologically assessed, which typically entails 
the following evaluation method: a) an introduction to the study; b) any 
advances in theory or techniques (methods) accomplished; c) a 
presentation and commentary of the empirical results; d) a discussion of 
the most important conclusions; and e) identifying ongoing/potential 
problems. More specifically, the following broad areas will guide our 
analysis: original contribution; theory; techniques; and historical 
application. However, even if it not possible to address all of these areas 
consistently, we are predominantly interested in the degree to which the 
advocates provide specificity—viz.: 1) the conceptual groundwork; and 2) 
socio-historical institutional analysis. We scrutinise whether the authors 
follow or develop Daly and Cobb’s oikonomia model, apply social choice 
theory, or integrate an adaptation of entropic net psychic income. 
Additionally, we dissect the authors’ trends concerning the indicators 
(where possible), focusing on the calibre of historical specificity vis-à-vis 
business cycles and institutional dynamics. Where appropriate, we offer 
constructive comments and/or criticisms in relation to the above areas. 
This is a meaty chapter; following the introduction, it is divided into 
twelve major sections. Sections 4.2 to 4.11 are the backbone of the 
literature survey, and the entire collection of net income studies up to 
and including April 2009, including the various criticisms, suggestions 













Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) US MEW, 1929–1965 
4.3.EconomicAspectsofWelfare(EAW)
Zolotas (1981) US EAW, 1950–1977 
4.4.IndexofSustainableEconomicWelfare(ISEW)
Cobb (1989) in Daly and Cobb (1989) US ISEW, 1950–1986 
Cobb and Cobb (1994) US ISEW, 1950–1990 
Diefenbacher (1994) German ISEW, 1950–1987 
Jackson and Marks (1994) UK ISEW, 1950–1990 
Jackson et al. (1997) UK ISEW, 1950–1996 
Moffatt and Wilson (1994) Scottish ISEW, 1980–1991 
Rosenberg et al. (1995) Dutch ISEW, 1950–1992 
Jackson and Stymne (1996) Swedish ISEW, 1950–1992 
Stockhammer et al. (1997) Austrian ISEW, 1955–1992 
Guenno and Tiezzi (1998) Italian ISEW, 1960–1990 
Castañeda (1999) Chilean ISEW, 1965–1995 
Gil and Sleszynski (2003), 
Prochowicz and Sleszynski (2006) 
Polish ISEW, 1980–1997; 
Polish ISEW, 1990–2003 
Clarke and Islam (2004, 2005a), Clarke (2006b) Thai ISEW, 1975–1999 
Bleys (2007a, 2007b) Dutch ISEW, 1971–2004 
4.5.GenuineProgressIndicator(GPI)
Cobb et al. (1995) US GPI, 1950–1994 
Anielski and Rowe (1999) US GPI, 1950–1997 
Cobb et al. (1999) US GPI, 1998 
Cobb et al. (2000); Cobb et al. (2001) US GPIs, 1999; 2000 
Venetoulis and Cobb (2004) US GPI, 1950–2002 
Talberth and Bohara (2006), Talberth et al. (2007) US GPI, 1950–2004 
Hamilton (1997, 1999) Australian GPI, 1950–1995 
Hamilton and Denniss (2001) Australian GPI, 1950–2000 
Lawn and Clarke (2006b), Clarke and Lawn (2007) Australian GPI, 1986–2003 
*Authors in Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific 
edited by Lawn and Clarke (2008d) 
Seven case studies of the GPI in the Asia-Pacific region:  
Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand, and Vietnam 
4.6.SubnationalGPIsandISEWs
Anielski (2001) Albertan (Canada) GPI, 1961–1999 
Costanza et al. (2004) Vermont, Chittenden County and Burlington (US) GPIs, 1950–1998 
Clarke and Lawn (2005),  
Lawn and Clarke (2006a, 2006b) 
Victorian (Australia) GPI, 1986–2003 
Pulselli et al. (2006) Sienan (Italy) ISEW, 1999 
Jackson et al. (2006) 
UK Regional ISEWs of Yorkshire and Humber, and the Northern 
Way, and the national ISEW, 1994–2004 
Bleys (2006a, 2006b), 
Bleys (2008) 
Belgian ISEW, 1971–1999; 
Belgian ISEW, 1970–2004 
Wen et al. (2007) 
Suzhou and Yangzhou in Jiangsu province, Ningbo in Zhejiang 
province, and Guangzhou in Guangdong province (China) GPIs, 
1991–2001 
*Bagstad and Ceroni (2007) Six Northern Forest counties in Vermont (Caledonia, Essex, 
Franklin, Lamoille, Orleans and Washington) GPIs, 1950–2000 
4.7.SustainableNetBenefitsIndex(SNBI)
Lawn and Sanders (1999), Lawn (2001) Australian SNBI, 1966-67 to 1994-95 
4.8.FisherianIncome(YF)
Lawn (2004b, 2006c) Australian YF, 1967–1997 
4.9.CriticismsandSuggestionsintheExistingLiterature
Authors in The Green National Product (1994) Various complications of the ISEW 
Atkinson (1995) and Crafts (2002) 
Neumayer (1999, 2004), Dietz and Neumayer (2007) 
Neumayer (2000), Dietz and Neumayer (2006b) 
Neri and Bradstreet (2006) 
Measurement-technique problems and a critique of the conceptual 
foundation of the ISEW/GPI/SNBI 
Böhringer and Jochem (2007) Critique of the mathematical foundation of ISEW/GPI 
Ziegler (2006, 2007), Daly and Cobb (2007) Critique of the conceptual-empirical foundation of the ISEWs 
**Brennan (2008) Survey and critique of the net income indicators 
Nourry (2008) French ISEW and GPI, 1990–2002 
4.10.ResponsesbyAdvocatesandSomeofthePersistentProblems
Lawn (2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007b),  
Clarke and Lawn (2006),  
Forgie (2007), Clarke (2007), Niccolucci et al. (2007) 
Resolving some of the theoretical and method-technique problems 
of the ISEW, GPI, SNBI and YF 






* These papers/articles could not be obtained in a timely fashion before the completion of this manuscript (due to 
the high cost and the difficulty of sourcing local supplies), and thus were not subjected to a critical analysis in the 
literature review (Chapters 4 and 5). Nonetheless, I have read these works and have provided comments/criticism 
where appropriate in the text. 
** The critique by Brennan (2008) has already been discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The above table provides an almost complete reference library of the 
MEW, EAW, ISEWs, GPIs, SNBI and YF studies—vis-à-vis empirics, 
methods and criticisms.98 Sections 4.2 and 4.3 examine the MEW and 
EAW respectively. These sections are important preliminaries for 
understanding the evolution of the ISEW and related indicators, and 
serve as a good introduction to the literature on net income indicators. In 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we examine the various ISEW and GPI studies 
worked out at the national level, while Section 4.6 examines the studies 
done at the subnational level. At the end of these sections, summaries of 
the strengths/weaknesses of the national ISEWs, national GPIs, and the 
subnational studies (ISEWs, GPIs) are given. This will aid the reader in 
handling the large flow of information. Section 4.7 looks at the SNBI, and 
Section 4.8 inspects the Fisherian income studies. Section 4.9 succinctly 
reviews the criticisms and suggestions of the net income indicators, and 
Section 4.10 looks at the various responses by advocates and by a new 
critic. The main conclusion in this study is that there are tendencies in 
the SEWI literature for authors not to substantially theorise about their 
measures nor have a strong socio-historical institutional analysis. How 
serious a problem is this? Section 4.11 demonstrates with applied 
empirical investigations of the SEWIs that these are indeed major 
problems. 
Section 4.12 delivers an overall assessment of the net income studies 
in relation to ɲ) advances in theory, and ɴ) strength of the socio-
historical institutional analysis. In order to evaluate H3, i.e. whether or 
not net income indices are good measures of environmental and social 
welfare, we will rate the authors’ levels of contribution with a score out of 
ten. With reference to criteria, ɲ andɴ, the degree of literary contribution 
scale (DLCS) is thus devised. A rating is based on the investigator’s value 
judgements that relate to a thorough inspection of the empirical literature 
on SEWIs. Section 4.13 then summarises the chapter. It is argued that the 
net income indices are not very good measures of environmental and 
social welfare (H3): many authors provide no major good or detailed 
advancement in theory and no one provides a strong socio-historical 
institutional analysis. Concisely, no author in the literature has 
undertaken a meticulous study of each work for the sustainable 
economic welfare indicators. It is the purpose of this chapter to embark 
on a systematic, detailed and scholarly examination of the conclusions 
drawn in the literature, beginning with the MEW in Section 4.2 below: 

98 We have delimited the scope of the literature survey to articles (in English) on SEWIs (MEW, 
EAW, ISEW, GPI, SNBI, and YF only) published between 1971 and April 2009. There may be a few 
works published that I am not aware of. 
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Nordhaus,William D. (1977) “Economic Growth and Climate: The Case of Carbon Dioxide”, The American
EconomicReview(May).
One of the first efforts in the literature to develop a convincing measure 
of the role of the economy in generating welfare was that of Nordhaus 
and Tobin (1972). They wanted to reveal over the 1929–1965 period the 
relationship between GNP and economic welfare in the United States; 
albeit due to lack of data only seven discrete data points could be used 
(1929, 1935, 1945, 1947, 1958, and 1965). The instrument they utilised 
was the Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW). The MEW involved 
“reclassification of GNP expenditures as consumption, investment, and 
intermediate; imputation for the services of consumer capital, for leisure, 
and for the product of household work; and correction for some of the 
disamenities of urbanization” (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972:5). 
While the MEW has no apparent theoretical basis, Nordhaus and 
Tobin began with GNP (or private consumption) and made several 
adjustments as follows. The authors separated final consumer 
expenditures from intermediate (non-final) expenditures, since they 
argue economic welfare is a matter of per capita ‘consumption’. After a 
depreciation allowance of durable fixed business capital from GNP (i.e. 
the Net National Product, NNP), they examined the following positive 
imputations: services flowing from the stocks of consumer durables, 
government and business capital, as well as leisure (nonmarket work). 
Next, they reclassify education and health expenditures as ‘investments’, 
and deduct expenditures that are “regrettable necessities” rather than 
contributions to welfare.99 To the regrettable necessities category, they 
consign the costs of police services, sanitation services, commuting to 
work, road maintenance, and national defence. There is some 
disagreement over these items. For example, it may be argued that police 
protection and defence expenditures contribute to welfare. But on the 
contrary, this argument may be disputed; i.e. the increasing costs of 
police protection and defence budget allocation does not imply that 
people are less vulnerable to crime or to wars/terrorism than we were in 
the past. Lastly, on a less controversial issue, the authors sought to 
account for negative externalities. That is, the urban disamenities 
connected with economic growth, e.g. some portion of the higher 
earnings of urban residents may be simply compensation for living in a 
more demanding urban environment. 
Their non-continuous results of the real growth rates for US NNP per 
capita and the MEW per capita over the following years, 1929, 1935, 

99 Since some portion of the NNP must be reinvested for a rising population, in order to obtain a 




1945, 1947, 1958 and 1965, are illustrated utilising both a figure and a 
table. In a comparative analysis of time-series data, a non-monetary 
indexation of 100 is useful because it illustrates the relative growth trends 
between the indicators over the period of examination. A higher index 
value means at the end of a period there was, on average, more growth 
experienced by that variable. In most of our empirical analyses of the net 
income indices, we will be utilising this format of normalisation, where 
the base year is set to 100. Giles Atkinson (1995:4) says that “the 
[absolute] magnitude of a MEW relative to, say, GNP is only partly the 
object of interest. The performance of any new indicator over time is a 
more relevant question”. For instance, over the unstable period (1929, 
1935, 1945, 1947) the US NNP per capita fluctuated, but the MEW per 




Adding specificity to the growth trend analysis, Table 4.2 below shows the 
noteworthy differences between the NNP and MEW per capita average 




Over the 1929 to 1947 period, per capita NNP grew by almost 21% 
























Source: Adapted from 



























NNP SustainableMEW Source: Adapted from 




During the post-war period (1947–1965), NNP and MEW grew 
respectively at 13% and 2.5%. Thus, it is evident that there are large gaps 
(in the growth rates) between NNP and MEW over their respective 
periods, 1929, 1935, 1945, 1947 cf. 1947, 1954, 1958, 1965. However, 
according to their MEW results in the table above, the depressing/war-
torn period was much more welfare enhancing (four times greater) than 
the post-war period. This peculiar result suggests that the exercise to 
create a new measure of net welfare is potentially flawed. 
Besides, there is some ambiguity with their analysis between NNP 
and MEW, because they ignore changes in economic activity during the 
war and post-war experience. They are simply interested in the 1929 to 
1965 period as a whole. Moreover, one of the goals of Nordhaus and 
Tobin in the construction of the MEW was to demonstrate that GNP 
similarly correlates with economic welfare and to make it redundant to use 
the instrument they formulate. “Although the numbers presented here are 
very tentative, ... [t]he progress indicated by conventional accounts is not 
just a myth that evaporates when a welfare-orientated measure is 
substituted” (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972:17). After reflecting on the 
significance of the work by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) five years later, 
the interpretation of the results and conclusions drawn by the authors 
are unchanged (see Nordhaus 1977:197). The authors see little value in 
constructing any other type of net welfare indicator—a claim that might 
have greater validity if they had adapted a stronger socio-historical 
analysis of the institutional dynamics of the GNP and MEW. 
As first noted by Daly and Cobb (1989) in their literature review of 
MEW, a conceptual problem with Nordhaus and Tobin’s net welfare 
measure is that they are unaware of ‘defensive expenditures’. Defensive 
means a defence against the unwanted side effects of production. This is not 
to say that, for example, food expenditures are a defence against hunger 
or clothing and housing expenditures defend against cold and rain. In 
other words, the ordinary baseline environmental conditions of cold and 
rain (and so forth) are not regrettable necessities because defensive 
expenditures are only those that were regrettably made necessary by 
other acts of production. Defensive expenditures need to be counted as 
costs of that other production; i.e. counted as intermediate rather than 
final goods. The validity of their GNP adjustments is at stake because of 
their problematic conceptualisation of the list of “regrettable 
necessities”.  
Nonetheless, the authors of MEW recognise that: 
 
the line between final and instrumental outlays is very hard 
to draw. For example, the philosophical problems raised by 
the malleability of consumer wants are too deep to be 
resolved in economic accounting. Consumers are 

119
susceptible to efforts of producers. Maybe all our wants are 
just regrettable necessities; maybe productive activity does 
no better than to satisfy the wants which it generates; 
maybe our net welfare product is tautologically zero. 
[Nordhaus and Tobin 1972:5] 
 
While the authors have overlooked ‘defensive expenditures’ they make a 
fascinating point about the inherent limitations of relying upon the 
systems of nationals accounts to radically construct a better measure of 
social and environmental welfare. It will be interesting to see what other 
studies have to say about this. Is it questionable to conclude “our net 
welfare product is tautologically zero”? Unfortunately, there is no detailed 
treatment of this issue by the authors of MEW; it is only mentioned in 
passing, so a proper answer cannot be ascertained at this stage. In 
retrospection, the various flaws in their analysis are somewhat 
pardonable because it was an important opener into the debate of net 
welfare indices and economic growth. 
4.3 Economic Aspects of Welfare (EAW) for the US 
Zolotas,Xenophon(1981)EconomicGrowthandDecliningSocialWelfare,NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.
Xenophon Zolotas (1981) in Economic Growth and Declining Social 
Welfare went beyond the MEW by encompassing a more detailed 
calculation of services and costs to welfare when he constructed the 
Economic Aspects of Welfare (EAW) for the US. Zolotas utilises the US 
as a case study, which is at an ‘advanced’ level of affluence. He examines 
empirically the “general deterioration of both the physical and the social 
environment and of human relations” over the 1950 to 1977 period, 
utilising both quantitative and qualitative measures (Zolotas 1981:14). 
The quantitative measure of “social welfare” is the EAW-index, which 
adjusts the national income accounts to correct for the social costs of 
external diseconomies and induced obsolescence (to some extent). He is 
interested in the symptoms of modern consumerism: large parts of 
relative wants are the product of persuasive salesmanship. The essay 
attempts to develop a global approach to the question of social well-being 
(Zolotas 1981:7): He raises the question of whether continuing growth in 
the mature industrial economies brought about a commensurate 
improvement in social welfare. He is concerned with a broadly agreeable 
spectrum of socio-economic phenomena associated with affluence, i.e. 
factors ranging from the wasteful use of natural resources to the loss of 
time and life due to traffic congestion in major urban centres and the 
social cost of environmental pollution. 
Similarly to the MEW, the compilation of the EAW-index primarily 
relies on items from the national income accounts; especially on private 
consumption expenditures which have the most direct bearing on a 
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society’s well-being. Private consumption is considered the appropriate 
starting point.100 As with MEW, EAW includes the benefits of personal 
consumption expenditures, household services and leisure while 
subtracting the costs of commuting to work as a regrettable necessity. 
But perceptively, Zolotas concentrates on the current flow of services, for 
example, consumer durables and public buildings which were added to 
the annual services derived from them. He supposes that the 
government has so much influence on the accumulation of all types of 
assets. Therefore, governments play an important role when 
uncoordinated private purchases fall short of the socially desirable level, 
because they potentially provide service benefits (in the form of public 
goods) which are available effectively to anyone. Also, he considers most 
educational expenditures to be non-current service generation, and there 
is a deduction of half the costs of advertising—on the assumption that 
only half of it provides a valuable information service to consumers. 
In the EAW, the depletion of non-renewable gas and oil reserves is 
regarded as a negative to sustainable welfare because they are forms of 
‘non-substitutable’ ecological capital. To account for the long-term 
service loss in the EAW, the depletion of non-renewable energy is treated 
as any depletion of a physical capital. In addressing environmental 
damage, he deducts half the pollution control costs for air and water 
pollution and the entire cost for solid waste. The estimated damage cost 
of air pollution is also subtracted. Finally, he considers that much of the 
rise in medical expenses has been related to greater environmental 
stresses, and therefore half of the per capita growth in real health care 
costs (both public and private) is subtracted. 
There are two major differences between MEW and EAW. In EAW, 
Zolotas simply omits business investment in durable fixed capital as a 
factor in ‘sustainable economic welfare’. No distinction is made between 
real net and monetary replacement business investment. Thus, unlike the 
MEW, the EAW does not reintroduce investments under the category of 
economic sustainability. The other major difference, which is an 
improvement on the MEW, was that Zolotas included pollution and 
natural resource depletion. Environmental damages were accounted for 
in Nordhaus and Tobin’s MEW very indirectly as an imputation for urban 

100 Personal consumption expenditures is considered the foundation of the EAW, as the GNP 
includes components that do not directly increase economic welfare, such as ‘investments’ and 
private health and education defensive expenditures. “Another class of products is that of 
“defensive” or corrective goods, including pharmaceuticals. It is, in fact, impossible to argue that 
overconsumption of drugs, for instance, enhances social welfare. To a considerable extent, 
excessive use of such preparations could be regarded as part of an overall effort to combat the 
negative effects of stressful living” (Zolotas 1981:11). Thus, ‘defensive expenditures’ are merely 
“antidotes” in the sense that they derive their value from the negative factor that is being 
countered, and whose existence makes them necessary. According to Fred Hirsch (1973:41), 
“another way of looking at the consumer intermediate goods is to see them as ‘defensive’ goods 
(sometimes termed ‘regrettable necessities’)”. 
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disamenities. Zolotas, by contrast, directly addresses the issue by 
deducting half the pollution control costs for air and water pollution and 
all of them for solid waste. 
Accounting for depletion of raw materials is a major contribution for 
a net welfare indicator. Zolotas’ procedure is based on the standard 
economic view that non-renewable resources should rise in price at a rate 
equal to the long-term interest rate plus a premium for risk and user 
cost. Since resource prices have not in fact risen at that rate, the author 
reasons that the market does not function properly at setting prices for 
the ‘optimal’ depletion of resources. Thus, as part of the EAW, he 
deducts the difference between actual resource prices and imputed 
prices derived from the long-term interest rate and an estimated risk 
premium. Zolotas’ results (not in per capita but absolute values) of the 
US GNP and EAW over the 1950–1977 period are summarised in Figure. 





According to Zolotas’ (1981) results in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3 above, 
there is a reduction in the increasing rate of welfare over the 1970–1977 
(1.6%) compared to the 1950–1970 period (average growth of 2.2%). In 
contrast, the average annual growth rate of US GNP was high (average of 


































































the declining trend in the EAW by offering a relatively good socio-
historical analysis with empirical support of more qualitative measures. 
Unfortunately, he falls short on some considerable issues because the 
socio-historical institutional analysis is not rooted enough in the EAW 
indicator. 
He argues that today’s economic life is not the enjoyment offered by 
the use of modern achievements, but the everlasting effort to obtain 
more novel goods. These ‘socially conditioned wants’ aggravate people’s 
insecurity: 
 
No one is liable to overlook ... the merits of a system that 
can ensure a sufficient supply of durable and other goods 
to liberate man from need and toil, provided that this 
process does not generate stress and anxiety instead of 
relief and contentment. ... [F]or instance, the fashion 
industry, through the subjective obsolescence of existing 
products, is actually a constant source of stress and 
dissatisfaction. Similarly, consumer durables very often fail 
to improve social welfare owing to their complexity and the 
artificial obsolescence to which they are subject. [Zolotas 
1981:10,11] 
 
Yet, the link between fashion obsolescence is weakly accounted for (e.g. 
one-half of advertising expenditures) in the EAW-index, and, despite that, 
it has little effect on the total value. Hence, the EAW-index is a weak 
measure of real social welfare indicator—the system is conceptually 
recognised but mostly de-linked from the empirical analysis. In addition, 
the author does not account for the distribution of income since he 
argues that in the US over the 1950–1977 period there was a neutral 
effect in income distribution for social welfare. However, at least he 
acknowledges the problem of distribution and fairness: “a claim to a 
generally fairer life, in the sense that every human being has an 
inalienable right to an equal share in the opportunities of a decent life” 
(Zolotas 1981:8). The ‘distribution of income’ is significant in 
contemporary writings on indicators of net welfare, as will be discussed 
in Section 4.4 below: 
4.4 The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) 
One of the most significant indicators of net income is the Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), as was introduced in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4. Herman Daly and John Cobb (1989) in their landmark book, 
For the Common Good, prepared the ground into developing a more 
appropriate measure of welfare. They devised the very first real ISEW for 
the US, over the 1950–1986 period (see Cobb 1989). Their work was an 
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important contribution because it was the first indicator assessing 
economic welfare with attention to income distribution, household 
labour and, especially, environmental destruction. They argue that 
accounting for sustainability is critical in a measure of welfare seeing as 
future generations will be affected by long-term environmental damage 
(such as the costs of climate change). Daly and Cobb (1994) revised their 
book For the Common Good into a Second Edition in which they modified 
the United States ISEW somewhat after accounting for various criticisms 
raised by scholars in The Green National Product – A Proposed Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (Cobb 1994, Cobb and Cobb 1994). Both of 
the empirical trends of the US ISEWs are examined in Section 4.4.1 
below: 
4.4.1 The US ISEWs 











Cobb,CliffordW.and JohnB.Cobb Jr. (1994)TheGreenNationalProduct–AProposed IndexofSustainable
EconomicWelfare,LanhamandNewYork:UniversityofAmerica.
We have already detailed our interpretation of Daly and Cobb’s theory in 
Chapter 3; therefore, it is not necessary to review it exhaustively again. 
However suffice it is to say, the authors have provided a remarkably good 
theory of an “economics for community” model for the ISEW. Their 
theory considers the costs and benefits to persons-in-community—the 
whole community, not merely individual agents involved in a transaction. 
Essentially, we argued that the crux of the ISEW is to determine whether 
the economy is supporting or destroying a healthy community, because 
the ISEW is embedded in oikonomia—the management of the household 
to increase value (service) to all members over the long-run. Daly and 
Cobb’s community theory is commendable. 
On the other hand, the authors note that ‘oikonomia’ suggests that 
no quantifiable features of the community can measure its actual health 
(Daly and Cobb 1989:141); consequently, they believe that it would not 
be practicable to include a measure of social relationships in the ISEW. 
Thus, the authors acknowledge the missing element within their ISEW, 
which is really accounting for social capital. According to Daly and Cobb 
(1989:379), the ISEW is derived from “contemporary mainstream 
economic discussion” and is not based on the vision they have of a 
‘redirected community’”. This is a rather strange divorce between the 
community theory and the ISEW construction; indeed the authors appear 
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to contradict this statement when they say that “all economic decisions 
should serve the common good” (Daly and Cobb 1989:105, emphasis 
added). But the vision they have of a ‘redirected community’ must (or 
should) bring about the fundamentals of the theoretical framework for 
the ISEW, and therefore include the flow of services from social capital, 
indeed all forms of capital. 
However after scrutinising their ISEWs, it is self-evident that Daly and 
Cobb’s (1989, 1994) notion of persons-in-community is absent in the 
indicators’ theoretical underpinning. The groundwork of the “person-in-
community” is effectually isolated from their analysis of the ISEW trends. 
That is, the conceptual linkage to their empirical and historical 
applications of the US ISEW is inadequate. The theoretical framework 
supporting the ISEW is mistily derived. Subsequently their overall mark 
out of ten on the ‘theory component’ will be low. With this major caveat 
in mind, nevertheless, we will proceed with an analysis of the empirical 
evidence for their US ISEWs in comparison with GDP growth. 
When comparing the trend of GNP with the net welfare indicator, 
only changes in the ISEW over time can be meaningfully interpreted (e.g. 
see Dietz and Neumayer 2006b:201). This is because the absolute level 
of the ISEW crucially depends on choosing a base year for indexing as the 
reference point, i.e. the ISEW is weighted by an index for income 
inequality, whereas GNP is not.101 Unless stated otherwise, this study 
considers the real (constant price) trends of the indicators rather than 
their absolute monetary values.102 In the Appendix of the First Edition of 
For the Common Good, Clifford Cobb (1989) has calculated a per capita 
US ISEW for the 1950–1986 period. The results of the real trends of US 
GDP per capita and ISEW over the 1950s to mid-1980s are presented in 
Figure 4.4a and Table 4.4a on page 125. As indicated below, there is a 
clear deviation in the trend between GDP and the ISEW per capita since 
the mid-1970s for the US. In the 1950s and 1960s, the annual growth 
rates of US ISEW per capita averaged around 2.1%, however, during the 
1970s to mid-1980s, there were negative annual growth rates (an 
approximate mean of –0.5%). These results suggest that economic 
welfare was more sustainable and equitable in the 1950s and 1960s in 
comparison to the 1970s and 1980s. 
Also, during the 1950–1990 period, the results in Cobb and Cobb 
(1994) of the revised US ISEW portray a similar divergence between GDP 
growth and welfare, as shown in Figure 4.4b and Table 4.4b below: 

101 Due to the indexing, the resulting ISEW cannot be interpreted as the income that society can 
safely consume and be as well off at the end of the year as at the beginning. 
102 Similarly as Clarke (2006b:175) says, in relation to his Thailand study between GDP and the 
ISEW, that “[i]t is important to realise that although both indices are money-metric, they are not 
cardinal in nature. ... [I]t is possible to infer from these two time series a distinct variation and 
divergence in the two lines ... by normalising both indices and starting both per capita GDP and 
ISEW per capita with an index of 100.0 [in the base year of the study]”. The same normalisation 
































































































































GDP ISEW Source: Adapted from
Cobb and Cobb (1994:463)
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Overall, the average annual growth rates of the revised ISEW are a bit 
less pronounced than the original US ISEW: growth in the revised ISEW 
per capita was not as strong during 1950s and 1960s and not as negative 
in the 1970–1990 period. Yet, in both cases, the ISEW per capita grows 
strongly during the 1950s and 1960s, indicating that there was good 
(positive) progress in net welfare. But, net welfare declined significantly 
as indicated by the stagnating trend in sustainable economic welfare 
since the late 1960s, and the gap between GNP and ISEW has become 
larger since the mid-1970s. 
Note that the ISEWs above were adjusted via the “Quintile index”. 
The quintile index calculates variations in the share of income by the 
lowest quintile. The rationale for this method is that improvements in the 
lot of the poorest segment of society are the most significant, as the 
relative benefit of additional income is (presumed) greater for them than 
for others. The author’s preference is to utilise the low quintile index, 
rather than by adjusting the ISEW by the Gini coefficient, as it gives 
special weight to the plight of the poorest members of society. The Gini 
gives the difference between actual distribution and equal distribution. 
But, what effect does the choice of distribution method have on the trend 
of the ISEW? The variation in the trend between the per capita ISEW 
adjusted via the Gini coefficient and the ISEW adjusted via the low 




In other words, depending on the chosen technique of the ‘income 
inequality’ component of the ISEW, it is subject to some variation in 
describing the reality of the underlying national accounting position, 
particularly during the mid-1960 to 1980 period. 
However, regardless of the differences between the various income 
distribution adjustments, there still is a noticeable flattening (and 
eventual decline) in the level of per capita welfare experienced by the 
average US citizen, particularly since the 1970s. As the authors explain, 

























Figure4.4c.USperCapita ISEWadjusted for Income Inequality, 1950–1990
adj.LowQuintileindex adj.GiniCoefficientindex
Source: Adapted from column d & f, 'Table A.2-B Effects of Alternative 
Income Distribution on Per Capita ISEW' in Cobb (1994:494)
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widening of the gap between GNP and the ISEW for the US, in both 
instances, were the rising costs of global warming, income inequality, 
defensive health expenditures (e.g. stress), natural resource depletion 
and reduced household production. It is good to see that the author has 
a reasonably good historical description of the path of ISEW relative to 
GDP. Thus, the Cobb (1989, 1994) US ISEW studies indicate that 
economic welfare in the US has not occurred during the 1970s–1990s 
because of rising environmental pollution, income inequality and natural 
resource depletion. 




There has been more than fifteen years of an ongoing discussion in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on the value of the GNP as a 
measure of economic and social welfare. Hans Diefenbacher, an 
economist at the Protestant Institute for Interdisciplinary Research 
(Heidelberg) sought to go beyond previous efforts (see Rubik 1985) to 
develop for the first time an ecologically-oriented national bookkeeping 
measure for Germany. These earlier publications did not include a critical 
assessment of the long-term consequences of production and 
consumption activities, i.e. they did not adequately incorporate the 
dimension of ‘sustainability’. Hence, Diefenbacher (1994) sought to 
construct an ISEW for FRG, 1950–1987. However, he also had another 
objective in mind, and that was to understand the conditions for 
international comparisons of welfare measures, specifically with the US 
ISEW (by Cobb 1989 in Daly and Cobb 1989). He provides no theoretical 
framework for the ISEW and no strong institutional apparatus, as he is 
simply concentrating on the empirics of an ISEW for the FRG. 
The FRG-ISEW centres on the sustainable economic welfare of the 
German ‘household’. Since Diefenbacher was proposing an international 
comparative study with the US ISEW (1950–1986), the compilation of the 
components in the FRG-ISEW (aka German ISEW) were technically 
similar to that of Daly and Cobb (1989), i.e. where the usual column-
based positive and negative adjustments from the “personal 
consumption expenditures” component take place. The author utilises 
national statistical sources (e.g. welfare surveys and statistical 
yearbooks) to estimate the ISEW for Germany over the 1950–1987 
period; albeit he notes severe data difficulties encountered over the thirty-
seven year period (see Diefenbacher 1994:217). His results of the 







In the period between 1950 and 1980, the per capita trends of GNP and 
the ISEW paralleled each other and moved sharply in an upward 
direction, where strong positive per capita average annual growth rates 
prevailed, especially during the 1950s. However, this changed drastically 
after 1980, where we find slow growth of GNP but very negative growth of 
ISEW. The two most influential factors in the benefit and cost columns 
were household services and long-term environmental damage. The 
sharp decline in per capita German ISEW since the 1980 peak are due to 
declines in net capital growth, net international position, and personal 
consumption expenditures; higher income inequality; as well as the 
detriments to welfare from the cumulative negative effects of soil 
degradation and of long-term environmental damage. 
A criticism of the paper is that Diefenbacher’s (1994) household 
labour statistics are inflated because he assumes that the value of 
housework keeps pace with growth of GNP. This assumption does not fit 
with patterns experienced in household and market activities in other 
advanced countries such as the US, because there has been a general 
shift from the household economy to the market economy. For instance, 
note the movement of increasing numbers of women into market 
employment and a growth in single person households (with fewer 

































































housework does not keep pace with the growth of GNP (see Cobb and 
Cobb 1994:259). 
Diefenbacher’s (1994) work is the first ISEW calculated for Germany 
and the first study undertaken since Daly and Cobb (1989). It is therefore 
an important step forward in historically exploring the FRG’s past vis-à-
vis sustainable economic welfare. An important result from Diefenbacher 
is that the monetary statistics developed to calculate an ISEW in various 
countries are not entirely comparable. Nonetheless, all international 
economic comparisons are approximations because categories differ 
between nations. Yet, there is some validity in comparing the growth rate 
trend between countries (see Diefenbacher 1994: Table B.10.7, “Growth 
Rates of [US and FRG] ISEW Variables”, 1950–1986). 
It is very interesting to note that the author examines FRG-ISEW in 
the context of the business cycle, albeit he does not have a thorough 
analysis (see Diefenbacher 1994:228). The results over the study period 
suggest that FRG-ISEW is more sensitive to the changes of the business 
cycle than GNP, where the amplitudes of ISEW are greater than that of 
GNP. This is mainly visible in the “economic dip” of 1967/68 and the oil 
crisis of the year 1973. The responsiveness of the sustainable economic 
welfare indicator is not completely synchronised with the fluctuations of 
GNP; yet only a minor lag for ISEW is evident. Understanding the cyclical 
nature of the system is critical in political economy. Hence, regardless of 
the author’s somewhat limited assessment of these issues, from a 
political economy point of view the level of historical specificity is a key 
highlight of the paper. 




EconomicWelfare for the U.K. 1950–1996, Guildford: University of Surrey, Centre for Environmental
Strategy.
Jackson and Marks (1994) have constructed an ISEW for the UK over the 
1950–1990 period. This was the first ISEW study for the UK. Later, 
Jackson et al. (1997) updated their efforts and reconstructed a revised UK 
ISEW for the 1950–1996 period. Both UK studies will be considered here 
because of their similar methodological approach. 
The authors argue that welfare or well-being is not wholly determined 
either by economic output or by material consumption. Much depends 
on what we consume and how we consume it. However, they state that 
the conventional GDPE (expenditure approach) methodology adds up all 
public and private “final” consumption and investment expenditures on 
goods and services. They recall Hicks (1948:172): that the purpose of 
income calculations in practical affairs is to give people an indication of 
the amount which they can consume without impoverishing themselves 
in the future. To some extent, the Net Domestic Product (NDP) 

130
addresses this issue by incorporating an adjustment for economic 
depreciation. NDP is equal to consumption plus net investment and 
(exports minus imports). ‘Net private and public investment’ and 
‘exports minus imports’ offer an indication of the changes in the stock of 
durable fixed capital on which future consumption possibilities rest, and 
the stability of the national international position, respectively. 
Yet, a number of problems remain within the GDP/NDP accounting 
framework such as the narrowness of the system boundary applied in 
economic practice. That is, the boundary excludes a number of non-
market goods and services such as environmental amenities and 
household production that contribute to present welfare. They justify the 
need for an ISEW because “an adjusted measure would attempt to 
include some of the important environmental and social factors which 
clearly contribute to welfare but which are omitted from the conventional 
accounts” (Jackson et al. 1997:1). The authors attempt to measure net 
welfare by extending the national accounts to incorporate various 
environmental and social aspects—albeit they do not provide an 
integrated theoretical foundation to account for these factors in their 
ISEW. 
Roughly, the same methodology for the US ISEW by Cobb and Cobb 
(1994) has been transposed to the original UK ISEW (Jackson and Marks 
1994) and to the majority of the revised UK study by Jackson et al. 
(1997).However, the 1997 paper has some important technical revisions 
to the original methodology such as modifying the ‘income distribution 
index’ and the ‘costs of ozone depletion’ items.103 The authors’ results of 
the original UK ISEW per capita and the updated ISEW (with the GNPs) 
are presented, respectively, in Figures 4.6a,b and Tables 4.6a,b on page 
131. In both cases since mid-1970s, the following negative contributions 
led to the noteworthy decline in the ISEWs for the UK economy: a sharp 
reduction in durable fixed capital investments; changes in the balance of 
trade; and a greater difference between expenditures in and the service 
flow from consumer durables. These predominant factors, plus the 
cumulative effect of rising income inequality and long-term 
environmental damage over the whole period, explain the widening gap 
between GDP and measured welfare. 
Overall, both UK ISEW studies confirm the general pattern emerging 
from similar ISEW studies in other European nations: while economic 
output continues to rise, sustainable economic welfare has begun to 
stabilise and then decline in recent decades (1980s–1990s). Note that 
there has been a slightly less dramatic picture of the change in net 
welfare in the revised UK ISEW compared to the pilot study, particularly 
over the 1974–1979 period. However, in both of these studies, the 
authors do not scrutinise the long-term trend of the ISEW. 


































Source: Adapted from 





































Source: Adapted from 




























Source: Adapted from 






































The authors fall short in their critical analysis of the Great Britain 
experience in the world economy, because they disengage from the major 
global financial and economic cycles over the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
4.4.4 Scottish ISEW 
Moffatt, I. andM.D.Wilson (1994) “An Index of Sustainable EconomicWelfare for Scotland, 1980–1991”,
InternationalJournalofSustainableDevelopmentandWorldEcology,vol.1,pp.264Ǧ291.
Moffatt and Wilson (1994) conclude—after reviewing the empirical works 
of the MEW and EAW—that an alternative measure of net welfare must 
be devised. That is, according to the authors, a full account of natural 
resources and the negative welfare costs associated with economic 
activity is required in a single indicator. The authors believe that a 
declining GNP has connotations of job losses, home repossessions, 
recession and a government that is not fit to run the economy of a 
country (Moffatt and Wilson 1994:265). Therefore, Moffatt and Wilson 
(1994) have deemed it significant to construct a Scottish ISEW (in 
pounds sterling, 1985 prices) for the 1980 to 1991 period. This is the first 
ISEW constructed for Scotland. 
Their results for the Scottish GDP per capita and ISEW are shown in 
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They argue that the ISEW is not a measure of social welfare, but an 
improved measure of Hicksian income (Moffatt and Wilson 1994:266). 
The authors are simply interested in assembling a single net income 
index for Scotland; theorising about it is not a priority or a consideration 
for that matter. In their construction of a Scottish ISEW, they have 
utilised similar methods to the works of Cobb and Cobb (1994) (US 
ISEW) and Jackson and Marks (1994) (UK ISEW). Interestingly, the 
Scottish ISEW is comparable to the Jackson and Marks’ (1994) UK ISEW. 
For instance, over the 1980 to 1990 period, per capita ISEW for the UK 
declined from 1831£ to 1136£ (38%), while for the same period per 
capita ISEW for Scotland dropped from 1643£ to 1075£ (35%). UK GNP 
per capita rose by 27% and GDP per capita for Scotland rose by 30% 
during the same phase (1980–1990). The good news is that these are 
consistent results. However, Moffatt and Wilson (1994) provide no 
explanation of the link between the business cycle and degradation of 
social and environmental welfare over the 1980–1991 period. 
4.4.5 Dutch ISEW (1) 
Rosenberg,David, TammoOegema andMarcel Bovy (1995) ISEW forNetherlands: Preliminary Results and
SomeProposalsforFurtherResearch,Amsterdam:ISMA,InstituutVoorMilieuǦEnSysteemanalyse.
This study by Rosenberg et al. (1995) calculates the first ISEW for the 
Netherlands. They are the first authors to include the ‘cost of 
unemployment’ in the ISEW. But they provide no theoretical framework. 
They argue that the ISEW can be viewed as a one-step process of 
highlighting the failure of the current economic system and generating 
support for more advanced analytical tools and political change. Along 
with GNP, an ISEW per capita for the Netherlands is calculated over the 
1950–1992 period, as shown in Figure 4.8 and Table 4.8 on page 134. The 
ISEW per capita grows very strongly in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, but 
then slows down somewhat during the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
authors explain that decline in the ISEW can be attributed to three 
factors: 1) recession in the early 1980s and 1990s that reduced personal 
consumption; 2) increasing costs of social and environmental damage; 
and 3) increasing income inequality and stagnation of real wages in the 
lower income brackets. These are interesting results. Unfortunately, this 
is a brusquely written article because of the lack of any real lively 
discussion of the Netherlands’ socioeconomic and ecological situation. 
For instance, the authors are not interested in examining the relatively 
momentous growth rates of “sustainable” economic welfare per capita in 
the 1960s (see Table 4.8 below). Hence, focusing on ‘the gap’ between 
GNP and the ISEW has led to an unbalanced application of the real 







4.4.6 Swedish ISEW 
Jackson,TimandSusannaStymne (1996)SustainableEconomicWelfare inSweden:APilot Index:1950–1992,
Stockholm:StockholmEnvironmentalInstitute.
The objective of Tim Jackson and Susanna Stymne’s research was to 
develop an ISEW for Sweden, 1950–1994. This is the first ISEW study for 
Sweden. They argue that construction of an ISEW is a fruitful exercise, 
especially for an international comparison of policy-based outcomes. 
They compare their trend results with other countries, chiefly the UK. To 
facilitate an international comparison, they follow as closely as possible 
the methodology already set out in the previous studies by Daly and 
Cobb (1989)—i.e. modifying the concept of Hicksian income to measure 
‘sustainability’. As in Cobb (1989:404) they have excluded changes in 
human capital, that is improvements in human physical (health), 
intellectual (educational) and emotional resources. But, the authors have 
overlooked Daly and Cobb’s “economics for community” model. 
Their results for the Swedish GNP per capita along with ISEW for the 
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Table4.8.DutchGNPandISEW(perCapita RealGrowth Rates), 1950–1992
GNP ISEW
Source: Adapted from  






ISEW per capita grew at similar rates to GNP per capita during the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s, easily keeping pace with economic growth during the 
golden decade, and staying ahead of it (slightly) during the initial period 
of the ensuing economic decline. The index of income inequality fell 
about 30% over the whole period, which had a positive effect on the level 
of net welfare. The loss of natural capital (e.g. resource depletion, loss of 
farmlands etc.) and the costs associated with long-term environmental 
damage (including the costs of ozone depletion) both increased 
substantially over the whole (1950–1992) period. Eventually the 
accumulative effect of this destruction of ecological capital led to a 
modest decline in the ISEW since the early 1980s. 
Jackson and Stymne (1996:5) observe that history shapes the Swedish 
economic experience during 1950–1992. That is, the authors give various 
details (on page five) about the trend of economic growth in the years 
immediately following the Second World War to the time of writing the 
paper. In the 1950s, Sweden experienced rapid export-led growth, albeit 
GDP growth was slowed to some extent by the Korean War inflation and 
cyclical downturns. Industrial output was very strong and sustained in 
the “golden decade” of the 1960s, but the aggregate rate of economic 
growth slowed down eventually due to the oil crises of the mid-1970s and 
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during 1982–1989 because of the expansion of the service sector and the 
devaluation of the Swedish krona in the early 1980s—but this growth was 
short-lived. “The most severe and the longest recession since the 1930s 
hit Sweden (along with many other western countries) in 1990, and for 
the years between 1990 and 1992, annual growth rates averaged –0.7%” 
(Jackson and Stymne 1996:5). The major problem with the authors’ 
business cycle analysis is that they overlook the real historical linkage 
between ISEW and GDP growth/decline. Apart from during the 1983–
1986 period where clearly GDP and ISEW moved in opposite directions, 
the two trends of the indicators virtually followed the same path in 1950–
1992, growing in sustained decadal boom times and lessening in times 
of deep recessions (cf. Table 4.9 above). 
However, this vital oversight can be partly disregarded because the 
authors have a good international comparative analysis. The divergence 
between the Swedish ISEW and GNP per capita over the 1980s and early 
1990s is much less noticeable than in the UK and US studies, which is 
mainly explained by the distributional index (see Stymne and Jackson 
2000:225). For instance, the Swedish ISEW demonstrates a considerably 
less ‘downturn’ and smaller gap between the ISEW and GDP than the UK 
ISEW study by Jackson et al. (1997). This is likely because of Sweden’s 
progressive stance on welfare and the environment. Indeed, unique 
within the Swedish ISEW was high levels of private consumption 
expenditures and non-defensive government expenditures. These 
changes reflect a deliberate orientation of Swedish domestic policy 
towards the creation and maintenance of social welfare: progressive 
taxation rates; high rates of national insurance payment; state 
responsibility for health and social services; extensive social security, 
pension rights, disability, maternity and paternity benefits; and an 
ambitious labour market policy to reduce unemployment (see Jackson 
and Stymne 1996:7). 
The authors acknowledge some of the limitations of their study. For 
example, the Swedish ISEW does not include the costs of hydropower, 
even though Sweden has one of the highest contributions from 
hydropower amongst any of the developed nations. “This form of 
electricity generation is not without adverse environmental impacts, but 
from the point of view of the ISEW it represents a fortuitous benefit, 
since the costs of these impacts are not quantified in the index” (Jackson 
and Stymne 1996:45). They conclude that “as a tool for examining the 
influence of social and environmental factors on economic welfare, the 
ISEW continues to play a valuable and critical role” (Jackson and Stymne 
1996:46). Sweden had pursued progressive policies in alleviating 
distribution inequalities, and, thus, when comparing the UK and Swedish 
ISEWs its policy effectiveness is evident. Sweden has a better socio-
political performance than other developed nations. It is good that 

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Jackson and Stymne (1996) have provided a reasonably good socio-
historical analysis. 
4.4.7 Austrian ISEW 
Stockhammer, Engelbert, Harald Hochreiter, Bernhard Obermayr and Klaus Steiner (1997) “The Index of
Sustainable EconomicWelfare (ISEW) as anAlternative toGDP inMeasuring EconomicWelfare. The
ResultsoftheAustrian(Revised)ISEWCalculation1955–1992”,EcologicalEconomics,vol.21,pp.19Ǧ34.
Stockhammer et al. (1997) attempt to show that GDP is an unsatisfactory 
indicator of economic welfare by empirically calculating an ISEW for 
Austria, 1955 to 1992. This is the first ISEW study for Austria. They make 
some significant theoretical contributions to the ISEW. For instance, the 
development of the “potential defensive costs” is an original contribution 
to the ISEW literature (discussed below). The authors seek to reformulate 
the Daly and Cobb ISEW by improving inner consistency and clarity in 
structure. Stockhammer et al. (1997:22) state that the ISEW follows an 
extended version of Hicks’ definition of income. In their view, the ISEW is 
committed to the idea of an environmentally sustainable economic 
development as well as to social justice. They have some elements of the 
theories, ‘economics for community’ (linking to the “principle of 
internalization”) and the ‘social welfare function’ (individual vs. the 
social choice). 
The authors intend not to measure potential defensive costs or the 
damage itself, but the economic aspect of it, e.g. the reaction to the 
damage or repair damages as measured by monetary expenditures. They 
note the role of prices in their ISEW: 
 
Market prices from a Marxian perspective do not measure 
economic welfare directly, but the effort to produce it.[104] 
As the commodities sold have use value (otherwise they 
would not have been bought), more products can be 
interpreted as more economic welfare. [Stockhammer et al. 
1997:25] 
 
To express these costs they used actual or potential defensive costs. 
‘Potential defensive costs’ are defined as: 
 
costs that would have occurred if society had reacted to 
environmental devaluation in the same way (concerning 
one ‘unit of pollution’) as it reacts today ... [and] give a 
consistent estimation of loss in economic welfare as they 
depart from actual expenditures, and use physical 
indicators to reconstruct past welfare losses. 
[Stockhammer et al. 1997:23] 

104 This is an interesting hypothesis, but no SEWI advocate has specifically incorporated this 




Accounting for ‘potential’ defensive expenditures in addition to ‘actual’ 
ones is critical: “[l]ow [actual] defensive expenditures can be caused by 
either a low social awareness of environmental problems or a low level of 
pollution” (Stockhammer et al. 1997:23). The inclusion (and distinction 
between) actual and potential defensive expenditures strengthens the 
conceptual foundation of the ISEW. 
The results of the Austrian GNP per capita and ISEW over the 1955–





For the Austrian ISEW, up to the late 1970s, GDP slightly overestimates 
the growth of sustainable economic welfare, but from 1982 to 1992, it 
has become misleading as a proxy for welfare. Long-term environmental 
damage has been growing much faster in the 1980s. Income distribution 
has worsened during the last decade of the period of study, and there has 
been a substitution between household production and private 
consumption. 
The authors of the Austrian ISEW make a crucial remark regarding 
the use of monetary values placed on multidimensional ecological and 
social phenomenon. They realise that the monetary value given to the 
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stands for; the defensive costs are merely the monetary equivalent of the 
reaction to the environmental damage: 
 
Since it implies expressing non-monetary phenomena in 
monetary terms, it usually implies a loss of information. A 
complex phenomenon is reduced to just one dimension. ... 
[I]t can give one the illusion that everything is exchangeable 
for money, which is obviously not correct[, as] money 
neglects their qualitative aspects. [Stockhammer et al. 
1997:23,33] 
 
In addition, they recognise the following limitations: measuring 
household labour via market prices neglects its specificity as a social 
relation; and relocating polluting industries to other countries count as a 
positive development. 
Moreover, the authors subtly suggest that ISEW is limited in its 
empirical application to understanding welfare progress in the capitalist 
system: 
 
Up to now the ISEW does not cover the costs of the 
capitalist mode of production, where labor is extracted 
from labor power (Bowles 1985). ... Bowles et al. (1990) 
suggest that huge losses are due to this hierarchical 
organization of the production process. ... [This critique] 
questions the ISEW as [a] whole. [Stockhammer et al. 
1997:33] 
 
What do their conclusions imply for the ISEW? Thus far, they are the only 
authors to recognise the limitations of the ISEW in the context of 
capitalism—Stockhammer et al. (1997) understand, to some degree, the 
system that we currently have. It is interesting that the authors have not 
only contributed to the ISEW’s theoretical foundations but also furnished 
a critique of the ISEW. Will we see this type of critical analysis of theory 
and critique in the proceeding sections? 
4.4.8 Italian ISEW 
Guenno,GiorgioandSilviaTiezzi(1998)TheIndexofSustainableEconomicWelfare(ISEW)forItaly,University
ofSiena,DepartmentofEconomics.NotaDiLavoro(WorkingPaper).
Guenno and Tiezzi (1998) construct an ISEW for Italy for the 1960–1990 
period. This is the first Italian ISEW study. According to the authors the 
primary purpose was to test whether the general (declining) trend of the 
US, UK and German ISEWs is verified in Italy. They also attempt to 
improve on some methodological shortcomings in the original Cobb 
(1989) ISEW, but give no theory. They stress that all the variables in the 
Italian ISEW are flow variables and none of them are stock variables. 

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Their results for the Italian GDP per capita and ISEW over the 1960–1990 





Over the 1960–1990 period, the long-run negative components of future 
welfare (loss of agricultural land, long-term environmental damage) have 
been growing much faster than the ‘consumption base’. However, the 
results above show that the decreasing ISEW trend after the 1970s as 
registered for some other countries is not significant for Italy. The 
primary environmental variables such as the cost of air, water and noise 
pollution and the loss of wetlands appear to be rather stable over the 
period of study. In addition, the weight of “exhaustible resources 
consumption” is negligible as compared to the other environmental 
variables—Italy has very low stocks of exhaustible natural resources. 
Thus, these generally ‘positive’ environmental circumstances prevent the 
trend in the Italian ISEW from declining (as in the case for the majority of 
other country studies, e.g. US, UK and Germany). 
Interestingly, the authors note that personal consumption 
expenditures are rising at a faster rate than the services flowing from the 
stock of consumer durables: “[this] seems to indicate an ever growing 
‘commodification’ … of durable goods” (Guenno and Tiezzi 1998:11). 
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GDP ISEW Source: Adapted from 
Guenno and Tiezzi (1998:11)
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‘commodification’ problem in the Italian ISEW. In addition, they ignore 
the fluctuations in the business cycle and provide no historical specificity 
concerning periods of intense economic, social and ecological 
development, e.g. in the early 1960s, 1970s and the late 1980s (see Figure 
4.11 above). 
4.4.9 Chilean ISEW 
Castañeda, Beatriz E. (1999) “An Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) for Chile”, Ecological
Economics,vol.28,pp.231Ǧ244.
The author, Beatriz Castañeda, constructs an ISEW for Chile for the 
1965–1995 period as a case study into environmental sustainability and 
economic growth. She contributes the first ISEW study for Chile, which is 
thought of as a ‘developing’ country. No specific theory is provided at the 
beginning of the study, generally the author follows the typical 
methodological framework put forward by Daly and Cobb (1994), Jackson 
and Stymne (1996). Yet, at the end of the study, she recognises several 
limitations of ISEW. It assumes that welfare is proportional to 
consumption. The index omits human capital. Also, “[s]ome of the 
defensive expenditures calculated have a very local effect; therefore, it is 
not obvious how to extrapolate for the rest of the country” (Castañeda 
1999:238). In other words, significant fragments of information can be 
lost in translation when constructing these national-centric indicators of 
net-consumption. 
She provides a good ecological-historical background before 
constructing the Chilean ISEW. A comparative analysis between GDP and 
ISEW is potentially valuable for the following reasons: the country has 
undergone market reform (trade liberalisation, privatisation); has 
powerful private sectors; and made the transition to electoral democracy 
(in 1990). Overall, the cyclical patterns between growth of GDP and ISEW 
are broadly comparable during 1965–1985 and 1990–1995, as shown in 
Figure 4.12 and Table 4.12 on page 142. Sustainable economic welfare of 
the average person was relatively worse than GDP per capita during the 
1970–1975 and 1980–1985 periods (see Table 4.12). The author points 
out that Chile experienced deep recessions during the 1973, 1975 and 
1981–1983. That is, the fluctuations in ISEW are stronger than GDP 
during the downswing periods of 1970–1975 and 1980–1985, suggesting 
that Chilean people were hit hard. In the 1985–1990 period, GDP growth 
per capita recovered, with an average annual change of 4.3%, but ISEW 
was stagnant, with a mean annual decline of 0.4%. The Chilean economy 
recorded strong GDP and productivity growth performance in industry 
and services sectors during the 1990s. ISEW for Chile recovered in the 







Castañeda arrives at a somewhat challengeable conclusion: 
“[e]specially since the 1980s, Chile has been on a non-sustainable path, 
and welfare has not increased over the last 30 years” (Castañeda 
1999:242, emphasis added). But according to the authors’ results, Chile 
seems to be on a “sustainable” path in 1990–1995 with an average 
annual growth rate of ISEW per capita of 4.1%. This occurred at the same 
time when the Chilean economy grew strongly, with an average annual 
percentage change of GDP per capita of 5.3%. Yet in the 1990s, Chile has 
apparently experienced fast growth of exports based on natural resources 
(see Castañeda 1999:234). Thus, the situation of high GDP per capita and 
an increasing per capita ISEW is in contradiction with the authors’ 
conclusions: that economic growth leads to environmental 
unsustainability. Unfortunately, the data on the Chilean ISEW does not 
extend beyond 1995 so it is difficult to ascertain if this is a transitory 
recuperation of net welfare.105 
While the author has quite a good ecological-historical account, her 

105 Compared with other Latin American countries, Chile has better managed macroeconomic 
stability by counter-cyclical policy, and has been able to reduce both fiscal and overall GDP growth 
volatility since the 1990s with the help of existing or newly created stabilisation or savings funds 
(see Budnevich 2008). For commodity-dependent countries, stabilisation funds are potentially 





































































story of the various social problems encountered by the average Chilean 
was too inadequate (e.g. see Castañeda 1999:233). During the 
recessionary years of 1971–1973, the ability to find compromise solutions 
between left parties and the political right broke down, leading to a 
military coup. In 1973, the ousting of Salvador Allende led to a sharp 
reorientation of Chile’s socioeconomic system. The subsequent 
leadership of General Augusto Pinochet and his successors championed 
a more free-market orientation. Under military rule (1973–1989), political 
repression and economic decline contributed to a substantially weakened 
trade union movement, income distribution became more unequal and 
poverty shot up (Edwards and Cox Edwards 1987:162). Hence, it is better 
to have a comparative analysis between the Chilean GDP and ISEW in the 
milieu of these times (1971 to 1989). 
For the eighteen moribund years of Chile’s socio-economic record 
between 1971 and 1989, the average annual growth of real GDP per 
capita was 0.99%, and the average annual percentage change of real 
ISEW per capita was –1.67%. During this period, privatisation in health 
care produced a two-tier system, involving a private system for the well-
off and a public system for the remaining 85 percent of the population, 
but a sharp deterioration of public health services occurred as both 
government and upper-class financial contributions to health care 
dropped (see Teichman 2008:448-9). While the Chilean ISEW seems to 
accentuate the extent of these social problems better than GDP, a high 
rate of economic growth is not the cause for the decline in social and 
environmental well-being. A less than one percent growth rate of GDP 
per capita in 1971–1989 indicates a dysfunctional capitalist institutional 
arrangement. In this case, the long-run trends of GDP growth illustrate 
quite well the workings of the socioeconomic system, almost as well as 
but not quite as good as ISEW. It is inopportune that the author does not 
give any discussion of how the socio-political system has shaped the real 
historical trends of GDP and ISEW. 





Gil and Sleszynski (2003) calculate a Polish ISEW for the years 1980 to 
1997. This study is the first ISEW for Poland. The authors do not provide 
a theory or any substantial methodological improvements. Essentially, 
they adopt the methods similar to those utilised in other ISEW studies 
(see Gil and Sleszynski 2003:47-9). For instance, they follow 
Stockhammer et al. (1997) by applying the ‘distribution of income 
inequality’ to the whole index rather than to ‘personal consumption 
expenditures’. Their empirical results of GDP per capita and ISEW over 

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This is how the authors observe the above trends of the ISEW for Poland: 
 
It turns out that after some fluctuations in 1980–85, a 
decline of the index in 1985–90 is observed. The ISEW 
reached its lowest values in 1989–90. Up to 1995, we can 
observe a growth dynamic at the beginning and falling in 
succeeding years, which eventually shows a tendency back 
downward that started in 1996. [Gil and Sleszynski 
2003:47] 
 
They argue that the recent decrease of the Polish ISEW in 1996 and 1997 
is explained by: (a) the increase in long-term environmental damage and 
ozone layer depletion; (b) losses caused by commuting and road 
accidents; and (c) growing welfare inequalities. 
They note the transition phase that Polish society recently 
experienced. In their words, 
 
[t]he research covers the time period between 1980 and 


























































GDP ISEW Source: Adapted from
Gil and Sleszynski (2003:52)
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of the conditions of economic development, which 
additionally complicates the analysis of the processes of 
growth or falls of welfare. [I]in fact, epochal and unique 
events took place: the crisis of the 1980s, transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a free-market-based economy 
[Gil and Sleszynski 2003:49, emphasis added] 
 
However, unfortunately, their article lacks any real lively discussion of 
Poland’s socioeconomic situation vis-à-vis the ISEW. The strikes and 
institutional instabilities of the 1980s followed by the transition to a 
market-based economy in the 1990s and their effect on the ISEW were 
poorly examined. Hence, it reduced the overall effectiveness of this 
aggregated-index of sustainable economic welfare. 
Prochowicz and Sleszynski (2006) revisit the situation in Poland and 
(re)construct an ISEW for the 1990–2003 period. The 1990s and 2000s is 
an interesting period of study for Poland, as the country is now under a 
radically different system of relative free market capitalism. The authors 
note that any conclusions drawn over this period of study should be 
scrutinised in the context of the past events, e.g. the crises of the 1980s, 
and transformation of the system accompanied by a decrease in 
production of majority of enterprises on the turn of the 1980s and early 
1990s. That is, the authors realise the importance of the political 
economy concept of path dependency: the trends that have been shaped 
by decisions or changes in the past have an influence on the efficacy of 
decisions and changes implemented in the present. Yet, “it is [difficult] to 
draw ... conclusions related to [the] ... before and after [periods of the] 
deep transitions of the system” (Prochowicz and Sleszynski 2006:79).  
The trend results of Polish GDP per capita and ISEW for the 1990–
2003 period are shown in Figure 4.13b and Table 4.13b on page 146. The 
average annual growth of the ISEW per capita over the 1990–2003 period 
was significantly higher (13.4%) than the growth rate of GDP per capita 
over the same period (4.1%), as indicated in Table 4.13b below. In 
relation to the “threshold hypothesis”, the point where socioeconomic 
welfare diminishes contemporaneously during the expansion of 
economic growth, a significant question arises: Has capitalist 
development been good for the average citizen of Poland? Yes 
apparently, economic growth has been conducive to welfare, as 
sustainable economic welfare increased over the 1990s and early 2000s 
(albeit at a slower rate in the latter period). However, we are not too 
confident in making these assertions, because the analysis of the long-
term trends in the stabilised market economy by Prochowicz and 







Despite the fact that the authors submit that a deeper analysis is 
needed (see Prochowicz and Sleszynski 2006:85), sadly, there is a 
deficient socio-historical account of the revised Polish ISEW. They are 
more interested in aggregating the variables to construct a single-
number indicator of ‘welfare–sustainability’. There is no attempt to place 
Poland in the wider regional system. The former USSR has been 
associated with a process of deindustrialisation since the 1980s. For 
instance, due to “transition augmented” fundamental uncertainty, the 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe area has experienced irregularity during 
1997–2007 (massive slump, then large expansion of growth) 
(Podkaminer 2006:311, Su!jan and Redek 2008:228). This is another 
missed opportunity to shine a bright light on the ISEW, especially from a 
regional comparative perspective. 
4.4.11 Thai ISEW 
Clarke, Matthew and Sardar M. N. Islam (2004) Economic Growth and Social Welfare: Operationalising
NormativeSocialChoiceTheory,Amsterdam:NorthHollandPublishing.
Clarke,Matthew and SardarM.N. Islam (2005a) “Diminishing andNegativeWelfare Returns of Economic
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case study of the relationship between long-term economic growth and 
sustainable economic welfare for a newly industrialising country, 
Thailand. Thailand ranks as one of the world’s most successful 
economies during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Sustained 
economic growth has played a major role in increasing the welfare of 
many Thais; reducing absolute poverty levels from nearly one third of the 
population in 1975 to less than 10% in 1999 (Warr 2001). However, 
Clarke and Islam (2005a) seek to attain a truer indication of the benefits 
and costs of the economic growth during that period by developing an 
ISEW for Thailand. 
The authors contribute to the literature by establishing that the ISEW 
is theoretically based on a social welfare function. In short, the social 
welfare function involves the maximisation of the net benefits of 
economic growth—the benefits from the utility provided by goods and 
services minus the costs of the damages caused by growth.106 An 
important methodological tool, which the authors utilise to construct the 
Thai ISEW, is cost-benefit analysis in company with social choice theory. 
For instance, a small number of adjustments are specific to the Thailand 
ISEW, such as for corruption, debt and commercial sex work. The 
decision to include these adjustments within the Thai ISEW is justified by 
accepting the principles of normative social choice theory. 
Figure 4.14 and Table 4.14 illustrate on page 148 their Thai GDP per 
capita and ISEW over a 25-year period, 1975–1999. In general, GDP per 
capita increased at a faster rate than ISEW per capita over 1975–1999. 
Figure 4.14 shows that the trend line of GDP per capita steadily rose from 
1975–1986 while ISEW rose and fell over the same period. ISEW per 
capita effectively remained unchanged from 1979–1986. The ISEW and 
GDP per capita increased progressively during the next decade (1986–
1996), but at different growth rates (see Table 4.14). Both indices peak in 
1996. This is just prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and several 
years after. From 1996 to 1999, both indices declined: the average annual 
(negative) growth rates of ISEW per capita and GDP per capita were –
6.2% and –3.8%, respectively. But, there was an apparent recovery in 
1999 of GDP per capita. Even as GDP per capita has shown the 
propensity to increase in 1999, ISEW per capita has not increased but has 
fallen again. The authors realise that it is too early to confirm whether 
this is a trend or a fluctuation in the ISEW. However, they underplay the 
paralleling trends of ISEW and GDP per capita over the business cycle: on 
average, economic welfare (and growth) was ‘sustainable’ during the pre-
crisis period and was ‘unsustainable’ in the post-crisis period. At the 
aggregate level, they are too absorbed in the “increasing gap” between 
GDP and ISEW. 
 







On the other hand, when comparing the two indices an increasing 
divergence is apparent. This may mean that the costs of achieving 
economic growth begin to outweigh the associated benefits. According to 
the authors, this indicates that the relationship between GDP and ISEW 
is becoming increasingly weaker throughout the time series, casting 
doubts over the long-term desirability of economic growth in Thailand in 
terms of welfare. The GDP per capita index maintains its three phases of 
growth (constant, accelerated and crisis), whilst the ISEW per capita 
index rises and falls through to the earlier 1990s, then has a steady 
period of growth before falling again following the financial crisis in 1997. 
The most significant adjustment in this ISEW was the cost of inequality 
to welfare. This was eight times more important than the estimated costs 
of commercial sex work. The largest positive adjustment within the ISEW 
was education. However, as argued in Chapter 3, Clarke and Islam 
completely neglect the contributions of household labour in this, their 
first Thai ISEW. With the inclusion of this variable, the divergence 
between the Thai ISEW and GDP (per capita) could be vastly different to 
the results gained.107 This leads to the general problem of leaving out a 
critical variable in the index. 

107 To confirm whether this is a problem or not, a further investigation is warranted into Clarke and 
Shaw’s (2008) updated Thai GPI study, since they have now included a monetary estimate for the 
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Table4.14.ThaiGDPand ISEW(perCapita RealGrowth Rates), 1975–1999
GDP ISEW
Source: Adapted from 
Clarke and Islam (2005:86)
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4.4.12 Dutch ISEW (2) 





This is the second ISEW study for the Netherlands. Bleys (2007a, 2007b) 
constructs several versions of the ISEW; for instance, he generates a so-
called Simplified Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (SISEW) for the 
Dutch economy over 1971–2004. A SISEW could prove useful to 
overcome some of the methodological issues raised in the literature. The 
SISEW comprises fewer items than the usual ISEW, that is, at a 
minimum, five ISEW items are not included in his “SISEW1”: namely, 
costs of personal pollution control; car accidents; noise pollution; 
adjustments for consumer durables; and loss of farmlands (see Bleys 
2007a:4). Bleys (2007a:33, 2007b:105) argues that these variables can be 
excluded to construct the SISEW because of their “low quantitative 
significances”. Following Lawn (2003), Bleys (2007a) simply accepts that 
the ISEW is soundly based on the income concept of Fisher. Reminiscent 
of all other ISEW studies, he does not go to the theoretical roots of Daly 
and Cobb’s (1989) person-in-community model. 
The results of the Dutch GDP per capita and SISEW over the 1971–




































































In the 1970s and 1980s, SISEW per capita declined (on average), whereas 
growth in GDP per capita was positive but moderate over the same 
period. Dutch GDP per capita grew much stronger in the 1990s yet slows 
a little in the early 2000s. SISEW per capita grew moderately in the 1990s 
and finished much stronger in the early 2000s. The most obvious 
conclusion is that the gap between GDP and SISEW significantly widens 
since the mid-1980s. But note that the 2004 level of sustainable 
economic welfare per capita is almost the same as the 1971 level (see 
Figure 4.15)—effectively his SISEW suggests that zero progress was 
made over the thirty-three-year study period. Unfortunately, there is not a 
lot else that can be said about these figures, as Bleys (2007a, 2007b) 
does not provide any historical specificity of the Netherlands’ economy. 
He describes the trend of the per capita SISEW (and GDP) in abstract 
terms: there is neither much reference to the institutional arrangement 
nor is there any business cycles analysis. This is a disappointing end to 
the ISEW national studies. 
4.4.13 Summary of the National ISEW Studies 
In all of the national-level ISEW studies, there is no conceptual support 
given to the empirical and historical applications of Daly and Cobb’s 
(1989) “economics for community” theory. Eleven out of thirteen 
empirical studies have not theoretically advanced the ISEW since Daly 
and Cobb (1989). That is, only two studies have contributed to the 
ISEW’s theoretical foundations—the authors of the Austrian 
(Stockhammer et al. 1997) and Thai ISEWs (e.g. Clarke and Islam 2004). 
Indeed, the authors of the Austrian ISEW study are the lone authors 
identifying the limitations of the ISEW in the context of capitalism. 
Some studies have provided a reasonably good socio-historical 
analysis, such as the US (e.g. Cobb 1989), German (Diefenbacher 1994), 
Swedish (Jackson and Stymne 1996) and Austrian ISEWs. However, most 
authors do not scrutinise the long-term trend of the ISEW vis-à-vis the 
expansionary period of economic growth (GDP growth) during 
historically interesting epochs (e.g. the 1950s and 1960s). A large 
number of studies provide no construal of the downturn of the business 
cycle and the degradation of social and environmental development. An 
injudicious application of the real socioeconomic processes of capitalism 
is the natural outcome when there is too much focus on ‘the gap’ 
between GDP and the ISEW, such as in the Dutch ISEWs by Rosenberg et 
al. (1995) and Bleys (2007a, 2007b). 
Moreover, several studies lack any real lively discussion of the 
socioeconomic situation vis-à-vis the ISEW—i.e. the authors of the 
Scottish (Moffatt and Wilson 1994), Italian (Guenno and Tiezzi 1998), 
Chilean and Polish (Gil and Sleszynski, 2003; Prochowicz and Sleszynski, 
2006) ISEWs. These advocates are more interested in aggregating the 
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benefit/cost variables to construct the single-number indicator of 
welfare–sustainability. They describe the trend of the per capita ISEW 
(and GDP) in a very mechanical way: there is no reference to the 
institutional arrangement nor is there any business cycles analysis. Let us 
hope that the empirical applications of the national-level Genuine 
Progress Indicators (GPIs) improve on the ISEWs, which will be 
discussed in Section 4.5 below: 
4.5 The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) 
Commonsensical Accounting 
According to authors at Redefining Progress, the defects of GDP as a 
measure of progress are egregious and many. For one thing, it includes 
only a portion of economic activity, the part that involves an exchange of 
money. Consequently, it leaves out the things that people value and 
fundamentally need, such as the unpaid work in households, caring for 
children and the elderly, and the hours of free time for family or 
community activities. GDP also excludes the critical contributions of the 
natural habitat, such as pure air and water, fertile soil, moderate climate, 
and protection from the sun’s harmful rays—even though these services, 
which the Earth provides freely, become expensive if they need to be 
bought instead (e.g. see Cobb et al. 1999:1-2). 
 
[GDP] ... completely ignores the non-monetary 
contributions of families, communities and the natural 
environment. ... [T]he GDP masks the breakdown of the 
social structure and natural habitat; and worse, it portrays 
this breakdown as economic gain ... and the nation’s 
massive borrowing from future generations. [Cobb et al. 
1995:1,44, emphasis added] 
 
Thus, the critical factors of genuine progress are a functioning ecology 
and society, i.e. the authors of the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) 
emphasise the social and natural aspects of life. The inclusion of both 
environmental and social dimensions is a more promising start than the 
US ISEW. 
For example, the authors of the US GPI note the following social and 
environmental problems with GDP: a) GDP treats crime, divorce, legal 
fees, and other elements of social breakdown as economic gains. For 
instance, the Enron scandal alone may well of contributed up to one 
billion dollars to the US economy, e.g. all the court cases, lawyer’s fees, 
housing criminals, media frenzy, and payouts continue to be counted as 
positive gains by the accounting standards of GDP (see Cobb et al. 
1999:7). These are “non-productive contributions” (Venetoulis and Cobb 
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2004:7). b) GDP increases with polluting activities and then again with 
clean-ups; c) car wrecks, medical costs, locks and security systems, and 
insurance are also pluses to GDP; d) GDP ignores the liabilities of living 
on foreign assets; e) GDP takes no account of income distribution; and f) 
GDP takes no account of the depletion or degradation of natural 
resources. In summary, GDP treats every transaction as positive, as long 
as money changes hands—the “GDP counts such costs as economic 
gain; even as the social structure erodes, we say ‘the economy is 
improving’ ... thus ... [i]t assigns to social and ecological capital an 
implicit and arbitrary value of zero” (Cobb et al. 1995:7-8). 
They argue that a truer indicator of progress, in contrast to the above 
shortcomings of GDP, would offer a statement of net benefit. For 
instance, in the case of a car, it would evaluate the services the car 
provides against the associated downsides: the pollution, the increased 
congestion and accidents, road maintenance and police services, and 
insurance rates. In the words of Cobb et al. (1999:10-1), “GDP operates 
like a business income statement that adds expense to income instead of 
subtracting them. ... A single index [is thus viable] so that gains in one 
area could be offset by losses in another, and vice versa”. Hence, a priori: 
 
The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) takes from the GDP 
the financial transactions that are relevant to well-being. It 
then adjusts them for aspects of the economy that the 
GDP ignores. The GPI thus reveals the relationship 
between factors conventionally defined as purely economic 
and those traditionally defined as purely social and 
environmental. ... But the GPI assesses the well-being of 
households, rather than focusing exclusively on the 
number of dollars they spend. [Cobb et al. 1999:3] 
 
Therefore, it is argued that by commonsensical accounting and 
pragmatic example, the authors provide a ‘theory’—an idea accounting 
for or justifying something (Soanes and Stevenson 2004)—to modify 
GDP to include the values of both market and non-market activity within 
a single, comprehensive framework (via a long-term perspective): 
 
[GDP] makes no attempt to approximate a net benefit. … 
[But] … [t]he GPI is much closer to the common-sense 
accounting that a household would do. A family would not 
add together its income and expenses to assess its 
financial condition; nor would it lump together every kind 
of expense to determine if it were doing better or worse. 
For example, college tuition and the cost of a new burglar 
alarm system would appear very differently: one a way of 
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getting ahead, the other a necessary defence against falling 
behind. [Cobb et al. 1995:9, emphasis added] 
 
For instance, Cobb et al. (1995) sketch their ‘theory’, or more correctly 
their sensible bookkeeping procedure, as follows: Similar to GDP, GPI 
examines ‘final’ purchases only. As, business expenses are intermediate 
costs (yet not necessarily true societal costs), and therefore show up 
ultimately in the price of products and services sold to consumers. In 
addition, the GPI authors at Redefining Progress have subtracted only 
household spending on crime prevention as well as the direct costs of 
crime to households. And they have excluded government expenditure in 
the GPI, e.g. city police, because their baseline, personal consumption, 
does not include government spending. In summary, the GPI adds the 
final value of services and products consumed in the economy (in a 
analogous manner to GDP), but they also add non-market activities not 
found in GDP. Then the GPI subtracts three categories of expense related 
to that consumption: 1) defensive expenditures (ambiguous and 
regretted consumption that compensate for past costs); 2) social 
costs/disservices to current well-being; and 3) the depreciation of 
environmental assets and natural resources. 
The US GPI (Cobb et al. 1995) is the first attempt in the history of 
sustainable economic welfare construction to account for well-being 
dimensions that are more “social”. As a result, the US GPI is a real 
attempt to incorporate social dimensions, which is in line with what Daly 
and Cobb (1989, 1994) wanted to convey in their original ISEW measure, 
an “economics for community”—albeit the GPI authors do not explain 
this. The GPI accounts for social cost and social cohesion in the 
following three respects: 
‘Social capital’ and the Value of Volunteer Work 
The authors observe that the role of families has been more and more 
dislodged by television, shopping malls, fast food restaurants and other 
aspects of the market. In an affluent society, as life functions such as 
meal preparation and personal counselling are increasingly provided 
through monetised commerce rather than though extended families, 
family bonds begin to fray for lack of the life activities that strengthen 
them. “The most basic and important “service sector” in America is the 
family” (Cobb et al. 1995:19). They note that children living with a single 
parent or with a stepparent are more likely to face socioeconomic 
hardship than children living with biological parents. Hence, the GPI is a 
more advanced version of the ISEW because it accounts for social 
dimensions of well-being affecting the society. 




Ideally, we would compute how the rising “service” and 
“entertainment” sectors have helped displace—and 
deplete—the stock of “social capital”, similar to the way we 
estimate the capital depreciation and depletion of natural 
resources. But there is virtually no data on the “service” 
parents and other adults provide children in the process of 
growing up (not to mention the problems of trying to 
quantify such relationships in the first place). [Cobb et al. 
1995:19] 
 
The authors therefore were forced (in their words) to adopt proxies that 
provide only indirect measures. Two such proxies they utilise are: 1) 
divorce and its effects on children; and 2) the amount of time families 
spend watching television. 
But, the authors are not purely interested in the economic costs to 
society; they are also concerned with (some of) the benefits. According to 
the authors, volunteer work is the nation’s ‘informal safety net’, the 
invisible social matrix on which a healthy market economy depends. A 
nation’s informal safety net, i.e. volunteer labour is perhaps a good proxy 
for social capital. 
Costs of Crime 
The authors calculate the costs of crime: “[c]rime exacts a large economic 
toll on society. Some of these costs are obvious, such as medical 
expenses and lost property. But others are more elusive, because they are 
psychological (the trauma of being violated) or are incurred in the form 
of lost opportunities, such as activities foregone because people fear the 
possibility of theft or violence” (Anielski and Cobb 1999:12). The GPI 
utilises the cost of crime to victims based on their out-of-pocket 
expenditures or the value of stolen property, while other direct costs are 
defensive expenditures to prevent or avoid the impacts of crime, such as 
locks, burglar alarms, security devices, and security services. Thus, the 
“costs of crime” item is only a partial measure of asocial capital. 
Underemployment 
Underemployment is the long-term rise in the proportion of the labour 
force that would like to work more but cannot obtain that work. The 
authors note that the social consequences of long-term unemployment 
are high, albeit much of the financial hardship is covered by 
unemployment insurance. However, the relative social distress (Cobb et al. 
1995:23) caused by long-term structural changes is dangerously 
exorbitant, e.g. suicides, assaults, and admissions to mental hospitals. 
Nonetheless, the authors do not measure these secondary costs of 
underemployment, but measure them directly via the hours of 

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underemployment as a cost. 
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Now we will examine the empirical results of the US GPIs in a 
chronological fashion. Since GDP measures output and GPI measures 
economic health or national well-being, the two trend lines do not 
purport to portray the same things. Thus, the absolute size of the 
indicators is not particularly relevant for comparative purposes (see Cobb 
et al. 1995:43). The best approach is to interpret the shapes and curves of 
the growth trends of the GDP and GPI. Cobb et al. (1995) constructed the 
first GPI study for the US over the 1950–1994 period. This GPI was 
calculated in 1982 constant dollars using the consumer price index and 
GDP implicit price deflator. In comparison to the growth in GDP per 
capita, the growth trend of ISEW per capita suggests that the 1950s and 
1960s was a relatively more welfare enhancing period than the 1970s, 
1980s and early 1990s (average annual rates of change were negative), as 
shown in Figure 4.16a and Table 4.16a on page 156. In Table 4.16a below, 
the growth rates of GDP per capita were slightly higher in the 1950s and 
1960s (when the GPI per capita was growing) than in the 1970s, 1980s 
and early 1990s (when GPI per capita was declining). The authors 
provide some good details vis-à-vis the reduction in the rate of progress 
since the 1970s, yet the authors do not offer a strong socio-historical 
narrative. But, the focus was on establishing the ‘theoretical’ foundation 
(i.e. commonsensical bookkeeping procedure) of the GPI, therefore their 
lack of historical specificity is forgivable. 
The second major US GPI study at Redefining Progress is by Anielski 
and Rowe (1999). There are only a few differences between this GPI and 
the original index by Cobb et al. (1995). Chiefly, Anielski and Rowe (1999) 
updated the GPI methodology. Firstly, they expressed all values in 
constant (inflation-adjusted) chained 1992 US dollars. Secondly, they 






The authors utilised the Gini coefficient, which measures relative income 
inequality across all income groups or quintiles.108 And all parameters 
were updated for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 (Cobb et al. 1999), 
including new physical and qualitative data and new value (cost or 
benefit) estimates. The implication of the revised methodology did not 
significantly change the overall picture of the US economy. The growth 
rates of GPI per capita were much higher in the 1950s and 1960s than in 
the 1970s–1990s, whereas, on average, GDP per capita increased over 
the 1950–1998 period, as shown in Figure 4.16b and Table 4.16b on page 
157. The authors argue that the gains from growth in GDP have 
proceeded increasingly to the highest income earners in America, leaving 
the poor further behind. From 1975 to 1998, the proportion of total 
income received by the poorest fifth of the population dropped from 
4.4% to 3.6%, while the proportion received by the richest fifth increased 
from 43.2% to 49.2%—hence, a major reason for the declining US GPI 
since 1975 (see Cobb et al. 1999). The authors claim, “[p]art of this 
widening gap between rich and poor in the 1990s derived from the 
tremendous surge in the value of equities” (Cobb et al. 1999:10).  
 

108 The original GPI used a customised index reflecting the change in the share of national income 



























Source: Adapted from 
Cobb et al. (1995:41)
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Thus, Cobb et al. (1999) are the first in the net income literature assess 
the contradictory role between industry and finance within the GPI—a 
significant theme of political economy. 
Finance is an ‘investment’ to the extent that it promotes real 
industrial activity by providing information, liquidity and spreading risk. 
Finance is ‘consumption’ to the extent that it erodes real wealth and 
promotes systemic instability. Historically in the US, finance played a 
somewhat volatile yet restrained role during the 1950s and 1960s. But in 
1970–2008, finance is an ever-more powerful yet highly volatile force. The 
weight, influence of “oligopoly–finance capital” (à la Amin 2008:52) and 
the obsessive pecuniary motives by multifarious actors are socially 
damaging. The declining trend of the US real GPI per capita since the 
mid-1970s to 1998 seems to reflect a dominance of finance over industry. 
Latterly, of course, high-risk sub-prime mortgages in the US and Europe 
have become a source of historic instability. It will be very interesting to 
see how other SEWI advocates tackle the industry–finance contradiction 
in their analyses. In any case, Cobb et al. (1999) must be commended on 
first seeing (in the SEWI literature) the criticality of this issue. 
In addition, the remarkable foreign ownership of American assets has 
led to a severe trade imbalance between the US and the rest of the world. 



























Source: Adapted from 
Aneilski and Rowe (1999:54);

































GDP GPI Source: Adapted from 
Aneilski and Rowe (1999:54);
Cobb et al. (1999:22)
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greatly to the dramatic stock market rise (leading to a speculative 
bubble). But as the authors say, this growth in paper value from foreign 
investment does not represent enduring economic strength. It means 
that foreign ownership of US assets grew rapidly compared to assets held 
by Americans overseas. When these foreign owners are finally paid off 
(with interest and dividends), the investment funds will flow out of the 
United States. Relying on foreign investors to inflate the US stock market 
is equivalent to borrowing now to pay for increased consumption and 
forcing future generations to pay the interest, according to the authors: 
 
While we have essentially financed our economic growth by 
borrowing overseas, the rise in paper wealth created an 
illusory sense of prosperity, which in turn fostered 
increased consumption, particularly by the wealthiest 
households. But this process is unsustainable. While we 
have added to future generations’ debt burden by failing to 
reinvest in business and borrowing from foreign countries, 
increased consumption has also depleted the legacy of 
natural assets that will be inherited by our children. [Cobb 
et al. 1999:11] 
 
Thus, Cobb et al. (1999) provide a very good but not excellent historico-
institutional analysis, which supplements the work on the GPI by Anielski 
and Rowe (1999), as discussed below: 
Generally, the authors argue that the following GPI components 
indicate improvements in the quality of daily social life for many 
Americans during the 1990s: less underemployment, divorce, household 
costs of crime, and more time devoted to household and volunteer work 
imply greater wellbeing and stronger social cohesion.109 However, there 
are several problems with their analysis. During the 1980s, the GPI 
showed a relatively consistent rate of growth of 0.5% per year in the 
‘costs of family breakdown’, but since 1994 these costs have stabilised. 
But, the choice of ‘divorce rate per population’ adopted by Redefining 
Progress in their US GPI is fallible. The correct method to utilise is 
‘divorce rate per married couple’. In other words, social cohesion in the 
US has probably deteriorated more than the authors had estimated, 
which would have provided extra support for the ‘threshold 
hypothesis’.110 Nonetheless, there is a real attempt to describe the quality 
of the stock of social capital at Redefining Progress. 

109 According to the authors, social life was enhancing even with leisure hours proportionally 
declining in the 1970s to 1990s. 
110 Direct costs to the adults involved measured by the ‘divorce rate per population’ 
underestimates the true situation. However, Anielski and Rowe (1999:15) acknowledge the 
limitations of using these proxies for social dimensions, and state that it “grossly underestimates 
the true cost to the nation from the erosion of social capital resulting from family breakdown”. 
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However, there are limits to which the GPI can tell a good story about 
the real relationships of persons-in-community. Consider the following 
relatively good inter-group analysis by Cobb et al. (1999). The justification 
for deducting half of the “private expenditures on health” component of 
the GPI as ‘defensive’ is quite valid: e.g. excess weight, Type II diabetes, 
obesity-related heart disease, cancer, stroke, and hypertension all 
contribute to GDP by payment to medical practitioners (medical costs). 
Extensive evidence supports that risks for high cholesterol, clogged 
arteries, and heart disease begin in childhood, with poor diets (i.e. 
consumption habits) and sedentary lifestyles. The US GPI authors (see 
Cobb et al. 1999:24-40), for instance, provide real estimates of medical 
spending on disease associated with obesity. They illustrate the real 
problem of GDP across the general population and amongst social 
groups. For example, the authors provide data demonstrating the 
illogicality of counting all growth in consumption as progress. They note 
that the food industry illustrates the differences between consumption 
that adds and detracts from genuine quality of life and demonstrates the 
self-replicating, self-expanding nature of economic growth. In short, 
many Americans are habituated to buying solutions to problems, so they 
prefer diet drinks disguised as pop or milkshakes and even surgery to 
altering their unhealthy eating habits and sedentary lifestyles (see Cobb 
et al. 1999:28). 
In addition, “Consuming Kids” in Cobb et al. (1999) further highlights 
the need to distinguish between different types of consumption, with 
different effects on consumers’ physical, mental, and psychological 
health. Thus, they specifically scrutinise the health of children. Their study 
demonstrates how children (as heterogeneous agents) are being 
habitually socialised, i.e. via fashion and obsolescence, into the idea that 
consumption is the route to happiness as well as the index of progress. 
Meanwhile, advertising creates a continuous flow of consumers to 
perpetuate the pattern of empty economic growth (see Cobb et al. 
1999:31). Advertising persuades unsophisticated consumers to acquire 
products that damage their physical health; the ‘ads’ themselves erode 
kids’ self-esteem or self-worth.111 An increase in spending on clothing by 
children also reflects the need to look stylish, keep up with trends, and try 
to purchase a sense of belonging and acceptance: 
 
If we were attending to genuine progress, as does the GPI, 
overeating, then dieting, then treating eating disorders and 

111 “The advertisers catch children in a vicious cycle, encouraging them to eat foods and live 
lifestyles that induce weight gain, while teaching them to see thin as attractive and fat as repulsive, 
by using stereotypically thin women and super-fit muscular men in advertising and shows. The 
more a child’s self-confidence declines, the more vulnerable he or she may be to messages linking 
consumption and happiness. … There is also evidence that children increasingly measure self-
worth by the products they own” (Cobb et al. 1999:36-7). 
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surgically removing excess fat would be considered a net 
loss for our psyches, our perceptions of ourselves, and our 
well-being. The physical and mental health costs of our 
dysfunctional relationship with food should not be 
included in any true measure of progress. [Cobb et al. 
1999:29] 
 
In fact, children’s spending has been rising since the 1960s. This 
increased personal consumption, according to conventional economic 
measures such as the GDP, is equated with progress. However, are kids 
progressing? Are they better off? Statistics concerning their physical and 
mental health, their eating, smoking, and drinking habits, their mounting 
debts, and their suicide rates indicate that they are not (see Cobb et al. 
1999:33). Therefore, the authors ask a vital question, 
 
Have American youth achieved progress in the last 
decade? Their spending patterns say yes. The GDP and the 
economy say yes. Common sense, however, says no. 
Increased disposable income may be an economic benefit, 
but children’s spending patterns—on more junk food, 
more cigarettes, liquor, and drugs—and their rising 
physical and mental health problems should be counted as 
social costs, and should depress a measure of progress. 
[Cobb et al. 1999:40] 
 
Cobb’s et al. (1999) socio-institutional analysis in “Consuming Kids” is 
laudable, stressing the problems faced by the modern youth of America 
and the damage to their net psychic income. 
However, the authors have not excluded any of these items from the 
‘personal consumption expenditure’ column in their US GPI. While the 
authors do account for the obesity epidemic, it is done in an indirect 
manner, by utilising the simplifying assumption of excluding half of the 
health expenditures as defensive expenditures. But, perhaps more 
importantly, while the authors report on various heterogeneous agents 
and their role in the socio-economy, e.g. children on drugs, heavy 
drinking, smoking and mood-altering substances (see Cobb et al. 
1999:36), their GPI does not break down the allotment in which 
heterogeneous people (in this case, the children) are affected. (In 
addition, the GPI authors have noted the problems of advertising and 
fashion yet have not included an estimate for them in the GPI.) The GPI 
authors have raised valid critiques against GDP, but how does one judge 
the claims above, professed under “Column A, personal consumption 
expenditures” (Anielski and Rowe 1999:1-3), in the overall index? The 
authors do not specifically address the issue. Perhaps their critical 
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analysis inadvertently reveals the limitations of the ‘personal 
consumption expenditure’ component in the SEWIs?112 In other words, 
pivotal limits of monetary-composite indices concerning the 
heterogeneity character of persons-in-community have been self-exposed. 
Cobb et al. (2000) and Cobb et al. (2001) at Redefining Progress also 
recognise that the quality of the natural environment and social 
relationships are interrelated with economic well-being. Cobb et al. 
(2000) are primarily interested in the changes in GPI from 1998 to 1999, 
whereas Cobb et al. (2001) examine the GPI over the 1999–2000 and 
1994–2000 periods. Only in passing do these studies examine the long-
term trends of GDP and GPI for the US. Briefly, we will consider each 
study in turn. 
In the Cobb et al. (2000) study, GPI per capita grew by 5.5 percent 
from 1998 to 1999, which is double the rate of real GDP per capita for the 
same period. This atypical rise in the GPI represents the highest 
percentage growth since 1976, surpassing even the years of economic 
recovery in 1983 and 1995. The authors have supplemented their results 
of the 1999 GPI with a high-quality analysis of real institutional 
processes. They argue that the GPI rose chiefly because of euphoria in 
the stock market and the massive splurge of household consumption 
expenditures. For instance, they converse on Hirsh’s (1976) “positional 
goods”—that some forms of consumption are driven by the ‘status 
contest’, which depends on the subjective sense of position relative to 
those above on the status ladder. The pursuit of “positional goods”, such 
as homes in exclusive neighbourhoods, luxury cars, and designer clothes, 
is by definition a contest that many must lose for a few to win, because 
the value of positional goods depends largely on unequal access. “In the 
interests of improving position (in reality or perception), luxuries become 
“needs” and impose demands for income to purchase them. ... Credit 
cards hold out the promise of staying in the running while escaping the 
immediate experience of deprivation, inadequacy, or losing ground” 
(Cobb et al. 2000:9). These factors overshadowed less dramatic, but 
persistent, signs of increased stress on social life and environmental 
health (see Cobb et al. 2000:3). 
This last point regarding the declines in social and environmental 
well-being raises a corollary for the aggregated net income index. 
Essentially, the authors go to considerable effort to say that although the 
GPI shows signs of progress in social life, other significant indicators, 
such as real wages and personal debt levels, imply that the “huge growth 
of consumption came at considerable cost to their time for anything 
other than work” (Cobb et al. 2000:6). But, their analysis shows the 

112 On the other hand, the authors of the Victorian and Australian GPI go to further lengths and 
include deductions for some of the above non-welfare enhancing items, but do not scrutinise the 
political economy of heterogeneous agents. 
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limitations of constructing a (restricted) all-in-one indicator of 
sustainable economic welfare, because the GPI leaves out these critical 
variables. That is, the GPI cannot detect the surreptitious changes of real 
socioeconomic progress. They had to spend a lot of time suggesting that 
the raison d’être of the rise in the US Genuine Progress Indicator is not 
actual improvement after all. Their detailed disaggregated account—which 
is rather brilliant—in effect shows the major inadequacy of GPI in 
measuring “genuine progress”. 
Yet in their defence, the advocates recognise that year-to-year 
fluctuations of a single value could distort understanding of long-term 
progressions. For example, the GPI per capita rose by only 1.6% in 2000 
over its 1999 level (see Cobb et al. 2001); a noticeable fall in the rate of 
growth which shows that the 1998–1999 period was not sustainable. 
Realising these limitations, Cobb et al. (2001) scrutinise the GPI over six 
years, 1994–2000. They provide the main reasons for why GPI per capita 
grew at a rate of 3.3% per year over the booming 1994–2000, which 
contrasted to the preceding 20-year period of stagnation (1974–1994). 
With reference to the GPI, we simply conclude that the authors know how 
to appraise socioeconomic and environmental progress or regress 
because of their reasonably good socio-historical account. 
However, the authors do not examine the role that economic growth 
played in enhancing (if at all) the GPI over the speculative bubble period 
(1994–2000). Nor do they attempt to explain the link between a relatively 
low GDP over the mid-1970s and mid-1990s and the worsening GPI over 
the same period. Effectively, the authors’ empirical applications have 
delinked the GDP—but not necessarily the GPI—from the capitalist 
system. As we argued in Chapter 2, cyclical trends of GDP growth can aid 
our understanding of the anomalies of capitalism. But these US GPI 
advocates ignore the real processes behind GDP growth (or lack thereof) 
that explain the pattern of capitalist development. The root of the 
problem is in their preferred bookkeeping technique. The GPI is based on 
good commonsensical accountancy whereas GDP, allegedly, lacks 
commonsense altogether: 
 
The GPI factors in hidden environmental [and social] costs 
... [because] [t]he GDP fails to distinguish between 
monetary transactions that genuinely add to well-being and 
those that diminish it or merely seek to maintain the status 
quo. It makes no adjustment for economic activities that 
simply try to make up for degraded conditions. ... [T]he 
GDP violates both basic accounting principles and common 





True, the authors are spot on vis-à-vis the limitations of GDP as a good 
measure of net welfare. The ‘commonsensical’ foundation of GDP might 
be more valuable than that proposed by the advocates of GPI, because 
GDP growth and decline are a suitable measure for understanding the 
dynamics of capitalism (discussed in Section 4.11 below). 
Another update of the US GPI at Refining Progress is by Venetoulis and 
Cobb (2004). It appears that this paper also supports the threshold 
tendency. There are no apparent methodological changes (in the 
Venetoulis and Cobb 2004 study) other than an update of the time-series; 
it is merely an extension of the study’s time period examined (i.e. from 
1950–1998 to 1950–2002). Their results of the US GDP per capita and 






Their empirical results are congruous with the previous studies. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the US GPI was on a ‘sustainable path’, i.e. there was 
no gap between GDP and GPI. Progress since the 1970s to early 1990s 
has significantly declined. GPI rose during the mid-to-late-1990s but 
dipped a little after the stock market crash in the early 2000s. Overall, this 
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
164
contributions to the existing literature on ISEW/GPI.113 
Talberth et al. (2007) reconstruct the GPI for the US economy by 
attempting to measure collective welfare in terms of principles of 
sustainable development drawn from the economic, social, and 
environmental domains. They are the first authors to significantly update 
the methodology at Refining Progress since 1998, and incorporate 
numerous new studies and sources of information that have evolved 
since that time. By updating the “calculation approach”, the US GPI is 
derived from 26 separate time-series data columns spanning the 1950–
2004 period. All their figures are reported in year 2000 US dollars. 
The authors constructively ridicule GDP from all angles, citing 
numerous examples of its erroneous assessment of real changes in well-
being. GDP is oblivious to gross inequality, e.g. GDP growth thrives on 
the conspicuous consumption habits of the wealthy. GDP (may) 
plummet when communities become more self-reliant and try to 
enhance social cohesion at the local level. Because the authors begin 
with GDP, the US GPI is still based on a commonsensical operational 
procedure: “green GDP accounting systems all involve three basic steps” 
(see Talberth et al. 2007:3). That is, the GPI corrects for the deficiencies 
of GDP by incorporating aspects of the non-market economy, separating 
welfare-enhancing benefits from welfare-detracting costs, correcting for 
the unequal distribution of income, and distinguishing between 
sustainable and unsustainable forms of consumption. In their words, 
“[we] first isolate personal consumption expenditures by removing 
money spent purchasing, maintaining, or replacing durable goods and 
then make a series of additions or deductions to reflect both positive and 
negative externalities associated with that consumption” (see Talberth et 
al. 2007:4). Hence, the commonsensical operational procedures still 
prevail. 
However, commonsensical accountancy does play a less significant 
role in this GPI than it did previously. For the first time at Redefining 
Progress, the authors argue that there is a theoretical foundation for the 
US GPI: “the Fisherian concept of welfare equivalent income—because it 
attempts to measure the net psychic income households derive from 
their consumption activities” (see Talberth et al. 2007:4). They utilise a 
similar approach to the normative social choice theory as outlined by 
Clarke and Islam (2004).114 That is, the core principles of sustainable 
development vis-à-vis the ‘environment’ and ‘social’ domains are 
embedded within the GPI. For example, the key sustainability principle 
from the environment domain is the principle of thermodynamic 
efficiency, i.e. from a normative standpoint, the approach calls for 

113 These authors also calculated a GPI for nine counties in the San Francisco Bay area, but as only 
a single year was briefly studied (2000), I did not subject it to critical analysis. 




recognition of the limits imposed on the economic system by the first 
and second laws of thermodynamics. In the realm of social sustainability, 
the GPI makes an explicit adjustment to personal consumption 
expenditures for improvements or declines in distributional equity. In 
summary, the theory of the reconstructed US GPI is primarily based on 
“entropic net psychic income”, and certain aspects of social welfare 
economics such as social choice theory. 
Moreover, the authors realise that there are lingering theoretical and 
methodological criticisms of the GPI.115 For instance, they state that in 
terms of GPI components, the most important critique is that the GPI is 
ad-hoc in what it includes or implicitly excludes as contributors to or 
detractors from welfare (à la Neumayer 1999). And, that there are 
components of current welfare that have little apparent link to long-term 
sustainability. According to Talberth et al. (2007), a major theoretical 
weakness is that the GPI purports to be based on the principle of strong 
sustainability, but it actually measures weak sustainability. This is 
because GPI measures the loss of both ecological and durable fixed 
capital separately. The authors do not attempt to resolve any of these 
criticisms. 
But, the authors’ attempt to solve an ongoing critique developed by 
Dietz and Neumayer (2006b): that the threshold effect found in most GPI 
and ISEW studies is essentially an artifact of methodological flaws than a 
true reflection of welfare growth and decline. 
 
We believe this update has at least partially remedied some 
of those concerns. For instance, in the calculation of long 
term environmental damage, we have discarded any 
assumptions about growth in this damage and, instead, 
tied damage calculations to actual carbon emissions and 
the estimated marginal social costs of those emissions. In 
several other columns, assumed growth rates were 
replaced by actual data so it remains unclear the extent to 
which the “hard wired” threshold effect hypothesis Dietz 
and Neumayer (2006b) suggest still applies. [Talberth et al. 
2007:19] 
 
They humbly conclude that there is potential room for improvement in 
their methodology and other approaches should be considered (see 
Talberth et al. 2007:20). This study shows a level of maturity in which the 
GPI accounts have been constructed. 
Furthermore, Talberth et al. (2007) are the first to use GPI time-series 
data to analyse the welfare impacts of policy change in relation to greater 
trade openness. Economic openness is the ratio of trade activity (imports 

115 Not including the various criticisms raised in Chapters 3 to 6. 
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and exports) to GDP. They replicate and partially update Talberth and 
Bohara’s (2006) analysis with respect to the new US GPI accounts.116 
“The [updated] results provide some empirical support for the 
burgeoning literature associating greater openness with environmental 
degradation, income inequality, and an increase in economic activity that 
may be self cancelling from a welfare perspective” (Talberth et al. 
2007:25). Talberth and Bohara (2006) also modelled the effects of 
changes in economic openness, the growth rate of carbon dioxide 
emissions and livestock production on the gap between GDP and GPI, 
and found each to have a significant, positive influence on the rate of 
growth of this GDP–GPI gap. In their newest study, they adopt that 
model and substitute the livestock variable for an urban growth 
parameter—a variable of significance to the policy debate over the degree 
of urbanization. Thus, Talberth et al. (2007) add a new dimension to the 
GPI literature by extending their analysis to include urban sprawl, which 
is measured in terms of urban land area per capita.117 
In relation to whether or not urban sprawl enhances or detracts from 
welfare, they find that the net effects are ambiguous, yet worth exploring 
in a more systematic fashion. But they found a positive relationship 
between the GDP–GPI gap and growth in urban land area per capita. 
According to the authors, this suggests that on balance, the personal 
consumption, time savings, and public infrastructure benefits from 
sprawl are more than counteracted by the costs associated with traffic 
congestion, auto accidents, carbon emissions, and lost farmland (see 
Talberth et al. 2007:27). These are intriguing results. Moreover, the 
authors portray the real worth of critically evaluating the gap between 
GDP and GPI. In short, the legitimacy of a GDP–GPI gap has been 
strengthened by the work of Talberth and Bohara (2006) and Talberth et 
al. (2007). 
Their GDP and GPI accounts (per capita) suggest that while the US 
economy has grown steadily since 1950, collective welfare may have 
peaked in the late 1970s and stagnated in the 1980s–2000s as the costs 
associated with income inequality, loss of time spent on non-market 
activities, and environmental degradation outweigh the benefits of 
economic growth, as shown in Figure 4.16d and Table 4.16d below: 
 

116 Briefly, their earlier (2006) study utilised panel data spanning 30–50 years from eight countries 
(Australia, Austria, Brazil, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States) with so-
called green-GDP accounts (e.g. GPI and ISEW) and an aggregate production function model. They 
found a strong negative relationship between openness and the net welfare indicator and a strong 
positive correlation between openness and the gap between GDP and ISEW/GPI. The effects, 
however, were non-linear, signifying that up to a point, greater openness is beneficial (see Talberth 
and Bohara 2006). Their study is unique because most studies relating openness to higher 
economic growth rates rely almost exclusively on GDP and related measures (i.e. not green-GDP). 
117 They also demonstrate the potential use of GPI data to inform the debate over tax cuts and 






Paraphrasing what the authors say: we find a prominent trend that while 
GDP growth rates have more or less fluctuated within a positive range, 
GPI growth rates fall into two distinct periods. In the first period, 
spanning 1950 to 1980, GPI per capita growth rates roughly match those 
of the GDP and are generally positive (e.g. see Table 4.16d). Beginning in 
1980, GPI growth rates are generally negative or marginally positive. 
When GPI is falling, it implies that the economic system is eroding the 
stocks of natural and social capital on which all goods and services flows 
depend and limiting the next generation’s prospects. The implication is 
that this trend might be good evidence of a “threshold” effect. This is 
how the authors observe the trends between GDP and GPI. 
But their degree of historical specificity is vacuous because, in effect, 
they are simply interested in ‘periods’. There is not enough inquiry into 
the real socioeconomic processes of US capitalism. It is critical to have a 
good understanding of how society has come to where it is; explaining 
why there might be problems is useful, practical and therefore very 
important for political economy research. Therefore, we will scrutinise 
the US GPIs (and the US ISEW) in more detail in Section 4.11, offering a 
comparative institutional analysis of the five national-level studies. For 
now, we will evaluate the Australian GPIs, beginning with study one in 
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4.5.2 Australian GPI (1) 
Hamilton,Clive (1997)TheGenuineProgress Indicator:ANew IndexofChanges inWellǦbeing inAustralia,The
AustraliaInstitute,Canberra,DiscussionPaperNumber14.




There are three main works to consider for the Australian GPI (study 
one), but only two sets of time-series were constructed. The study by 
Hamilton (1997, 1999) covers the 1950–1996 period, while Hamilton and 
Denniss (2001) cover the 1950–2000 period. Hamilton’s (1999) paper is 
a condensed version of Hamilton (1997). Hamilton and Denniss (2001) 
at The Australia Institute only extend the trend sequence of the GPI by 
four years, and they add a few minor (yet good) technical improvements. 
In this section, we will discuss the three papers together since the 
principal innovations were put forward in the original paper (Hamilton 
1997) and (most) have been carried forward to Hamilton and Denniss 
(2001). 
According to Hamilton, GPI attempts to measure the broader impact 
of economic growth, mainly those transactions that fall outside the 
system of national accounts. The national accounts that generate GDP 
fail to recognise that the growth process produces ‘ill-being’ in addition 
to well-being, ‘bads’ as well as goods. The reason for the inquiry into 
devising alternative indicators to GDP is that measures of national 
progress have been bound inseparably to the price system. For instance, 
only when the market captures the spread of paid childcare, fast food and 
the employment of housekeepers do they appear to add to our well-
being—because they now have price tags. In other words, the 
contribution of family, community, and the natural environment, which 
lie outside the marketplace, simply do not count. People do not 
experience economic growth as such, rather, they experience a complex 
set of economic and social changes that affect their daily lives. 
As a polemist of GDP growth fetish, Hamilton (1997, 1999) justifies 
the development of a composite well-being index, the GPI, as follows: 
 
[T]he selection of components is not arbitrary but follows 
some rules. The process begins by identifying the 
deficiencies of GDP as a measure of welfare and asks how 
it would need to be changed to make it a better measure. 
In doing so, it builds a framework for measuring 
sustainable consumption. ... Thus the GPI is not ‘arbitrary’ 
in the sense that its authors simply add in components at 
random. In each case, there is an identified problem with 
GDP as a measure of welfare, and an attempt is made to 





Concurrently, Hamilton reveals a major flaw in the GPI accounting 
framework: placing dollar values on things that convert ethical values 
into economic ones is a process that for many people actually devalues 
the environment and human life. “It is not possible to develop the 
concept of NNP into an exact indicator of sustainability on the basis of 
current price information, which flags the general problem of attempting to 
estimate sustainable consumption using prices that reflect objectives other 
than sustainability” (Hamilton 1999:14, emphases added). Nonetheless, 
he argues that the modifications to GDP are necessary, and they form the 
basis of the GPI’s foundation (see Hamilton 1999:15, Hamilton and 
Denniss 2001:8). This is done by utilising the commonsensical operation 
procedure—only this time, according to the authors, we are trying to 
measure “sustainable consumption”.118 
Methodological/technical improvements 
Firstly, it is important to note that Hamilton makes some interesting 
methodological contributions to the debate. Unique to the literature, this 
Australian GPI includes measures of the costs of problem gambling and 
an assessment of the value of advertising, on the basis that most are 
designed to be persuasive rather than informative, creating new ‘needs’ 
rather than fulfilling existing ones (à la Zolotas’ EAW). In addition, there 
is an inclusion of a pertinent environmental factor for Australia, the 
‘costs of irrigation water use’. The authors account for the social welfare 
of the heterogeneous population, by focusing on ‘problem gamblers’. 
Hamilton notes, “it makes no sense to count an increase in spending by 
gambling addicts as an addition to national welfare, so the GPI deducts 
expenditure on gambling by problem gamblers from total consumption 
expenditure” (Hamilton and Denniss 2001:x). 
There are some important comments to make regarding their GPI 
assessment of defensive costs. Hamilton (1999:16-7) argues that if some 
part of consumption expenditure does not represent an addition to 
welfare, but is undertaken to offset some other impact, it is quite 
legitimate to deduct it to obtain a better measure of welfare irrespective 
of whether the decline can be attributed to the growth process itself. That 
is, ‘defensive expenditures’ are designed to maintain welfare in the face 
of a deteriorating environment (e.g. a declining sense of personal 
security) (Hamilton and Denniss 2001:ix). But, “[t]his applies to private 
expenditures on social welfare” (Hamilton and Denniss 2001:10, 
Hamilton 1999:17, emphases added). It appears, therefore, that 
defensive expenditures are individual and social phenomena. This 
meshing of individual and social elements could be a problematic 

118 For instance, the typical assumption is adopted, that increases in personal consumption 
(adjusted for the distribution of income) reflect an increase in welfare. 
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assumption; as Clarke and Islam (2004) argued, the “social choice” 
perspective is different to aggregating individual choices. However, with 
the GPI (and much like most of the ISEW studies), the distinction 
between individual and social processes is unclear. 
Techniques and original ‘theoretical’ contributions to the GPI 
The objective is to measure the annual flows of marketed and non-
marketed goods and services more comprehensively. Specifically, the 
interest is in sustainable consumption over a given period (see Hamilton 
1999:7). Sustainable consumption depends on maintaining the 
productive potential of the capital stocks that are needed to generate the 
flow of goods and services that are consumed. For the first time in a GPI 
study, Hamilton and Denniss (2001:8-9) attend to five types of capital 
stocks: 1) built capital; 2) financial assets; 3) natural capital; 4) human 
capital; and 5) social capital. But, the authors only consider changes in 
stocks/flows of built and natural capital.119 That is, human, social as well 
as financial capitals are not included in the estimate for the Australian 
GPI. 
The authors also converse on the substitutability among the five 
capital assets. Yet again, the chief focus is between ecological and final 
artefact capital (i.e. ‘consumption’). They have taken the view that for 
particular classes of ecological capital, complete substitutability between 
built and natural assets is not a valid assumption. Hamilton then links all 
the different types of capital (and their substitutability) back towards 
‘sustaining’ consumption. The authors identify the following non-
substitutable aspects of ecological capital: the depletion of fossil fuel 
based energy, especially oil and gas (i.e. not coal); destruction of old 
growth forests; ozone depletion; long-term environmental damage; land 
degradation; and costs of irrigation water use. In other words, these are 
the present activities undermining the sustainability of the natural 
resource base future generations. 
More specifically, the strength of the Australian GPI (study one) is 
that it is principally based on strong sustainability. These ideas closely 
resemble one key element of the “economics for community” theory, that 
income is in principle based on strong sustainability. Hamilton accepts 
that particular forms of ecological capital, e.g. minerals such as iron ore, 
bauxite and copper ore, would have no binding or serious constraint 
imposed on global consumption growth. This is because both induced 
and autonomous technological changes have provided, and will continue 
to provide, substitutes to some emerging scarcities. Already there is a 
shift towards dematerialisation of consumption activity, and recycling 
technologies are advancing rapidly in some activities which remain 

119 The authors argue that monetizing the welfare derived from human and social capital is too 
complex and unethical. 
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resource intensive (Hamilton 1999:17). Thus, Hamilton has a more 
optimistic outlook towards minerals. However, he takes a much less 
optimistic position concerning energy sources. He says that 
consumption of energy is essential to all economic activity, including 
those activities required for the most basic level of subsistence. For 
instance, he states, “the uniquely valuable attributes of petroleum as a 
transport fuel, for which no truly sustainable substitutes would appear to 
be available except at much higher costs” (Hamilton 1999:18). Therefore, 
the authors conclude that in the case of irreplaceable assets (such as soil 
and old-growth forests and non-renewable energy resources), any decline 
in the capital stock in one year will generate a stream of future losses, so 
that the cumulative losses must be taken into account. 
In order to prevent the depreciation or depletion of capital stocks a 
portion of current consumption needs to be ‘set aside’ to replenish the 
stocks. The implication according to the authors is that unlike the way in 
which changes in GDP are used, year-on-year changes in the GPI are not 
very meaningful. The main application of the GPI is to illustrate trends 
over time (see Hamilton 1999:14, Hamilton and Denniss 2001:7). In fact, 
“[t]he absolute levels of the GPI and GDP are not comparable because 
GDP measures economic activity while the GPI is a measure of changes 
in welfare” (Hamilton 1999:25). For the Hamilton (1997) study, the 
Australian GDP per capita and GPI over the 1950–1996 period are 
depicted in Figure 4.17a and Table 4.17a on page 172. The results below 
show that there has been a sharp divergence between GDP and the GPI 
since the early 1980s. The decline in the GPI since the late 1970s would 
have happened earlier except for the impact of a considerable measured 
improvement in income distribution in the 1970s. The key factors 
explaining the breakdown of sustainable economic welfare in Australia 
since the late 1970s have been unsustainable levels of foreign debt; the 
growing costs of unemployment and overwork; the combined impact of a 
number of environmental problems including GHG emissions; the 
escalating costs of energy resource depletion; and a failure to maintain 
investments in the national private, business and public capital stock. 
The major difference between the earlier (Hamilton 1997) and revised 
(Hamilton and Denniss 2001) Australian GPI is that the 1950–1996 study 
required development of an index of changes in income distribution 
using the share in total income of the lowest quintile, while the 1950–2000 
study entails a calculation of an Atkinson Index (which allows for 
society’s aversion to inequality). Comparing the previous 1997 study to 
the updated 2001 study, the latter study shows that GPI per capita 
performance in the 1970s is much slower, and in the 1980s it is much 
higher. Utilising a wider social and environmental accounting method in 
Hamilton and Denniss (2001) portrays a divergent trend between GDP 
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Over the 1950–2000 period, while real GDP per capita has grown at an 
average annual rate of 2.2 percent, the GPI per capita has grown at only 
1.2 percent. The 1950s was a period of weak GDP growth per capita, 
while the 1960s was the only post-war decade of rapid growth. From a 
historical perspective, the whole period since the 1960s underlies the 
weakness of Australia’s economic performance for most of the period 
studied. Rising growth rates of GDP over time are typically construed as 
verifying that Australians have become significantly materially better off, 
but the welfare ‘gap’ growth trend between GPI and GDP per capita has 
widened considerably since the 1970s. This growing gap trend is 
worrisome. 
However, the major problem is that the authors provide no socio-
historical context in both studies; they simply concentrate on the gap 
between GDP growth and the GPI. The predicament is more evident in 
Hamilton and Denniss (2001). For instance, consider the results in Table 
4.17b above. The average annual real growth rates in GPI per capita were 
0.6% during both the 1950s and 1970s. However, in the 1960s and 1980s, 
respectively, average annual rates of real GPI per capita growth were 
1.8% and 1.7% (i.e. about the same progress of socioeconomic and 
environmental performance over each period). The rates of GPI growth 
were three times higher in the 1960s and 1980s than in the 1950s and 
1970s. But, the authors have not placed the Australian GPI trend results 
in the context of long waves of societal growth and development over the 
whole period.120 For the average Australian, the 1960s was characterised 
by a high and rapid GDP growth phase (i.e. no major recessions) and 
underwent a ‘short-wave upswing’, but the 1980s was a ‘short-wave 
downswing’ of capitalist growth and development (see O’Hara 
2008b:97). Thus, it is difficult to understand Australia’s actual progress 
during these economically diverse times, as represented by the real GPI 
per capita. 
Some critical questions arise: What is the ‘true’ depiction of society’s 
progress during the various cycles? Does sustainable economic welfare 
progress or regress when the economy grows? Does social and 
environmental welfare progress or regress during recessionary times? 
Consider the Australian economy, which was subject to a typical business 
cycle during 1980–2000. For a more detailed analysis over this period, it 
would be better to use change per quarter in order to make the changes in 
the business cycle comparable in segments of different length. But 
because the net welfare indicators are constructed on a yearly (not 
quarterly) basis, we are confined to annual average percentage changes 
in GDP per capita over real historical time. There were two recessions 

120 There is extensive literature on long waves of capitalist growth and decay (e.g. see Mager 1987, 
Mandel 1995, Silver 1992). 
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during the early-eighties (1980–1983) and early-nineties (1990–1993). 
There was a speculative financial/property boom during the mid-to-late 
1980s (1983–1990) and an economic boom of the mid-to-late 1990s 
(1993–2000). Adapting data from Hamilton and Dennis (2001), the 
trends of GDP and “sustainable consumption” (GPI) growth per capita 





This is a fascinating result. The figure shows that real GDP growth per 
capita was low during recessionary times when real GPI growth per 
capita was also relatively low. During the expansionary phases, growth in 
real GDP per capita was high when real GPI per capita was also high (i.e. 
progressing). That is, Australian “sustainable consumption” grew 
strongly during the speculative boom of 1983–1990 and the upswing of 
1993–2000. This contradicts their main hypothesis of the divergence 
between GDP and GPI. The trends of both GDP and GPI essentially run 
parallel—which GPI authors avoid pointing out. Unfortunately, the 
authors are only engrossed in the GDP–GPI ‘gap’ over the whole period 
(1950–2000). Overall, the authors have provided a relatively good 
contribution in relation to techniques, methods and some theory, but 
their socio-institutional analysis is weak because they do not consider net 
welfare vis-à-vis the cyclical instability of capitalism. 
4.5.3 Australian GPI (2) 




The work by Lawn and Clarke (2006b) generates a strong case for the 
application of the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). The GPI is an effort 
to integrate the concepts of ‘sustainability’ and ‘well-being’ into the one 
measure. It is the first book in the literature to be entirely devoted to the 



































Source: Adapted from 
Hamilton and Denniss (2001:60)
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are specifically interested in constructing a GPI as a case study for the 
state of Victoria, the second largest economy in Australia. But they also 
calculate a GPI for Australia and the Rest-of-Australia (the Australian GPI 
‘minus’ the Victorian GPI). The authors aim to reveal the extent to which 
the sustainable well-being of the average Australian (or Victorian) has 
advanced over the study period (1986–2003). 
Summary versions of chapters from their book have been published 
in international and Australian academic journals. There is no need to 
scrutinise each article individually, as the nature of the content covered is 
virtually identical to their book. Of course, it is best to partition the 
empirical enquiry at two levels, the national and subnational. But, the 
methodology, conceptual, and technical details are the same for the 
Australian GPI as they are for the Victorian GPI, so there is no need to 
repeat these details when investigating Victoria’s GPI. We will examine 
the common essentials below, followed by an empirical analysis of the 
Australian GPI (version two). 
The authors argue that GDP and gross state product (GSP) were 
never designed to be indicators of sustainable well-being. Hence, the 
construction of the GPI is mainly based on overcoming the shortcomings 
associated with GDP, GSP and Hicksian income. But they believe the 
deployment of the GPI is a partial solution to the problem of growth 
fetish.121 Their GPI is not purely based on commonsensical accountancy 
either. They believe that the GPI is congruous with Lawn (2003), i.e. it is 
soundly based on entropic net psychic income. Thus, the authors do not 
deem it necessary to develop or reconstruct their theoretical foundation 
(see Lawn and Clarke 2006b:111). 
However, the authors do endeavour to improve on one of the 
indicator’s most significant (and controversial) components, “personal 
consumption expenditures”. They note a few contemporary problems of 
‘consumerism’, but they choose not to confront this issue.122 Instead, 
they are more interested in the real welfare-related benefits that 
consumption entails. Besides, the authors see consumption as a 
‘necessary evil’: “[i]t is necessary in the sense that one must consume 
and, in a sense, destroy goods to experience the benefit they yield. But if 
more consumption can be enjoyed without having to place greater stain 
on families, social relationships, and the natural environment, the evil 
side-effects of consumption can be contained” (Lawn and Clarke 
2006b:21-2). 
For the first time in the literature, the authors attempt to include a 
‘qualitative’ dimension of consumption by rigorously adjusting 

121 Indeed, the authors (briefly) look at numerous social and environmental indicators and statistics 
on issues other than those covered in the GPI, such as overwork, household affordability and 
obesity. But they do not link them to their empirical study of the GPI. 
122 This position has still not changed in their latest book, Sustainable Economic Welfare in the Asia-
Pacific (see Lawn and Clarke 2008e:52). 
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consumption expenditures by defensive and rehabilitative expenditures. 
Defensive and rehabilitative expenditures are not welfare-enhancing 
because they merely serve to maintain and restore the “productive 
capacity of the economy” (Lawn and Clarke 2006b:22). It would be 
double counting if these regrettable expenditures were included in the 
personal consumption expenditures item. There may be a clear benefit 
which emerges from such defensive and rehabilitative spending, 
nevertheless “it is not felt in the present but in later years by way of future 
consumption” (Lawn and Clarke 2006b:22). They show three separate 
measures of “adjusted consumption”. The measure varies to the extent 
that defensive and rehabilitative spending is deducted from personal 
consumption expenditures. But their preference is for a strict array of 
adjustments vis-à-vis defensive spending: food; electricity, gas and fuel; 
the operation of vehicles; transport services; communications; hotels, 
cafes and restaurants; and insurance and other financial services. This 
austere view of adjustments made to the consumption category (in the 
System of National Accounts) is a major innovation in the literature of 
net income indices. 
In addition, the authors are the first to question the usefulness of 
comparing real GDP or GSP growth with the GPI. Real GDP/GSP simply 
reflects the percentage rise in the quantity of goods and services 
produced from one financial year to the next. The indicators do not 
indicate the amount by which the number of goods has declined. For an 
economy to grow in physical scale, the amount of durable goods added to 
the existing stock (production) must exceed the amount by which the 
existing stock declines (depreciation). Therefore, to take into account the 
degree to which the physical scale of the economy expands or contracts, 
the authors are interested in the net capital investment (NCI). The NCI 
equals the investment in all human-made capital minus the depreciation 
of all human-made capital (i.e. producer and consumer durables). Thus, 
a comparative analysis between NCI and the GPI is potentially 
meaningful. 
However, the authors have overlooked the fact that disembedded 
capitalism thrives on real GDP/GSP growth—regardless of whether the 
stock of durable human-made capital has depreciated—the more goods 
produced and consumed the ‘better’ it is for the system (barring the 
“second contradiction”). Therefore, we will consider both NCI and GDP 
in our review of their empirical results. The NCI per capita fluctuated 
more wildly than GDP per capita over the study period (1986–2003). Yet 
in both instances, their empirical results confirm that beyond 1993 GPI 
per capita did not accelerate in the same manner as real GDP and NCI, 
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Lawn and Clarke (2006b:119)
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Clarke and Lawn (2007:521) conclude that “[b]eyond 1994, the growth 
rate of Australia’s GPI was unable to keep pace with the rate of increase 
in Australia’s per capita GDP”. The advocates could not have asked for 
anything better to support the threshold hypothesis.  
On the contrary, they pay no attention to the business cycle. In 
Business Cycles, Schumpeter (1939:169,173-4) argued that cycles are of 
the essence in capitalism; and it follows that depressions are an 
inescapable and even (a potentially) beneficial phase in its evolution. The 
Juglar cycle was probably one of the most plausible and important of the 
cycles he studied.123 The 1986–2003 period for Australia can be broken 
down into the following cycles: boom (1986–1989); recession (1990–
1993); upswing (1993–1996); boom (1996–1999) and downswing (2000–
2003). Their supposition that GDP growth is detrimental to “genuine 
progress” crumbles when we dissect their study into the broad 
periodicity of the (8–11 years) Juglar cycle. For consistency and 
comparability over the 1986–2003 period, the business cycle is divided 
into three-year periods and the peak of the booms between 1989 and 




In the figure above, the trends of the average annual percentage changes 
of GDP and GPI largely mirrored each other. During the upswing/boom 
times of 1986–1989 and 1993–1999, real growth of GDP per capita was 
medium-high (2.3% and above), and real growth of GPI per capita was 
relatively medium-high (1.8% and above). It is also the case during the 
recession of 1990–1993 and the downswing of 2000–2003, when the 
average growth rates of GDP and GPI are less than 2.3% and 1.8% per 
annum, respectively. Our examination of the Australian business cycle 
suggests that the indicator of “sustainable well-being”, the GPI, is 
roughly as good as the very measure the advocates want to debunk, 
GDP. A lack of information regarding the cyclical situation leaves the 
reader uninformed. Indubitably, Wesley Mitchell and Simon Kuznets 









































GPIpercapitagrowthrates were, respectively, 2.2%and1.7%in
1989–1990,2.5%andǦ9.6%in1999–2000.
Source: Adapted from 
Lawn and Clarke (2006b:119)
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would have been alarmed of such paucity in critical commentary in 
relation to the economic growth cycle. 
Furthermore, the authors have a less detailed analysis of the social 
problems, especially when compared to their historical reading of 
environmental issues. Overall, their worldview of social problems is a bit 
too restricted and one-dimensional. For example, the undermining of 
human relations, family life, responsibility and a loss of sociality are 
simply revealed in terms of an increase in the ‘cost of crime’ and ‘family 
breakdown’. Taken in isolation, the increase in “social costs” over the 
study period was significant. But, when combined in the net income 
index with all the other ‘item adjustments’, the costs to society were 
hardly measurable. On the other hand, the authors possess a good 
understanding of the Australian natural landscape, for example, citing 
the substantial impacts on inland river health and neighbouring 
ecosystems from excessive irrigation water use. Their analysis and 
understanding of the ecological problems is very good. What we learn 
from Clarke and Lawn (2007:523-7) is that the real value of the Genuine 
Progress Indicator rests in its de-construction, i.e. the disaggregated 
account. Besides, perhaps there is more significance to the GPI in a 
comparative analysis of Australian “sustainable well-being” with Victoria? 
The next major section will study the GPI and the ISEW at the 
subnational, and where applicable, comparative to the national level, 
following a summary of the national GPI studies in Sections 4.5.4 and 
4.5.5 below: 
4.5.4 Summary of the National GPI Studies 
The US GPI by Cobb et al. (1995) is more advanced than the original US 
ISEW, as it was the first attempt to account for “social” dimensions of 
well-being. It is what Daly and Cobb (1989) really wanted to convey in 
their original ISEW measure, an “economics for community”. However, 
the main ‘theory’ of the US GPI is based on a bookkeeping procedure of 
commonsensical accountancy. Whilst this formula has a less significant 
role in the most recent study at Redefining Progress, the authors do not 
make any major theoretical improvements to suggest otherwise. 
In contrast to the ISEWs, there are many good socio-historical 
analyses, namely, the US GPIs written during 1999–2002 (e.g. Anielski et 
al. 1999, Cobb et al. 2000, Cobb et al. 2001) and the 2006/2007 studies 
(Talberth and Bohara 2006, Talberth et al. 2007). For instance, Cobb et al. 
(1999) examine the contradictory role between industry and finance and 
link their analyses to the trend of the US GPI. There is also a good socio-
institutional analysis of the poignant problems faced by the modern 
youth of America. Unfortunately, other authors have forgotten about the 
industry–finance and individual–community trade-offs, e.g. the problems 
are only parenthetically mentioned by Venetoulis and Cobb (2004). 
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However, there are limits to which the GPI can tell a good story about 
social relationships. The heterogeneity of persons-in-community is 
unable to be fully expressed within the GPI. They inadvertently show the 
limitations of constructing an all-in-one indicator of “genuine progress”: 
the authors had a far superior disaggregated account of real 
socioeconomic processes and institutions to their aggregated inquiry. 
Specifically in their aggregated account, five out of the six US GPI 
studies do not examine the role that economic growth played in enhancing 
(if at all) the GPI over the period of study. The 2006/2007 studies, 
however, is highly original in that it uses GDP and GPI time-series data to 
scrutinise the welfare impacts of policy change in relation to greater trade 
openness. For example, Talberth et al. (2007:25-7) show that critically 
evaluating ‘the gap’ between GDP and GPI has significance. However, 
none attempts to explain the link between a relatively low GDP over the 
mid-1970s to mid-1990s and the worsening GPI over the same period. 
Effectively, the US authors’ empirical applications have delinked the 
GDP—but not necessarily the GPI—from the capitalist system. 
The ‘theory’ of the first group of Australian GPI studies is similarly 
based on the commonsensical operation procedure. The forte of the 
Australian GPI (study one) by Hamilton (1997, 1999), Hamilton and 
Denniss (2001) is that it is principally based on strong sustainability. It 
makes a good contribution in relation to techniques and technical 
measurement of “sustainable consumption”. The authors of the 
Australian GPI (study two), Lawn and Clarke (2006b) and Clarke and 
Lawn (2007), also make some good advances in technique and method, 
albeit their measure is not founded on commonsensical accountancy. 
The authors of the Australian/Victorian study argue that their indicator is 
soundly based on entropic net psychic income. Their main innovation 
lies in their attempt to include a better measure of the services flowing 
from artefact capital (by adjusting consumption expenditures by 
defensive and rehabilitative expenditures in a more rigorous manner). In 
addition, the authors are the first to question the usefulness of 
comparing real GDP growth with GPI. They are more interested in the 
physical scale to which the economy grows as reflected in the net capital 
investment (NCI) measure—an important and relevant contribution to 
the literature. 
However, the problematic common to both study one and two of the 
Australian GPIs is that there is a relatively poor socio-institutional 
analysis. This contrasts greatly to the good analyses that were 
characteristic of the US GPI studies. But the Australian authors have a 
very good ecological-historical account. On the other hand, they underplay 
the paralleling trends of GDP and the GPI per capita over the business 
cycle, e.g. they ignore the economic crises of the early 1980s and 1990s in 
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their trend analyses. A lack of historical specificity vis-à-vis the cyclical 
situation leaves much more room for improvement. 





















Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of the works contained in Sustainable 
Welfare in the Asia-Pacific: Studies Using the Genuine Progress Indicator, 
edited by Philip Lawn and Matthew Clarke (2008d), was not subjected to 
our critical evaluation. The book was published near the completion time 
of this manuscript. Only a laconic review is offered. The various authors 
of Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific present seven GPI case studies 
for the following areas: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. The GPIs are constructed for seven countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region at various stages of industrialisation, with vastly 
different political, social, and cultural characteristics. Around 20 
individual benefit and cost items are combined into a single monetary-
based index. The contributors have endeavoured to follow a consistent 
methodology, and the overall argument is that GPI is considered more 
comprehensive than a piecemeal approach to sustainable development. 
On page 48 of their book (Ch. 3), Lawn and Clarke (2008e) merely 
include one small note on the GPI theoretical foundation, referring to 
Lawn (2003). The reason why they use GPI is that they wanted to raise 
the profile of the index and increase the public appeal for an alternative 
welfare indicator to GDP. The GPI is thought to be conceptually sound, 
“although debate continues as to which items should be included in the 
GPI” (Lawn and Clarke 2008e:64). In other words, theorising about the 
GPI is not necessary to any further extent since in their view the 
conceptual groundwork, that is to say, the ‘entropic net psychic income’ 
version, is considered strong. Apparently, according to the editors, the 
valuation methods remain the main problem. 

124 Much of what is written in his chapter has been transferred into a journal article (Lawn 2008c). 
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There is no mention of capitalism in the book. Nevertheless, the 
authors have made some noteworthy contributions and have come to the 
forefront of the majority of research published on SEWIs. In the past, GPI 
accounting has attempted to measure sustainable welfare in a purely 
national context. Some exceptions to this include the incorporation of net 
foreign borrowing/lending and long-term environmental damage.125 On 
the other hand, the cost of natural resource depletion is viewed only from 
a national perspective. But there is a potential problem with this view. 
For example, Japan does not deplete its own natural resources on a 
grand scale; it has managed to offload many of the environmental costs 
associated with the growth of its economy onto other countries (see 
Makino 2008:185). An open economy GPI for Japan is thus required, i.e. 
an estimate of the environmental costs linked to all non-renewable 
resource imports, and all timber and food imports that have caused 
agricultural land to be lost in the originating country. The boundaries for 
the GPI are national as the indicator refers to the welfare of a particular 
society delineated by geographic boundaries. Yet, the book is the first 
attempt to be regionally based and less nationalistic. Featuring a 
dynamic and regional assessment of sustainable socioeconomic welfare 
is a major advance in the literature of SEWIs. 
In addition, the writers strive for a more thorough assessment of GPI. 
An analysis of GDP is not left behind as much as it used to be (rather 
than ignoring it completely). In general, the authors actually examine 
some institutions, particularly with reference to the costs of 
unemployment, underemployment, and family breakdown. There are 
some good historical stories about ecological and social aspects, even 
some analyses of the economic growth phases. For example, in the 
Chinese GPI study, the authors divide the entire study period (1970–
2005) into five key development periods (see Wen et al. 2008:250-6). 
Indeed, most of the authors divide the periods into distinct time periods 
and then actually provide a social-historical institutional analysis, which 
is a great improvement over previous works and is admirable. The 
authors are interested in history. Lawn (for the first time) is very 
interested about institutions and the business cycle to some extent (see 
Lawn 2008a:93-5). There are good analyses of GDP and linkages to 
institutions (e.g. see Forgie et al. 2008:127-9). In short, the bulk of 
authors go to great lengths to provide in-depth historical specificity, and 
the majority of the studies do not simply ignore GDP, and the linkage 
between GDP and GPI. Overall, there is a greater attempt to provide a 
better socio-historical institutional analysis. 
It is also good to see that the authors are not as obsessed with the 
‘increasing gap between GDP and GPI’. It is revitalising that, in general, 

125 For example, some studies try to view the cost of CO2 emissions from a global perspective by 
assigning the entire cost to the emitting country. 
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the authors have evaluated the differences between GDP and GPI and 
then explained them with a historical institutional analysis. However, the 
case studies would benefit from much more specificity by examining in 
more detail the trends of GDP per capita and GPI per capita over real 
historical time. As the main argument unfolds in this chapter, it is critical 
to examine the empirical trends of GDP and GPI/ISEW growth rates with 
a fine toothcomb, breaking down patterns of growth and development 
into periodic epochs. In other words, the rigour of analysis between GDP 
and GPI growth rates is rather weak. It is a shame that we could not 
include these works in our discussions/critical analyses, as on face value 
this volume is probably the most solid empirical (but not theoretical) 
contribution in the literature on SEWIs. 
4.6 Subnational GPIs and ISEWs 
Up to now, we have examined the ISEW/GPI studies at the country level 
only. Yet, when evaluating well-being with socioeconomic and 
environmental indicators, it can be just as valuable to appraise the level 
of welfare at the subnational level, which is the unit of study for this 
section. Wish (1986:97) argues that the unit of study is important, “since 
the quality-of-life differs within nations, regions, and states probably as 
much as it differs among them, any aggregate statistic that largely 
obliterates these differences is of questionable validity”. It is possible to 
construct an ISEW or GPI at the subnational or subregional level of 
analysis, beginning with the Albertan (Canada) GPI in Section 4.6.1 
below: 
4.6.1 Albertan GPI 
Anielski,Mark(2001)TheAlbertaGPIBlueprint.TheGenuineProgressIndicator(GPI)SustainableWellǦBeing
AccountingSystem,PembinaInstitute.
The Alberta GPI Blueprint by Mark Anielski at the Pembina Institute is an 
advanced sustainability accounting system.126 His major work describes 
the rationale, structure and methods used in constructing a Genuine 
Progress Indicator “system of sustainable well-being accounts”: 
 
After more than 30 years of debate about how to live with 
“sustainable development”, we still lack a conceptual and 
pragmatic analytical framework for managing living and 

126 In a similar vein, the Nova Scotia GPI project (www.gpiatlantic.org) is a sophisticated wealth–
welfare measurement system, with a sectoral approach and an emphasis on policy relevance. But 
their primary intention is to do away with a single conglomerate monetary measure of sustainable 
well-being (akin to ISEW, GPI etc.). For instance, their figures can be gender-disaggregated. Hence, 
the Nova Scotia ‘GPI’ project is not strictly a net welfare indicator and therefore is excluded from 
our analysis because our focus is on typical SEWIs. Besides, only key points and press statements 
about the various sectoral accounts appear on their website, and the full reports need to be 
purchased. The Pembina Institute provides its reports free of charge. 
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produced capital with a view to its physical conditions. 
This is partly because we are fixated on monetary 
expressions of what we falsely call “wealth”. We need a 
new accounting framework for managing the real physical 
or qualitative conditions of wealth in its original context—
the conditions of well-being. [Anielski 2001:4] 
 
According to Anielski, wealth is defined as the “condition of well-being” 
associated with human, social, natural, produced and financial capital. 
The Genuine Progress Indicator accounts include: a) physical inventory 
of stocks/flows of the five forms of capital; b) monetary accounts (full 
costs and benefits) of the capital stocks and flows, using market values 
where relevant; and c) genuine progress indicators derived from either 
the physical inventory or monetary data in the total capital accounts (see 
Anielski 2001:20). It is not necessary that all components should have a 
financial value. Thus, constructing a monetary GPI is not the raison 
d’être; qualitative measures of the “conditions of well-being” are also 
important for the sustainability accounts. Unlike other ISEW/GPI 
advocates, it is good to see that Anielski is not preoccupied with the gap 
between GDP and GPI; rather he wants to transcend pecuniary-based 
measures of wealth. 
Nonetheless, the monetary net income index (GPI) is still an 
important part of the sustainability accounting system. However, the 
author does not provide a fully-fledged account of the linkage between 
sustainable development and the conditions of well-being. His work is 
really a scheme of reports, where the most important thing is compiling 
the statistics to give an indication (qualitative or quantitative) of 
“genuine progress”. As a result, no real theoretical foundation for the 
monetary-based GPI is presented. The mechanics behind the Albertan 
GPI are based on the methodological tools outlined in Anielski and Rowe 
(1999) at Redefining Progress—i.e. the commonsensical operational 
procedure. 
Anielski (2001) has constructed a GPI (with debt costs) for Alberta, a 
province in Canada, but there is no national Canadian GPI to allow for a 
comparison. Except during the 1970s, on average the growth in real GPI 
per capita exceeded the GDP for Alberta over the most part of the 1961 to 
1999 period, as shown in Figure 4.19 and Table 4.19 on page 185.127 This 
brings into question the legitimacy of the ISEW/GPI to give promise to a 
‘threshold hypothesis’ because of the exemplar of Alberta’s amazing 
socioeconomic and environmental progress in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 

127 Note that the time-series of the Albertan GPI accounts have been updated, 1961–2003 (see 
Taylor 2005), but the Pembina Institute has not published their raw data columns of the monetary 






As cited by the author, there were some noteworthy reasons why the 
growth trend in GPI per capita went beyond GDP: the Albertan GPI grew 
strongly through the 1960s; fell during the recessions of 1974–1975 and 
1980–1983, and recovered extremely well during 1985–1989 as the 
significance of oil and gas weakened in the Albertan economy, and from 
1986–1999 the value of unpaid work rose considerably which also 
explained the overall rise in the GPI for that period. 
However, if GDP is used as a measure of material well-being then the 
average Albertan has fared quite well over the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s, 
notwithstanding the rather grim (low-growth) episode of the 1980s. But 
regardless of whether or not GDP provides a good measure of welfare, 
the author is disinterested in how GDP explains real system processes—e.g. 
the dismal growth rates of GDP per capita in the 1980s are completely 
ignored from the analysis. Nevertheless, he does provide a 
comprehensive institutional analysis of the individual components of the 
monetary GPI.128 This is a good thing, and highlights that the bona fide 
worth of a disaggregated account (not in a combined index). But the 
effectiveness of the disaggregated account is reduced somewhat in The 
Alberta GPI Blueprint, as no conceptual basis is specified to guide the 

128 For example, fifty-one indicators that form the Alberta GPI accounts have been individually 






























Source: Adapted from 
Anielski (2001:41,105,117)





































4.6.2 Subnational US GPIs: Burlington, Chittenden County, and 
Vermont 
Costanza, Robert, Jon Ericksona, Karen Fligger, Alan Adams, Christian Adams, Ben Altschuler, Stephanie
Balter,BrendanFisher, JessicaHike, JoeKelly,TysonKerr,MeganMcCauley,KeithMontone,Michael
Rauch, Kendra Schmiedeskamp, Dan Saxton, Lauren Sparacino,Walter Tusinski and LaurelWilliams



















In the US, Costanza et al. (2004) constructed several GPIs at multiple 
subnational levels (the city, county and state), and have shown that it is 
possible to compare the indices with the national average. They are 
attracted to the explanatory power of a comparative study between the 
GPIs. But they are not concerned with comparing and contrasting GDPs 
and GPIs per se. This paper is an important contribution because the GPI 
has been estimated at various scales for the US. The authors have 
followed closely the methodological framework as set out by Anielski and 
Rowe (1999) to estimate three GPIs for six decades over the 1950–2000 
period for the state of Vermont, Chittenden County (the county with the 
largest population in the state), and Burlington (the largest city in 
Chittenden County) (see map attached). 
The subnational scales of the GPI per capita for Burlington, 
Chittenden and Vermont were significantly higher than the US national 
GPI since the 1980s, as shown in Figure 4.20 and Table 4.20 on page 187. 
The trend of GPIs in Vermont, Chittenden County and Burlington were 
better than the national-level US GPI, because Vermont had a greener 
policy stance during the 1980s–1990s, e.g. hydro-electricity generation 
(Costanza et al. 2004:149). In contrast, the US was reliant on fossil fuels 
for power generation. This study highlights the usefulness of the 
comparative analysis between GPIs at national and subnational levels. 







Furthermore, it is positive that the authors recognise that 
interregional flows of non-marketed goods and services (i.e. ecosystem 
services) are not captured in either the GPI or GDP. This is the first time 
in which ISEW/GPI advocates have noted the issue of transboundary 
pollution. For example, while Vermont may be benefiting from a better 
local environment, this may be at least partly at the expense of a depleted 
environment elsewhere in the country or the world. But, the authors say 
that even if incorporating some quantification of these transboundary 
effects would improve the GPI, it seems unlikely that this effect would 
explain the vast differences between Vermont’s GPI and the GPI for the 
US. 
The authors show there are limitations to direct monetary 
comparisons between countries. A challenge for a comparative view of 
GPI is gathering the necessary expenditure and depreciation cost data to 
complete the net income index. In their multi-level inquiry, they 
encountered many measurement problems and found that data 
availability for GPI components decreased with a decreasing 
geographical scale. GPI relies heavily on available statistical sources and 
data. Often these secondary data sources and statistics are not available, 
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Source: Adapted from 



































Source: Adapted from 
Costanza et al. (2004:152)
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not over the whole period—a common problem for ISEW/GPI studies. 
“In lieu of local data, some of the columns were based on national or 
state figures scaled down to the local level using ratios of various kinds. 
This method obviously does not fully capture the unique qualities present 
at the smaller scales” (Costanza et al. 2004:149). The authors suggest 
that some of these problems for calculating environmental and social 
costs can be rectified via alternative methods, such as the use of the 
social survey (Costanza et al. 2004:149,152-4). In other words, we may be 
able to identify various regrettable social and environmental costs in the 
country/state/city, yet we are not able to calculate them.  
Their exercise has alerted them to the major data limitations of the 
subnational scales (see Costanza et al. 2004:153-4). They have begun to 
think about how to improve both the data and the index by offering the 
following suggestions, where future work will focus: (1) improving the 
database for GPI at the city, county and state scale, including estimates 
of between-census years starting with the 1990s; (2) systemising the 
calculations so that GPI can more easily be applied to other cities, 
counties and states across the country to allow comparisons at these 
scales; and (3) comparing GPI and revised indicators with survey data to 
help understand how monetary-based indicators like GPI relate to 
people’s subjective rankings of quality of life. Thus, GPI is valuable 
provided “measurement” problems are solved. Yet, they made no 
comments or criticisms of the theoretical foundation of the GPI (or lack 
thereof). At least the authors provided a reasonably good comparative 
study, and identified several other non-conceptual problems, which were 
innovative. 
N.B. Following in the steps of Costanza et al. (2004), Bagstad and 
Ceroni (2007) calculated GPIs for the decennial years 1950–2000, for the 
six Northern Forest counties in Vermont (Caledonia, Essex, Franklin, 
Lamoille, Orleans and Washington). These counties are characterised by 
abundant forest cover, a settlement pattern of small New England town 
centres, and a low population density. Bagstad and Ceroni (2007) have 
replicated the Costanza et al. (2004) study completely. The paper by 
Bagstad and Ceroni (2007) is the first local GPI calculation for a US rural 
area, which successfully shows that GPI can identify components 
(parameters of the GPI) where a region is performing more strongly than 
nearby regions or the national average. However, due to not having full 
access to the content of this difficult-to-find journal in time for my thesis 
completion, it cannot be subjected to a full critical analysis in this chapter 
and the next. 
4.6.3 Victorian GPI 






Lawn, Philip A. and Matthew Clarke (2006b) Measuring Genuine Progress: An Application of the Genuine
ProgressIndicator,NewYork:NovaSciencePublishers,Inc.
The authors aim to reveal the extent to which the sustainable well-being 
of the average Victorian has advanced over the study period (1986–2003). 
The authors also try to comprehend the factors behind the trend 
movement in Victoria’s GPI and the link between GPI and the growth rate 
of the Victorian economy. We have already discussed the methodological 
advances that they made in Section 4.5.3 above. Any new ideas made vis-
à-vis the empirics of the Victorian economy are discussed in this section. 
Lawn and Clarke (2006a, 2006b) look at the performance of Victoria in 
relation to the “Rest-of-Australia”, which is done via a simple and minor 
change, by subtracting the Victorian GPI from the Australian GPI. They 
find that the trend movement in GPI per capita was much the same for 
both Victoria and the Rest-of-Australia. However, there was a notable 
widening of the gap between the GPI of Victoria and that of the Rest-of-
Australia towards the end period of the study, 1997–2003. The difference 
between Victoria and the Rest-of-Australia was greatest in relation to the 
various environmental cost items, such as the ‘non-renewable resource 
depletion’ and the ‘lost agricultural land’ components of the GPI (see 
Lawn and Clarke 2006b:74-5). Victoria is much less reliant on mining 
proceeds as a means of financing its consumption of goods and services. 
They argue this suggests Victoria is better able to operate within its 
biophysical means by generating a significantly larger fraction of genuine 
money income from value-adding activities compared to other states 
such as Western Australia and Queensland. The rate of native vegetation 
clearance was also much lower over the entire study period for Victoria 
than the Rest-of-Australia (especially the reckless vegetation clearance in 
Queensland). Indeed, the lower per capita cost of lost agricultural land in 
Victoria was a very strong dynamic that explained the disparity between 
the GPIs of Victorian and Rest-of-Australia. Victoria does not need to rely 
as intensely on the depletion of natural capital assets to finance its 
consumption endeavour compared to the Rest-of-Australia. The authors 
seem to have more stimulating discussions on the subnational 
performance of sustainable well-being than their national GPI study. 
Additionally, the authors link policy to the various components that 
have declined over the period.129 For example, the “cost of long-term 
environmental damage” is relatively lower in the Rest-of-Australia; this 
implies that Victoria has failed to find better and cleaner ways of using 
energy. “Increased energy efficiency and the transition towards renewable 
energy sources clearly requires greater policy emphasis if Victoria is to 
reduce its per capita energy consumption and bridge the cost gap 

129 The authors put forward some excellent policy prescriptions; see chapter 6, “Policy Implications 
of the GPI Results” in Measuring Genuine Progress: An Application of the Genuine Progress Indicator. 
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between itself and the Rest-of-Australia” (Lawn and Clarke 2006a:130). 
They provide a relatively good context-specific analysis of the GPI trends 
(e.g. see Lawn and Clarke 2006a:120-36). For instance, they find that 
Victoria’s cost of excessive irrigation water use was both large and 
persistently on the rise throughout the study period (e.g. $3,863 million 
in 1986 and $5,827 million in 2003). This is because the state of Victoria 
relies heavily on the Murray-Darling Basin for is agricultural output. 
Unfortunately, they have a relatively limited social analysis, which was 
also a problem in their Australian GPI study. But overall, the authors had 
a fabulous eco-historical comparative analysis of the disaggregated 
account of the GPIs for Victoria and the Rest-of-Australia. 
In their aggregated inquiry, they aim to link the trend of GPI to GDP 
and net capital investment (NCI). They argue that high rates of growth 
have failed to translate effectively into sustainable well-being for the 
average Victorian. Victorian GPI rose moderately over the 1986–2003 
period. Similarly to their Australian GPI study, evidence for Victoria 
suggests that beyond 1993 GPI per capita did not accelerate in the same 
manner as per capita real GDP and NCI, as shown in Figures 4.21a,b and 
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The main difference between the Australian and Victorian GPI was the 
higher growth rates of GDP and NCI per capita over 1993–2003. A 
considerable proportion of GPI upsurge was due to an increase in 
consumption-related welfare, especially since 1997. Again, the authors 
have a very good analysis of the component items of the GPI: why its 
general rise did not begin until after 1993; and why the rise in the GPI per 
capita was disappointing when compared to the rate of economic growth 
(e.g. see Clarke and Lawn 2005). The results would appear to support 
their major conclusion that “a lower rate of growth is beneficial to 
sustainable well-being” (Lawn and Clarke 2006a:133, b:80). But, their 
disaggregated study is far better than the aggregated account. Besides, 
they are not interested in real socioeconomic processes of capitalist 
development and demise. 
On the surface, they appear to do a very good job at scrutinising GPI 
trends with the ratio of net capital investment. While the authors look to 
critically evaluate the socioeconomic and environmental position of the 
Victorian economy, they are merely interested in ‘various changes 
between periods’ (a problem also eminent in their Australian GPI study). 
The Victorian instability should be examined in a more systematic 
fashion: the boom (1986–1990); recession (1990–1993); upswing (1993–
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Source: Adapted from 
Clarke and Lawn (2005:389)
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presumption that GDP growth is detrimental to “genuine progress” 
falters when we scrutinise the Juglar cycle over 1986–2003, as shown in 




In the figure above, GPI growth is less volatile than GDP growth—but 
they both follow the same general cyclical pattern (i.e. the same 
periodicity). During the upswing/boom times of 1986–1989 and 1993–
1999, real growth of GDP per capita was high (2.6% and above), and real 
growth of GPI per capita was relatively medium-high (2.1% and above). It 
is also the case during the recession of 1990–1993 and the downswing of 
2000–2003, when the average growth rates of GDP and GPI are less than 
2.6% and 2.1% per annum, respectively. The authors said, “we have 
conducted a very comprehensive assessment of Victoria’s genuine 
progress performance” (Lawn and Clarke 2006b:65). Yet, their analyses 
of the business cycles of capitalism at both the national and subnational 
level have been insubstantial. 




Another significant study undertaken at the subnational level was Pulselli 
et al. (2006) which compared Siena’s local experience with the national 
Italian economy (see Guenno and Tiezzi 1998). This is the first study for 
the ISEW calculated at the local level for the Province of Siena, located in 
Tuscany, central Italy. Siena is the second largest Province in Tuscany 
and is composed of 36 municipalities with a total population of 252,972 

130 To ensure some sort of consistency and comparability over the 1986–2003 period, the business 
cycle is divided into five distinct ‘three-year’ cycles. However, we have deliberately left out the 
1989–1990 and 1999–2000 figures of the average annual percentage changes in GDP per capita 
and GPI in Figure 4.21c. These two periods are at the peak of the boom. If we included these peak 
periods, then the results would alter the depiction of the business cycle, but only over the 1999–
2000 period, where GPI per capita fell by 7.4% and GDP per capita grew by 1.6%. Thus, we submit 





































GPIpercapitagrowthrates were, respectively, 4.1%and1.7%in
1989–1990,2.1%andǦ7.4%in1999–2000.
Source: Adapted from 
Clarke and Lawn (2005:389)
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(in 1999). The Province’s main economic activities are linked to tourism, 
trade, banking and agriculture; the level of industrial activity is low, 
except in the crystal, building materials and furniture sectors. The main 
commercial products are food including regional specialities such as 
wine (Brunello di Montalcino, Chianti, Vino Nobile di Montepulciano and 
Vernaccia di San Gimignano), cheese (pecorino di Pienza) and olive oil. 
Four UNESCO World Heritage sites are in the Province of Siena: the 
Historic Centres of San Gimignano, Siena, and Pienza; and Val d’Orcia. 
“They are much more than tourist attractions because they call for a 
special policy to preserve and sustain their natural and historical 
integrity” (Pulselli et al. 2006:273). It is exciting to read that the authors 
are passionate about the history, culture and socio-ecological character 
of their place of residence. 
The authors have an eclectic approach to finding the most suitable 
methods/procedures for calculating the sustainable economic welfare 
index. They are consistent with Leipert (1986), Daly and Cobb (1989) and 
Stockhammer et al. (1997) in constructing an adjusted measure of GDP. 
In their work, “[w]elfare is affected by the flow of services to humankind 
rather than by the current output of marketable goods and services 
(England [2001])” (Pulselli et al. 2006:272). However, no concrete theory 
is offered. In addition, the authors realise that the ISEW is imperfect, 
referring to some of Neumayer’s (1999, 2000) “methodological 
contradictions”. 
The methodology used in their paper is consistent with Guenno and 
Tiezzi (1998). Some exceptions relate to the public maintenance costs of 
urban development, water distribution, and urban health. Urbanization 
costs were not subtracted, because the authors argue they are directly 
related (positive) to welfare in Siena. In addition, local advertising plays 
an important social role by broadcasting information that is (potentially) 
unbeneficial for collective welfare. Hence, a portion of local advertising 
costs should be subtracted; yet, since no data on local advertising costs 
were available, this item was omitted. 
Unfortunately, their results cannot be directly compared with Guenno 
and Tiezzi’s (1998) Italian ISEW because of the different periods. The 
Sienan ISEW is only calculated for a single year, 1999 (Pulselli et al. 
2006), whereas the Italian ISEW is for the whole 1960–1990 period. All 
monetary values were expressed in Italian Lira (1999), and then 
converted into Euro by multiplying by the fixed exchange rate of 1936.27 
Lira per Euro, as shown below: 
ISEWperCapitaforSiena(1999): 11,231ItalianLira
GDPperCapitaforSiena(1999): 17,822ItalianLira
The ISEW per capita/GDP per capita ratio is equal to 63%; thus, the gap 
difference is about 37%. While the authors stress the importance of the 
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large gap between the Sienan GDP and ISEW, it is not really the focal 
point of their paper. 
There are several important conclusions about the level of sustainable 
economic welfare in Siena versus Italy. The main differences concern 
pollution and exhaustible resources. The low impact of air, water and 
noise pollution in the Province of Siena reflects the characteristics of the 
area, where economic production is in the sectors of agriculture, tourism, 
services, etc. rather than the industrial sectors. In addition, the towns in 
Siena are small and population density is small. However, exploitation of 
non-renewable resources is a typical activity of the local area due to 
quarrying of ornamental stone, gravel and sand for construction. The 
authors argue that a substantial increase in the production inputs of 
energy and non-renewable resources greatly affected the level of net 
income in Siena. The scattered presence of industrial activities and the 
low population density in the Province of Siena make the effect of 
pollution smaller than Italy as a whole. Energy and resource consumption 
as well as the exploitation of local stocks of non-renewable resources are 
substantial inputs and greatly affect the results (see Pulselli et al. 
2006:279). We are impressed by the care given to the environmental-
historical analysis. 
The authors conclude that “the Province of Siena is already beyond 
the “threshold” (Max-Neef 1995), though with a prosperous economy 
based on the tertiary sector and good environmental conditions due to 
the absence of invasive urbanism and heavy industry” (see Pulselli et al. 
2006:279). But, they overlook Neumayer’s (1999, 2000) critique that the 
‘threshold limit’ may be synthetic—as a result of a mechanical tweaking 
of the variables in the ISEW. Authors rightly advocate the vital 
importance of having multidimensional indicators that reflect the links 
between the economy, environment and society: 
 
The use of this holistic indicator demonstrates that a set of 
good economic indicators and good environmental status 
are not sufficient for sustainability of human activity, if 
applied separately. ... Sustainability indicators should go 
beyond the reductionist approach with its separate 
compartments of environment, economy and society and 
reflect the interactions between them. [Pulselli et al. 
2006:279] 
 
Their conclusions in this statement are problematic. As we argued in 
Chapter 3, the ISEW evidently cannot handle concrete reality; it is in itself 
reductionist because it does not the link the spheres of ecology, economy 
and society to a specific socioeconomic system (e.g. the disembedded 
economy). Nevertheless, it is a refreshing change to see that the authors 
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did present a sophisticated analysis of real socio-historical processes. 
4.6.5 Yorkshire and Humber, Northern Way, and UK ISEWs 
Jackson,Tim,NatMcBrideandNicMarks (2006)An IndexofSustainableEconomicWellǦbeing,London:New
EconomicsFoundation.
Jackson et al. (2006) develop a pilot indicator of “sustainable economic 
well-being” for the Yorkshire and Humber region and the Northern Way 
region in the United Kingdom. Specifically, they construct two regional 
ISEWs and one country ISEW for the United Kingdom. The aim of their 
study was to develop an economic indicator that could be implemented 
as one of the headline indicators of progress by the Yorkshire and 
Humber region. 
The basis for the indicator is simply a regional variation of the 
adjusted economic indicator developed by Daly and Cobb (1989). They 
propose a so-called Regional Index of Sustainable Economic Well-Being 
(R-ISEW) which incorporates various “economic”, “social” and 
“environmental” adjustments. No specific theory is provided and the 
authors ignore Daly and Cobb’s persons-in-community model. 
Compared to the original US ISEW by Cobb (1989, 1994), Jackson et al. 
(2006) include some additional variables in their R-ISEWs and UK ISEW, 
such as volunteer labour and costs of divorce (family breakdown) (which 
are familiar to the GPIs). They also change a few of their measurement 
techniques. They do not deduct the defensive education and health costs 
from personal consumption expenditures, as they believe all public 
expenditures on health and education are a social benefit. Instead, they 
account for the health-related costs directly related to the environmental 
and social factors in the index. Additionally, the authors are the first to 
include an adjustment for any “environmental benefits” that have been 
attributable to good policy-making, e.g. the Yorkshire and Humber region 
has attempted to compensate for the effects of climate change through 
carbon sequestrations. Overall, the authors have made only minor 
technical advancements to the ISEW/GPI literature. 
However, the authors develop a new methodology by addressing the 
question of long-term ecological debt. That is, they want to account for 
the accumulated and present actions of a deferred ecological debt. Their 
method treats the current accumulated debt as though it might be paid 
off over time through an annuitized endowment fund that matures when 
required in the future. “Regular payments into this fund over the next 50 
years (say) will be sufficient to pay off the debt provided that we start 
making the payments today. Should we fail to pay the premiums this 
year, however, the time available to achieve the required sum at payout 
will shorten and next year’s required payments will therefore be higher” 
(Jackson et al. 2006:19). They argue that this method is effective because 
it avoids the “huge adjustments” required to reflect the entire discounted 
value of estimated future costs within current accounts. The endowment 
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premiums attributable to a Yorkshire and Humber climate change fund 
from 1994 to 2004 increased by 35%. The escalating atmospheric carbon 
causing damage is more prevalent in Yorkshire and Humber than for 
many other areas in the UK because of the high density of fossil fuel 
power plants and energy-intensive industry. The impact of this 
accounting procedure is significant; nevertheless, it does not overwhelm 
the aggregated measure (the ISEW). 
Their results portray a steady increase in the Yorkshire and Humber 
R-ISEW, Northern Way R-ISEW and UK ISEW per capita between 1994 




The increase in the R-ISEWs and the UK ISEW is primarily driven by 
strong consumption growth, increased business investment, rising 
expenditures on public health and education, and considerable 
reductions in local air pollution. However, there are regional differences 
between the subnational trends and national trend. But the authors only 
want to converse on the absolute variation between the national ISEW 
and R-ISEWs. For instance, consider the reduction of air pollution, the 
largest single environmental component contributing to an increase in 
the ISEWs. In Yorkshire and the Humber, the per capita cost of air 
pollution in 1994 was £1,244, 50% higher than the UK average of £832. 
By 2004, the per capita cost of air pollution in Yorkshire and Humber had 
fallen to £561, which is still 46% higher than the average cost per UK 
citizen of £384. This represents a much greater absolute reduction, and 
considerably closes the gap between region and nation. The Yorkshire 
and Humber region achieved significant reductions of emissions per unit 
of production because of the tighter regulations on emissions and 
improvements in technology. In comparison to the Northern Way region 
as a whole, the costs begin and end higher for Yorkshire and Humber 
due to the high levels of heavy industry and power generation. The 
authors argue that this progress in the Yorkshire and Humber region 































Source: Adapted from 
Jackson et al. (2006:49,51,53)
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starting position in the R-ISEW. 
Yet, the authors are obsessed with the variance of absolute monetary 
values.131 Of course, this is not a serious problem because the 
comparative analysis between the multiple ISEW values offers an 
intriguing perspective of the historicity of the performance in Yorkshire 
and Humber, Northern Way, and UK. The authors excel in this area. 
However, a comparative analysis of the absolute values between GDP (or 
gross value added, GVA) and the ISEW is problematic, because GDP was 
designed as a measure of economic activity or output, whereas the ISEW 
purports to measure sustainable economic welfare. The indicators are 
two very different monetary-based measures, and only trend-based 
comparisons are useful. 
The major problem is that they underplay the real trend situation: of 
higher average annual growth rates of ISEW per capita relative to the 
lower growth rates of GVA per capita over the 1994–2004 period, as 




Jackson et al. (2006) completely downplay their empirical results: that the 
ISEWs grew much faster than the GVAs for all areas over the 1994–2004 
period. They are simply not interested in the relative growth trends 
between GVAs and ISEWs—no socio-institutional account of these 
remarkable results in Table 4.22 is provided. Their results are notable 
because GVA growth per capita (especially in the UK) appears to be 
benefiting the real growth of sustainable economic welfare, which could 
be the case. After a relatively disembedded period of Thatcherism in the 
late 1970s and 1980s and a deep recession of the early 1990s, the 
expansionary 1994–2004 era in Britain most likely characterises the 
slightly less disembedded policies of the Blair–Labor government. It 
must be noted that Jackson et al. (2006) is a pilot study. Yet it seems 

131 Atkinson (1995:5, emphasis added) argues that “it is not the absolute terms that are important 
but the size of the adjustment relative to that of conventionally defined income[,] ... [i.e.] changes in 






























































































Source: Adapted from 
Jackson et al. (2006:49,51,53)
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strange that they do not want to specify whether the ‘threshold 
hypothesis’ has been reached or not. 
4.6.6 Belgian ISEWs 




Bleys, Brent (2008) “Proposed Changes to the Index of Sustainable EconomicWelfare: An Application to
Belgium”,EcologicalEconomics,vol.64,pp.741Ǧ751.
Brent Bleys (2006a, 2006b) from Vrije Universiteit Brussel constructs a 
preliminary ISEW for Belgium for the 1971–1999 period. He considers it 
is only a first attempt to measure sustainable economic welfare in 
Belgium, and realises that there are some important caveats to his study. 
In a more recent study, Bleys (2008) modifies the original Belgian ISEW 
to some extent and extends the time-series analysis for the 1970–2004 
period. He contributes to the discussion by proposing that there are 
changes required to the existing ISEW framework. 
In both studies, he suggests that supplementary indicator systems 
are vital for a full report on welfare, and that a single indicator such as 
GDP or the ISEW should by no means guide policy decisions (e.g. see 
Bleys 2008:750). In addition, he tends to agree with the methodological 
criticisms of Neumayer (1999, 2004)—that the ISEW cannot 
simultaneously function as both an indicator of current welfare and an 
indicator of sustainability; and that the index is not an indicator of strong 
sustainability, but one of weak sustainability. This is because the ISEW 
framework allows for perfect substitution among different types of 
capital. In essence, he argues that the ISEW is actually a measure of 
economic welfare, and not so much one of sustainability (see Bleys 
2006a:76-81). The initial impression is that Bleys is up-to-date with the 
prevailing issues of the ISEW in the literature. 
However, despite a lengthy inquiry into the issues, he offers no new 
theoretical foundation. Yet, he states that there is a theory for the ISEW. 
He agrees with Lawn (2003) that the ISEW has a good theoretical basis: 
Fisher’s (1906) concept of income and capital. For example, he thinks 
that Fisher’s definition of ‘capital’ has three elements: capital is a 
productive capacity; capital generates dividends for the future; and 
capital only includes factors that themselves have been produced in the 
economic system. In his view, therefore, a major part of this concept of 
income is the flow of services derived from all consumer goods (the 
‘psychic income’) by final users after deducting the irksome activities 
(the psychic outgo). But, the setback is that he downplays the sustainable 
component of the ISEW in the theory of ‘entropic net psychic income’, 
and disregards the other two theories identified in Chapter 3 of 
economics for community and social choice. 
His preliminary results of Belgian GDP per capita and the ISEW over 
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the 1971–1999 period does not appear to support the ‘threshold 




It is peculiar that in the 1970s the average annual growth rates of GDP 
per capita and ISEW per capita were both high, 3.2% and 5.6%, 
respectively. Also, in the 1980s and 1990s, the average annual growth 
rates of GDP per capita and ISEW per capita were both low, at 1.9% and 
0.65%, respectively. This may indicate that high GDP growth per capita is 
conducive to sustainable economic welfare and low economic growth is 
not, as shown in Table 4.23a above. In this preliminary study for Belgium, 
the ‘threshold hypothesis’ turns out to be false. 
On the other hand, the author realises that the economic welfare 
recession of the mid-1980s is largely caused by a decrease in ‘net capital 
growth’, which drops off significantly between 1983 and 1987. Other 
driving factors include the rapid increase of CFCs released into the 
atmosphere and that non-renewable energy use increased by 15% over 
this period of four years as well (i.e. rising costs of ozone layer depletion 
and natural capital depletion). In addition, the recent drop in the Belgian 
ISEW per capita can be mostly attributed to the decline in its net 
international investment position. That is, for small countries with a 

























































overwhelming impact on the overall evolution of the index. 
Hence, Bleys (2008) omits two variables within the methodology of 
the ISEW, ‘net capital growth’, and the ‘changes in the net international 
investment position’, and also updates the valuation methods of four 
items (as discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). It will be interesting to 
see how these adjustments influence the overall trend of the indicator 
that supposedly measures social and environmental welfare. Regrettably, 
Bleys (2008) has not provided the raw time-series data used in the 
compilation of this ‘revised’ Belgian ISEW; he only provides the average 
annual percentage changes of real GDP per capita and ISEW. The results 
of the revised Belgian ISEW that incorporates the changes mentioned a 




The results of the Belgian trends of GDP and ISEW in Table 4.23b are 
highly interesting but grossly unexamined; the author shows no real 
interest, and he has no socio-institutional apparatus (not even a weak 
one) because he is not cognisant of the real processes of the social 
economy. How was life for the average citizen of Belgium over the last 34 
years or so? With respect to Bleys’ (2008) study, we do not know. It is left 
up to the reader to examine the relationship between GDP and ISEW on 
their own accord. 
It seems that the author has lost a lot of hope in the ISEW in its 
present form and past applications: given the high sensitivity of the 
results of any ISEW study to its underlying assumptions, he argues that it 
is imperative to state the assumptions clearly. Yet, unpacking all the 
arcane assumptions behind this single index is going to be very difficult. 
Hence, he warns against interpreting the results too literally (at least 
until a widely accepted and more robust set of valuation methods is 
established). The raison d’être of the compilation of an ISEW lies in its 
potential as a communication tool (Bleys 2006a:37)—“the value of the 
whole exercise lies in its rationale (economic growth and economic welfare 







































results” (Bleys 2008:750, emphases added). Why have detailed empirical 
studies of the ISEW been done in the first place? Bleys seems to be both 
an advocate and critic of ISEW, which in this case is a somewhat 
contradictory position because the author is undermining the very measure 
he has constructed, studied empirically and published. 
4.6.7 Chinese Provinces, GPIs 
Wen, Zongguo, Kunmin Zhang, BinDu, Yadong Li andWei Li (2007) “Case Study on theUse ofGenuine
ProgressIndicatortoMeasureUrbanEconomicWelfareinChina”,EcologicalEconomics,vol.63,pp.463Ǧ
475.
This is the first case study that used GPIs to evaluate the urban economic 
welfare progresses over the 1991–2001 period in China. Wen et al. (2007) 
study the welfare of the following urban/city areas in China: Suzhou and 
Yangzhou in Jiangsu province, Ningbo in Zhejiang province, and 
Guangzhou in Guangdong province. The authors do not provide a socio-
historical overview of these Chinese cities, which makes it difficult for 
their readers. The goal of their study is to show that the GPI overcomes 
the deficiencies of GDP in measuring economic performance and well-
being. But the authors are less focused on whether or not there are any 
“gaps between GDP and GPI”; in the main, they are more concerned with 
the specific components that comprise the GPI, especially environmental 
factors. 
 The authors slavishly follow the commonsensical operational 
method or as they call it, “the GPI approach”, and as such, the authors 
make no theoretical advances:  
 
The GPI differentiates between what most people perceive 
as positive and negative economic transactions, and 
between the costs for producing economic benefits and 
the benefits themselves. … [In essence,] [t]he GPI approach 
uses the consumer expenditures adjusted for income 
inequality as its base, then added or subtracted the values 
determined for all the components based on whether they 
enhance or lessen the human wellbeing, regardless of 
whether or not money changes hands. [Wen et al. 
2007:464] 
 
Hence, no theory is provided—the GPI is purely an ‘approach’. In their 
study, they include over twenty “economic”, “social” and 
“environmental” components that GDP ignores. In other words, their 
GPI is based entirely on a range of adjustments to personal consumption 
expenditures that seem natural and commonsensical. 
At least these GPI advocates concede that there are some major 
weaknesses of the GPI. They say that a single measure cannot 
satisfactorily evaluate urban economic welfare because the scope is too 
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broad and subtle. They also state that even though factors such as family 
break-up, community services, and depletion of ecological capital have 
significant economic consequences, it is difficult to translate into 
monetary terms for the calculation of the GPI. “The GPI is developed as a 
measure of weak sustainability. It cannot be used for strong 
sustainability[.] ... The GPI alone cannot conclude whether an economic 
activity is more or less sustainable. Other supplementary approaches 
such as the Ecological Footprint (EF) are needed to determine what is 
happening to natural capital over time” (Wen et al. 2007:465). They say 
‘sustainability’ is such a multi-faceted concept, and it is impossible for 
GPI to assess everything about it. 
Nonetheless, in their study, the GPI components were divided into 
three categories: “economic sustainability”, including nine components 
such as the services of consumer durables (cars and refrigerators), 
highways, and streets. The second apparently measures the “social 
sustainability”, e.g. costs of divorce, crime, and non-monetary benefits 
such as the value of time spent on household work, parenting, and 
volunteer work. The third indicates “environmental sustainability” with 
ten cost items such as the depreciation of environmental and natural 
resources. The three types of “sustainability” are anomalous, given that 
the authors previously deride GPI for being a poor measure of 
sustainable development. 
In their results, GDP and GPI growth were found to be divergent. 
Alas, we cannot illustrate their results for the GPI and GDP because they 
have not provided enough raw data but we can describe the general 
picture. In the four cities the gaps between GDP per capita and GPI per 
capita increasingly widened over the study period. According to the 
authors, this is indicating the depletion of non-renewable natural capital 
(rising fossil fuel use), rising pollution in the atmosphere through 
industrial and vehicle emissions, increasing traffic congestion and 
accidents; most of these factors are contributing to climate change. 
Consequently, the gap between GDP and GPI grew rapidly, reflecting 
worsening sustainability of local economic welfare. 
The authors explain that the large social costs in these cities were 
primarily due to commuting costs resulting from outdated public 
infrastructure and from the problems of unemployment. However, for 
most values of “social sustainability”, the authors merely report on the 
situation that it has gone either ‘up’ or ‘down’. No specific historical 
context is provided. The authors are more engrossed in the ecological 
side of the GPI than the economic and social factors, but this is a trade-
off they willingly took on. Their attention to environmental degradation is 
thus excellent. For example, they explore the increasing costs of wetland 
losses in the four cities in some detail. Despite the fact that the land 
coverage and the reserves of forests in Ningbo, Guangzhou, and 
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Yangzhou have been increasing continuously since the beginning of 
1970s, the overall cost of the destruction of natural resources still increased 
during the study period. Thus, the authors have a very sophisticated 
analysis of the ecological problems in parts of China. 
However, notwithstanding the growing gap between GDP and GPI for 
four Chinese cities, the per capita GPIs grew substantially (but at 
different rates) over the study period. Their GPI results over 1991–2001 
for Guangzhou and Suzhou cities were comparatively higher than Ningbo 




The diversity of the trends in the growth rates in Figure 4.24 and Table 
4.24 is closely connected with such factors as economic structure, energy 
efficiency, and environmental pollution control policy. But there are two 
problems concerning the results of this study. The first is that these 
figures are unadjusted for inflation. For example, a study they utilised 
revealed that the hours spent on household work declined in the four 
cities since 1991, but the values increased with time primarily because of 
the gradual increase of the market price of these services. Thus, all their 
results need to be treated with prudence because any increase in market 
prices over the period of study has the effect of enhancing (biasing) 
upwards the GPI growth trend. The second dilemma is that the authors 
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Wen et al. (2007:472)
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rising trends in a single paragraph (Wen et al. 2007:473). This is 
problematic because they ignore critical role of the developmental state 
in promoting sustained GDP growth: 
During the late 1970s and 1980s, China and other East Asian 
economies adopted a series of measures to socialise investment risk 
(originating in the agricultural sector) and to raise profits above those 
generated by competitive market forces. Successful export-led growth 
strategies involved varying combinations of supportive industry policies 
(O’Hara 2006c:ch.10). The long-term success rested on embedding 
markets in a stable, secure and more inclusive process of development, 
in which the emerging entrepreneurial class accepted, in return for state 
support, some degree of direction relating to its investment decisions. 
This was both to effect an adjustment to more technologically 
demanding activities that were more likely to guarantee rising living 
standards in the future, and to secure growth of jobs in labour-intensive 
manufacturing as a means of absorbing unskilled labour (including from 
the rural sectors) and reducing poverty (see Siebert 2007:893-9). The 
dynamic reallocation of labour from low- to high-productivity activities 
enabled Asian regions (especially, China) to experience robust growth of 
GDP, labour productivity, and employment during 1990–2007. In other 
words, GDP growth in China might be conducive to the rise in 
sustainable welfare, as registered by the strong increase in GPI growth of 
the Wen’s et al. (2007) study. 
Moreover, the authors have effectively replicated a westernized 
indicator into a relatively Eastern Chinese culture (albeit an increasingly 
westernized society). That is, they do not undertake any additional urban-
area adjustments specific to the Chinese situation. Their lack of socio-
historical context contrasts to the Clarke and Islam (2004) ISEW study for 
Thailand (by adjusting for the costs of exploitative sex work and political 
corruption). Nevertheless, the value of the study lies in their data 
calculations for the various components that comprise the GPI, which 
was a formidable task to collect for four Chinese cities. 
4.6.8 Summary of the Subnational ISEWs and GPIs Studies 
In summary, the theoretics behind the subnational GPIs are based on the 
methodological tools outlined in the national US GPIs by Redefining 
Progress—i.e. the commonsensical operational procedure. Only the 
authors of the Victorian GPI specify a real theory. All other authors 
profusely follow the commonsensical operational method or as some call 
it, “the GPI approach”. Consequently, there are zero theoretical advances 
in almost all cases. 
Yet surprisingly, the studies highlight the usefulness of the 
comparative analysis between the national and subnational levels. They 
include more inspiring discussions of the subnational performance of 
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sustainable well-being than the national equivalents. In particular, the 
authors of the Vermont, Chittenden and the Burlington GPIs (Costanza 
et al. 2004), the Sienan (Italy) ISEW (Pulselli et al. 2006) and the Chinese 
GPIs (Wen et al. 2007) provided a thorough comparative study, and 
identified several other non-conceptual problems which were innovative. 
We again learn that the real value of the Genuine Progress Indicator lies 
in its disaggregation. For instance, Lawn and Clarke (2006a, 2006b) who 
constructed the Victorian GPI had a thorough disaggregated account of 
the GPIs for Victoria and the Rest-of-Australia. These authors also 
provided a thorough environmental-historical analysis. 
However, the same thorough treatment for the disaggregated 
account does not transfer to their aggregated level of investigation. 
ISEW/GPI advocates ignore capitalism, e.g. analyses of business cycles 
are not undertaken. The absence of critical evaluation and dissection of 
the subnational trends of GDP and ISEW/GPI growth is problematic. The 
majority of authors do not examine holistically the problem of how GDP 
(and GPI) explain real socio-economic processes, i.e. the Albertan GPI by 
Anielski (2001), Belgium ISEW by Bleys (2006a, 2006b, 2008), and the 
Yorkshire and Humber, and Northern Way ISEWs by Jackson et al. 
(2006). They are too absorbed in explaining how ISEW/GPI affects the 
ecological-economy. Yet the quality of their study depends on the number 
of environmental-economic parameters selected for their measure. This 
leads to the tendency to focus on the ecological side of the problem. The 
crux of the matter: a weak socio-historical apparatus is characteristic of 
the majority of subnational (and national) analyses. Is this a similar case 
for other types of net income indices? It will become evident as the 
literature survey continues, beginning with the Australian SNBI study in 
Section 4.7 below: 
4.7 Australian SNBI 





Lawn and Sanders (1999) and Lawn (2001) develop a Sustainable Net 
Benefit Index (SNBI) for Australia over the 1966-1967 to 1994-1995 
period. They utilise the SNBI to empirically test whether the nation has 
surpassed its “optimal macroeconomic scale”, i.e. whether an increase in 
the physical scale of the macroeconomy is either beneficial or detrimental 
to sustainable economic welfare. In addition, they explain why GDP is 
unable to serve as an indicator of sustainability. They seek to answer the 
following problem: “To what extent should a nation continue to increase 
the rate of production and expand the scale of the macroeconomy?” 
(Lawn and Sanders 1999:215). 
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The SNBI is based on entropic net psychic income (see Chapter 3). 
The theory of the SNBI is important because it specifies that it is a cost 
to replace worn out producer goods such as plant, machinery, and 
equipment. The authors argue that there are two major types of final 
transactions in the SNBI: the “uncancelled benefits” and the 
“uncancelled costs”. That is, apart from artefact capital itself, what 
remains at the end of the process is the uncancelled exchange value of 
the psychic income the consumer expects to gain from the artefact, and 
any psychic disbenefits associated with the artefact’s production. In 
addition, there is the ecological capital services sacrificed in the process 
of accumulating the artefact capital—the “final or ‘uncancelled’ costs” of 
economic activity to keep the stock of human-made capital intact. Hence, 
the SNBI is equal to the net psychic income (żʌǊ) minus the depletion of 
ecological capital services (ɷEK), which is shown for Australia over the 




The rate of increase in net psychic income was much higher over the 
1966-1967 to 1973-1974 period compared to the 1973-1974 to 1994-1995 
period. Notice in the figure above that the loss of ecological capital 
services is continually rising over time, virtually at a constant rate. 
Therefore, in relation to the SNBI, it is clear that Australia is failing to 
invest a sufficient amount of the proceeds from non-renewable resource 
depletion into the cultivation of additional renewable resource 
substitutes. The advantage of the conceptual framework built into SNBI 
shines through by disentangling the index into two separate accounts. 
Their results indicate that the transformation of natural to human-
made capital is at the growing expense of the sacrificed source, sink, and 
life-support services of natural capital. The biggest increases occurred 
within the uncancelled cost account in the user cost of non-renewable 

132 The purpose of Figure 4.25a is to illustrate the advantage of separating the aggregated-index into 









































DepletionofEcological Capital Services (ɷEK)
Sustainable NetBenefit Index(SNBI) =żʌǊ– ɷEK
Source: Adapted from 




resources, the loss of agricultural land, and in the cost of ozone 
depletion and long-term environmental damage. While pollution costs 
generally increased over the study period, such increases were 
moderated by improvements in waste treatment, pollution abatement 
technologies, and tighter legislative controls on waste emissions. 
According to the authors, it appears that Australia has exceeded its 
sustainability potential since 1973-1974, as the Australian SNBI per 
capita declined while GDP per capita continued to increase over the 




Lawn (2001:239) argues that “[b]oth the aggregate and per capita SNB 
index indicate the strong likelihood of the Australian macroeconomy 
having exceeded its optimal scale, if not, given the length of time the 
SNB index has been in decline, its maximum sustainable scale”.133 
However, the authors heed caution regarding their SNBI results: “[o]ne 
can never be certain whether the total loss has exceeded a sustainability 
threshold[.] ... [N]ot for one moment should the index be seen as a 
precise measure of Australia’s sustainable economic welfare” (Lawn and 
Sanders 1999:228).  
How helpful then is Lawn’s net income index for exposition of real 
socioeconomic processes? We dissect the trends of the Australian GDP 
per capita and SNBI into the recessionary (1980–1983, 1990–1993), 
declining (1974–1981) and booming (1967–1974, 1983–1990) cycles, as 
shown in Table 4.25 on page 208. The results of sustainable economic 
welfare over the business cycle are mixed. For instance, as can be seen in 
Table 4.25 below, the downturn of 1980–1983 was slightly “sustainable”, 
whereas recessionary period of 1990–1993 was apparently very 
“unsustainable”. That is, according to the SNBI, the average Australian 
citizen was not too fazed during the early 1980s deep recession, but was 
greatly dismayed during the early 1990s recession. 

133 The authors accept the principles of ‘optimality’: “SD [(sustainable development)] requires the 
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A global downturn in real GDP growth occurred since the mid-1970s, 
where financial instabilities beset the economic subsystems. The high 
growth rates of GDP per capita that contributed to the speculative boom 
marginally weakened the SNBI over 1983–1990 period—a favourable 
result apropos the ‘threshold hypothesis’—but this was not discussed by 
the authors. Also, the phenomenal growth in the Australian SNBI and 
high GDP growth during the mid-1960 to early 1970s is disembodied in 
their analysis. 
In other words, the authors of the Australian SNBI are not interested 
in how capitalism functions over the business cycle. They are right and it 
is agreed that “the index [is not] a precise measure of sustainable 
economic welfare” (Lawn and Sanders 1999:228). But, the critical point is 
that we are implying that their index is futile without a strong socio-
historical analysis. We cannot make a fitting judgement of the coherence 
of their results, because the authors have completely ignored the role of 
institutions affecting the business cycle. 
The major components of GDP such as investment demand, 
consumer demand, employee compensation, and net exports are 
significant variables for facilitating an endogenous-institutional 
explanation of the peaks and troughs of the cycle (see Sherman 2003). 
For instance, when capitalists invest within the institutional framework of 
capitalist finance and capitalist production processes, the economy 
expands. As a result, employment expands, demand expands, and a 
cumulative process of economic boom is under way. Without capitalist 
investment, output stagnates, more workers are unemployed, demand 
declines, and a cumulative process of depression is under way. The two 
main arguments put forward in Chapter 2 are: a) that the growth rate of 
GDP in a historical context is relatively good at both depicting the stage 
of the business cycle and any effective demand problems emanating 
from the system; and b) that the “shortcomings” of GDP growth make it 
a weak indicator of net welfare because there are many unresolved socio-





































GDP SNBI Source: Adapted from 




focused simply on the welfare deficiencies problem of GDP growth (i.e. 
argument ‘b’). However, it would have been more fruitful had the SEWI 
advocates centred their analysis on the net social welfare effects of the 
capitalist system. 
Nevertheless, overall we can conclude that the SNBI is an important 
contribution to the literature because of the inclusion of psychic bearing 
and welfare maintaining (psychic outgo) variables, as well as the 
ecological capital accounts. For its time, it was a major advancement in 
the literature, because it was the first group of studies to put forward a 
credible conceptual framework. Their work plays a key role for the 
development of the much-needed progress of having separate cost and 
benefit accounts in national accounting systems. However, the fact that 
the SNBI per capita grew at an average annual rate of 0.1% over the 
whole study period (1967–1995) suggests that virtually zero progress was 
made, which may be true, but the authors do not make or elaborate on 
this point—because of their weak institutional apparatus. If not much 
progress was made, then perhaps from the very beginning Nordhaus and 
Tobin (1972:5) were right in saying, “maybe our net welfare product 
[under capitalism] is tautologically zero”. 
4.8 Australian Fisherian Income (YF) 
Lawn,PhilipA.(2004)“UsingtheFisherianConceptofIncometoGuideaNation’sMacroǦInvestmentPolicy”,
InternationalJournalofSustainableDevelopment,vol.3(3/4),pp.339Ǧ352.
Lawn,PhilipA. (2006c) “Using theFisherianConceptof Income toGuideaNation’sTransition toaSteadyǦ
StateEconomy”,EcologicalEconomics,vol.56,pp.440Ǧ453.
Philip Lawn (2004b, 2006c) constructs a sustainable economic welfare 
indicator under the name of Fisherian Income (YF) for Australia over the 
1967–1997 period. We will consider both of his works jointly because the 
content of the two articles is virtually identical. In these papers, the 
primary goal of Lawn is to demonstrate the theoretical and empirical 
advantages of Fisherian income over Hicksian income. Also, Lawn 
(2006c:442) rationalises that a growing economy along with a decline in 
economic welfare will tend to be the consequence of a national economy 
having surpassed its “optimal scale”. Another aim of Lawn is to show the 
significance of an empirical scrutiny of the trends between physical 
growth and Fisherian national income. 
He agrees with Fisher that a critical aspect of economic welfare is the 
services enjoyed by the ultimate consumers and users of the entire stock 
of all physical goods (i.e. “human-made capital”). Lawn (2006c:443) 
argues that “[i]t is the service yielded by physical goods that Fisher 
referred to as ‘psychic income’”. He provides good examples of the 
practical implications of Fisherian income. For instance, consider the 
lighting of a room by a single light bulb. The level of total (gross) welfare 
experienced is the same even if four light bulbs are worn out or 
consumed over one year in comparison to just one light bulb lasting the 
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full year. That is to say, the service of light is virtually continuous during 
the year for both scenarios. Nevertheless, when more light bulbs wear 
out (depreciate) over time more goods have been produced and 
consumed. Net welfare is enhanced when the actual rate of production 
and consumption is low. 
To account for this dilemma of wrongly associating production 
and/or consumption with real welfare, Lawn converses on the meaning 
of price vis-à-vis Fisherian income. He says that it is true that the price of 
a durable light bulb will usually be higher than the price of a fragile light 
bulb. However, the price disparity rarely reflects the difference in product 
durability because goods prices fail to properly reflect the relative scarcity 
of the natural resources used in their production. In other words, 
according to Lawn, market prices of producer or consumption goods fail 
to consider that the stock of ecological capital depreciates when physical 
goods are produced or consumed. Lawn argues that the cost of lost 
natural capital services is hence deducted from the Fisherian national 
income, as the depreciation of ecological capital reduces the capacity of a 
nation to generate the net psychic income for the future. In essence, 
therefore, the Fisherian income is synonymous to ‘entropic net psychic 
income’, which we presented in Chapter 3. 
Lawn thinks that the sustainable net domestic product (SNDP) or 
Hicksian income is a problematic approach to measuring welfare. 
According to Lawn, Hicksian income is the ability to keep producing the 
same quantity of goods over time, i.e. it is an index of sustainable national 
cost (not net welfare). But there are some similarities between Hicksian 
and Fisherian income. Both notions of income implicitly take into 
account the natural capital services lost in providing the throughput of 
matter-energy needed to keep the stock of human-made capital intact. 
And both necessitate that current consumption be included in this year’s 
income. However, SNDP also includes this year’s additions to the stock 
of human-made capital as current income. Conversely, Fisherian income 
only considers the following as part of this year’s income: the services 
rendered in the current year from the consumption of nondurable goods 
and the depreciation of previously accumulated durable goods. In terms 
of measuring welfare, Hicksian income is less compelling than Fisherian 
income because, as Lawn argues, Hicksian income wrongly associates 
economic welfare with the rate of production and consumption. In 
essence, he is saying that economic welfare is linked to the flow of net 
services from production/consumption activities. 
We can easily compare and contrast Hicksian income (YH) and 
Fisherian income (YF) with the following two identities, as shown in Eq. 
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These two equations express each income concept in its simplest terms 
and are adapted from Lawn (2004b:340-1, 2006c:444).134 Hicksian 
income is consumption expenditure plus the gross investment in durable 
fixed human-made capital subtracting the depreciation of human-made 
capital and the lost natural capital services. Fisherian income is equal to 
the private and public consumption expenditures plus the depreciation of 
human-made capital minus the lost natural capital services. Lawn argues 
that Fisherian income is superior to Hicksian income: Hicksian income 
wrongly counts current income as all newly produced human-made 
capital—i.e. that which has been produced now in order to provide 
welfare benefits in the future. Hicksian income erroneously subtracts the 
depreciation or consumption of previously accumulated human-made 
capital—specifically, the welfare benefits currently being enjoyed because 
of past production. According to Lawn (2004b:341, 2006c:445), 
measuring national income as per Eq. (4.1) is analogous to saying that 
“investing rather than consuming now involves no sacrifice in the 
present and that sacrifices in the past yield no current benefits”. 
Fisherian income as defined in Eq. (4.2) surmounts this falsity. 
How do the theories translate into a valuable comparative analysis? 
Lawn’s (2004b, 2006c) empirical results of GDP, YH and YF (all in per 
capita terms) over the 1967–1997 period are shown in Figure 4.26a and 
Table 4.26 on page 212. In general, YH per capita increased in almost 
every year during the study period, but there were falls over the downturn 
years of the mid-1970s and early 1980s (when per capita real GDP 
decreased). However, in comparison very little progress was achieved in 
YF per capita over the whole study period. Fisherian income 
predominantly declined during the 1973–1979; and grew slowly from 
1980–1997. The divergence in the trends between Hicksian income and 
Fisherian income suggest that:  
 
the sustainable cost incurred during most of the study 
period went largely squandered since it did little to  
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134 Lawn suggests that a measure of Fisherian income might also include social and environmental 
factors. However, he omits various social and environmental items to avoid over-complicating this 
calculation of Fisherian national income. The other advantage of delimiting the measure of 
Fisherian income to a basic version is that it can permit a more meaningful comparison with 
Hicksian national income. Note too that Lawn’s (2004b:340-1, 2006c:446-7) empirical versions of 





the sustainable economic welfare enjoyed by the average 
Australian citizen. ... This ... reflects the lack of effective 
translation of sustainable cost to sustainable economic 
welfare—presumably the result of excessive growth and an 
insufficient focus on such qualitative factors as value-
adding in production, increased resource use efficiency, 
distributional equity, and natural capital maintenance. 
[Lawn 2004:349, 2006c:449,450] 
 
These results are interesting. Lawn’s (2004b, 2006c) study reveal the 
goodness of indicators such as Fisherian income to measure sustainable 
economic welfare more accurately than the alternatives of Hicksian 
income or GDP. This is an encouraging outcome for the advocates of net 
income indices. 
Additionally, the author puts a great deal of attention to the 
‘desirability of growth’ vis-à-vis the steady-state economy. As developed 
by Daly (1978, 1991), a steady-state economy (SSE) is a physically non-
growing economy—that is, an economy where the stock of physical 
goods and the population of human beings are constant over time. Lawn 
(2004, 2006d) provides much specificity regarding the need to get to a 
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strategies” which have (or should have) been adopted. For instance, he 
says that a ‘rapid-growth strategy’ would be relatively undesirable for 
wealthy nations which have recently completed a long phase of 
industrialisation. This is because rich countries “adopting such a strategy 
quickly surpass its optimal scale—in which case Fisherian national 
income would fall—it would risk exceeding its maximum sustainable 
scale” (2004b:345). Only on a few occasions in the literature has an 
advocate been truly interested in a comparative empirical analysis 
between the growth rates of the economy and their net income indicator. 
But there are major limitations to his descriptive approach. This is 
how Lawn dissects the linkage between growth and welfare: that the 
“high growth” and “rapid growth” policies of the late 1960s and early 
1970s had a positive effect on YF per capita, but the continuation of a 
“high growth” policy beyond the mid-1970s led to its eventual decline. 
On the contrary, YF per capita recovered on both occasions that Australia 
made the transition to a “lower growth” rate strategy (1979–1984, 1991–
1996). He argues, “Australia probably reached its optimal 
macroeconomic scale in the mid-1970s and should have initiated the 
transition to a SSE at this time” (Lawn 2006c:452, emphasis added). This 
italicised material is the crux of the problem with Lawn’s empirical 
analyses: his ‘growth strategies’ are exogenous to the world-system. 
Nations do not simply adopt (choose to take up or follow) ‘desirable 
growth strategies’ when they are part of a rapacious global, regional and 
local system. Historically, the international business cycle is linked to 
downturns in the US economy (IMF 2007:121-32). For example, at the 
macroeconomic level during the global subprime mortgage market crisis 
of the 2000s, the supposed risk reduction for individual capitals of 
securitised mortgage bonds has been transformed into an increase of the 
collective risk, ultimately affecting the individual units of the system. 
When crises emerge in one market, there is risk of contagion spreading 
to others and global repercussions follow. Only a perspective that 
examines the global system within a regional and (where relevant) 
national environment is appropriate to such problems. How can we 
achieve a SSE when continuous instability, conflict and disarray are 
natural to (disembedded) capitalism? Philip Lawn, the finest aficionado 
of the net income indicators completely ignores real socioeconomic 
processes of the prevailing system. 
An even more pertinent question arises. What is the relationship 
between GDP growth and Fisherian income during the business cycle? 
The purpose of this inquiry is to highlight the potential usefulness of net 
welfare measures when we have a socio-historical institutional apparatus. 
Figure 4.26b below portrays the per capita real growth rates of the 







In the figure above, there was an inverse relationship between real GDP 
and YF in the two recessionary phases of the Juglar cycle, 1980–1983 and 
1990–1993. This may describe how the real workings of the 
socioeconomic system affect our daily lives in a positive way: that there is 
less ecological damage because of a reduced amount of destruction-
creation, and people adapt to make the most of tougher economic times 
(rather than splurging on conspicuous consumption etc.) and relying on 
family and friends to help them through. The mean annual change of YF 
per capita during the 1983–1990 upswing was 0.5 percent, which is quite 
low, suggesting that the speculative Australian property boom in the mid-
to-late 1980s was detrimental to the average citizen’s ‘true’ economic 
and environmental well-being. This would make sense with social reality 
of this era, characteristic of reckless buying and selling of fictitious 
financial assets. In the recovering upswing of 1993–1997—not directly 
comparable with the previous upswing because of the shorter time-
frame—the average annual change of YF was 2.3 percent, which is high, 
perhaps reflecting the greater degree of innovatory practices undertaken 
to enhance net psychic well-being. Of course, the extent to which our 
explanations correspond with reality is dependent on how good YF is a 
measure of social and environmental well-being (hypothesis three, H3). 
Consequently, a relatively weak socio-historical institutional analysis 
is characteristic of Lawn’s works on the YF (and the SNBI). A strong 
institutional apparatus is critical for a proper view of the ecological, 
evolutionary and socio-political dimensions of global and regional 
dynamics. At least Lawn’s effort is much better than average, as the 
majority of the GPI advocates superficially breakdown the trends of GDP 
growth with their constructed net income indicator. He does provide a 
very convincing case for the empirical application of Fisherian income 
over Hicksian income. However, similar to the problems of his entropic 
net psychic income theory, his empirical analyses are diminutive of a 











































capitalism. This is our major critique of the empirical applications of the 
net income indicators. 
4.9 A Concise Review of the Criticisms and Suggestions 
of Sustainable Economic Welfare Indicators  
Before we provide a full summary of our conclusions, we will briefly 
review in Subsections 4.9.1 to 4.9.5 the various criticisms and suggestions 
raised in the literature. There have been general criticisms of the ISEW, 
such as those raised by several authors in The Green National Product 
(1994), and specific critiques offered by Atkinson (1995) and Crafts 
(2002), which identify an array of measurement/valuation problems, 
particularly for the UK ISEW. Not strictly limited to the UK ISEW, 
Neumayer (1999, 2004), and Dietz and Neumayer (2007) put forward a 
critique of the conceptual foundation for all the net income indicators, 
namely the ISEW and GPI. Neri and Bradstreet (2006) agree. Also, 
Neumayer (2000) and Dietz and Neumayer (2006b) offer some 
constructive suggestions concerning measurement issues of the 
ISEW/GPI. Böhringer and Jochem (2007) demonstrate that the 
mathematical underpinnings of the net income indices are unsound. 
Nourry (2008) shows that relying on a solitary measure of sustainable 
development will give a misleading picture of reality. Ziegler (2006, 2007) 
scrutinises the dichotomy between the conceptual foundations and 
empirical applications of the ISEW; especially the notion of Daly and 
Cobb’s (1989, 2007) person-in-community. Naturally, the advocates of 
net income indicators have responded to some of these criticisms, which 
responses are explained in Section 4.10 along with a recent debate 
between a new critic and a leading advocate, followed by our own critical 
analysis of the issues in Section 4.11. 
4.9.1 General Criticisms of the ISEW 
VariousAuthors in TheGreenNationalProduct –AProposed Index of Sustainable EconomicWelfare (1994),
LanhamandNewYork:UniversityofAmerica.
The ramifications of including national consumption as the root 
According to Robert Eisner (1994:98), the dollar dimension in the “plus-
minus” structure initiates with personal consumption expenditures 
(adjusted for distributional equity). Consequently, it imposes a stringent 
requirement on the components because each variable should be 
weighted into the total in a way that is consistent with the market value 
to consumers. For example, the ‘national advertising’ item (‘Column K’) 
of the US ISEW (1) (Cobb 1989) is technically purchases by business, not 
purchases by consumers. Eisner (1994:103) criticises the inclusion of 
national advertising in the US ISEW (1) however wasteful they may be 
they were not in the measures of GNP or consumption to begin with. He 
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also argues that the ISEW’s basis for estimating urbanisation costs is 
unwarranted and probably excessive. He suggests that urbanisation has 
substantial benefits that could outweigh the costs.135 Agreeing with 
Eisner, Cobb and Cobb (1994) subsequently modify their original ISEW 
(1) to the US ISEW (2). 
Mishan (1994:176) remarks that we must be aware that varying 
amounts of ‘leisure’ are necessarily involved in the consumption of the 
range of finished goods. Thus, leisure is important for the US ISEW; but 
it was excluded in the US ISEW (2). In addition, a proportion of work for 
which people are paid generally yields them positive satisfaction, a 
proportion that can be substantial for artists and professional peoples. 
Thus, any positive psychic income that is derived from different 
occupations is eliminated in the ISEW, because the measure of welfare is 
(partly) restricted to the value of goods consumed. However, with the 
development of the GPI, which includes the benefits of volunteer and 
parenting labour, Mishan’s critique is possibly less commanding now 
than what it was. 
Thomas Michael Power (1994) argues that any welfare measure (e.g. 
the ISEW) that begins with composite data on national income or 
expenditure is beset with the problem of ignoring regional differences in 
the value of a given level of per capita income. However, with the advent 
of subnational ISEWs and GPIs his critique is less valid. Yet, Allan Young 
and Carol Carson (1994) suggest that worldwide consumption, not 
merely US consumption, must be brought into the calculation. Tinbergen 
(1994:195) agrees with Young and Carson, and says that when 
scrutinising modern problems it is critical to consider the global society: 
“the interrelations between the world’s nations have become so 
important that the appropriate policies must take into account the 
welfare of all citizens of our planet”. However, global consumption-
demand is not part of the SEWIs’ conceptual framework. 
Stocks, flows and the treatment of capitals 
Robert Gottfried (1994) proposes that welfare is a function of both 
disposable money income (a flow of dollars per year) and of the capital 
stock or wealth. That is, both aggregate disposable income (flow) and 
wealth (stock) determine aggregate welfare. However, he suggests that 
either the services of capital or the changes in the stock of capital should 
be included in the ISEW. Thus, his main argument is that there is 
consistency in the evaluation, i.e. the variables must be either stocks or 
flows (see Gottfried 1994:139). For instance, in Cobb (1989), ‘costs of 
water pollution’, ‘long-term environmental damage’, and ‘net capital 
growth’ are reported as changes in the capital stock, whereas other 

135 On the contrary, Talberth’s et al. (2007) empirical analyses show that the costs of urbanisation 
outweigh the benefits. 
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columns are pure flow variables. He goes on to argue that all capital-
related columns should provide data on capital services, so that total 
capital services (higher or lower than the previous year) are reported. In 
summary, Gottfried argues that the authors of the US ISEW (1) do not 
treat capital consistently; sometimes they deal with capital services and 
sometimes with changes in capital stock. 
Opposing Gottfried, Cobb and Cobb (1994:276) believe that: a) the 
measure of current welfare should be based on the level of services 
flowing from an existing stock of capital; and that b) the measure of 
‘sustainability’ or ‘the capacity to generate services in the future’ should 
be based on changes in capital stocks. Cobb and Cobb’s (1994) ISEW 
combines both of those features in a single index on the basis that true 
welfare is current enjoyment that does not take away enjoyment from 
future generations. Subsequently, despite the call for consistency from 
Gottfried (1994:139), they regard the use of two different methods for 
two different purposes as acceptable: 
 
Sustainability involves maintaining a given stock of capital 
to allow an equal level of income or service from it in the 
future. Increases in stock enhance the potential for future 
production of services, while decreases in the stock 
diminish future potentialities. The columns in the ISEW 
dealing with loss of mental damage [defensive private 
health expenditures], ozone depletion, net capital growth, 
and net international position all deal with sustainability 
and thus ought to be calculated on the basis of changes in 
the stock of capital. In other cases, where current 
enjoyment is concerned, valuation ought to be on the basis 
of services from that capital. [Cobb and Cobb 1994:276] 
 
Therefore, for the “welfare–sustainability index” (i.e. ISEW), Cobb and 
Cobb (1994:276) believe that the measure of current welfare should be 
based on the level of services flowing from an existing stock of capital, 
and that the measure of sustainability or capacity to generate services in the 
future should be based on changes in capital stocks. Hence, the 
specifications of the aggregated welfare–sustainability index consist of 
current and future (sustainable) well-being terms. In other words, it is 
sometimes hard to manage aspects such as stocks of capital and flows 
(or funds) of service, independent and dependent variables: 
interdependency is more usual in empirical actuality.  
Finally, the ISEW neglects technical progress and an adjustment for 
the improved quality of consumer goods over time (i.e. durability) and 
the increase in human capital (Eisner 1994:99). Eisner (1994) considers 
the services from human capital as the “most critical factor of 
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production”—albeit the ISEW, GPI, SNBI and YF exclude an adjustment 
of human capital. Thus, he argues, without measures of investment and 
depreciation of human capital it is difficult to make much of ISEW’s 
critical measure of ‘net capital growth’ (Eisner 1994:100). The omissions 
of human capital and technical progress from a combined current-
welfare and sustainability index have been critical issues for debate in the 
literature. Indeed, critics have supplied good critiques on what has been 
discussed in The Green National Product, as will become evident in 
Section 4.9.2 below: 













Neri, Frank and Paul Bradstreet (2006) “Comment on “Measuring Victoria’sGenuine Progress: A Genuine
ProgressIndicator(GPI)forVictoria””,EconomicPapers,vol.25(3),pp.295Ǧ297.
Dietz, Simon and Eric Neumayer (2007) “Weak and Strong Sustainability in the SEEA: Concepts and
Measurement”,EcologicalEconomics,vol.61,pp.617Ǧ626.
The ISEW is a sensitive operational procedure 
Giles Atkinson (1995) and Nicholas Crafts (2002) expose serious flaws in 
the methodologies or technical methods employed for the UK ISEWs.136 
Atkinson (1995) sets out an alternative and more rigorous treatment of 
the valuation methods of Jackson and Marks (1994). He considers the 
rationale for the adjustments to be sound, but the problem is a small 
number of factors dominate the index. For example, much of the down 
turn in the 1980–1990 period in the UK ISEW (1) was attributable to 
changes in the value of non-renewable resource depletion, long-term 
environmental damage and ozone depletion. Atkinson (1995) is critical 
that the price chosen to reflect long-term environmental damage per unit 
of pollutant emitted is unquestionably too high and largely arbitrary. 
Thus, he shows that we can attach little credibility to the magnitudes that 
the authors propose and their rates of change over time: in Jackson and 
Mark’s (1994) study, the claim that the growth achieved in welfare over 
the 1950–1970 period has been largely eroded by 1990 “is fundamentally 
flawed” (Atkinson 1995:29). 
Crafts (2002) also points out that the ISEW is a very sensitive 
operational procedure. The authors of the UK ISEW (2) claim that there 

136 Specifically, Atkinson (1995) critiques the UK ISEW (1) study (Jackson and Marks 1994) and 
Crafts’ (2002) critique relates to the UK ISEW (2) (Jackson et al. 1997). 
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has been an absolute decline in sustainable living standards in the UK 
since the mid-1970s. But, Crafts revises the national UK ISEW (2) by 
Jackson et al. (1997) to make it more nearly a measure of utility-based 
Hicksian income. He considers the rationale for some of the benefit/cost 
adjustments to be unsound. In particular, a critical omission from the 
ISEW is the improvement over time in life expectancy—one of the most 
dramatic feats of the twentieth century was the rise in life expectancy at 
birth to almost 80 years from a level about half that in 1870. He notes 
that the ISEW fails to take account of the high value that people place on 
the reductions in mortality risks that have been very important 
achievements of government health expenditure as well as private 
initiative. He argues that ISEW should be revised to take account of 
much-improved life expectancy. His investigation shows that 
implementing the suggested revision reverses the finding of the absolute 
decline in sustainable economic welfare since the mid-1970s. It is 
“simply not plausible” (Crafts 2002:88). Thus, Atkinson (1995) and Crafts 
(2002) reveal (upon closer inspection of the net welfare measures) that 
the original declinist claims are lacking in methodological robustness. 
Lack of a theoretical foundation, and arbitrary assumptions about human 
capital formation and technological progress 
One of the most influential critics of the net welfare indicator is Eric 
Neumayer. He argues that the corrections in the ISEW are simply 
undertaken without giving any theoretically sound justification for doing 
so.137 For example, Neumayer (1999:83) criticises the dubious concept of 
‘defensive expenditures’: “one could argue that at least part of food, 
drink, entertainment and holiday expenditures are caused by the 
stressful, exhausting and boring modes of modern production that make 
these expenditures necessary as a defence against their unwanted side 
effects”.138 He also recognises an inherent weakness of the single 
composite indicator (akin to the ISEW, GPI, SNBI, YF.). That it includes a 
correction term for income inequality, but does not include a correction 
term for the degree for political freedom, a correction term for the degree 
of equality based on gender, etc. “And how do you provide a reliable 
estimate of these correction terms?” (Neumayer 1999:83). This is his 
most powerful argument for a lack of theoretical foundation. 
Moreover, Neumayer shows that with the inclusion of the positive 

137 At the time, the theoretical critiques raised by Neumayer (1999:82) relate to the US, German, UK 
(1, 2), Swedish, Austrian, Italian ISEWs. 
138 This was a rather weak assessment by Neumayer, as he does not refer to any of Leipert’s 
writings on compensative/defensive expenditures (e.g. see Leipert 1986, 1989a, 1989b). Yet, Dietz 
and Neumayer (2006b:202, 2007:622) still hold onto the view that “[t]here are both conceptual … 
and practical problems … with deducting defensive expenditures that ultimately make the 
endeavour, in the view of some, a “dead end” (Brouwer and Leipert, 1999, p. 196). ... [T]he major 
problem with deducting defensive expenditures is where to draw the line”. 
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effects flowing from human capital formation and technical progress, 
and different assumptions about the weighting of the income 
distribution, one reaches a completely different picture of a society’s 
“sustainable welfare”. By excluding investment into human capital and 
technical progress from their measurement, Neumayer (1999:87-8) says 
that the “ISEWs are constructed in a way that prompts one to suspect 
that their very aim is to show that welfare is lower than GNP and has 
risen much more slowly than indicated by GNP or has even fallen”. With 
the inclusion of education expenditures he shows that the level of welfare 
is considerably higher than the Cobb and Cobb (1994) ISEW. 
In addition, the corrections for the depletion of non-renewable 
resources and long-term environmental damage manipulate the index. 
For example, without the corrections for the depletion of non-renewable 
resources, long-term environmental damage and ozone depletion, the 
US ISEW (Cobb and Cobb 1994) in 1990 would be 83.5 percent higher. 
Neumayer argues that these relatively large subtraction terms dominate 
all the other subtraction terms by one or two orders of magnitude.139 The 
potential costs of long-term future welfare damage from global climate 
change are uncertain, yet a simple monetary estimate is used. Therefore, 
the ISEW conclusions are highly dependent on certain key and rather 
arbitrary assumptions about the weighting of income distribution, the 
valuing of depletion of non-renewable resources and long-term 
environmental damage. Only a few of the advocates have directly 
confronted these critiques. 
The ISEW meshes two separate identities: current welfare and 
sustainability 
Neumayer (1999, 2004) argues that GNP was never intended to be a 
measure of welfare and the need for an alternative single indicator of 
welfare and sustainability (i.e. the capacity to provide future welfare) is 
superfluous. In the words of Neumayer (2004:1,4), “[c]ontrary to well-
being itself, which has an orientation towards the present, sustainability 
is a future-oriented concept. ... [C]urrent well-being is affected by the way 
in which current total capital is used. Sustainability is only affected if the 
total capital stock itself is affected”. For instance, he remarks that the 
valuation of leisure time has no direct link whatever to sustainability, and 
that the distribution of income at any given point in time does not 
directly impinge upon the capacity to provide future welfare (see 
Neumayer 1999:84-5,92). Thus, according to Neumayer there is a need to 
measure separately ‘welfare’ and ‘sustainability’ because doing otherwise 

139 Also for the long-term environmental damage component, Cobb and Cobb (1994:266) have 
supposedly ignored technical progress in their computation of non-renewable resource depletion 
because technical progress brings about cheaper renewable resources alternatives in the 
foreseeable future (see Neumayer 1999:85). 
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leads to methodological inconsistencies, and these entities are too 
complex to be dealt with by a single indicator, such as the 
ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF. My experiential critique of the SEWIs in Section 4.11 
is in agreement with part of his view: measuring both sustainable and 
economic welfare in a single monetary-based index leads to problematic 
results. 
The ISEW implicitly assumes perfect substitutability within and between 
ecological capital and other forms of capital 
A significant critique by Neumayer (1999, 2000, 2003:ch.5) is that the 
ISEW implicitly assumes perfect substitutability within and between 
ecological capital and other forms of capital. Neri and Bradstreet (2006) 
share a similar view, but they specifically direct the criticisms to Clarke 
and Lawn (2005) and their Victorian GPI study.140 That is, the critics 
agree it is based on ‘weak sustainability’ (see Neumayer 1999:92-3). The 
aggregated ISEW does not explicitly distinguish sub-indices for different 
forms of total capital (e.g. human-made and natural capital) and different 
the forms of natural capital (e.g. renewable and non-renewable 
resources), but simply computes an overall index. “This meshing 
together of values from natural and other forms of capital amounts to a 
conceptual break since the heart of the concept of strong sustainability 
demands that natural capital itself and even sub-categories of natural 
capital are held constant” (Neumayer 1999:93).141 Dietz and Neumayer 
(2007) and Brennan (2008) realise that the ISEW/GPI were intended to 
support the propositions of strong sustainability. “However, by assuming 
that the diverse components of comprehensive utility can be simply 
added together in arriving at an overall indicator, they are a measure of 
[weak sustainability], not [strong sustainability]” (Dietz and Neumayer 
2007:621). Therefore, the subjacent presupposition is that an increase in 
one component can compensate for a decrease in another, e.g. an 
increase in resource depletion can be offset by an increase in personal 
consumption expenditures. 
Lack of a support for the threshold hypothesis 
Many empirical works supposedly reveal solid support for the threshold 
hypothesis, for example, Clarke and Islam (2005a) and Jackson et al. 
(1997) based on their empirical analyses of ISEW and GDP. However, 
one must be cautious to interpret their trend results of a potential 
threshold limit as having much significance. Neumayer’s (2000) and 
Dietz and Neumayer’s (2006b) papers have tried to show that the 
threshold, if existent, is not due to factors related to the destruction of 

140 Yet their criticisms are nothing more than a rehashing of Neumayer’s critiques. 
141 True, but the SNBI does distinguish between human-made and natural capital, and the different 
forms of natural capital. 
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the natural environment. They argue that the widening gap between GNP 
and the ISEW/GPI might be the artefact of highly contestable 
methodological assumptions. They show via sensitivity analysis that if 
the cost escalation factor in the valuation of non-renewable resource 
depletion and the assumption of cumulative long-term environmental 
damage is abandoned, then these items no longer give evidence to a 
threshold hypothesis. Thus, the critics raise an important and valid 
argument: that the empirical results are dependent on many arbitrary 
assumptions, which influence the declining or stabilising trend. 
4.9.3 A Mathematical Index-Formation Critique of the ISEW/GPI 
Ebert,UdoandHeinzWelsch(2004)“MeaningfulEnvironmentalIndices:ASocialChoiceApproach”,Journalof
EnvironmentalEconomicsandManagement,vol.47,pp.270Ǧ283.
Böhringer, Christoph and Patrick E. P. Jochem (2007) “Measuring the Immeasurable – A Survey of
SustainabilityIndices”,EcologicalEconomics,vol.65,pp.1Ǧ8.
The authors argue that ISEW/GPI fail to meet fundamental scientific 
requirements and rules for aggregation. That is, according to Böhringer 
and Jochem (2007:2), scientifically sound methods for normalisation (to 
make data ‘comparable’), weighting (to specify the ‘correct’ 
interrelationships), and aggregation (to get the ‘right’ functional 
relationship) are pre-requisites for the construction of meaningful 
sustainable development indices. In ISEW/GPI, all the adjustments are 
monetarised such that aggregation is achieved by simply adding up. In 
line with Ebert and Welsch (2004:281), this procedure of normalising 
data before aggregating them does not provide a solution to the 
‘noncomparability’ of the data. Rather, the arbitrariness of the 
normalisation rules introduces additional ambiguities. Hence, the crude 
variables that comprise the ISEW/GPI are noncomparable since their 
scaling can be changed independently. For example, the time (number of 
hours) spent volunteering or undertaking housework is incomparable 
with an index of air pollution (e.g. sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and 
particulate matter). Yet according to Böhringer and Jochem (2007), 
noncomparability is not the chief setback. 
Aggregation of variables measured in ratio-scale when the variables 
are not directly comparable would call for a geometric mean, however, 
these indices are based on a (misleading) arithmetic mean (Böhringer 
and Jochem 2007:3). In other words, ISEW and GPI are inherently 
inconsistent because they violate these qualifying conditions. On a 
positive note, the authors say that it would be straightforward to 
aggregate indicators by a geometric mean of the crude (i.e. 
unnormalised) data (instead of the used arithmetic mean) to assure 
consistency and meaningfulness (see Böhringer and Jochem 2007:6). If 
they are correct then the implication of this finding is significant: all 
empirical data on SEWIs (including the studies presented in this chapter) 
would need to be entirely rewritten to conform to these aggregation 

223
rules. Up to the time of writing (April 2009), SEWI advocates have not 
addressed this potentially serious problem. 
4.9.4 French ISEW and GPI, 1990–2002 
Nourry,Myriam(2008)“MeasuringSustainableDevelopment:SomeEmpiricalEvidenceforFrancefromEight
AlternativeIndicators”,EcologicalEconomics,vol.67,pp.441Ǧ456.
This paper by Nourry (2008) presents results from time-series analysis of 
eight measures for France such as the green national net product, the 
Genuine Savings, the ecological footprint, ISEW, GPI and two “green” 
Human Development Indicators. The purpose of her paper is to draw a 
parallel between the eight measures to determine whether the indexes 
show a trend towards sustainable development. The relevance is that 
ISEW and GPI per capita (in real terms) are constructed for the period 
1990–2002. But note, a critical evaluation of this paper is not featured in 
the main body of the literature survey: this is because the French 
ISEW/GPI take up a small fraction of her analysis. The other problem is 
that the author has not provided the raw data on these measures. Suffice 
to say, the author makes no theoretical advances and offers no socio-
historical institutional analysis of the trends between GDP and the 
ISEW/GPI. Nonetheless, the main contribution of Nourry’s (2008) paper 
is to show that study of a single measure is insufficient to assess 
sustainable development. The SEWI advocates would agree. However, 
Nourry (2008) does not address the predicament of whether these 
composite measures, ISEW, GPI and its variants are in fact worthy of 
being supplemented or discarded completely. This is a critical question 
in light of a growing disenchantment in the literature over the 
applicability of reductionist metrics and tools for sustainability 
assessment (e.g. Gasparatos et al. 2008). 
4.9.5 The Debunking of Persons-in-Community in the ISEW 
Ziegler,Rafael(2006)PoliticalPerceptionandtheEnsembleofValueandMeasure,McGillUniversity,Montreal,
Quebec,Canada:Governance for SustainableDevelopment,GoSDWorkingPaperNo. 4,March 2005
(UpdatedJanuary2006).
Ziegler, Rafael (2007) “Political Perception and the Ensemble of Value: The Paradox of the ISEW”,
EnvironmentalValues,vol.16,pp.43Ǧ60.
Daly, Herman E. and John B. Cobb Jr. (2007) “ISEW. The ‘Debunking’ Interpretation and the PersonǦinǦ
CommunityParadox:CommentonRafaelZiegler”,EnvironmentalValues,vol.16(3),pp.287Ǧ288.
Ziegler (2006, 2007) tries to reconstruct the ontological option that Daly 
and Cobb develop in For the Common Good. Why? Daly and Cobb (1989) 
attempted to show via ISEW the limitations and consequent errors of the 
belief that the measure of economic activity (GDP growth) can serve as 
an indicator of economic welfare. They wanted to depart from Homo 
Economicus to ‘person-in-community’.142 The person-in-community 

142 Rather than thinking of society as an aggregate of individuals with given preferences, they 
propose to replace this description “with an image of Homo Economicus as person-in-community” 
(Daly and Cobb 1994:159). 
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approach acknowledges the importance of community and the diversity 
of the individual—thereby without claiming that the person is entirely 
determined in its choices by the community. It aims to illuminate the 
critical issues that need to be considered when measuring questions of 
agency and social well-being. Daly and Cobb’s model was meant to 
examine the whole of relationships that are central for self-
understanding, preference formation and well-being. But, 
 
[f]aced with the measure and objective of economic 
growth, they develop an alternative index. The need to 
produce an alternative measure seems so strong that it 
leads to the almost complete bracketing of their prior work on 
person-in-community, the emphasis put there on communal 
structure and the consequent question mark behind any 
attempt to capture economic welfare with one, monetary 
numeraire based on personal consumption. [Ziegler 
2007:53, emphasis added] 
 
That is, Zeigler (2006, 2007) discovers that the conceptualisation of 
economic welfare in terms of personal consumption in the ISEW is 
paradoxical. 
On balance, the structure–objective of consumption transcends the 
relationships said to be constitutive of persons-in-community. 
“Consumption brackets relationships at work, recognition and 
stigmatisation, and more generally the social fabric of the production and 
consumption process” (Zeigler 2007:51).143 He argues that the 
consumption base does not even add these features of economic welfare, 
“contrary to the fact that consumption can go up, but work relations 
deteriorate (or conversely recognition via workplace democracy may 
increase, but income decrease)” (Zeigler 2007:51).144 The significant 
argument for the inclusion of income distribution is also not based on 
community. The argument rests on the principle of marginal utility (see 
Daly and Cobb 1989:402)—there is no justification in terms of equality 
considerations as a demand of democratic communities. And he 
criticises Lawn’s theory, arguing that the psychic flux of individuals 
likewise stands in tension with the description of person-in-community. 
In other words, the main argument of Ziegler (2007) is that the ISEW is 
not systematically built from the theory developed by Daly and Cobb 
(1989). 

143 Of course, Mishan (1994) already noted the problematic of having an index of net consumption. 
On the other hand, Ziegler does not realise that Lawn sees consumption as a “necessary evil”. 
Ziegler also underplays the significant role of service and oikonomia which underlie the conceptual 
framework of the ISEW (see Chapter 3). 
144 Stockhammer et al. (1997:33) were the first in the literature to realise that the ISEW does not 
incorporate an adjustment of the antagonistic working class relations of capitalism. 
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Daly and Cobb (2007) verify this ‘debunking interpretation’ of the 
ISEW. They agree wholeheartedly with Ziegler that more attention has 
been paid to the ISEW that has probably deflected attention from the 
more basic person-in-community argument. They also advocated strong 
sustainability, but recognise that the construction of the ISEW in the 
appendix assumes weak sustainability: “an index that converts both 
manmade and natural capital into ‘dollar’s worth’ units makes them 
fungible in terms of that imposed common unit of measure. From a 
dollar’s worth standpoint they are then substitutes, not complements. 
Without complementarity there can be no strong sustainability” (Daly 
and Cobb 2007:288). Nevertheless, they argue that at a minimum the 
ISEW should question the viability of GDP. 
We have arrived at parallel conclusions after undertaking a 
comprehensive literature review of all the relevant empirical studies: that 
Daly and Cobb’s (1989) notion of an “economics for community” 
apparently disappears in the construction of the net income indicators. 
We also agree wholly with Zeigler (2007:52) that “[t]he preparatory work 
on person-in-community really does achieve one thing: it shows just how 
questionable the idea of one monetary value as an indicator for 
sustainable welfare really is”. The problematic of the all-inclusive indices 
is strengthened through our applied empirical investigations in Section 
4.11. Firstly, it is important to discuss the advocates’ responses (if any) 
to the rather large list of problems/criticisms, beginning with the support 
for a theoretical foundation of the net income indices in Section 4.10 
below: 
4.10 Arguments by SEWI Advocates—But Are they 
Powerful Enough to Address the Lingering Problems? 
4.10.1 The Theory and Method-Techniques of Net Income Indices 
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Solid theoretical foundation (apparently): ‘optimal macroeconomic scale’ 
According to the authors of the SNBI, the theory for the ISEW/GPI is 
based on a macroeconomic perspective of classical microeconomic theory 
of constrained optimisation. The SNBI fundamentally corresponds to the 
methods of the ISEW and GPI, as the authors conceptually link the 
SNBI/ISEW/GPI to a marginal benefit/marginal cost framework (see 
Lawn and Sanders 1999:216-7). Their primary objectives are to calculate a 
pecuniary measure of net psychic income and have a monetary 
quantification of the lost services from ecological capital over time (Lawn 
and Sanders 1999:220).146 The authors argue that to account for the 
costs of growth, ascertaining whether any given macroeconomy is 
nearing or has surpassed its optimum is required. That is, the economy 
must have a proper scale relative to the ecosystem.147 
Lawn attempts to develop a realistic model describing the 
relationship between the “uncancelled benefit” and “uncancelled cost” 
accounts (see Lawn 2001:ch.6, 2006b:39). The uncancelled benefit 
account (the net psychic income) is subject to the law of diminishing 
marginal benefits (utility). The uncancelled cost account (loss of natural 
capital services) is attributable to the law of increasing marginal costs.148 
He shows that (broadly speaking) continued physical expansion of the 
economic subsystem beyond the optimal scale is antithetic to the 
sustainable development goal because it eventually leads to a decline in 
sustainable economic welfare. In other words, the authors put forward 
what they argue is a solid theoretical framework for the SNBI/ISEW/GPI 
(e.g. Clarke and Lawn 2006:300). They also show that there is much value 
in critically evaluating “the gap” between the physical economic growth 





145 The paper by Niccolucci et al. (2007) is not evaluated in Section 4.3 because there are no new 
calculations/constructions of net income indicators. Note too that the papers by Lawn and Sanders 
(1999) and Lawn (2001) are relevant to Section 4.7. 
146 Psychic income and the psychic outgo of the economic activity, i.e. the net psychic income is 
net effect of the modes of experience and is measured in ‘pecuniary terms’ (see Lawn 2001:225-9). 
147 Lawn (2001:77) diagrammatically adopts the notion of ‘optimal macroeconomic scale’ from 
Daly (1991:28). 
148 The law of diminishing marginal benefits: enjoyment of the service increases at a diminishing 
rate as consumption of physical goods increases. People may lose interest even though the item of 
wealth is not physically depreciating, e.g. the enjoyment of playing a music compact disc 
repeatedly may only last for a short time. The law of increasing marginal costs: for each further unit 
of economic expansion a more important ecosystem service is traded-off, as the macroeconomy 
expands relative to a finite natural environment. Costs increase because the more readily available 
higher-quality resources are extracted first, followed by the more complicated and expensive task of 
extracting lower quality resources. 

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Criticisms of the SNBI, ISEW, and GPI evaluated by Lawn 
Lawn (2003:108) notes that “surprisingly little effort has been devoted 
towards the establishment of a theoretical foundation to support [the 
ISEW and GPI]”. In response to Neumayer (1999, 2000)—who argued 
that the ISEW/GPI is based on a makeshift accounting framework with 
no theoretical foundation—Lawn (2003) seeks to demonstrate that the 
net income indicators are based on a sound theoretical ‘income’ 
foundation, and stresses that they would be increasingly accepted if a 
more robust and consistent set of valuation methods were employed in 
their calculation. As we have systematically argued in Chapter 3, the SEWI 
could be based on entropic net psychic income. Lawn details each item 
within the ISEW, GPI, SNBI, e.g. consumer durables, publicly provided 
human-made capital, defensive and rehabilitative expenditures, linking 
them all to the Fisherian concept of income and capital (see Lawn 
2003:112-5, 2005:185-208, 2006a:146). For example, Lawn argues that “if 
the undesirable side-effects of economic activity are not deducted, 
personal consumption expenditure will overstate the psychic benefits 
generated by the economic process” (Lawn 2005:200).149 Hence, to 
account for the net psychic income, subtracting defensive expenditures 
from consumption is required; as shown by Lawn, this adjustment is 
consistent with Fisher. The theory of entropic net psychic income is 
perhaps the most convincing response by the advocates of net income 
indicators. 
Lawn (2003) also welcomes Neumayer’s critical analysis, and 
evaluates the criticism of whether the (typically declining) trends of the 
ISEW, GPI and SNBI are the product of the subconscious desire to 
connive an index to vindicate a threshold hypothesis. Lawn (2005:202-5, 
2006a:157-60) provides a strong counter-argument regarding non-
renewable resources having to be fully replaced in the present when there 
are reserves available for many years to come. This is because, he argues, 
the ISEW and related measures are interested in the sustainability of, as 
well as the current welfare generated by economic activity. However, 
Neumayer (2004, 2007) is not entirely convinced of Lawn’s argument, 
and hence the subject area of an all-in-one indicator of “sustainable 
economic welfare” remains contentious. 
As well, Lawn deals with Neumayer’s (2000) claim that the use of the 
Gini coefficient to establish an index of distributional inequality is very 
subjective and ad hoc. Lawn (2005) disagrees with him, because by 
starting with an index value of 100.0, the Gini coefficient method makes 
no subjective assumption about the desirability of the distribution of 
income at the beginning of the study period: “It is only assumed that an 

149 Indeed, the SNBI/ISEW/GPI already includes items to capture some of the costs of undesirable 




improvement/deterioration in the distribution of income has a 
positive/negative impact on the overall welfare of a nation’s citizens” 
(see Lawn 2005:196). However, Lawn (2005:196-7) suggests there needs 
to be more deliberations on the issue of weighting the “final ISEW” value, 
rather than the “raw ISEW” value (i.e. private consumption expenditures) 
as Stockhammer et al. (1997) did. For instance, Lawn says that it could 
be successfully argued that the cost of environmental damage, crime, 
and family breakdown is disproportionately borne by the poor—and 
therefore it would be preferable to adjust the whole index. Ultimately, the 
SNBI cannot provide a transparent indication of the distribution and 
ownership of net benefits enjoyed by various heterogeneous agents, as it 
is argued in Chapter 6. 
Limitations of the SNBI, ISEW, and GPI evaluated by Lawn 
A major controversy surrounding the net income indices is the reliance 
on “private consumption expenditure” as the reference point for 
measuring economic welfare. But, according to Lawn (2001:222-3), the 
majority of consumer goods are purchased, “not with the idea of 
consumption in mind, but largely for the services they yield. ... People will 
generally pay a higher price for a commodity embodying superior service-
yielding qualities. Consequently, a measure of psychic income can be 
approximated with the use of market prices”. Lawn follows Daly (1991): 
that the service yielded by commodities completely consumed during the 
accounting period in which they are purchased can be valued at their 
actual market prices. He argues that market prices and the rental values 
of physical commodities are readily available (see Lawn 2005:194), and 
that there is an advantage in having price-based measures of sustainable 
economic welfare. 
However, market prices and rental values vary for reasons other than 
from changes in their service-yielding qualities. “Clearly, for prices to 
remain a proxy indicator of psychic income, it is necessary to eliminate all 
price-influencing factors other than those related to a commodity’s 
service-yielding qualities” (see Lawn 2001:223, 2005:194). Evidently, it is 
very difficult from a practical perspective to eradicate all price-influencing 
dynamics.150 He concludes that by utilising the ‘real value’ (i.e. prices 
adjusted for inflation) of private consumption expenditures as the 
reference point is the most desirable option. This is because “it is 
reasonable to assume that, through technological progress, the service-
yielding qualities of most commodities will continue to increase for some 
time to come (i.e. increase the service efficiency of human-made capital)” 

150 According to Lawn, the price of a commodity is effected by: a) the relative prices of the different 
forms of low entropy available to produce it; b) the actual quantity or supply of the commodity 




(Lawn 2001:223-4, 2005:194-5) (and Lawn and Clarke 2008b:73). The 
implicit assumption is that any positive impact on psychic income over 
time is probably well reflected by an increase in real private consumption 
expenditure. 
On the other hand, Lawn realises that there is need to supplement 
the SNBI/ISEW/GPI because many welfare-related factors have been 
overlooked (citing the disutility of work and the existence values of 
natural capital) and ascertaining monetary estimates for some of items 
involves a great deal of ‘subjectivity’ (see Lawn 2001:258-60, 2003:115). 
He suggests that the indicators of sustainable economic welfare must be 
supplemented by a satellite account of natural capital to determine 
whether the changing level of economic welfare is ecologically 
sustainable. In addition, the SNBI does not convey the future impact of 
current activities; this reduces the indicator policy effectiveness—a 
consequence of the definition of sustainable economic welfare being 
measured (Lawn 2003:116). On the other hand, according to Lawn, the 
net income indicators do express a wealth of information on the current 
manifestations and immediate effects of past and present human 
activities. Lawn therefore believes that despite the above limitations the 
SNBI/ISEW/GPI/YF are very good measures of the benefits and costs of 
economic, social and environmental activity over time. (We critically 
evaluate the extent to which the net income indicators are good 
measures of sustainable economic welfare in Section 4.11 below.) 
The need for convention in SEWIs 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) are mainly derivatives of 
rule-based accounting systems. The use of particular methods in SNA to 
make the system work is often due to convention, albeit the approach 
taken may not be strictly accurate. In other words, the methodology to 
calculate GDP, as set out in the SNA, requires general agreement about 
various assumptions. Therefore, the main argument by Vicky Forgie 
(2007:79) is that establishing similar ‘conventions’ would increase the 
acceptability of the GPI to both government agencies and the public. The 
most important point is that “some theoretical framework is required to 
determine what to include/exclude” because there are infinite potential 
inclusions both for social and environmental factors (Forgie 2007:79). 
Besides Philip Lawn, very few SEWI advocates attempt to formulate and 
discuss these issues. Unlike Forgie (2007), our main argument is that as 
a minimum the theoretical foundation must be set in context with a 
specific socioeconomic system. 
The open (ecological-) economy GPI 
Matthew Clarke (2007) looks at the theoretical necessity and the practical 
feasibility of creating an open economy GPI that considers the welfare 
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impacts of exports and imports. Clarke’s major point is that the GPI 
should concern the ‘ownership’ of the costs and benefits connected with 
economic growth rather than with the ‘location’ of those costs and 
benefits. The structure of GPI allows a nation to enjoy, gratis, the benefits 
of importing goods from countries that carry a disproportionately large 
cost of environmental degradation. This results in an exaggeration of the 
real progress experienced by the country importing ‘dirty goods’ (linked 
to environmental waste in the country of origin). Clarke goes into some 
detail about this problem but only relates it to environmental degradation 
not social or cultural decay. However, these are critical issues as we argue 
in Chapter 6. He mentions a global GPI, but thinks the criticality of the 
SEWI research project lies in working out an open economy GPI for 
particular nations (see Clarke 2007:96). The advance Clarke makes is very 
good, but this conjecture is that GPI is still a good measure of net 
welfare. This simply requires gradual evolutionary enhancement of the 
basic structural foundation, rather than calling for a radical overhaul 
(contra Clarke) of the GPI accounting scheme. 
Some support for the threshold hypothesis: SEWI and biophysical 
indicators 
Finally, Lawn (2007) stipulates that if there is a reduction in some of the 
arbitrariness involved in the calculation of the influential components 
contributing to the decline or flattening trend in the ISEW, then the ISEW 
et al. may gain wider respect and acceptance in the economic 
community. He notes that economic indicators reveal only so much 
about the sustainable development performance of a nation/area. That 
is, the ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF should be supplemented with non-economic 
indicators. He suggests that non-economic indicators, particularly 
physical indicators based on biophysical assessments, are of greatest value to 
policy makers in ascertaining the ecological impact of human activities. A 
well-known biophysical indicator is the ecological footprint. 
The ‘ecological footprint’ (EF) is a measure of how much productive 
land and water an area requires to produce all the resources it consumes 
(food, energy and materials), and to absorb all the waste it generates 
using established technology. The EF therefore increases with increasing 
consumption. The counterpart of a nation’s EF is its biological capacity: 
the maximum supply of natural resources and ecological services that 
can be provided by an area. The biocapacity represents the theoretical 
maximum resource capacity in a year. It can be used as a comparative 
term to reveal whether existing natural capital is sufficient to support 
human consumption patterns.151 A country with an EF higher than its 
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151 The units are global hectares (gha) or hectares with the potential to produce usable biomass 
equal to the world’s potential average for that year. The EF reflects the efficiency with which natural 
resources are turned into consumption. The EF changes with population size, average 
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biocapacity is in a state of ‘ecological deficit’ and cannot meet the human 
demand for resources in a sustainable way. In contrast, if the EF is less 
than biocapacity, the country is in a state of ‘ecological surplus’. In a 
similar fashion to how a widening gap between GDP and SEWI can 
explain a reduction in welfare over time, an ecological deficit (overshoot) 
implies the reaching of biophysical limits to growth. 
Niccolucci et al. (2007) briefly look at the trends of the EF vs. 
biocapacity and the ISEW/GPI vs. GDP within six nations (three cases): 
Italy and Germany; Sweden and Australia; and the US and Austria. Firstly, 
the Italian and German cases are unconvincing. The increase in 
environmental pressure matches a growing gap between GDP and ISEW 
in the late 1960s (Italy) and early 1980s (Germany), but it is not 
comparative to the EF/biocapacity accounts. Yet, the authors suggest 
that a low but increasing GDP–ISEW gap is being maintained by 
accumulating environmental debt towards other countries or 
generations. For the Swedish and Australian cases, “both have an 
ecological surplus ... due mainly to a vast environmental heritage and low 
population densities[.] ... [The] ISEW stagnated after 1980 in both cases, 
probably due to decreasing ecological surpluses” (Niccolucci et al. 
2007:670). Regrettably, the authors’ commentaries are incredibly thin; 
only general observations are given with no detailed breakdown of the 
various trends of GDP, ISEW, EF and biocapacity. 
Nevertheless, the third case of the US and Austria provides some 
support for the threshold hypothesis. They observe that the ecological 
overshoot occurred in 1965–1970 (US) and 1980–1985 (Austria) 
corresponding with the stagnation trend of the ISEW for Austria and a 
decrease in GPI in the US. They say that the EF and biocapacity reveal the 
different magnitude of the problem in the two countries, as reflected in 
the gap between GDP and ISEW (GPI). In short, Niccolucci et al. 
(2007:670) argue that the EF has already overshot the biocapacity in 
most western countries and this “may therefore be a reason for the 
decrease in welfare measured by ISEW”. However, these claims re the 
threshold hypothesis must be examined from a socio-historical 
institutional analysis perspective (as prepared in Section 4.11 below). 
4.10.2 The New Critic vs. the Leading Advocate: Commentary on 
the Recent Debate Between Michael Harris and Philip Lawn  
Harris, Michael (2007) “On Income, Sustainability and the ‘Microfoundations’ of the Genuine Progress
Indicator”,InternationalJournalofEnvironment,WorkplaceandEmployment,vol.3(2),pp.119Ǧ131.





consumption per person, and resource efficiency. Biological capacity varies each year with 
ecosystem management, agricultural practices (such as fertiliser use and irrigation), ecosystem 
degradation, and weather (Monfreda et al. 2004). 
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These three recent papers by Michael Harris (2007, 2008) from University 
of Sydney (Australia) and Philip Lawn (2008d) from Flinders University 
(Adelaide, Australia) evoke much cogitation about the outlook of the GPI. 
This (likely ongoing) debate spells major problems for the GPI and its 
related variants. Harris (2007) attacks Lawn’s interpretation of Fisherian 
and Hicksian income. Lawn (2008d) counters some of the primary and 
secondary criticisms raised, detailing (of what Lawn sees as) the 
strengths and weaknesses of these two measures of income. Philip Lawn, 
who is the Editor in Chief of the International Journal of Environment, 
Workplace and Employment, then invites Harris back for a follow up reply, 
entitled “Towards Genuine Progress on the Genuine Progress Indicator”. 
Interestingly, Lawn (2008d) submits that some elements of Harris’ 
(2007) analysis can lead to a more robust theoretical foundation to 
support GPI; in other words, Lawn sees that despite the criticisms raised, 
there are good prospects for GPI. In contrast, Harris (2008) is more 
critical, arguing that there are deep-seated theoretical flaws in the 
structure of GPI. Note that the GPI critiques of Harris (2007, 2008) are 
from an orthodox (neoclassical) viewpoint, whereas Lawn (2008d) is 
coming from an ecological economist’s position. In order to ensure a 
consistent flow of the most important ideas raised in the debate, the 
works of Harris (2007, 2008) and Lawn (2008d) are discussed in a non-
rigid format.152 
Fisher’s view is that income is fundamentally experiential, while Hicks 
presents income in monetary terms. Fisher articulated the distinction 
between income-as-flow and wealth-as-stock, while Hicks focussed 
explicitly on the link between the two and the implications of one for the 
other. As noted above in Section 4.8, Lawn prefers Fisherian to Hicksian 
income because the former is purportedly more realistic for 
understanding sustainable economic welfare. Lawn (2008d:73) is right in 
saying that when valued in real terms (constant prices) Hicksian income 
is effectively based on the quantity of goods consumed, irrespective of 
their content and genuine contribution to human well-being. The GPI 
based on Fisherian income attempts to correct for that anomaly. 
Contrary to Harris’ (2007:125) view, Lawn is also right when he points 
out that the GPI does not ignore questions of sustainability completely, 
since it accounts for the ‘net psychic income’ (żʌǊ) and the ‘depletion 
flow of ecological capital’ (ɷEK).153 Harris seems to confuse the two 
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152 Less attention is given to Lawn’s (2008) paper because he is essentially clarifying and retelling 
the same old argument, as that which is discussed in Section 4.10.1. 
153 Lawn and Clarke (2008b) in “In Defence of the GPI” make a similar point. In the GPI, the 
adjustment for the ‘cost of lost natural capital services’ is effectively equal to (a part of) the cost of 
natural capital depletion. But, merely counting the cost of the various natural capital services lost in 
the provision of welfare-yielding goods is an underlying problem of GPI. In Lawn and Clarke’s 
(2008b:81) words, “[t]he GPI should ... be strictly regarded as more of a ‘welfare’ indicator than a 
‘sustainable welfare’ indicator”. However, GPI does ... incorporate a sustainability element insofar 
as the estimated costs of environmental degradation ... have been calculated on the premise that 
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somewhat. As clearly exemplified in Brennan (2008:7), these two 
components of ISEW make up the second theoretical foundation of 
‘entropic net psychic income’.154 Harris is also unfamiliar with the other 
(perhaps) richer theoretical foundations supporting the GPI/ISEW (see 
Brennan 2008). Nonetheless, Harris argues that the “theoretical 
microfoundations” of GPI are unsound; in effect, he is commenting on 
the income (namely, ‘żʌǊ’) aspect in his 2007 paper and the entropy 
(‘ɷEK’) dimension in the 2008 paper. 
Lawn’s adaptation of the service flow aspect of Fisher’s psychic 
income is problematic. This is because he misreads some of Fisher’s 
latter views and some of Hicks’ original thoughts on the theme of 
‘avoiding impoverishment’ (see Harris 2007:122). James Tobin 
(2005a:212) notes that Fisher relented late in life, agreeing that capital 
accumulation or decumulation was important to pay attention to in a 
measure of income—an analogous conclusion reached years earlier by 
John Hicks. Thereby, a half-baked interpretation of Fisherian income—
income as the net psychic service flux (żʌǊ) from human-made capital—
says little about what might happen to consumption in the future. This 
measure of ‘genuine progress’, in the derisive words of Harris 
(2007:125), simply involves “the extensive recalibration of a product-
based measure [of GDP,] in such a way that it tells us something about 
something more closely about [sic] currently experienced economic 
welfare”. In other words, Harris is saying that Lawn’s approach to 
Fisherian income cannot measure the current level of welfare (or even 
‘sustainable welfare’ for that matter) very well, because the calculation of 
GPI does not consider the relationship between changes in the capital 
stock (i.e. accumulation or decumulation) and psychic service flows. 
Hicksian income is (broadly) defined as the standard of living that 
can be conceived without lowering the achievable standard of living in 
the future. Hicks (1939:176) argued that income is a complex concept 
and not that useful a tool to help understand reality: “[t]he practical 
problem, as Hicks himself explicitly noted, lies in operationalising his 
concept using actual data” (Harris 2007:124). Lawn misconstrues the 
problem of translating an abstract unit (income) into a tangible actuality 
(welfare or psychic income), and does not learn from Hicks’ preliminary 
investigations. “Advocates of the GPI and its variants have eschewed the 
intertemporal—Hicksian—emphasis on assessing the implications of 
current consumption on wealth and hence future consumption” (Harris 
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natural capital should be kept intact”. That is, some of the impact of present activities on future 
well-being is at least accounted for in the GPI. They now argue that a decline in the GPI could be a 
reflection of ‘uneconomic’ GDP growth. This differs from their previous (or current?) position of 
saying that a declining GPI reflects (to a degree) ‘unsustainable’ welfare because it has the capacity 
to warn us of “unsustainability” (e.g. see Lawn 2008d:71, 2009:1899). Why do SEWI advocates 
keep changing their minds? 




According to Lawn (2008d:60), Harris’ (2007) paper poses the 
greatest credible challenge yet to the GPI. In light of Harris’ (2007) 
argument, Lawn realises that additional psychic income and psychic 
outgo factors ought to be included in a measure of national income. 
Lawn confesses that “the failure to include changes in the stock of 
human-made capital casts doubt as to whether the GPI satisfies Hicks’ 
central criterion. It therefore potentially weakens the theoretical case for 
the GPI” (Lawn 2008d:65, emphasis added).155 However, what is missing 
from both authors’ accounts is the rather narrow interpretation of 
‘wealth’, i.e. there is no mention of the need to adequately account for 
changes in human-health and social capitals over real historical time, let 
alone placing them in a specific socioeconomic system. These ideas are 
pursued and refined in Chapter 6. 
The second main argument of Harris (2008) relates to the entropy 
(‘ɷEK’) dimension of the GPI. He questions Lawn’s position: that 
continued conversion of natural capital to produced capital cannot be 
relied upon as a recipe for continued economic growth, since any 
conversion or transformation of matter-energy involves some loss along 
the way (entropy increases). Lawn’s position seem impregnable if this 
were all there was. However, maintaining a standard of living is not 
identical to maintaining a flow of physical outputs. Moving away from 
reliance on tapping long-stored sunshine (in the form of fossil fuels) is a 
possibility, especially in a radically different socioeconomic system 
altogether (i.e. social, rather than, private-for-profit control over 
depletable-energy-systems). Separately, Harris (2008:90) raises the same 
critique that David Schwartzman (2008) puts forward, that there are 
prospects for a solarised economy (albeit Harris ignores the capitalist 
system and the role of institutions in GDP growth). “Hence, the existence 
of entropy itself does not, in and of itself, provide an open-and-shut case 
for moving to a steady-state economy” (Harris 2008:90). As a result, 
Harris doubts how inferences about threshold-crossing can be drawn 
from observation of a GPI. “Downturns in measured GPI series may, 
possibly, be reversible, without downsizing to a steady-state economy” 
(Harris 2007:126). 
In one sense, Harris is potentially right, and so a key question arises: 
What is the implication for the ‘entropic net psychic income’ theory? Note 
that the main role of Chapter 3 (à la Brennan 2008) is to interpret and 
apply theory to the existing literature, and put forward a 
‘macrofoundational’ critique pertinent to the three theories. It was 
impossible to solve all of the theoretical concerns in the one 

155 He concludes, “changes to future welfare possibilities brought about productivity gains 
embodied in newly created human-made capital should in some way be incorporated into the GPI. 
But the GPI should not be rejected because, like any other measure of income, it fails to satisfy 
Hick’s central criterion” (Lawn 2008d:78). 
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paper/chapter; in fact, our stated goal was to present the SEWIs in their 
best possible light. But we suspected that the three theories, especially 
the one developed by Lawn, have some weighty problems. The model of 
‘entropic net psychic income’ holds true for an economy run on fossil 
fuel energy (finite reserves)—i.e. we cannot reuse waste-heat ad infinitum 
and we cannot regenerate the low-entropy energy reserve. But Lawn 
neglects the possible flow of energy into/out of the system, which is 
‘closed’ but not isolated.156 This means that if humanity can successfully 
harness solar energy, then the constraints of the Entropy Law will not 
present us with a problem for a very long time (i.e. at least for a couple of 
millennia) (see Schwartzman 2008:52-4). Chinks begin to emerge in the 
fabric of the ‘entropic net psychic income’ theory. How many more flaws 
will be found? An answer to this question is provided in Chapter 6. 
To conclude thus far, Harris has problems with both components of 
the theory of entropic net psychic income. Why? The raison d'être of his 
argument is that, unlike GDP, which has a process of formal modelling, 
the GPI does not have such a method: 
 
The GPI, according to Lawn (2003), has been provided 
with theoretical microfoundations by being rendered 
compatible with a definition, rather than being derived from a 
well-articulated model. ... There are many widely varying 
indicators that could conceivably be constructed consistent 
with Fisherian principles, so it is hard to say why Lawn (or 
anyone else) would regard the GPI as the ‘correct’ one. 
[Harris 2008:86] 
 
The sum of the choices made on the right-hand side is simply equal to 
the left-hand aggregate value. Harris’ (2008) first point is that the GPI, 
ISEW etc. are based on a constructed equality (a simple arithmetic sum) 
and not on an accounting identity (an agreed upon system of rules). To 
put it another way, he might be alluding to what we argue: that the GPI is 
based on ad-hoc commonsensical operational procedures. His second point 
is also accurate, as demonstrated in Section 4.11 below when we 
construct a stand-in net welfare indicator that is consistent with Fisherian 
principles and compare it with a SEWI. The results are very interesting 
because we arrive at a similar conclusion but by demonstrating it 
empirically. 
GDP is guided by strict accounting identities that impose their own 
discipline. That is, national economic accounting identities are the 
framework for carefully constructing GDP; these identities provide a 

156 An isolated system occurs when energy and matter transfers in or out are closed. A closed system 
occurs when only energy (not matter) transfers. Work can be produced to recycle indefinitely by 
converting low-entropy, high-temperature energy (solar radiation) to high-entropy, low-temperature 
heat (Schwartzman 2008:52). 
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formal framework for making decisions about what is significant and why 
and how the aggregate is to be inferred. But, “[t]he creators of the GPI are 
not guided by any particular discipline in its construction and 
calculation” (Harris 2008:93). Perhaps, as Vicky Forgie (2007) argues, the 
most fitting answer is the need for more convention in the GPI. It will be 
interesting to see how well her proposal (of building an agreed upon 
system of rules) for GPI will pan out. 
On a related link, the major argument of James Boyd from Resources 
for the Future is to aspire to and develop an accounting system, not just 
environmental indicators (e.g. see Boyd 2008b:5). He is advocating an 
anthropocentric, utilitarian approach to accounting, which requires 
focusing on “final” units of consumption. Boyd (2007:718-21) and Boyd 
and Banzhaf (2007:618) argue that welfare-based accounting for 
environmental goods must begin with defensible definitions of the units to 
be counted. Keeping track of these units—even without the using 
prices—leads to useful information, e.g. it is better to know how many 
cars and trucks are produced each year than not to know at all. The same 
is true for environmental public goods. Hence, their goal is to count 
nature on an equal footing with what GDP is already counting— 
measurement of ecological, nonmarket public goods in a way consistent 
with economic accounting principles (Boyd 2008a:19). In other words, 
the ‘Green GDP’ requires a clear distinction between nature’s final 
outputs (which are counted) and the inputs necessary to produce 
them—in order to ensure internal integrity (and international 
comparability) of the current accounting framework. But to what extent is 
this method of focusing on “final” units of consumption relevant to the 
indicators that purport to measure sustainable socioeconomic welfare? 
GDP counts only “end products”, not the intermediate products and 
manufacturing processes used to make “final” market goods and 
services. The reason is that the value of the intermediate goods and 
processes is included in the value of the final good (e.g. a car’s value 
embodies the value of the parts and labour used to create it). Hence, 
counting the intermediate goods and processes would be ‘double-
counting’. In an attempt to be consistent with GDP, the SEWI advocates 
(and the Green GDP) seem to be concerned with the outcomes of the 
process, rather than the process itself. In light of the above dialogue, a 
critical question arises: Is an endogenous change in human or social 
capital over real historical time an intermediate or final process? The 
quandary is that psychic income and outgo experienced are inextricably 
linked with the condition of a person’s well-being (their psyche), and 
therefore a simple means–ends dichotomy (as used in GDP or Green 
GDP) may not be useful for the conceptual substructure of SEWIs. This 
argument is developed in Chapter 6 because it is too complex to deal 
with all at once. But the main lesson about everything said so far is that 

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quantification for the sake of quantification will not aid our 
understanding of sustainable socioeconomic welfare: institutional theory 
must direct the statistical work, as discussed in Section 4.11 below: 
4.11 Deficiency of a Strong Socio-Historical Institutional 
Analysis and Lack of Advance in Theory  
Most relevant scholars recognise the limitations of the ISEW, GPI, SNBI 
and YF accounting framework, pointing out numerous measurement 
problems (e.g. Clarke and Lawn 2008:574-5). For instance, one of the 
main challenges for an ISEW study is gathering the necessary 
expenditure and depreciation cost data to complete the net income 
statement. An ISEW estimate relies heavily on available statistical 
sources and data. Often these secondary data sources and statistics are 
not available, and if they are, they are only available for particular points 
in time, and not over the whole period of the study—a problem familiar 
to all the empirical studies. This is because important required data for 
calculating environmental and social costs may be not available or 
statistical values may be missing. In other words, we may be able to 
identify various regrettable social and environmental disservices, yet not 
be able to calculate them owing to data limitations. Hence, utilising 
Stockhammer et al. (1997:19) words for the general accord shared 
amongst the advocates, “the ISEW does not intend to simply replace 
GDP as a unique measure of welfare but should form part of a more 
holistic social reporting system”. Their calculable ISEWs, GPIs, SNBIs 
and YFs can be of assistance, indicating net welfare trends and the 
significant costs borne towards the nation, despite the shortcomings. 
However, how well does a combined current and future (sustainable) 
well-being indicator work out practically? In answer, this final major 
section argues that there are principal failures in the advocates’ empirical 
analyses. A weak socio-historical institutional apparatus with a 
substantial lack of advance in theory curtails the aggregated net welfare 
index. Besides, the spotlight of the ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF has been on 
measurement-technique issues, but excluding any real socio-historical 
institutional scrutiny. Measuring net welfare without a systematic 
understanding of capitalism, it is argued, has rendered the exercise 
unsuccessful. 
It is surprising that most advocates of a combined indicator of 
socioeconomic and environmental well-being have not supplemented 
their analyses of economic growth with a strong institutional apparatus. 
Simon Kuznets (1966:6) argued that it was the role of institutions to 
condition economic growth. In a footnote, Stockhammer et al. (1997:33) 
hinted at having a more detailed institutional analysis. They alluded to 
social structures of accumulation theory, where the dominant set of 
institutions that contribute to capital accumulation are scrutinised over 

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40–60 years’ waves. The idea behind the approach—which is similar to 
the French regulation school—is that a long period of stable and 
relatively large expansion needs an effective macro ‘social structure of 
accumulation’. 
In the US, the long wave upswing of the 1950s to 1960s (where deep 
recessions were absent) was produced by strong institutional clusters: 
the Keynesian welfare state; durable agreements between capital and 
labour; US hegemony; and a regulated financial system with fixed 
exchange rates. During this long wave upswing, these institutional forms 
provided financial stability and resolved conflicts between industrial 
capital (real investment) and finance capital. In addition, the relationship 
within the family was stable and relatively durable. However, the post-war 
set of institutions began to weaken. From the early 1970s through to the 
2000s, there has been a relatively long wave downswing, where deep 
recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s and financial instability occurred 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (see O’Hara 2006c).157 Hence, an 
institutional analysis would be invaluable in a comparative trend analysis 
of economic growth and sustainable economic welfare. 
To illustrate the trends of GDP and SEWI over real historical time, 
data are gathered from the US ISEW study (by Cobb and Cobb 1994) and 
selected US GPIs (by Redefining Progress) for the 1950–1998 period, 
where the per capita values are indexed at 100 in 1950 (the beginning 
year of the study period). We will also portray the respective per capita 
average annual percentage changes for the five measures over the 1950s, 
1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990–1998 (where data is available). Utilising 
this alternative theoretical approach (social structures of accumulation 
theory), the 1970s–1990s is described as a period of regressive 
socioeconomic development, which is generally in line with the declining 
or flattening trend in US ISEW study and the four US GPI studies, as 
shown in Figure 4.27 and Table 4.27a on page 239. But, large cross-
variations in the five net income studies for the US are detected. For 
instance, the 1950s had the highest variance: the average annual growth 
rates in the per capita GPIs (2,3) were much higher than the ISEW and 
GPI 4 studies, and they completely outstripped the low growth of GPI 1. 
In the 1970s, the GPI 4 grew at an average rate above 1.3 percent per 
annum, whereas the GPI 1 experienced negative average annual growth 
rates (–0.9%). Even when we break down the results into a forty-year 
Kondratieff cycle of the 1950s–1960s and the 1970s–1980s, a degree of 




157 Whether a new social structure of accumulation has been consolidated since the mid-1990s (i.e. 
sufficient for a long wave upswing) remains an open question within the literature, e.g. see Victor 







In Table 4.27b, there are two major variations in the long wave upswing 
of the 1950s and 1960s (‘I’, ‘II’), and there are three major deviations in 
the 1970s and 1980s (‘I’, ‘II’, ‘III’). No author has commented on the 
changeability of the trend results (relative to preceding Redefining Progress 
works). Nevertheless, the trends of the indicators are remarkably similar: 
the five studies illustrate that 1950s–1960s were much more conducive to 
sustainable economic welfare than the 1970s–1990s. The trends of the 
US ISEW and the four US GPIs tend to follow the long wave cycle of 
capitalist growth and development. Therefore, the studies are relatively 

























USISEW USGPI1 USGPI2 USGPI3 USGPI4
Source: Adapted from
US ISEW: Cobb and Cobb (1994)
US GPI 1: Cobb et al. (1995)
US GPI 2: Aneilskiand Rowe (1999); Cobb et al. (1999)
US GPI 3: Venetoulis and Cobb (2004)

















































USISEW USGPI1 USGPI2 USGPI3 USGPI4
Source: Adapted from
US ISEW: Cobb and Cobb (1994)
US GPI 1: Cobb et al. (1995)
US GPI 2: Aneilskiand Rowe (1999); Cobb et al. (1999)
US GPI 3: Venetoulis and Cobb (2004)





































USGPI1 USISEW USGPI2 USGPI3 USGPI4
II II II III
Source: Adapted from
US ISEW: Cobb and Cobb (1994)
US GPI 1: Cobb et al. (1995)
US GPI 2: Aneilskiand Rowe (1999); Cobb et al. (1999)
US GPI 3: Venetoulis and Cobb (2004)
US GPI 4: Talberth et al. (2007)
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some support to the robustness of their evaluation methods. It is a 
shame that the ISEW/GPI advocates have a tendency to neglect history 
and disembody the institutions from their analyses. 
Furthermore, there is irregularity present for the Australian net 
income indicator studies, which makes an important case study for 
illustrating internal consistency problems. Data are adapted from three 
Australian GPI studies, one YF, and one SNBI study. Because of lack of 
consistent time series data, we can only extract the authors’ results over 
the 1986–1994 period. When contrasting the results, the average annual 
rates of change in per capita “sustainable well-being” during 1986–1994 
illustrate that three major divergences are apparent, as shown in Figure 




Clearly, the results describing the nature of Australian “sustainable well-
being”—a term coined by Lawn and Clarke (2006b:120)—are 
contradictory. For instance, over the 1986–1994 period Lawn and Clarke’s 
(2006b) GPI reveals that the average Australian is doing marvellously. 
Fisherian Income portrays tolerable sustainable well-being attainment. 
But according to Lawn’s (2001) SNBI, Australians have fared dreadfully 
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Source: Adapted from
GPI 1: Hamilton (1997)
GPI 2: Hamilton and Denniss (2001)


















































each Australian study undertakes a different technical approach.158 Yet, 
the Hamilton (1997) and Hamilton and Denniss (2001) studies show 
some level of uniformity even with the utilisation of different techniques. 
Nonetheless, the relatively wide inconsistencies in the above indicators 
expose the indeterminate nature of the conclusions drawn by the studies 
together. Therefore, given the relatively large variability of up to 3% in the 
average annual growth rates per capita in the Australian net welfare 
analyses, it is difficult to infer an upper threshold limit. 
Our most important criticism is that there are some major internal 
inconsistencies in the explanation of the social reality. After surveying the 
literature, the “solid support for the threshold hypothesis” by Lawn 
(2005:186) is now shaky. Not all of the studies examined reveal that 
growth beyond a certain point has considerable negative costs. But, 
which studies do and do not support the threshold hypothesis? It is 
somewhat difficult to assess, namely, because of the rather vague 
meaning of the “threshold hypothesis”—the point where net welfare 
diminishes contemporaneously during the expansion of economic 
growth. From the advocates’ viewpoint, many studies show that around 
the mid-1970s or early 1980s a ‘threshold limit’ was somehow reached: 
that the gap between GDP and their SEWI widened. We would generally 
agree that sustainable economic welfare has deteriorated over the past 
three decades since the early 1970s. Yet, this is an intriguing result 
because we are in an environment of historically low world GDP growth, 
meaning lower rates of production (creation) of marketed commodities 
and consumption (effective demand growth) have occurred over the last 
three to four decades. 
The Brennan Illustrative Figure (BIF) will be utilised to organise the 
time-series data on GDP growth in a sophisticated way. The BIF is a dual-
pane figure that combines a table and a graph in one diagram, and 
shows a specific critical value (or values) of importance. In this case, 
there are two values identified in the literature. For advanced capitalist 
nations, O’Hara (2006a) argues that a real GDP growth rate above 2.50 
percent in per capita terms over a period of (at least) ten years is 
sufficient for a long wave upswing—because the major institutions are 
promoting a relatively embedded social structure of accumulation. The 
United Nations argues that growth in real GDP per capita above 3.0 
percent is the minimum rate necessary in order for a developing country 
to make a dent in poverty (e.g. see UNDESA 2006:62). Utilising a BIF and 
arranging (where possible) the data into six successive decades during 
1950–2007, the average annual percentage changes of real GDP per 

158 Obviously, most of the difference between the indices can be explained by the different 
approaches towards measuring and estimating the various cost/benefit components.  
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Real world GDP growth per capita was strong during 1950–1969 (average 
annual change 3.03%), when the advanced economies and the majority 
of peripheral countries enjoyed growth from a relatively stable 
macroeconomic environment. During the 1970s–2000s, no region apart 
from Asia has been able to expand and uphold their growth 
opportunities. Advanced capitalist economies had their major 
breakthrough of high growth of real GDP per capita in the 1950s and 
1960s, with an average rate of 3.46% per annum (easily a long wave 
upswing). Latin America had only one decade of high growth in the 
1970s, coinciding with the surge in international bank lending. SSA has 
yet to experience a sustained GDP growth phase in the last six decades, 
albeit recuperating a bit (on average) in 2000–2007160. Average decadal 
GDP growth in the economies of Latin America and SSA during 1950–
2007 was never greater than 3.00%, the amount needed for sustained 

159 In this study, ‘advanced capitalist nations’ include most of Western Europe and its Offshoots 
(North America, Australia, New Zealand), and Japan. The category excludes Southern Europe due 
to their higher levels of familial (i.e. less market-based) capital, and the fact that uneven 
development persists within some of these countries (e.g. South v North Italy). In general, ‘Asia’ 
includes all areas within the continent, not including Japan, Central Asia and Australasia. ‘Latin 
America’ excludes the Caribbean and Cuba. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) consists of the Central, 
Eastern and Southern areas, including South Africa (unless otherwise stated). (Western Africa is 
excluded from our SSA category.) For each region, an unweighted average is calculated. The World 
Development Indicators (WDI) by the World Bank (2008) have data on annual % ñ of GDP per 
capita (constant 2000 US$) for (most of) the 1960–2007 period. In order to promote historical 
continuity, data from alternative sources on the annual % ñ of GDP per capita (1990 Geary Khamis 
$) were utilised for the 1950s period, and any missing values in the WDI database were substituted. 
The compositions of regions are derived from the country categories in “The Total Economy 
Database” by GGDC (2008).
160 N.B. It is not the whole decade yet and we still have 2008–2010 to include figures. 
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Adv.Cap.Nations 3.19 3.74 2.60 2.21 2.18 1.79
Asia 2.31 2.97 3.48 3.54 4.01 5.00
LatinAmerica 1.94 2.44 2.65 Ͳ0.42 2.14 2.70
SSA 1.94 1.76 Ͳ0.29 Ͳ0.76 Ͳ0.42 2.93







































Sources: Data adapted 




poverty reduction. The standout is Asia, which experienced remarkable 
real GDP growth rates per capita, for example, at an average rate of 
4.18% per annum during 1980–2007. But this has not been enough to 
stimulate world growth.161
There are several good institutional explanations for the declining 
world growth rate since the early 1970s. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
global GDP growth was fostered by the Fordist system (e.g. mass 
creation, utilisation of oil, coal and the combustion engine of 
production), financial regulations and social protection measures. 
Fordism matured in the early 1970s, which led to numerous problems 
and to a paradigm shift of ‘neoliberalism’. Neoliberalism entails the 
ending of the state’s regulatory interventions, allowing free markets to 
take on more control and reduce the power of labour. The deregulation of 
global assets has inhibited real economic growth. This is a crucial problem, 
yet many SEWI advocates simply leave out an analysis of the endogenous 
processes of capitalistic GDP growth as historically determined. 
That is, “financialisation” and the subsequent rise of inequality in the 
US (for instance) have been on balance a detrimental link to GDP growth 
(Perelman 2008).162 Austere global income policies, labour market 
flexibility coupled with a reduced role of the state during the 1980s, 1990s 
and 2000s have operated as a stabilising mechanism for industrial 
profits. The evidence by Argitis and Pitelis (2006) shows that a ‘rentier 
trap’ might have been (is) an obstacle to high GDP growth and to full 
employment in areas that have experienced neo-liberal policy 
transformations. Open market policies “have contributed to the creation 
of a global “rentier-led low growth and instability” regime in which 
financial and rentier interests have set limits to industrial investment, 
employment, growth and overall economic performance and a reliance 
on global wealth creation through outsourcing in the developing 
countries” (Argitis and Pitelis 2006:77). The normal path of the mature 
capitalist economies, such as those of the US, the major Western 
European countries, and Japan, is not based on sustained GDP growth. 
Today’s periodic crises, instead of comprising short-term interruptions in 
a process of accelerated advance, indicate serious and growing long-term 
constraints on industrial investments (Foster 2008:10). It is interesting 
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161 Latterly, sub-prime mortgage crises and the end of private consumption expenditure fuelled by 
cheap credit have resulted in lower than expected US GDP growth rates and weak import demand. 
There are major limits to export-led growth (Hung 2008)—a paradigm that emphasises becoming 
internationally competitive and relying on export markets is problematic in a world-economy of low 
(historically speaking) growth of real GDP per capita. 
162 From the 1970s, the increasing trend to “financialisation” and changes in the pay structure of 
managers (for example, stock options) has had a negative impact on industry and the rate of 
accumulation in US, UK, and France (see Stockhammer 2004:738). Binswanger (2004) shows a 
similar breakdown between the stock market and real investment in other countries and regions, 
namely Canada, Japan and the European economy. Since the 1980s, the Granger-causality 




that merely one set of SEWI advocates looked at the finance–industry 
contradiction, and yet this very brief analysis of the global financial 
system dynamics has shown that it is erroneous to overlook its destruction 
effects on sustainable economic welfare. Moreover, in general SEWIs view 
problems in a national-centric fashion, which is not a useful approach. 
Therefore, the crux of the problem is that SEWI advocates ignore the 
real socioeconomic and institutional processes of the global capitalist 
system. They have ignored the fact that since the early 1970s westernised 
nations were undergoing a long wave downswing: conditions of relatively 
low world income growth. Recall that SEWIs are (in the main) flow-based 
indicators not stock-based. Hence, a comparative analysis between the 
flows of GDP and SEWI over real historical time is valid. Utilising the 
advocates’ data on the average annual rates of change in per capita 
GDPs and SEWIs over the late 1950s to late 1980s lends less support to 
the so-called ‘threshold hypothesis’. Only those national studies that had 
sufficient data on GDP and SEWI over the 1957–1990 period could be 
selected: US ISEW (2); UK ISEWs (1, 2); Dutch ISEW (1); Swedish ISEW; 
Austrian ISEW; US GPIs (1, 2, 3, 4); and the Australian GPIs (1a, 1b). 
Once the data is collated into a table, the results are remarkable. 
Sustainable economic welfare was rising in a high world GDP growth 
environment of more than 2.50 percent per person on average per 
annum (long wave upswing), and it was declining in conditions of 
relatively low world growth during the long wave downswing, as shown in 




Moreover, during the very low (or negative) growth rates of the deep 
recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s, sustainable economic 









































These are extraordinary results:163 it implies that the SEWIs do not really 
“debunk” GDP; the indicators look as if to go hand in hand. 
Does an institutional or socio-historical account matter anyway? 
Absolutely, otherwise we cannot make an accurate judgement of reality; 
we cannot have a holistic understanding of the economic, social and 
ecological spheres. Yet strangely, the results boost the measurement 
reliability of the SEWIs, as they seem to be empirically elucidating the 
reality. An important question arises: To what degree would a socio-
historical institutional analysis adequately supplement the net income 
indicators and provide integrity for the sustainable well-being indicators? 
Perhaps the root of the problem is that the SEWIs mesh the 
measurement of two separate identities: (a) current welfare and (b) 
sustainability. Giles Atkinson (1995:27) hinted at the problem of including 
both sustainability and welfare within the ISEW, but Neumayer details the 
conundrum (see Section 4.9.2). According to Neumayer (1999:95), what 
should be abolished is the “misplaced and misleading belief that there 
can be one single indicator that measures both current welfare and 
sustainability, which commands enough general agreement to brush 
away GNP from the attention of policy makers and the public”. Of 
course, Lawn (2005:202-5, 2006a:157-60) disagrees with Neumayer’s 
criticisms. But which premise regarding the inclusion of welfare and 
sustainability in the index is correct, Philip Lawn’s or Eric Neumayer’s? 
To investigate this question, we will construct a synthetic ‘net welfare 
index’ and compare the trend of the indicator with a sustainable 
economic welfare index. Several simplifying assumptions are employed. 
The net welfare index is based on the broad category of social capital as a 
proxy for the “quality of social relationships” (Daly and Cobb 1989:161). 
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163 In Table 4.30, only those national studies that had sufficient data on GDP and SEWI could be 
selected. For the early 1980s period: US ISEWs (1, 2); German ISEW; UK ISEWs (1, 2); Dutch ISEW 
(1); Swedish ISEW; Austrian ISEW; Italian ISEW; US GPIs (1, 2, 3, 4); Australian GPIs (1a, 1b); and 
the Australian SNBI. For the early 1990s period: UK ISEWs (2); Dutch ISEW (1); Swedish ISEW; 






































By design, our synthetic index excludes ‘sustainability items’, such as the 
depletion of ecological capital, as well as the components of final artefact 
and durable fixed business capital. In other words, only the monetary-
based variables that relate to the ‘social’ aspects are selected. A net 
social capital index is devised by utilising the following sources that have 
sufficient data: the US GPI (Anielski and Rowe 1999, Cobb et al. 1999); 
US GPI (Talberth et al. 2007); the Australian SNBI (Lawn 2001); and the 
Australian GPI (Lawn and Clarke 2006b). The purpose is to highlight 
major problems when one incorporates welfare and sustainability within 
an aggregated-index. 
Firstly, determining the services and disservices flowing from the 
stock of social capital is required to construct the synthetic net welfare 
index. The services flowing from social capital vis-à-vis the GPIs or SNBI 
components include household and volunteer labour, non-defensive 
private health and/or education expenditures, and perhaps leisure. The 
disservices flowing from the stock of social capital within the GPIs or 
SNBI components include the following: family breakdown; crime; 
defensive private health and education expenditures; underemployment; 
commuting costs; and perhaps lost leisure time. Redefining Progress 
perceives the above positive and negative items to be “social 
dimensions”. The inclusion of the above items for our net social capital 
index is reasonable, but obviously, “social capital” is a much more 
meaningful concept (e.g. see Carroll and Stanfield 2003). In addition, we 
are confined to monetary-based expenditures. Thus, subtracting the 
disservices from the services derives a rather crude proxy for the quality 
of social relationships. 
Secondly, the net social capital indicator is adjusted by the Gini 
coefficient to account for inequality. It is presumed that the services from 
social capital are unevenly distributed amongst poor individuals, and the 
disservices are disproportionately borne by the poor, as in Eq. (4.3) 
below: 






Adjusting social capital by an index of distribution is a valid supposition, 
even if it is admittedly ad-hoc. The adjustment of distribution in the GPI 
and SNBI is well substantiated on the commonsensical method. For 
instance in their US GPI, Anielski and Rowe (1999) have “factored 
income distribution on the assumption that inequality of income directly 
relates to the economic welfare and social cohesion of a society. By doing 
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so, we are making an explicit ethical argument that growing income 
inequality represents a social cost” (Anielski and Rowe 1999:5, emphases 
added). The GPI and SNBI account for distribution by adjusting ‘private 
consumption expenditures’ via the Gini Coefficient—it is not applied to 
the whole index. Yet, Lawn (2005:196-7) suggests that there needs to be 
more debate on the issue of weighting the final value of the 
ISEW/GPI/SNBI via an index of distribution. Indeed, Stockhammer et al. 
(1997) multiplied their Austrian “raw-ISEW” by the index of income and 
work distribution. Hence, it is preferable to adjust the whole of the net 
social capital index by the income distribution, as in Eq. (4.3) above. 
To illustrate the relative real growth rates (per capita) between the 
various indices over the study period, the net social capital and the 
sustainable economic welfare indicators are indexed to 100 at the base 
year. The comparative trend results of the GPI and the social capital 






























Source: Adapted from 
Aneilski and Rowe (1999) 
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The US GPIs and the Australian SNBI experienced virtually identical 
growth rates to the net social capital index (see Figures 4.30, 4.31, 4.32). 
This implies that our synthetic index of social capital strongly influences 
the trend of the sustainable economic welfare indicator. In other words, 
classifying and sorting the authors’ data into social variables reveals that 
accounting for all the other items—the services and disservices from 
final artefact, durable fixed business and ecological capital—makes little 
difference to the trend depiction of “genuine progress”. But it was not 
the case in Figure 4.33 above: the GPI steadily increased over the period 
of study while social capital declined somewhat. This implies that there is 
a weak relationship between social capital and the Australian GPI in 
Figure 4.33. However, the widening gap between GPI and social capital 
may underestimate the real conditions of society: the “genuine progress” 
of the average Australian improved whereas there was a bit of social 
degradation over the 1986–2003 period. Overall, these problematic 
results may suggest an inherent design flaw of the procedural 
mechanism of the sustainable economic welfare index. Given these 
anomalies, how can the reader ascertain the truth of real progress from 
the ISEW/GPI/SNBI or YF? 
Eric Neumayer expresses the problem faced by advocates desiring an 


































































Source: Adapted from 
Lawn and Clarke (2006b)
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The co-existence of factors within one integrated indicator 
of welfare and sustainability, which affect one, but not the 
other (or only weakly and ambiguously so), means that as 
the indicator rises or falls we do not know what rises or falls. A 
rising indicator could mean rising welfare and 
sustainability, rising welfare and a decline in sustainability 
(that is less in value terms than the rise in welfare) or 
falling welfare and a rise in sustainability (that is[,] more in 
value terms than the fall in welfare). Which one is not clear. 
The lesson is that one needs two separate indicators to 
trace two distinct concepts. [Neumayer 2004:5, emphasis 
added] 
 
In other words, there might be a need to measure ‘welfare’ and 
‘sustainability’ separately because doing otherwise yields very strange 
results. 
On the other hand, the trend interpretation between the SEWI and 
GDP is (at least to some degree) notionally valid because the costs of 
economic growth are too unforgiving to ignore. GDP growth is simply a 
proxy for the rate of expansion of market relationships. GDP does not 
measure directly the ‘consumption’ (destruction) of specific durable 
structures over time. On its own, GDP growth only offers an indication of 
the creation of (market) service potential, or, more precisely, exchange-
value creation. However, when accompanied by a story of the real 
workings of institutions, GDP growth may give us an indication of the 
creation of actual services generated in society. This is why having a 
strong socio-historical institutional apparatus of GDP growth is decisive, 
which was missing from the vast majority of the aggregate indices of 
ISEW and GPI. If embedded market institutions are working 
progressively to promote the investment (building up) of specific 
capitals, then GDP growth is more plausibly conducive to actual (as 
distinct to potential) ‘service’ creation. 
Evidently, GDP growth may give a poor indication of real 
developmental experience, particularly at the national or subnational 
levels. Kerala (India) is a good case in point, renowned for its low GDP 
performance but high development of health, knowledge and community 
capitals. GDP and similar variables, though, ignore certain things, as the 
ISEW, GPI SNBI and YF rightly point out. GDP accounting does not 
differentiate growth from sustainable development (viz. depletion of 
ecological capital). Growth means a quantitative increase in the scale of 
goods and services (marketed dimensions) of the economy. Hence, 
‘growth’ refers to the quantitative expansion in the scale of the physical 
dimensions of the economic system. Sustainable development means a 
qualitative improvement in the structure, design and composition of the 
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institutions that result from greater knowledge and understanding of 
social progress. But the qualitative analysis of society, institutions, and 
history tends to be missing in the authors’ accounts of SEWIs. These authors 
want society to achieve ‘sustainable development’—a qualitative 
phenomenon—yet end up adopting a quantitative constant price-based 
measure similar to real GDP per capita. This is inadequate to 
understanding capitalism. 
Thus, even if the proposal of both ‘welfare’ and ‘sustainability’ is 
accepted in the one index, it is imperative to see how well the particular 
measure describes reality during the relevant trend period. There needs 
to be a strong socio-historical institutional analysis to support the results 
of GDP and SEWI. An index is completely futile without a socio-historical 
institutional explanation substantiating the results. Without a strong 
socio-historical institutional explanation and decomposition (e.g. Figures 
4.30–4.33), the results in the ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF can practically suggest 
anything, i.e. arbitrary conclusions. The core of the issue is that because 
most studies are devoid of any real socio-historical institutional analysis, 
the trend results are rendered much less useful. 
4.12 A Summary of the Results from the Degree of 
Literary Contribution Scale (DLCS) 
In summary, the following major types of sustainable economic welfare 
indicators (SEWIs) are considered in this study: Measure of Economic 
Welfare (MEW), Economic Aspects of Welfare (EAW); the Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW); Genuine Progress Indicator 
(GPI); Sustainable Net Benefits Index (SNBI); and Fisherian Income 
(YF). After the MEW and EAW, the original US ISEWs generated a wave 
of studies estimating various net income indicators for different 
countries. The ISEW has been constructed for many countries, including 
Germany, the UK (twice), Scotland, the Netherlands (twice), Sweden, 
Austria, Italy, Chile, Poland (twice), and Thailand. At the national level, 
the GPI has been calculated for the US and Australia. In addition, the 
following subnational studies have come into fruition: a GPI for Alberta, 
Canada; GPIs for the US (Vermont, Chittenden County and Burlington); a 
Victorian GPI (state of Australia); a Sienan ISEW (Italian province); two 
regional-ISEWs for Yorkshire and Humber, and Northern Way, and the 
national (UK) ISEW; two Belgium ISEWs; and Chinese GPIs (four cities 
over three provinces). The subnational GPIs and ISEWs can allow a 
comparative analysis of the national net income situation. In addition, 
there have been several relabelled versions of the ISEW/GPI, the SNBI 
and YF, both calculated for Australia. As a whole, the historical 
applications of net income indices typically span a number of decades. 
In relation to hypothesis three (H3): Are the net income indices good 
measures of environmental and social welfare? To answer affirmatively, it 

251
is argued that there needs to be ɲ), a solid theoretical foundation 
complemented by ɴ), a strong socio-historical institutional analysis. In 
addition, it is imperative to see how well the particular SEWI describes 
reality during the relevant trend period; historical specificity is critical. In 
both of these areas, ɲ and ɴ, we find recurrent deficiencies in the 
empirical studies. However, each empirical study contributes to the 
literature in varying degrees. The degree of literary contribution scale 
(DLCS) is therefore devised to give a mark out of ten in relation to the 
following two areas: (ɲ) advance in “theory”; and (ɴ) socio-historical 
account vis-à-vis the SEWI. The distinction between theory and technique 
is somewhat ambiguous due to the prevalence of commonsensical 
accounting. Hence, the word ‘theory’ (in the DLCS) is in quotation 
marks. The nature of the semi-qualitative scale implies that there is a 
subjective element, but it is based on a comprehensive survey and critical 
analysis of the literature undertaken in Sections 4.4 to 4.8. 
The lowest grade of the scale is ‘poor/minor’, the highest grade is 
‘detailed’, and in the middle, ‘fair’ and ‘good’. A score between zero (0) 
and three (3) says that there were only “poor” or “minor” theoretical 
advancements, and/or a purely descriptive analysis of the welfare periods 
was evident. A score above three (3) and below six (6) implies that the 
study was only “fair” (e.g. lacked originality in theory yet made a small 
contribution overall). Between six (6) and nine (9) implies that it was a 
generally a “good” to very good contribution (e.g. the authors in question 
investigated the environmental or social conditions with specificity, or 
that examined the relationship between economic growth and their 
SEWI). A score of nine (9) to ten (10) means that the level of innovation 
of a study was “detailed” and creative (e.g. the authors had an excellent 
understanding of capitalist institutions). Table 4.31 below, on page 252, 
lists most of the relevant works on the MEW, EAW, ISEWs, GPIs, SNBI 
and YF as well as grading their contribution on the DLCS between 0 and 
10 (inclusive), and provides selected brief (positive) comments on the 
authors’ primary/new contribution. Note that the DLCS does not 
evaluate the criticisms/critiques raised in the existing literature or the 
counter-arguments from the advocates, only our criticism/critiques. This 
study reveals that many authors provide no major ‘good’ or ‘detailed’ 
advancement in theory (2.9/10); none provides a strong socio-historical 
analysis (5.2/10), as shown in the table below. Taken as a collective body, 
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Nordhaus and Tobin (1972)  US 2* 0 1 A significant study on net income indicator construction. 
EconomicAspectsofWelfare(EAW)
Zolotas (1981) US 2.5 4* 3.25 A good historical analysis of the social problems in the US. 
IndexesofSustainableEconomicWelfare(ISEWs)
Cobb (1989) in Daly and Cobb 
(1989) 
US 
6* 6.5 6.25 
The first ISEW study, with the development of 
the notion of the “economics for community”. 
Cobb and Cobb (1994) 3 2 2.5 
Diefenbacher (1994) Germany 0 7.5* 3.75 A good comparative analysis between Germany and the US ISEW. 
Jackson and Marks (1994) 
UK 
3 3* 3 
First UK ISEW study. 
Jackson et al. (1997) 1 2 1.5 
Moffatt and Wilson (1994) Scotland 0 2* 1 First ISEW for Scotland.  
Rosenberg et al. (1995) Netherlands 0 1* 0.5 First ISEW for the Netherlands.  
Jackson and Stymne (1996) Sweden 3 8* 5.5 
A good comparative analysis between the UK 
ISEW and the Swedish ISEW, i.e. different social 
and environmental policies influenced the 
ISEW trend.  
Stockhammer et al. (1997) Austria 8* 5.5 6.75 
Notion of “potential defensive expenditures” 
established. Improved inner consistency and 
clarity in the conceptual structure of the ISEW. 
Guenno and Tiezzi (1998) Italy 1 2* 1.5 First ISEW for Italy. 
Castañeda (1999) Chile 0 6.5* 3.25 First ISEW for a newly-industrialised country, Chile. 
Gil and Sleszynski (2003) 
Poland 
1 3* 2 First ISEW for a country in transition to a 
market economy. Prochowicz and Sleszynski (2006) 0 4 2 
Clarke and Islam (2004, 
2005a), Clarke (2006b) 
Thailand 8 8* 8 
A detailed account of Thailand’s 
socioeconomic situation via a decomposition of 
the aggregated-index. 
Bleys (2007a, 2007b) Netherlands 0 2 1 The second study of the Dutch ISEW.
GenuineProgressIndicators(GPIs)
Cobb et al. (1995) 
US 
7* 6.5 6.75 
*The GPI by Redefining Progress is an important 
attempt to ‘socialise’ the ISEW (e.g. includes 
volunteer labour) and accounts for social 
breakdown (e.g. divorce). 
 
*A brilliant socioeconomic inquiry into  the real 
processes affecting American children.  
 
*A very good critical analysis of the GPI/ISEWs 
and the degree of economic openness. 
Anielski and Rowe (1999) 0 6 3 
Cobb et al. (1999) 0 8.0* 4 
Cobb et al. (2000) 0 7.5 3.75 
Cobb et al. (2001) 0 7.5 3.75 
Venetoulis and Cobb (2004) 0 4 2 
Talberth et al. (2006), Talberth et al. (2007) 7* 6 6.5 
Hamilton (1997, 1999) 
Australia 
8* 6.5 7.25 Attempted to embed GPI in a strong 
sustainability framework.  Hamilton and Denniss (2001) 5 5.5 5.25 
Lawn and Clarke (2006b),  
Clarke and Lawn (2007) 7 7.5* 7.25 
A good deconstruction account of the GPI vis-
à-vis the Australian natural landscape. 
SubnationalGPIsandISEWs 
Anielski (2001) Alberta 3 6.5* 4.75 A sophisticated set of GPI accounts developed and scrutinised.  
Costanza et al. (2004) 
Vermont, Chittenden 
County and Burlington 
(US) 
0 8* 4 
A good comparative subnational–national 
analysis: Vermont’s progressive stance on the 
environmental policy shows that relative 
sustainable well-being is better than the US 
GPI. 
Clarke and Lawn (2005) 
Lawn and Clarke (2006a, 2006b) Victoria (Australia) 7 8.5* 7.75 
Excellent eco-historical assessment of the Rest-
of-Australia versus the Victorian situation. 
Pulselli et al. (2006) Siena (Italy) 0 8* 4 
Compared Siena’s local environmental 
situation (vis-à-vis natural resource 
dependency) with the Italian ISEW. 
Jackson et al. (2006) 
Yorkshire and Humber, 
Northern Way, UK 2 6* 4 
A good analysis of the absolute values 
changes of the regional versus the national.  
Bleys (2006a, 2006b) 
Belgium 
0 2.5* 1.25 
First ISEW for Belgium. 
Bleys (2008) 3 1 2 
Wen et al. (2007) Suzhou, Yangzhou, Ningbo, and Guangzhou (China) 2.5 7.5* 5 
An excellent ecological inquiry into the four 
provinces of China. 
SustainableNetBenefitsIndex(SNBI)
Lawn and Sanders (1999), 
Lawn (2001) 
Australia 8.5* 6 7.25 
SNBI embedded in entropic net psychic 
income. Explicitly separated ‘benefit’ and ‘cost’ 
accounts.  
FisherianIncome(YF)
Lawn (2004b, 2006c) Australia 8.5* 7.5 8 YF is shown to be superior to Hicksian Income. 
TOTAL:(Averageoutof10) All of Thirty-Seven Studies 2.9 5.2 4.1 Overall Mark = ‘Fair’ 

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In other words, many studies have not bothered to theoretically 
explain their work. This conclusion should not be too surprising given 
that we have had to deconstruct the theoretical framework of ISEW in the 
previous chapter. According to Lawn (2005:188), “the ISEW and GPI 
basically differ in name only”. This statement is not quite true and 
highlights Lawn’s lack of profundity in the social realm— originally the 
GPI was an advance in principle as it accounted for more social welfare 
terms, even though the attempt was inadequate. Actually, the 
introduction of Fisherian psychic income has disconnected the meaning 
of the services to persons-in-community. Not even one study took into 
consideration Daly and Cobb’s “economics for community” framework. 
Nevertheless, despite the attempt to ‘socialise’ the ISEW, to some degree 
the claim that the ISEW and GPI differ in name only is correct—but for 
different reasons to which Lawn would proclaim. Besides the few studies 
stipulating that their measure is entropic net psychic income, both 
indices are construed in the same way: a sort of commonsensical 
operational procedure anchored in a simple plus-minus technique. The 
majority of studies had no theory or made insignificant theoretical 
advances; they were primarily based on commonsensical accountancy. 
In addition, the nature of the inquiry for most of the studies is 
without adequate critical analysis of real socio-historical processes vis-à-
vis their index. In political economy, a detailed socio-historical 
institutional analysis is critical, i.e. no less than a score of ‘9’ or above in 
Table 4.31. Only ten out of the thirty-seven studies showed a relatively 
good ecological-historical account (a mark of 6 and above). The majority 
of studies (twenty-seven) reduce the overall quality of the research; not 
much can be said for a detailed socio-historical account. As a whole, the 
supporters, particularly Philip Lawn, have been successful at integrating 
ecological economic principles into the SEWI literature. However, the 
problem is that a raw ecological economistic approach is undertaken, 
which limits the approach of the study into the territory of strong 
sustainability. Therefore, it is difficult to have much faith in the 
ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF describing accurately and measuring social and 
ecological change, because significant conceptual and empirical 
inconsistencies mar the results. 
4.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has exhaustively reviewed the literature on thirty-seven 
empirical studies and on other relevant works of sustainable economic 
welfare indicators (SEWIs): MEW, EAW, ISEWs, GPIs, SNBI and YF. The 
two main conclusions in this study are that: 1) there has been a 
considerable lack of advance in theory throughout the period of study 
(from 1972 to April 2009); and 2) no study has offered a strong socio-
historical institutional account vis-à-vis their index of sustainable well-
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being. On these terms, hypothesis H3 is rejected; net income indices 
have not been successful measures of environmental and social welfare. 
In all of the ISEW studies, there is no conceptual support given to the 
empirical and historical applications of Daly and Cobb’s (1989) 
“economics for community” theory. Only a few studies have contributed 
to the SEWI’s theoretical foundations (e.g. the SNBI and YF). The 
majority of empirical studies have not theoretically advanced their ISEW 
since Daly and Cobb (1989). Besides, the main ‘theory’ of the national 
GPI is based on a bookkeeping procedure of commonsensical 
accountancy. The theoretics behind the subnational GPIs are also based 
on the same mechanical operational procedure. Consequently, there are 
zero theoretical advances in almost all cases of the GPIs. 
The index is impressive on paper; however, a low degree of detail in a 
socio-historical institutional account reduces the overall effectiveness of 
the aggregated welfare–sustainability index. Alas, this is a common 
characteristic of the studies on SEWIs and truly raises credibility issues 
with the aggregated all-in-one measures: Can the reader trust the results 
in representing the social reality or describing the conditions of society? 
To what degree do the ISEW, GPI, SNBI or YF describe the underlying 
socioeconomic evolutionary patterns? How can one explain the results 
over the business cycle or over long waves of growth and development? 
The answer to these questions is a difficult task. 
Yet, there needs to be a strong socio-historical institutional analysis to 
support the results. Most authors do not scrutinise the long-term trend 
of their SEWI vis-à-vis the expansionary and recessionary periods of 
economic growth (GDP growth) during historically interesting epochs 
(e.g. the 1960s vs. the 1980s). A large number of studies provide no 
construal of the downturns (or upswings) of the business cycle vis-à-vis 
the degradation or enhancement of social and environmental 
development. Effectively, the authors’ empirical applications have 
delinked the GDP from the capitalist system: a lack of historical 
specificity vis-à-vis the cyclical situation leaves the reader uninformed. An 
imprudent application of the real socioeconomic processes of capitalism 
is the usual outcome when there is too much focus on ‘the gap’ between 
GDP and the SEWI. 
Of course, some studies have provided a reasonably good socio-
historical analysis. But in the main, the better analyses were related to 
their disaggregated accounts and/or with respect to their comparative 
analyses between the national and subnational levels. We learn that if 
there is any great value to the SEWIs, their merit lies in the disaggregated 
account (and not in a combined index). Disaggregating the SEWI 
components and utilising socio-historical evidence yield more interesting 
results when observing social groups than adhering strictly to the 
indicator as a whole. At the aggregated level of investigation, however, 
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there is a tendency for the authors to be uninterested in the relative 
growth trends between GDP and their net income indicator. They 
inadvertently show the limitations of constructing an all-in-one indicator 
of “genuine progress”: the authors had a far superior disaggregated 
account of real socioeconomic processes and institutions to their 
aggregated inquiry. 
In conclusion, a weak socio-historical apparatus is prevalent to the 
majority of national and subnational analyses, and there is a serious lack 
of advance in theory. It is argued that an index is completely futile 
without strong conceptual and socio-historical institutional explanations 
substantiating the results. The problematic of the all-inclusive indices is 
strengthened through our applied empirical investigations. We found 
that without an institutional explanation and decomposition, the results 
of SEWIs could practically suggest anything. The net income indices are 
not very good measures of environmental and social welfare (H3). 
But, it is difficult to distinguish between techniques (or methods) and 
the theory of the net income indicators. The strongest case for the 
continuation of the SEWIs is in the advocates’ refinement of the 
benefit/cost variables comprising their measure. We came across some 
very good and innovative solutions proposed by the advocates. However, 
it would have been too complex to review such matters in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 will complete the literature survey, where a cavernous 









As argued in Chapter 4, there is a fine line to be drawn between theory 
and techniques of the net income indicators. Perhaps the strongest case 
for prolongation of the net income indicators is in the advocates’ 
refinement of benefit/cost variables comprising their measure. Some of 
the advocates have made some very good contributions in this area. But 
it was too complicated to appraise such matters in the previous chapter. 
Chapter 5 will complete the literature survey, whereby a deeper scrutiny of 
the technical foundations of the net income indices is carried out. 
Directing the second part of the literature survey, the following 
hypothesis four (H4) is scrutinised: 
 
H4:  Net Income Indices are innovative measures of welfare and 
capable of improvement. 
 
This chapter is a technical literature review of the MEW, EAW, ISEWs, 
GPIs, SNBI and YF. The objective is to provide a detailed historical 
account of the a priori inclusion and exclusion of variables in these 
Sustainable Economic Welfare Indicators (SEWIs). The valuation and 
estimation methods employed are considered as well. But the 
controversies surrounding the choice of valuation methods are not 
detailed in this survey. Critics, namely Eric Neumayer, Giles Atkinson and 
Nicolas Crafts, disagree with some of the valuation techniques utilised by 
the authors of net income indicators. In reply, advocates Philip Lawn, 
Matthew Clarke and John Talberth have addressed some of the 
measurement problems. Indeed, Lawn dedicates numerous journal 
articles debating these matters. We briefly reviewed the criticisms and 
responses in Chapter 4. Valuation problems have been extensively 
discussed in the existing literature. In this study, the most important 
theme is the relative degree of technical contribution vis-à-vis the original 
foundation of the US ISEW by Daly and Cobb (1989, 1994). Hypothesis 
four, H4, is utilised as a guide to evaluate this theme in some detail. 
The choice of variables is an important sub-genre that no author has 
critically examined. In this study, alphabetical symbols (a,...az) and short-
hand formulae are utilised to describe each variable. There are fifty-two 
relatively distinct variables encompassing the net income indices, which 
are categorised into the broad economic, social and environmental 
dimensions, as shown in Table 5.1 below:164  

164 Note that ‘P’ (in italics) stands for private or personal related behaviour. Italicised ‘B’ and ‘G’ 






a åPCE Services from personal (private) consumption expenditures 
b åCDK Services from the stock of consumer durables (final artefact capital) 
c åGFK Services from durable fixed public capital 
d åGE Services of non-defensive public (government) expenditures 
e åGheedE Services of non-defensive public expenditures in health (he) and education (ed) 
f åHht Services of household labour 
g åFamCaret Services of parenting and eldercare 
h åVolt Services of volunteer labour 
i åLeist Services of leisure labour 
j åHhFamt Services of household work and parenting 
k åCSeq Services of carbon sequestrations 
Subtractions
l CDE Consumer durable expenditures 
m PGDebtE Private and public debt expenditures (outlays) 
n dšPUrban Disservices of the disamenities of urbanization (private level) 
o dšPAuAcc/ Disservices of auto accidents (private defensive expenditures on vehicle damage) 
p dšAuAcc Disservices of automobile accidents and human injuries 
q dšPCmt Disservices of private commuting 
r dšPheed/ Disservices of defensive expenditures on private health and education outlays 
s dšPCr/ Disservices of defensive expenditures on crime prevention (private level) 
t dšAd Disservices of advertising 
u dšFamBr Disservices of family breakdown 
v dšLeist Disservices of lost leisure time 
w dšUet Disservices of unemployment 
x dšUdet Disservices of underemployment 
y dšOvWt Disservices of overwork 
z dšBWAcc Disservices of industrial (work) accidents 
aa dšBSexW Disservices of commercial sex work 
ab dšGCor Disservices of public corruption 
ac dšGamE Disservices of problem gambling expenditures 
ad dšSu Disservices of suicide 
ae dšPPoll/ Disservices of defensive expenditures on household (private) pollution abatement 
af dšNoiPoll Disservices of noise pollution 
ag dšAirPoll Disservices of air pollution 
ah dšWatPoll Disservices of urban water pollution 
ai dšWasPoll Disservices of municipal solid waste pollution (i.e. landfills) 
aj dšToxWasPoll Disservices of toxic waste liabilities 
ak ɁMineEK Depletion of mineral resources 
al ɁEnerEK Depletion of energy resources 
am ɁTimbEK Depletion of timber resources 
an ɁFishEK Depletion of fishery resources 
ao ɁOzoneEK Depletion of the ozone 
ap ɁSalinEK Costs of salinity (depletion of agricultural yield on dryland and irrigated cropland) 
aq ɁIrrigEK Costs of excessive irrigation water use (depletion of river and the surroundings) 
ar ɁForestEK Loss of native forests (i.e. deforestation of non-timber old growth forests) 
as ɁNatHabEK Loss of natural habitats/areas (e.g. wetlands, mangroves and saltmarshes) 
at ɁLandEK Loss of agricultural land (soil loss on cultivated land, i.e. farmland degradation) 
au ɁFuturEK Long-term (future) environmental damage (via excess CO2 role to climate change) 
MiscellaneousAdjustments (+/–) 
av ɁBFK Depreciation flow of durable fixed business capital 
aw ăInvPBGFK Net investment of durable fixed (private, business and government) capital 
ax ăInt Net international position (i.e. net foreign borrowing) 
ay DI Distribution index (adjustment) 
az EHI Ecosystem Health Index (adjustment) 
 
Which variables are common to the original ISEW template? What 
degree of innovatory practices have SEWI authors employed? To aid the 
investigation of this study, Venn diagrams and set theory notation are 
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utilised. The purpose of the Venn diagrams is to provide a visualisation 
of the differences between the original templates and their successive 
derivatives. Supplementing the Venn diagrams, detailed equations of 
each net income indicator are incorporated in order to promote 
specificity. Thereby employing these tools, we can work out the technical 
contribution of each study. 
Chapter 5 is divided into six major sections. It is important to 
investigate the preliminaries. Section 5.2 discusses the historical 
evolution of the basic ISEW template. The two original net income 
indicators, the Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW) and Economic 
Aspects of Welfare (EAW), are examined. Many of the initiatives 
undertaken by the authors of the MEW and EAW lead to the development 
of the US ISEW (1) by Daly and Cobb (1989) and the revised version, the 
US ISEW (2) by Cobb and Cobb (1994). The ISEW is the first measure of 
net welfare to include distribution, defensive costs, and sustainability 
(e.g. the costs of long-term environmental damage) in the one index. The 
‘US ISEW (2)’ is central to our inquiry into the degree of innovations made 
to the basic template. 
In relation to hypothesis H4, we are ascertaining the level of 
innovation(s) undertaken for each SEWI study published in the period 
from 1989 to April 2009. In general, the term ‘innovation’ entails an 
invention and implementation of a new way or idea of doing something. 
From a political economy perceptive, innovations are the radical and 
revolutionary changes in thinking, processes, products, or organisations 
(Schumpeter 1911:63-6). In this study, the introduction of a new variable 
for the first time would constitute an innovation. Making a significant 
change to an existing variable, strictly speaking, would not amount to an 
‘innovation’. Hypothetically, even though a major advance in technical 
methods could have been made, the variable in question (from the list in 
Table 5.1) is not radically modified or new per se. Nonetheless, we still 
should assess these types of modifications in view of providing a fair and 
sympathetic assessment of the net income studies. 
Therefore to minimise complexity, a straightforward dual-score rating 
system is introduced in this chapter. The rating procedure is briefly 
discussed in the middle segment of Section 5.2.3, initially in a practical 
way, and then followed by the particulars of the Venn diagrams and set 
theory notation. In this case, I want to measure the technical advances of 
other studies in relation to the ‘US ISEW (2)’ and to the prevailing 
empirical material of other ISEW studies. The relative degree of 
contribution is thus determined by the extent to which new variables 
and/or considerable changes in technical methods are devised. A rating 
is based on the investigator’s value judgements that relate to a thorough 
inspection of the technical literature on SEWIs. Limiting the rating system 
to a score of ‘1’ (minor contribution) or ‘2’ (major contribution) reduces 
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bias and makes it easier to clarify the level of originality embodied in the 
net income studies; most importantly, the reasons for a score of 1 or 2 
are made explicit in the text. 
Subsequently in the following five sections, the authors’ innovations 
or enhancements achieved over the basic ISEW template are scrutinised. 
Section 5.3 specifically deals with the degree of innovation made in 
seventeen individual ISEW studies. The US Genuine Progress Indicator 
(GPI) by Cobb et al. (1995) is a significant advance over its predecessor. 
Section 5.4 verifies the evolutionary advances of the GPI over the 
template ISEW. In Section 5.5, the ‘US GPI (1)’ by Cobb et al. (1995) 
becomes the new template design and consequently the benchmark for 
comparing US GPI (1) with fourteen other GPIs. That is, the innovations 
achieved over the basic GPI template and the prevailing empirical 
material of other GPI studies are scrutinised. In Section 5.6, two 
measures that are derivatives of the ISEW and GPI are discussed. They 
are the Sustainable Net Benefit Index (SNBI) and Fisherian Income (YF) 
studies. The comparative analysis centres on the technical advances 
made in relation to the templates of the US ISEW (1) and US GPI (1), 
since these are the two foundational studies in the SEWI literature. 
Section 5.7 summarises the technical survey and links the results to 
hypothesis four (H4). A final score (100 percent or less) in relation to the 
Effective Rate of Replication (EROR) is given for each study (thirty-three 
in total, excluding MEW and EAW). The EROR pertains to the degree of 
replication relative to the basic template and to the former studies. 
Founded on the simple dual-score rating system, EROR is a weighted 
summation of these individual scores. That is, studies that have a 
relatively low EROR are highly innovatory because these authors have 
made significant (major) technical contributions. A relatively high EROR 
is a weak (minor) contribution, as the basic template was copied, 
replicated. The extent of basic template replication is thus determined by 
the relative degree of the authors’ contribution(s). EROR is a useful proxy 
for determining whether the ‘Net Income Indices’ are innovative 
measures and capable of improvement (H4). Interestingly, the overall 
total result found in this study is an EROR of about 87%. In other words, 
many studies slavishly follow the basic templates of Cobb and Cobb 
(1994) and Cobb et al. (1995). The high replication rate may indicate that 
there are major limits to fundamentally developing the ISEW/GPI, 
suggesting that the measures are not innovative, lacking the potential for 
improvement (H4). 
In summary, this study critically evaluates the authors’ relative degree 
of literary contribution vis-à-vis the basic template of the US ISEW (2) 
devised by Cobb and Cobb (1994) and the US GPI (1) by Cobb et al. 
(1995). With the aid of Venn diagrams, the minor and major 
contributions/innovations accomplished are scrutinised, beginning with 
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a discussion of the MEW, EAW and US ISEW (1) in Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 
and 5.2.3 below: 
5.2 Historical Evolution of the Basic ISEW Template 
5.2.1 The US MEW – Nordhaus and Tobin (1971, 1972) 
One of the most original net income indicators is the Measure of 
Economic Welfare (MEW), developed almost four decades ago by 
William Nordhaus and James Tobin (1971, 1972). As mentioned in the 
introduction, we are employing Venn diagrams to provide a foundation 
for a visual comparative analysis of the thirty-five studies, beginning with 
the MEW. In this and the proceeding Venn diagrams, the Universal Set, 
r, incorporates all of the 52 variables. However, in order to keep the 
diagrams as simple as possible, only certain variables of significance are 
highlighted. Text adjacent to the right and bottom of the figures give the 
full details, as expressed in standard set theory notation. In order to 
differentiate between the various types of components (positive or 
negative) in the SEWI, purple represents a ‘plus’ item, red exemplifies a 
‘minus’ item, purple-red is a ‘plus or minus’ item. Of the 52 variables in 
r (the boxed area), the eleven components, utilised in the US MEW are 























While there may evidence of some conceptual analysis, there is no 
definitive theoretical framework for this indicator. The authors prefer 
MEW to start with private and public consumption expenditures, because 
“GNP is not a measure of welfare ... the goal of economic activity, after 

















and negative adjustments to consumption are undertaken in MEW, as 
shown in Eq. (5.1) below: 
MEW = å[PCE+CDK+GFK+GE+Hht+Leist]+ăInvPBGFK






GE = nonǦdefensive public expenditures, such aspublic consumption of postal services, parks and
recreationprograms
Hht = householdlabour(valuedattherealwagerate)
Leist = leisure labour excluding instrumental maintenance items such as personal care (preferred
assumptionisthatleisureisunaffectedbytechnicalprogress)




CDE = consumer durable expenditures (treated as investments, ‘costs’), and personal business
expenses





They separate ‘consumption’, ‘investment’ and ‘intermediate’ (aka 
instrumental or regrettable) monetary expenditures to determine the 
individual contribution to welfare. The authors consider ‘consumption’ 
as a positive contribution to welfare, such as the services derived from 
consumer durables and durable fixed capital. By ‘investment’, they mean 
replacement monetary consumer expenditure required to replenish the 
damaged stock. In this case, the damaged stock or costs that require 
replacement are the educational and health stocks. Consequently, these 
‘investment’ expenditures, Pheed in Eq (5.1), are deducted from the 
services account (because they are disservices). ‘Intermediate’ or 
‘regrettable’ expenditures are the costs associated with the non-final 
expenditures that do not add to welfare. ‘Instrumental’ or ‘intermediate’ 
expenditures, such as road maintenance, general government, sanitation, 
and civilian safety (e.g. police services) are not direct sources of utility, 
but are “regrettable necessary inputs” to activities that may yield utility. 
Also, according to the authors, no reasonable nation purchases defence, 
because its services are not desired per se. Hence, under the ‘GE’ item in 
Eq (5.1) the following items are excluded: national defense less one-half; 
atomic energy development; space research and technology; 
international affairs and finance; and veterans’ benefits and services. 
The ‘żInvPBGFK’ item in Eq. (5.1), the net investment of durable fixed 
(private, business and government) educational, health, reproducible 

165 When typically detailing the equations in this study, information on the measurement 
techniques/methods are summarised in parentheses. This style was deemed more appropriate 
than putting it in the body-text. 
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and non-reproducible capital is an important dimension of economic 
sustainability. It is calculated by working out the additional durable fixed 
capital consumption minus the growth requirement for ‘sustainable’ 
durable fixed capital (i.e. ѐPBGFK – œreqPBGFK). That is, the annual 
increase in durable fixed capital necessary to keep up with the trend 
growth of labour force and productivity. “In the case of [public] 
educational and health capital, we have assumed the yields to be 
intermediate services rather than direct consumption [services]; that is, 
we expect to see the fruits of investments in education and health 
realized in labor productivity and earnings, and we do not count them 
twice” (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972:517). Thus, their measure understates 
economic welfare and its growth to the extent that education and medical 
care are direct rather than indirect sources of consumer satisfaction. 
They hope to include a measure of distribution and ecological capital 
in future efforts. But they underestimated the significance of these 
components. “[N]on-appropriated resources such as water and air are 
used and valued as if they were free, although reduction in the per capita 
stocks of these resources diminishes sustainable consumption in future 
... but given the size of components of [durable fixed] wealth, we do not 
believe it would be significant” (Nordhaus and Tobin 1971:A-37, emphasis 
added). Daly and Cobb (1989, 1994) show that depletion of ecological 
capital has a significant effect on the trend of the net income indicator. In 
addition, inclusion of leisure is a controversial item (e.g. see Daly and 
Cobb 1994:457). In MEW, ‘leisure’ and ‘nonmarket work’ (household 
labour) have a very large effect on indicator’s final value. In retrospection, 
the MEW is significant and provided impetus for the development of 
other net income indices. 
Interestingly, they state that they cannot estimate the externalities of 
‘social interdependence’ (see Nordhaus and Tobin 1971:A-2). What is the 
degree to which increasing consumption over time is pleasurable to 
society as a whole? How much consumption is simply relief of artificially 
induced cravings nurtured by advertising and sales effort? The authors 
do not attempt to solve these problems in their measure; but at least in 
principle recognise them as a source of complexity. The Economic 
Aspects of Welfare (EAW) by Zolotas (1981) addresses some of these 
issues, as will be discussed in Section 5.2.2 below: 
5.2.2 The US EAW – Zolotas (1981) 
Contrary to Nordhaus and Tobin, Zolotas (1981) focuses on the current 
flow of services and disservices, leaving out the issues of economic 
sustainability and capital accumulation, but giving some attention to 
ecological sustainability. While there is no theory developed for the 































Similarly to the MEW, the EAW adds to and subtracts from personal 











Hht = household labour (the value of housework per unit of timeminus the service supplied by






PCmt = privatecommutingasaproxyforurbanisationcosts(thedirectcostand lossoftime involved
whentravellingtoandfromwork)
Pheed/ = defensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays(50%oftheannualincrementin
per capita real private expenditure on health, 100% of private expenditures on primary and
secondaryeducation,plus50%onhighereducation)
Ad = advertising,where the aim is to create an insatiable desire for new goods, thereby causing
dissatisfactionwiththosealreadypossessed(50%ofadvertisingexpenditures)



























In Eq. (5.2), the outlays for the acquisition of consumer durables 
(CDE) are deducted from private consumption because they do not 
contribute directly to personal well-being. Zolotas recognises the 
problem of technological obsolescence, yet only to a small degree measures 
it. He accounts for technological obsolescence by deducting the total 
value of automobile production from personal consumption 
expenditures (see Zolotas 1981:90). It is assumed that 50 percent of 
advertising expenditure (Ad) is informative, assisting consumers to meet 
their specific wants. The other 50 percent of advertising is considered 
‘suggestive’ with the aim of creating an insatiable desire for new goods, 
thereby causing dissatisfaction with those already possessed. This is a 
significant problem in political economy. 
Zolotas (1981:86) assumes that only 50 percent of public buildings 
supply services that are enhancing social welfare, while the other 50 
percent comprises buildings that do not contribute to social welfare 
either directly (e.g. penitentiaries) or indirectly (e.g. factories). The 
proportion of public expenditures in health contributing to social welfare 
is 50 percent, since the other half was reckoned as investment or 
corrective spending. He considers most public educational expenditures 
non-current service generation; hence, they are not included in the EAW, 
albeit they were included in the MEW. Also, expenditures on national 
defence, police services, fire department activities etc. are corrective or 
intermediate in nature. They serve to ‘purchase’ goods and services 
essential for the preservation of fundamental social values, such as 
personal freedom and public order. Thus, they are not included in the 
EAW index. Nonetheless, the private investment or corrective outlays on 
health and education are disservices, thereby deducted from the account 
of services. On the other hand, he makes no effort to quantify the private 
sector corrective expenditures on pharmaceuticals, handguns, alarm 
systems, safety locks etc., since they seem low in comparison with the 
corresponding category of public expenditure (Zolotas 1981:45). 
The pollution borne by government or industry (business) sectors is 
excluded because the starting point for all calculations is real private 

166 Control costs are actual outlays aimed at preventing or correcting the destructive effects of 
pollution (e.g. domestic smoke eliminators, special filters for car exhaust fumes etc.). Damage 
costs are the residual amounts of social cost owing to that part of environmental pollution not 
affected by control costs (e.g. the damage cost of air pollution includes health problems and the 
spoiling of crops). 
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consumption (see Zolotas 1981:66). Damage costs denote the residual 
amounts of social cost owing to that part of environmental (e.g. air, 
water) pollution not affected by control costs. He accounts for the 
depletion of raw materials, which is a small fraction of the total ecological 
capital stock. Similarly to durable fixed capital, natural resources (e.g. 
fuel and minerals) eventually become exhaustible if the rate of 
exploitation exceeds the rate of replacement over a period. But natural 
resources are not accounted for in the production process or via the 
competitive market. Hence, Zolotas deems it significant to account for 
the depletion of energy and mineral resources in the EAW index—this is 
a major innovation over the MEW. The authors of the Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) strongly agree with Zolotas on this 
issue, as discussed in Section 5.2.3: 
5.2.3 The US ISEWs – Cobb (1989), Cobb and Cobb (1994) 
Herman Daly and John Cobb (1989) in For the Common Good pioneered 
early work into developing a more appropriate measure of sustainable 
economic welfare. They devised the very first ISEW for the US (see Cobb 
1989). Daly and Cobb (1994) revised their book for a Second Edition in 
which they modified the index somewhat after digesting various 
criticisms raised by scholars (Cobb 1994, Cobb and Cobb 1994). The 
significance of their work is that it was the first indicator attempting to 
combine welfare aspects of income distribution and environmental 
destruction. Only a part of their ISEW is rooted in the “Economics for 
Community” theory, namely, it is based on the principles of 
internalization and strong sustainability (of human-made and natural 
capitals). 
The spotlight of ISEW centres on measuring aspects of ecological 
‘sustainability’. For instance, Cobb (1989) deducts the annual loss of 
productive services associated with the past and present conversion of 
wetlands and farmlands to urban areas. He assumes that land 
development is irreversible because substitutes for the services of 
wetlands and farmland are not readily available. A marsh area converted 
to airport runway, for example, no longer provides present and future 
benefits of flood protection, groundwater purification and storage, 
wildlife preservation and scenic vistas. The loss of high-quality farmland 
to suburban development or soil erosion requires that crops be grown on 
less fertile fields with heavier doses of chemical fertilisers. Cobb’s (1989) 
accounting methodology ensures escalating aggregate costs of land 
development over time. 
Specifically, the twenty-two items utilised by Cobb (1989) in the US 





































The starting point of the US ISEW (1) is personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE) adjusted by an index of distributional inequality (DI). 
From there, flows of services, net capital growth and net investment are 
added, and disservice flows and depletion of ecological capital are 




  –ɁEK[Mine+Ener+NatHab+Land+Futur]    (5.3)
Services(å)
PCE/DI*100= personal consumption expenditures divided by the index of distributional inequality (low
quintile option of the harmonic mean method, which emphasises the variations in the
relationshipbetweenthehighestquintileandotherquintiles)
CDK = the stock of consumer durables (annual flow of services derived from the stock of ‘durable’

























ăInvPBGFK= net investment of durable fixed (private, business and government) capital (ă»PBGFK =
ρá*ăPBGFK–á%ρLaborForce*áăPBGFK(tǦ1))
167











damage,costsofcleaningsoiledgoods,acid raindamage to forestsandaquaticecosystems,
urban disamenities such as the reduction in property values, and aesthetics due to loss of
visibilityandenjoymentinnationalparksandotherscenicareas)(usingemissionlevels)











Economic and ecological sustainability is a speciality of the ISEW in 
Eq. (5.3). In contrast to Nordhaus and Tobin, the authors of US ISEW (1) 
redefine the growth requirement as the growth of capital necessary to 
compensate for depreciation and population growth, without including 
any consideration of changes in labour productivity (see Cobb and Cobb 
1994:35). ‘Net capital growth’ (żInvPBGF) involves adding the amount of 
new capital stock (increases in fixed reproducible capital) minus the 
capital requirement, the amount necessary to maintain the same level of 
capital per worker.169 Cobb (1994:448) argues that declining productivity 
should expand the growth requirement, because capital must be used to 
compensate for reduced productivity if the same level of consumption is 
to be maintained. In the sustainable MEW, a fall in productivity enhances 
the MEW, which is an unrealistic result. In other words, Nordhaus and 
Tobin (1972:6) have ignored the possibility that productivity would 
decline, which it has during many of the years since they published their 

167 The parameter, ƍ, symbolises “rolling average of the ...”. 
168 Some of the “consumption” during the accounting period will relate to expenditures on durable 
goods from previous accounting periods. To avoid double counting, an adjustment (CDE) is made 
by subtracting out the actual expenditures on consumer durables. Technically, in the ISEW, ‘CDE’ 
is neither a service nor a disservice item per se, but it is included under the ‘disservice’ (dš) 
category to show that it is deducted from the stock of consumer durables (CDK). 
169 To sustain long-term economic welfare, Cobb and Cobb (1994) believe that there should be an 
increasing or constant supply of capital per worker. ISEW calculates net capital growth by adding 
the stock of new capital and subtracting the requirement of private, business, government capital. 
The capital requirement is the amount needed to sustain the stock of capital and, hence, the 
amount needed to sustain the same level of capital per worker. The capital requirement is obtained 
by multiplying the percentage variation in labour force by the stock of capital of the preceding year. 
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paper. Thus, the authors of the US ISEW (1) avow for a more 
conservative method by choosing to leave out productivity changes of 
economic sustainability altogether. 
The US net international position measures the amount that 
Americans invest overseas minus the amount foreigners invest in the 
United States. The annual change in the net international position (żInt) 
indicates whether the US is moving in the direction of net borrowing (if 
negative) or net lending (if positive). If it is negative, part of US capital 
formation is in fact based on wealth borrowed from foreign interests that 
must eventually be repaid with interest. If the change is positive, the US 
has in effect increased its capital assets. 
The interaction of net foreign lending or borrowing and net capital 
growth effectively measures the net borrowing to finance current 
consumption. If net borrowing exceeds net capital formation, then 
borrowing from overseas is for consumption purposes. If borrowed 
money is used for investment purposes, the negative effects of borrowing 
are neutralised by the positive effects of investment and the ISEW 
increases; but if the borrowed money is used for consumption then the 
ISEW declines. Annual changes in the net international position, a 
supposed measure of long-term viability, are therefore included. 
Depletion of non-renewable natural resources such as minerals, 
energy, land and natural habitats (wetlands) in Eq. (5.3) represents a loss 
of natural capital and thus a reduction of future consumption 
possibilities. Consider the depletion of mineral and energy resources, for 
instance. Daly and Cobb (1989) wanted to utilise El Serafy’s “user cost” 
method for relating ‘true income’ to total receipts from mineral 
production via a discount rate and the number of years to depletion.170 
The resource rent method is inspired by the idea of sustainable income 
and aims to separate sustainable from the non-sustainable income parts. 
That is, non-renewable resources are irreversibly lost in the process of 
use; non-renewable resource extraction represents the (partial) 
liquidation of an existing capital stock. However, due to the practical 
limitations of El Serafy’s model, the authors of the US ISEW (1) decided 
to take the total value of receipts from mineral production to account for 
ecological capital depletion. 
Under the category of agricultural land, they measure the losses in 
future production as a result of changes to the soil area resulting from 
current activities. Thus, in calculating the loss of soil productivity, they 
are interested in calculating those losses that result from the future 
impact of current activities. They do not subtract lost present-day 

170 The user cost: the amount of money that would need to be set aside from the proceeds of the 
liquidation of the assets of ecological capital to generate a permanent income stream that would 
be as great in the future as in the present. Rental income accrues from resource extractions, 
therefore this is ‘non-sustainable’ into the future and should either be fully (total resource rents) or 
partly deducted (user costs according to El Serafy method). 
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agricultural production, since this is already reflected (at least in 
principle) in lower personal consumption. In a similar fashion, the loss of 
natural habitat (specifically, wetlands) is a cumulative process. They 
calculate the value per acre of the flow of services from an acre of 
wetland. 
Items of disservice in Eq. (5.3) are regarded as “implicit 
overestimates of welfare in the measure of personal consumption” (Cobb 
and Cobb 1994:51). The authors have deliberately omitted any estimate 
of the stock of human capital in the US ISEW. They do not want to 
quantify the qualitative nature of human capital. In their view, quantitative 
measures of the costs to knowledge and health dimensions are seen as 
key to the inquiry into sustainable economic welfare. Thus, the authors of 
the US ISEW do not think the measures of ‘defensive educational and 
health expenditures’ have anything to do with the formation or 
destruction of human capital (since it is excluded from their analysis).171 
Both private and public education expenditures relate more to 
improving relative position in the labour market than to a significant 
overall increase in human capital or to increased productivity in the 
market. Overall, they argue that education becomes a “defensive 
expenditure necessary to protect one’s ‘market share’”. An individual is 
much more compelled under a market-based system to obtain a college 
degree to gain access to certain jobs “simply because others have the 
degree”. In addition, a certain proportion of private health and education 
expenditures are subtracted because they are included in personal 
consumption expenditures, and not subtracting them would involve 
double counting. Private (‘P’) and government (‘G’) health expenditures 
are subtracted because they are considered purely defensive in nature, 
i.e. compensating for growing health risks due to urbanisation. 
In relation to the first basic template, there are several differences in 
methodology between US ISEW (1) and the revised measure, the US 
ISEW (2). The US ISEW (1) incorporates the disservices of national 
advertising (dšAd) and urbanisation (dšPUrban). The value of national 
advertising expenditures was deducted because national advertising 
(especially on TV and in magazines) tends to be aimed at creating 
demand for products and brand name loyalty by images that have little to 
do with the actual product. In addition, they account for the 
socioeconomic costs of urbanisation because of the increasing density 
and higher cost of living. In general, growing population density in urban 
areas (or overcrowding) implies that land and house prices and rents rise 
without a compensating increase in economic welfare. That is, as 
population grows in urban areas, the cost of land increased without any 
compensating increase in welfare. 

171 N.B. We discuss the conceptual problems of holding the stock of “human capital” constant in 
Section 6.2, Chapter 6. 
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However, subject to the criticisms in The Green National Product 
edited by Cobb and Cobb (1994), these two components were excluded. 
Advertising expenditures are seen as a ‘business’ item, not a private 
consumption expenditure item. On this basis, they were not deducted in 
the index. In relation to the item of urbanisation, there are many benefits 
from living in an urban area, yet the criticism raised was that the authors 
focused only on the negatives. The convenience of living nearby the 
greengrocers, cafes, pubs, churches, local parks, and the satisfaction 
received from owning a high-quality house (more likely in an urban area) 
are some examples of the positives. Without knowing exactly the effects 
of urbanisation on economic welfare, the authors omitted this item to be 
on the conservative side. 
Out of suggestions from the same book, some further refinements to 
the original indicator were ratified. A minor innovation for US ISEW (2) is 
the additional ways that are possible to measure the distribution of 
income: harmonic mean, top quintile, low quintile, weighted ratio of 
shares and the Gini coefficient. Hence, multiple methods were utilised to 
adjust personal consumption expenditures by a distributional index of 
inequality. Another criticism relates to the net capital growth component, 
which includes all government structures and equipment (including 
military). But if only streets and roads among the government’s 
expenditures on equipment and structures (GFK) are considered to yield 
services that contribute to welfare, why are the full range of government 
equipment and structures considered necessary to equip the labour force 
and the excess counted as adding to welfare? Hence, for the US ISEW 
(2), only the stock of private physical and infrastructure capital (żInvPF) 
is incorporated. 
Taking the total value of receipts from mineral production to account 
for ecological capital depletion attracted much criticism during the 1994 
review of the US ISEW (1); a different valuation method was introduced, 
and this constitutes a minor advance. For the US ISEW (2), Cobb and 
Cobb (1994) estimate the amount of money that has to be put aside in 
order to compensate future generations for the loss of ecological capital. 
Consumption of primary energy fuels (coal, oil, gas, nuclear) is valued 
using a replacement cost factor, which reflects the costs involved in 
replacing each barrel of oil equivalent of energy consumed with 
renewable energy resources. The replacement cost was taken to be $75 in 
1988 per barrel of oil equivalent (BOE) and is assumed to be subject to a 
3% per year increase to account for the increasing costs of supplying 
each marginal unit of energy.172 The replacement cost method is a 
different concept to the user cost method. Both assist in calculating the 

172 In any given year not only is the value of current resource consumption deducted but the values 
from all past years as well (see Cobb and Cobb 1994:74). Should the costs of climate change be 
accumulated over time? Atkinson (1995) and Neumayer (1999) argue that this way of evaluating 
long-term environmental damage is theoretically incorrect. 
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depreciation of the stock of ecological capital.173 But the rationale behind 
the replacement cost method is to replace non-renewable resource use. 
The replacement costs are the amount of rent from resource production 
that should be reinvested in a process to create a perpetual stream of 
output of a renewable substitute (such as biofuels) for the non-renewable 
resource being depleted. 
Furthermore, two new additions are evident in the US ISEW (2): 
‘ozone depletion’ (ɷOzoneEK) and ‘defensive expenditures on household 
(private) pollution abatement’ (dšPPoll). Personal pollution control 
expenditures is only a minor improvement since Zolotas (1981) already 
made the effort to measure this item in his EAW. On the other hand, 
accounting for the depletion of the ozone in measuring the estimated 
costs of cumulative production of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs-11,12) 
represents a major innovation. This is an original contribution to the 
literature. 
Illustrating the differences between the first and second US ISEWs 
will involve using a Venn diagram (discussed below). In order to keep the 
diagrams uncomplicated, the same format as before will be used, i.e. 
only the selected variables of importance are highlighted. But a few new 
conventions are employed, which are pertinent to this and other studies 
in Sections 5.3–5.6. 
Firstly, the ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ items that comprise the indicator are 
divided into two sets. This makes the diagram uncluttered and clearer 
because each ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ set portrays the relevant extensions 
made to the ‘benefit’ and ‘cost’ items, respectively. The union of the two 
sets (‘plus’ and ‘minus’) contains all the items of the newer measure 
(e.g. the second US ISEW). The intersection of these two sets contains the 
same items as the template (e.g. the first US ISEW). For our purposes, 
any key modifications to the existing template items are specified (i.e. 
highlighted) in the intersection of the ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ sets. 
 Secondly, a dashed circle delineating element(s) in the universal set 
show the variables excluded from the original template. Authors exclude 
items from the existing template for various reasons, e.g. due to a lack of 
data or the irrelevance of certain items on smaller (subnational) spatial 
scales. In the technical assessment of this chapter, authors are not 

173 The idea of the ‘replacement cost method’ is that non-renewable resource use, which cannot be 
prolonged forever and is therefore not sustainable into the indefinite future, would have to be 
replaced by renewable resources. It is methodologically correct to value it at the cost for replacing 
national consumption of non-renewable resources (not extraction). For an overview of the studies 
that utilised this method problematically, see Neumayer (2000). He argues that it might be more 
appropriate to assume that replacement costs are falling over time rather than rising over time, 
because costs fall over time as technology improves. The replacement cost method together with 
the 3% escalation factor has a substantial influence on the Dutch (1), Swedish, US and UK ISEWs 
(1, 2) and the US GPI (1). Neumayer then shows that the ‘depletion of non-renewable resources’ 
item no longer gives rise to a ‘threshold hypothesis’ when replacement costs are not assumed to 












penalised (or rewarded) for leaving out certain variables. Generally, this 
choice gives the benefit of doubt to the SEWI advocates. 
Thirdly, a simple rating system is devised in order to work out the 
technical advances of a study over the template design and over the 
prevailing empirical material. This is imperative for the comparative 
literary analysis—in relation to hypothesis four (H4). With respect to 
each variable assessed, the superscript number, 1 or 2, signifies either a 
‘minor’ or ‘major’ a technical contribution. Major technical contributions 
(2) are credited to the author(s) who first introduced a new variable 
and/or made a significant change in methods. Minor technical 
contributions (1) are credited to the author(s) who subsequently copy 
these “new” variables and/or methods and apply them to their 
country/area of interest. That is, since nothing original from an 
evolutionary point of view has been created, it still represents a minor 
technical advance with respect to the basic template. It is necessary to 
assign some (minor) score since the ‘basic template’ is our point of 
reference, and it ensures that we are being on the conservative side of the 
SEWI cause. A ‘major technical contribution’ is a rough proxy for an 
innovation whereas a ‘minor technical contribution’ is not. 
The following, one major innovation and four other minor 
improvements of the US ISEW (2) vis-à-vis the US ISEW (1) template are 















 al = {ɁEnerEK|Depletionofenergyresources}
 aw= {ăInvPFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(private)capital}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=USISEW(2)C={n,t,ak}
 n = {dšPUrban|Disservicesofthedisamenitiesofurbanization(privatelevel)}
 t = {dšAd|Disservicesofadvertising}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={ae,ao}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
























The dashed circle delineating




US ISEW (2) is the union of the Plus and Minus sets. The basic template 
is the intersection of the Plus and Minus sets, Template US ISEW (1). All 
twenty-two items of US ISEW (1) are in the Plus Ŋ Minus area. Key 
modifications to the existing template items are vividly coloured in this 
area. This means that all other (non-coloured) items, referred to as 
“Template Items”, have not changed significantly since the basic 
template. In Figure 5.4, the key modifications are the elements which we 
discussed above, al (ɷEnerEK, ‘depletion of energy resources’), aw 
(żInvPFK, ‘net investment of durable fixed (private) capital’), and ay (DI, 
‘distribution index (adjustment)’)—‘al’, ‘aw’ and ‘ay’ are minor advances. 
The excluded items from the basic template comprise the complement 
(c) of the Plus Ӣ Minus set, i.e. US ISEW (2)c. In the above figure, the 
dashed circle delineating elements in the universal set, r, illustrates the 
three excluded variables from the original template. Finally, there can be 
extensions of the benefit (Plus \ Minus) or cost items (Minus \ Plus).174 In 
Figure 5.4, there are no new extensions of the benefit items, the set is 
empty; the symbol, Ø, illustrates this. But there are two extensions of the 
cost items: ae (dšPPoll, ‘disservices of defensive expenditures on 
household pollution abatement’) and ao (ɷOzoneEK, ‘depletion of the 
ozone’), where the inclusion of the latter item is an innovation in the 
literature. In summary, there are five technical advances (4 minor, 1 
major) in the US ISEW (2). 
In this study (in Section 5.3), the US ISEW (2) becomes the primary 
template for a comparative analysis of other ISEWs. The twenty-one 




















174 In set theory the symbol, “ \ ”, is the “setminus command” (Wikipedia 2009). ‘Extension of the 
benefit items’ (Plus \ Minus) is the Minus set subtracted from the Plus set. ‘Extension of the cost 
items’ (Minus \ Plus) is the Plus set subtracted from the Minus set. Items in these crescent shaped 
areas are not included in the basic template. Items belonging to any of these sets are considered 

































The identity of US ISEW (2) and an explanation of the components are 




































A couple of small measurement revisions are worth mentioning. For US 

175 The authors utilise ambient air quality data to construct a revised time-series for the cost of air 
pollution. In theory, they attempt to estimate the loss of services from the stock of air pollution. 
However, for water and noise pollution, they do not calculate an estimate for the loss of services 
from the change in stock of water and noise pollution because of practical/conceptual difficulties. 
Therefore, a certain proportion of the ‘air pollution’ item—that portion affecting the ecological sink 












ISEW (2), the annual flow of services derived from the stock of durable 
consumer goods estimated over their useful life span is 22.5%. In 
contrast, for each year in the US ISEW (1), the total net stock was 
multiplied by 10%. The authors of the US ISEW (2) determine that the 
services of durable fixed public capital are 7.5% of the net stock of 
federal, state and local highways and streets, excluding military. In US 
ISEW (1), the estimated service flow of the gross stock of durable fixed 
public capital was 5%. These revisions are not significant enough to be 
graded by our marking system because they do not relate to a major (or 
‘minor’) modification to an existing variable. Thus, as is evident in Eq. 
(5.4), the US ISEW (2) is a relatively minor update to the original ISEW. 
In conclusion, ISEW is the first measure of net welfare to include 
distribution, defensive costs, and sustainability (such as, the costs of 
long-term environmental damage) in the one index. With the exception of 
the German ISEW, which was created before the Second Edition of For 
the Common Good, the US ISEW (2) is central to our inquiry into the 
extent of basic template replication, as discussed in Section 5.3 below: 
5.3 Innovations Achieved over the Basic ISEW Template 
and the Prevailing Empirical Material 
5.3.1 German ISEW – Diefenbacher (1994) 
Only one minor technical contribution is evident in the German ISEW by 
Diefenbacher (1994) (as well as having no theory). At the time of the 
study, the social insurance system of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) is very different to the US system of education: attendance at 
public schools and universities is free in the FRG. Hence, the percentage 
of defensive expenditures in the area of advanced vocational training is 
very small and insignificant in the official statistics. There is no need to 
deduct defensive spending on private (non-public) education in the 
German ISEW. The technical advance of the German ISEW over the US 
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In Figure 5.6 above, there is one key refinement to the existing template. 
There were no advances in the other categories. 

















PUrban = thedisamenitiesofurbanization (private level) (extracompensatoryexpenditures forbuilding
andforrentalpayments)
PAuAcc/ = autoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)(damageofvehicles)



















Regarding the above items in Eq. (5.5), a few points can be said. In 
Diefenbacher’s work, the computations derived for many of the items in 
the German ISEW differ notably to Cobb’s (1989) US ISEW, as the official 
statistics do not report such values. Interestingly, there are some 
differences in methodology since the issues only pertain to the FRG and 

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not the US. For instance, costs of urbanisation (dšPUrban) were 
assumed zero from 1950–1964 because the air-raids of World War II 
destroyed in some cities up to 80% of the housing, and there were 
extreme housing shortages in the 1950s. This made it impossible to 
compute an estimate of the disservices of urbanisation directly 
comparable to the US. In addition, for the index of distributional 
inequality, he uses wage income to total income as a proxy for income 
distribution rather than household income quintiles as in the US ISEW 
(1). The income inequality index is moving in an opposite direction to the 
ISEW. Hence, personal consumption expenditures (PCE) are multiplied 
by the wage ratio because the lower the wage ratio the less equal income 
is distributed. Generally, however, the German ISEW virtually replicates 
the itemised benefit/cost accounts of US ISEW (1). 
5.3.2 UK ISEWs – Jackson and Marks (1994), Jackson et al. (1997) 
Despite no overall theoretical framework, there are two major and two 
minor technical contributions of the UK ISEW (1) by Jackson and Marks 
(1994). Jackson and Marks (1994) criticise the US ISEWs (1, 2) for 
estimating the costs of air pollution in which Cobb (1989, 1994) utilised 
emissions of three priority pollutants (sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen 
oxides (NO2) and particulates (PM)) in providing an index of air 
pollution. They argue that the choice of pollutants—emissions which all 
decreased over the period in question—was non-representative, and 
ignored the impact of certain other air emissions, such as volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) and carbon monoxide (CO), which tended to 
increase. This means, in particular, that the benefits of reduced 
particulate emissions are (incorrectly) attributed to the total emissions 
index. A better way to account for the costs of each type of emission 
would be to account separately for the costs of each type of emission and 
then to sum these costs. Therefore, incorporating the environmental 
costs of a broader scope of emissions (SO2, NO2, PM, VOCs, CO) is a 
major development in the UK ISEW (1). 
Jackson and Marks (1994) suggested that the ozone depletion item 
should account for the trend in all of the Montreal listed 
Chlorofluorocarbons, i.e. CFC-11, CFC-12, CFC-113, CFC-114 and CFC-
115. Since production of CFCs 113, 114, and 115 was increasing even 
when production of CFCs 11 and 12 had begun to decline, they argue 
that by taking account of all five CFCs a more realistic picture of the 
changes over time would be obtained. Hence, the inclusion of the 
additional listed CFCs in the UK ISEW (1) is another major improvement. 
Cobb and Cobb (1994) only include net private capital growth. 
However, for UK ISEW (1), Jackson and Marks (1994) have essentially 
followed Cobb and Cobb’s (1994) revised methodology, with the 












accounts as well as net changes in the stock of private capital. This is 
because over the 1980s, the transfer of capital from public hands to 
private hands during a series of privatisations of public corporations 
(initiated by the former conservative governments) posed accounting 
problems. The inclusion of public capital is rated as a minor 
improvement. 
The authors draw from a study that considers the services flowing 
from personal consumption expenditures as a whole. Yet it is essentially 
the same methodology for calculating the flow of services from durables 
as was used by Daly and Cobb (1989) and Cobb and Cobb (1994) in their 
ISEWs for the US. For the UK ISEWs, the service flow of consumer 
expenditure is divided into two main categories: consumables—where all 
service flows derive from expenditures in that year; and durables—
wherein service flows derive from a number of years following the year of 
purchase, depending on the service life of the durable in question. 
Accordingly, the authors need only to calculate the difference between 
consumer durable expenditures and the services from the stock of 
consumer durables. They express the ‘services flow’ from consumer 
expenditures as a group, rather than from consumer durables per se. 
Nonetheless, different depreciation rates are applied to the three 
categories of durables. Consumer durables include cars, other durables 
and semi-durables. For durables other than cars, the applied depreciation 
rate is 15 percent, and for semi-durables, it is 30 percent. This is a minor 
advance, because the annual flow of the service value varies with eleven 
different categories of consumer durables, rather than valuing all 
durables with a standard depreciation rate. 
The technical advances of the UK ISEW (1) over the US ISEW (2) 
template, including the abovementioned four contributions (2 minor, 2 















 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
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The item, ‘services from durable fixed public capital’, is excluded because 
the service flows from public capital are already captured in their 
measure. With two major improvements, the UK ISEW (1) is a 
reasonably good contribution to the literature, albeit there were no new 
extensions or innovations to the US ISEW (2) template. Now, because of 
the similarities between the UK ISEW (1) and the UK ISEW (2), a single 
equation is formulated for both measures, as discussed below: 
The following revisions are applied to UK ISEW (2): (a) use of the 
Atkinson index; (b) inclusion of natural habitats other than wetlands; (c) 
the use of a (discounted) marginal social cost to account for future long-
term damage caused by climate change; and (d) a change in the basis for 
computing the costs of ozone depletion from domestic production to 
domestic consumption. The most significant revision relates to point (a), 
the income distribution inequality index. An intractable problem arises 
from the inherent assumption that one unit of consumption is much the 
same as another in terms of delivering welfare. However, Jackson et al. 
(1997) argue that one way to indicate relative changes in welfare is by 
utilising a welfare-theoretic adjustment to incomes based on measured 
inequalities in income distribution. The method is the so-called Atkinson 
index, which attempts to measure the equivalent equalised income 
associated with each unequal distribution of income. Historically, Gini 
coefficient is the focal measure for the adjustment of income 
distribution. But, according to the authors of the UK ISEW (2), the 
disadvantage of using the Gini coefficient is that it does not allow for an 
explicit assumption regarding society’s aversion to income inequality. 
The Atkinson measure does.176 The use of the Atkinson index is a major 
refinement to the existing template, since Jackson et al. (1997) are the 
first to implement this adjustment. 
The original UK ISEW (1) included an assessment of costs associated 
with the loss of wetlands. However, Jackson et al. (1997) say that 
consideration of wetlands, as a principal category of land loss, is mainly 

176 The Atkinson (1970) index allows a parameter (ɸ) to represent society’s aversion to inequality: 
Atkinson Index = 1 – PCE[єi (Yi/Y)1/(1-ɸ).fi]1/(1-ɸ). Where: Yi is the income of all individuals in the ith 
group (n groups altogether); fi is the proportion of the population with incomes in the ith range; Y 
is the mean income; ɸ = 0 – infinity (If ɸ = 0, this implies no aversion to inequality) (If ɸ = infinity, 
implies extreme aversion to income inequality in the society). Since welfare falls as the inequality of 
income distribution increases, the Atkinson index must rise also. Hence, personal consumption 
expenditures item (PCE) in the ISEW is multiplied by 1 minus the income-based Atkinson index 
with the appropriate ɸ parameter. The best estimate from a UK empirical study is ɸ = 0.8. In 
principle, the value of ɸ can be determined in a given society by using attitudinal survey data on the 












germane to North America. In Europe, most of the wetlands were lost a 
long time ago. But, a number of other kinds of land types have come 
increasingly under threat because of advancing urbanisation during the 
last half of the twentieth century. For example, uncultivated heathlands 
and moorlands have been declining steadily over the period in question. 
Jackson and Marks (1994) noted, therefore, that it would be more 
appropriate for a European ISEW to take a broader approach to the loss 
of natural habitat. Yet they did not include an adjustment in their 
estimate. Since the Scottish ISEW by Moffatt and Wilson (1994) has 
already used this alteration, it still counts as a ‘minor contribution’ to the 
UK ISEW (2).177 
Rather than utilising Cobb’s (1989, 1994) method of the ‘long-term 
(future) environmental damage’ item, this variable in the US ISEW (2) is 
directly linked to greenhouse gas emissions. They use a (discounted) 
marginal social cost to account for future long-term damage caused by 
climate change. There is no score given for this because it constitutes a 
small variation to the same variable. Also in the revised UK ISEW study, 
Jackson et al. (1997:25) have estimated the costs associated with ozone 
depletion based on the UK consumption of the Montreal-listed CFCs. This 
is because some countries (Sweden, for example) produce no CFCs at all, 
but by consuming them, they are clearly contributing to future 
environmental damage. This is a clever modification, but, Jackson and 
Stymne (1996) in their Swedish ISEW have already made this alteration; it 
counts as a minor contribution in the UK ISEW (2). 
The technical advances of the UK ISEW (2) over the US ISEW (2) 















177 As we stated at the beginning on page 273, to avoid the problem of being overly critical of the 
SEWI studies, in our rating system a lesser (minor) score is credited to the author(s) who 
integrated variables that are not found in the basic template and/or moderately changed the 
methods found in the basic template, applying them to their country/area of interest. Since nothing 
original has been created from the prevailing empirical material, a minor score is awarded here in 
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 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofnaturalhabitats/areas}
 aw= {ăInvPGFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(privateandgovernment)capital}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=UKISEW(2)C={c}




In summary, the authors of the UK ISEW (2) achieved five contributions 
(5 minor, 1 major) compared to the existing US ISEW (2) template. 
Combining the results of the UK ISEWs (1, 2), there are six technical 
contributions (3 minor, 3 major), albeit without any real conceptual 
support for the measures. 








CDK = the stock of consumer durables (varying the annual flow of the service value with eleven
differentcategoriesofconsumerdurables)
GheedE = nonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresonhealthandfurther(higher)education(50%forboth)
Hht = household labour(population*shadowwagerate*hoursspendperyear inproductive labourat
home)(excludingactivitiesofdomestictravel,gardeningandshopping)(timeǦvaryingwage)178

















Ozone = ozone (cumulative domestic production ofCFCsǦ11,12,113,114,115,UK ISEW (1)) (cumulative
domesticconsumptionofCFCsǦ11,12,113,114,115,UKISEW(2))

178 The shadow wage rate is the cost of employing a domestic worker in the commercial sector. For 
household labour, domestic travel was excluded because an increase in the time spent travelling 
(for instance to go shopping or taking children to school) seems, according to the authors, as not 
representing any clear increase in welfare. “In addition, many shopping activities are recreational in 
nature rather than “productive”, and since we are excluding leisure from this account, they should 
also be excluded. Thus the final account for household labour included cooking and washing up, 





Futur = longǦterm (future) environmental damage (linked to energy use, UK ISEW (1)) (linked to
greenhousegasemissions,discountedmarginalsocialcosts,UKISEW(2))
 
As can be seen above, despite the technical advances of the UK ISEWs 
(1, 2) made over the basic template, Eqs. (5.6), (5.7) are structurally 
similar to the US ISEW (2) template. 
In a footnote, Jackson and Marks (1994:13) and Jackson et al. 
(1997:15) realise the significance of accounting for obsolescence in 
certain categories of durable goods, yet it is not undertaken in Eqs. (5.6), 
(5.7). In theory, separate accounting of expenditures on durables and the 
value of services received from the stock of durables might allow for 
changes in obsolescence of durable goods in the economy. For example, 
improvements in durability of goods would increase the service value 
associated with those goods without increasing personal consumption, 
whereas short-term obsolescence of durable goods tends to inflate 
consumer expenditure without adding to the service flowing from the 
stock. In practice, the task of computing the flow of services from a stock 
of durable is dependent on a complex set of information about lifetimes, 
opportunity costs, and depreciation charges as well as some means of 
evaluation of the service flowing. 
Lifetime and depreciation rates are taken as constant over the period 
of study—this implies that any potential reductions in the service value 
of consumer expenditures on durables because of increased technical, 
economic or fashion-driven obsolescence cannot be identified here. Yet 
when lifetimes are shorter, the depreciation rates are higher. But, “not all 
“premature” replacement of durable goods can be regarded as unwanted 
obsolescence, since some replacement arises from technological 
upgrading” (Jackson et al. 1997:15). It will be interesting to see how other 
authors deal with the problem of obsolescence in their measure. 
5.3.3 Scottish ISEW – Moffatt and Wilson (1994) 
Drawing closely on the methods of the UK ISEW (1), Moffatt and Wilson 
(1994) construct an ISEW for Scotland, albeit also without a theory. But, 
the authors of the Scottish ISEW do make a good advance in relation to 
the ‘loss of natural habitats/areas’ item (ɷNatHabEK). They incorporate 
the loss of heathland, moorland and peatland areas. This is a major 
contribution because of the broader scope to the ecological problem of 
habitat destruction. This advance as well as some others of the Scottish 
ISEW over the US ISEW (2) template is shown in Figure 5.9 below: 
 

179 In the revised UK ISEW (2), a time series for the costs of the loss of habitat has been 
constructed by computing the cumulative loss since 1930 for each year of the study, and then 
























 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofheathland,moorlandandpeatlandareas}
 aw= {ăInvPGFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(privateandgovernment)capital}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=ScottishISEWC={c}




The following three items are directly copied from the UK ISEW (1): the 
services from the stock of consumer durables (ƒCDK); depletion of the 
ozone (ɷOzoneEK); and the net investment of durable fixed (private and 
government) capital (żInvPGFK). These are minor contributions given 
that the improvements were already implemented (in the UK ISEW (1) 
study). In summary, the figure above shows that there were zero 
extensions to the benefit and cost items. But the authors had four 
modifications to the existing template and so this is where the 
contributions are made (3 minor, 1 major). 
Hence, the advancements to the Scottish ISEW are imperceptible in 
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Services(å)
PCE/ID*100= personalconsumptionexpendituresdividedbytheindexofdistributioninequality(Gini)




in productive labour at home) (excluding the activities of domestic travel, gardening and
shopping)
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Overall, the Scottish ISEW in Eq. (5.8) is a minor contribution to the 
literature and highly replicates the US ISEW (2). 
5.3.4 Dutch ISEW (1) – Rosenberg et al. (1995) 
The assumption by Daly and Cobb (1989) that the public services of 
education are mostly defensive in nature does not seem to be 
appropriate for the Netherlands, as stated by Rosenberg et al. (1995). 
The authors of the Dutch ISEW (1) argue that public expenditures are 
much more important in Western Europe than in the US. Hence, their 
minor contribution is treating 100 percent of public expenditures in 
education as non-defensive. Yet the welfare-enhancing public expenditures 
such as those on public housing, culture, and recreation are disregarded 
in their ISEW. 
Despite having absolutely no theory, there are two major technical 
contributions in the Dutch ISEW (1). The first relates to the ‘disservices 
of automobile accidents and human injuries’ (dšAuAcc) item. This is an 
advance over the template because rather than simply assessing the 
vehicular damage element of accidents, the authors are valuing human 
costs of injuries and death. This is a more holistic accounting approach 
(cf. variable ‘o’ vs. ‘p’ in Table 5.1). The other major innovation is the 
accounting of the costs of unemployment (dšUet). Unemployment was 
derived from the absolute number of unemployed divided by total 
potential workforce (‘workforce’ in Dutch is known as 
‘beroepsbevolking’). They utilise the opportunity cost method. The 
opportunity cost of unemployment is the number of unemployed 
multiplied by average wage per month times 12 months, minus the 
amount distributed as unemployment compensation. Accounting for the 
disservice items of human injuries from automobile accidents and 
unemployment are new extensions to the prevailing template. 
Technical advances of the Dutch ISEW (1) over the US ISEW (2) 



























 e = {åGedE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresineducation}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=DutchISEW(1)C={b,c,o,r,ae,as,aw,ax}
 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 c = {åGFK|Servicesfromdurablefixedpubliccapital}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 r = {dšPheed/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofnaturalhabitats/areas}
 aw= {ăInvPFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(private)capital}
 ax = {ăInt|Netinternationalposition}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={p,w}
 p = {dšAuAcc|Disservicesofautomobileaccidentsandhumaninjuries}
 w = {dšUet|Disservicesofunemployment}
 
Figure 5.10 shows the authors have excluded eight variables from the 
primary template (typically, due to lack of data). But there are three 
advances (1 minor, 2 major innovations). 
The modified, excluded and new variables of the basic template in the 




  –ɁEK[Ener+Ozone+Land+Futur]    (5.9)
Services(å)







Uet = unemploymentbyopportunity costmethod (differencebetween averagewage rate and the
amountpaidoutinunemploymentcompensation)
NoiPoll = noisepollution
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Overall, the Dutch ISEW (1) is only a modest advance over the US ISEW 
(2) template, but at least two major innovations were put forward. 
5.3.5 Swedish ISEW – Jackson and Stymne (1996) 
In their Swedish ISEW, Tim Jackson and Susanna Stymne (1996) make 
only four advances over the basic template, albeit there is one significant 
enhancement (yet without having an overall theory). They have used 
‘consumption’ rather than production as the basis of cost estimation for 
ozone damage because Sweden is an ‘importing’ country (Jackson and 
Stymne 1996:32). In the other three cases, the advances have already 
been primed in earlier efforts—Scottish ISEW and the UK ISEW (1). The 
four technical advances of the Swedish ISEW over the US ISEW (2) 















 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 aw= {ăInvPBFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(privateandbusiness)capital}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=SwedishISEWC={c,ae}
 c = {åGFK|Servicesfromdurablefixedpubliccapital}




The four key items modified in Figure 5.11 are ƒCDK, dšAirPoll, ɷOzoneEK, 
and żInvPBFK. There were no new extensions of the benefit or cost items. 
In brief, the authors of the Swedish ISEW made four contributions (3 
minor, 1 major). 
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design, the Swedish ISEW does not alter the basic template, as shown in 
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Services(å)
PCE/ID*100= personalconsumptionexpendituresdividedbytheindexofdistributioninequality(Gini)
CDK = the stock of consumer durables (varying the annual flow of the service value with eleven
differentcategoriesofconsumerdurables)
GheedE = nonǦdefensive public expenditures on health and further (universities and adult) education
(about50%forboth)
Hht = domestic household labour excluding “recreational” shopping, gardening, travelling to the
shops,andcaringfortheelderlyandsickrelatives(timeǦvaryingshadowwagerate—equivalent
tothatofhomehelporhemsamarit)





PAuAcc/ = auto accidents (private defensive expenditures on vehicle damage excluding hospital care,
humanecostsandproductionlosses)
PCmt = privatecommuting (theaveragecostperkm*thenumberofcommutingkilometres fromcars
andpublictransport)
Pheed/ = defensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays(50%)













Although the weakness of the Swedish ISEW is a lack of major technical 
advances, regarding Eq. (5.10) there are some areas of interest. For 
instance, defensive expenditures on private health and education outlays 
are relatively insignificant for Sweden because much of the expenditure 
on both health and education is borne by the government, i.e. the public 
sector (Jackson and Stymne 1996:21). In addition, they exclude health 
and production costs from their estimates of air and water pollution 
because of the issues of ‘double counting’—on the basis that at least 
some account of this is taken in the treatment of health expenditures in 
the index.180 Overall, except with one major improvement in technique in 
the existing template, the Swedish ISEW is a copy of the US ISEW (2) 
blueprint. 

180 The authors argue that it would have been better to use ambient air quality levels (flow level), 
rather than emissions levels for the category of air pollution.  

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5.3.6 Austrian ISEW – Stockhammer et al. (1997) 
Stockhammer et al. (1997:22), authors of the Austrian ISEW, provide 
some good theory, showing that that the concept of ISEW involves three 
steps: (1) possible consumption base, (2) subtraction items (leading to a 
raw-ISEW), and (3) distribution. The possible consumption base (step 1) 
measures what could be consumed given the actual extent of production. 
The latter two items (steps 2, 3) make assertions about actual economic 
welfare, such as accounting for defensive (and potentially defensive) 
environmental and social expenditures. Defensive expenditures have 
actually occurred and are classed as not ‘welfare-bearing’ due to a 
systematic bias in the economic social system (e.g. needed to repair 
damages caused by the economic system itself). Potential defensive 
expenditures are the monetary costs that would have occurred if society 
had reacted to environmental devaluation in the same way (concerning 
one ‘unit of pollution’) as it reacts today (Stockhammer et al. 1997:23). In 
other words, they account for the costs incurred to society/ecology even if 
no actual market-based payments on protection goods have occurred, 
e.g. for the air and urban water pollution items.181 Identifying potential 
defensive expenditures is a major innovation in the Austrian ISEW. 
The authors aim for a ‘new’ level of consistency, which involves three 
specific requirements. Requirement 1(RI): a clear distinction between 
stocks and flows. Requirement 2(RII): only something counted positively 
in the first place can be subtracted afterwards. Requirement 3(RIII): all 
subtraction items within one field should be methodically calculated in 
an analogous way. The authors argue that it is unreasonable to subtract 
full defensive costs from a weighted private consumption (RII). 
“Theoretically, each item should be weighted with an index indicating its 
specific distributional effects” (Stockhammer et al. 1997:25). As a rule, 
for the defensive social and environmental expenditures and the 
distribution of welfare, the authors work out the changes relative to the 
initial (base) year. Thus, for example, a more equal distribution 
contributes positively to economic welfare. When they exceed the level 
given by the base year, they are subtracted.182 
The following adjustments are taken into account. Their raw-ISEW for 
Austria is divided by the index of distributional inequality in work and 
income. “Distribution is an integral part of welfare itself. As we generally 
reject methodological individualism, we regard welfare as a social 
phenomenon. It is only possible to speak of social welfare if society as a 
whole can take part in this welfare” (Stockhammer et al. 1997:30).183 By 
rejecting methodological individualism, the whole (society) is more than 

181 Potential defensive expenditures were examined in Section 4.4.7, Chapter 4. 
182 “The comparison to the initial year does not necessarily imply that the value of that year was 
sustainable, but that a further increase in the amount of that item is not contributing to economic 
welfare” (Stockhammer et al. 1997:27). 
183 The individual and society are inextricably linked, as argued by John B. Davis (2003). 
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the sum of its parts (individuals).184 To some degree, this can be seen in 
their index. They consider the distribution of income and work: the 
distribution of goods representing the material substance of economic 
welfare and the distribution of the effort necessary to produce these 
goods. Only changes in the distribution relative to the initial year are 
considered. This avoids judgements on the optimal distribution of 
income and work. Thus, the assumption implied is that a more equal 
distribution contributes positively to economic welfare. Adjusting income 
and work distribution to the raw-ISEW is a major innovation by 
Stockhammer et al. (1997). 
The authors regard welfare as a social phenomenon. Thus, 
community, automobile accidents, urbanisation and health defensive 
expenditures are no longer a ‘private’ or individual phenomenon they are 
social aspects.185 For instance, the individual no longer has a choice 
about whether to commute or not, for she or he cannot change the 
surrounding conditions. Their inclusions of social costs are significant. 
Yet the social defensive expenditures on auto accidents, commuting and 
health outlays are just minor refinements to the basic template because 
the techniques are no different to US ISEW (2). All of ‘public 
consumption’ is included in their Austrian ISEW. They argue that it is 
only possible to speak of social welfare if society as a whole can take part 
in this welfare. There is no a priori reason why public consumption (i.e. 
mostly services offered by the state) should be more or less welfare-
bearing than private consumption. 100 percent of public expenditures are 
considered non-defensive. This is a major advance, as Daly and Cobb 
(1989, 1994) did not add public consumption premised on social welfare. 
To be consistent with RI, net capital growth is multiplied by capital 
productivity since the item’s aim is to indicate future consumption, not 
growth in assets, as: żœPFK*OPFK = ѐƍ*żPFK– ƍ%ѐLaborForce*ƍżPFK(t-1). In 
other words, this variable is converted from the stock concept into a 
‘flow’. The net capital growth item in the Austrian ISEW is slightly 
modified, hence a minor improvement. Lastly, a proportion of advertising 
expenditure and depletion of minerals were deemed appropriate 
‘subtraction items’. These are minor advances for the reason that they 
were chosen by Zolotas (1981) and Cobb (1989) beforehand, albeit they 
are, of course, extensions to the basic template of Cobb (1994). 
The technical advances of the Austrian ISEW over the US ISEW (2) 




184 But whether the composite monetary indicator can assimilate such a theoretical position is 
another matter, discussed in Chapter 6.
185 The authors realise the theoretical validity of counting the disamenities of urbanisation, yet it 

























 o = {dšAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(socialdefensiveexpenditures)}
 q = {dšCmt|Disservicesofcommuting(sociallevel)}
 r = {dšhe/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhealthoutlays(sociallevel)}
 ag = {dšAirPoll/|Disservicesofairpollution(potentialdefensivecosts)}
 ah = {dšWatPoll/|Disservicesofurbanwaterpollution(potentialdefensivecosts)}
 aw= {ăInvPFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(private)capital}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=AustrianISEWC={e}
 e = {åGheedE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresinhealthandeducation}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={d}
 d = {åGE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpenditures}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={t,ak}
 t = {dšAd|Disservicesofadvertising}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 
In Figure 5.12 above, there are seven key modifications to the existing 
template. Non-defensive public expenditures in health and education 
(ƒGheedE) were excluded; they were replaced by services of non-
defensive public expenditures (ƒGE). And, there are ‘new’ cost items, the 
disservices of advertising and accounting for the depletion of mineral 
resources. Overall, there are ten contributions (6 minor, 4 major). 
Because there are seven modifications to the existing template, the 
structure of the Austrian ISEW does not drastically change, except that 
the cost/benefit items are adjusted by the distribution index, as shown in 
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NoiPoll = noise pollution (avoidance costs, utilising the number of people burdened strongly or very
stronglybynoise*thecostsfornoiseprotectionwindows(e.g.doubleǦglazing))
AirPoll/ = airpollution (potentialdefensivecostsaccording to theemissionsofpollutants, therebySO2,
NOx,particles,VOCs,COwereweightedtothethresholdlevelsofAustriansmogalarmplans)





NatHab = wetlands (price stemming from the political process used in negotiations between the land
(localgovernment)andtheelectricitycompany)




DI*100 = distribution index(adjustment)(the incomedifferencesbetweenworkersandemployers,men
andwomen,andaverageincomeandweightedbytheshareofthegroupconcerned)
 
In the main, there are some very good technical refinements of the 
Austrian ISEW over the basic template, largely due to the superior 
conceptual foothold that Stockhammer et al. (1997) developed. 
5.3.7 Italian ISEW – Guenno and Tiezzi (1998) 
Guenno and Tiezzi (1998), authors of the Italian ISEW, make several 
improvements over the US ISEW (2), albeit there is no theoretical basis 
(they even allude to this on p. 11). For the private commuting item 
(PCmt), they incorporate the maintenance and indirect costs of 
private/public transportation services. A few additional air pollutants 
(CO2, TSP) are taken into consideration for the ‘disservices of air 
pollution’ item (dšAirPoll). And they subtract the disservices caused by 
the disamenities of urbanization (private level) (dšPUrban). These three 
items are only minor contributions. Nevertheless, when accounting for 
the depletion of mineral resources (ɷMineEK) the authors of the Italian 
ISEW achieve a significant advance. Manganese, magnesium, 
aluminium, copper, lead, zinc, sulphur, rock, pyrites, and rock salt are 
measured by user costs. So a more comprehensive account of the stock 
of mineral resources is a major innovation. The technical advances of the 
Italian ISEW over the US ISEW (2) are illustrated in Figure 5.13 below: 
 

186 There is a slight inconsistency in their description of the net capital investment item. We 
assume that the “change in net capital stock” is equivalent to their meaning of “net capital growth” 
























 q = {dšPCmt|Disservicesofprivatecommuting}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=ItalianISEWC={ae}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={n,ak}
 n = {dšPUrban|Disservicesofthedisamenitiesofurbanization(privatelevel)}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 
Figure 5.13 shows that there are two key modifications to the existing 
template and two ‘new’ extensions of the cost items. The ‘d!PPoll’ 
parameter, i.e. the defensive expenditures on household pollution 
abatement, is the only item omitted. Overall, there are four contributions 
(3 minor, 1 major). 
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Futur = longǦterm (future)environmentaldamage (linked toenergyuse, suchaswood, coal,natural
gas,crudeoil,nuclearandelectricenergy)
 
Overall, despite the good development of the minerals component, the 
authors of the Italian ISEW in Eq. (5.12) imitate the US ISEW (2) 
template liberally. 
5.3.8 Chilean ISEW – Castañeda (1999) 
Castañeda (1999), author of the Chilean ISEW, has no theory but 
nonetheless extends the basic template to include two ‘new’ variables: 1) 
criminal costs and 2) depletion of renewable resources. While these are 
fresh items over the template design, they were already considered in the 
US Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) by Cobb et al. (1995). Therefore, to 
avoid double counting, both of these items in the Chilean study are 
counted as minor contributions. The author excluded five items. Four 
items were omitted because of lack of data: cost of noise pollution; loss 
of wetlands; cost of ozone depletion; and changes in net international 
position. The defensive expenditures on household pollution abatement 
were left out too. The author argues that this item has a small impact on 
the overall index and thus believes it should be excluded. The technical 

















 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 af = {dšNoiPoll|Disservicesofnoisepollution}
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 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofwetlands}
 ax = {ăInt|Netinternationalposition}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={s,ar}
 s = {dšPCr/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresoncrimeprevention(privatelevel)}
 ar = {ɁForestEK|Lossofnativeforests}
 
In short, there are two innovations (2 minor, 0 major) in the Chilean 
ISEW, as shown above in Figure 5.14. 
The identity of the Chilean ISEW incorporating the two ‘new’ 
variables, disservices of defensive expenditures on crime prevention 
(private level) (dšPCr) and loss of native forests (ɷForestEK), is shown 



























In Eq. (5.13), the methodology used to calculate the health costs for air 
pollution (associated with increases in PM10) and water pollution 
(imputed cases of Typhus fever) involves some likely double calculation 
for costs already deducted in private expenditures for healthcare. Yet, 
according to the author, this method still underestimates true cost, i.e. 
the damage to crops due to acid rain and corrosion is not included in the 
calculation. In general, the Chilean ISEW’s technical contribution to the 
literature is insubstantial: the author replicates most of the items in the 













5.3.9 Polish ISEWs – Gil and Sleszynski (2003), Prochowicz and 
Sleszynski (2006) 
There are two ISEWs calculated for Poland, the first by Gil and Sleszynski 
(2003), the second by Prochowicz and Sleszynski (2006). Even though 
the two studies concern different periods, both Polish ISEWs are 
considered together because the authors undertake identical 
adjustments. There are some elements of theory but the authors mainly 
borrow concepts from earlier analyses. Two minor advances are 
computed for their Polish ISEWs. In essence, they copy the adjustments 
made by Stockhammer et al. (1997) as discussed in Section 5.3.6 above, 
albeit the analysis of social versus individual welfare is overlooked. They 
integrate a deduction of mineral resources and adjust the raw value by a 
distribution index. Also, a couple of items were excluded. The disservices 
of defensive expenditures on household pollution abatement do not 
contribute to the Polish ISEW value a great deal, so according to the 
authors this item is omitted. The loss of wetlands was excluded because 
it is not important in the Polish context. 
The relatively negligible technical advances of the Polish ISEWs over 















 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=PolishISEWsC={ae,as}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofwetlands}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={ak}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 
As portrayed in Figure 5.15 above, the two minor contributions 
attributable to the Polish ISEWs are the ‘ɷMineEK’ and ‘DI’ variables. 
The Polish ISEWs are thus marginally different to the stencil set out 
by Cobb (1994), even when the raw-ISEW is adjusted by the Gini 
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The conclusion is obvious: the Polish ISEWs are virtual replications of the 
basic US ISEW (2) template. 
5.3.10 Thai ISEW – Clarke and Islam (2004, 2005a), Clarke 
(2006b) 
The Thai ISEW is a fascinating and innovatory study. The authors provide 
good examples of the market and social choice perspectives vis-à-vis the 
various subsystems in Chapter 4 of Economic Growth and Social Welfare 
(see Clarke and Islam 2004). Thankfully, the authors go to a great length 
at trying to put forward a theoretical foundation for their ISEW, a ‘social 
welfare function’ ingrained in a systems analysis.187 In the political 
subsystem, for example, corruption places wealth into the control of a 
limited number. Thus, even though a few individuals may benefit, at a 
social level, corruption misrepresents the market distribution of goods 
and services away from the poor in support of the powerful. In addition, 
paying off soaring levels of non-productive debt with public funds can 
lead to grave social accountability problems. For the ‘spiritual’ 
subsystem, because of exploitation, near slave conditions, violence and 

187 This theory is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 and then critiqued in Section 3.5. 
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the involvement of children and other vulnerable people, the economic 
value of commercial sex work is subtracted from their ISEW. The proper 
social cost of commercial sex work is not directly captured within market 
preferences. However, the social costs of commercial sex work are real in 
terms of justice, poverty, and intergenerational equity. Accounting for the 
disservices of public corruption (dšGCor), public debt (GDebtE), and 
commercial sex work (dšBSexW) are major contributions to the literature. 
Social choice theory has implications for other items in the Thai 
ISEW. The authors interpret the disservices of the disamenities of 
urbanisation and commuting as socio-environmental problems (as 
distinct to merely considering the private costs). Yet, the social and 
environmental costs of urbanisation and commuting are just minor 
advances to the basic template because the techniques are no different to 
US ISEW (2). An important—albeit small improvement—is the inclusion 
of 75 percent of public expenditures in health and education as non-
defensive. Only some of the additional public spending is for defensive 
purposes (25%), rather than assuming 50% of health and education 
expenditures as in the template. This ensures the higher importance of 
education in enhancing ‘social or human capital’ in developing countries, 
albeit this does not account for the change in the stock of human/social 
capitals per se. Seventy-five percent of medical expenditure was added as 
a benefit of economic growth because one of the major benefits is the 
increase in life expectancy within Thailand, which has increased ten years 
from 60 to 70 between 1975 and 1999 (Clarke and Islam 2005). 
In the Thai study, counting deforestation and an Atkinson distribution 
index are not significant innovations because these have been previously 
included in other studies (e.g. the Australian GPI 1b and UK ISEW 2). 
Forest depletion and utilising a different inequality index are rated as 
minor contributions. The authors of the Thai ISEW have implemented a 
better way of dealing with two of the environmental items, long-term 
environmental damage (ɷFuturEK) and air pollution (dšAirPoll). In 
addition to costs associated with carbon emissions of fuel consumption, 
their ‘ɷFuturEK’ item includes the costs of lost CO2 absorption from 
forests and increased methane emissions from wet rice farming. Their 
‘dšAirPoll’ item integrates a wider range of emissions than the basic 
template, i.e. SOx, NOx, CO, CO2 and SPM from major polluting sectors. 
These adjustments are thus minor refinements because they have been 
done before in some former studies. 
The technical advances of the Thai ISEW over the US ISEW (2) are 






























 q = {dšCmt|Disservicesofcommuting(socialcosts)}
 r = {dšPheed/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 au = {ɁFuturEK|LongǦterm(future)environmentaldamage}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=ThaiISEWC={f,o,ae,ak,al,ao,as,at,aw,ax}
 f = {åHht|Servicesofhouseholdlabour}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 al = {ɁEnerEK|Depletionofenergyresources}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofnaturalhabitats/areas}
 at = {ɁLandEK|Lossofagriculturalland}
 aw= {ăInvPFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(private)capital}
 ax = {ăInt|Netinternationalposition}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={m,n,aa,ab,ar}
 m = {GDebtE|Publicdebtexpenditures}
 n = {dšUrban|Disservicesofthedisamenitiesofurbanization}
 aa = {dšBSexW|Disservicesofcommercialsexwork}
 ab = {dšGCor|Disservicesofpubliccorruption}
 ar = {ɁForestEK|Lossofnativeforests}
 
Ten items of the original template have been excluded in the Thai ISEW, 
as shown in Figure 5.16 above. There are absolutely no reasons specified 
by the authors for their omission. Nonetheless, ten contributions (7 
minor, 3 major) are prevalent in the Thai ISEW. 
The Thai ISEW is a relatively good advance over the US ISEW (2) 
template, especially with the development of new context-specific 
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AirPoll = air pollution of SOx, NOx, CO, CO2, suspended particulate matters (SPM) from five main
pollutingsectors, transportation,electricity, industry,household,andcommercialsectorsand
others(pollutionabatement)
WatPoll = urban water pollution visǦàǦvis Biological Oxygen Demand (costs of cleaning water, i.e.




Futur = longǦterm (future)environmentaldamage (cost linkedto lossofCO2absorption from forests,
methaneemissionsfromwetricefarming,andthecarbonemissionsfromfuelconsumption)
 
Overall, the authors of the Thai ISEW have made some vital 
contributions to the literature. 
5.3.11 Sienan (Italy) ISEW – Pulselli et al. (2006) 
Pulselli et al. (2006), authors of the Sienan ISEW, make a couple of small 
advances over the US ISEW (2), albeit without an overall theory. In a 
similar fashion to the Italian ISEW, they incorporate the maintenance and 
indirect costs of private/public transportation services for the private 
commuting item (PCmt). Likewise, a few additional air pollutants (CO2, 
TSP) are taken into consideration for the ‘disservices of air pollution’ 
item (dšAirPoll). Specifically for the Sienan ISEW, the services of durable 
fixed public capital (GFK) are applied to the context of a local urban 
environment. The sum of the value of services of the road system and the 
value of current public expenses in urban development, water 
distribution, and urban health are calculated. These three items are not 
substantial modifications (minor contributions) to the basic template. 
However, when accounting for the depletion of mineral resources 
(ɷMineEK) Pulselli et al. (2006) make good progress. They measure the 
depletion of the sand, clay, gravel, limestone, marble, travertine minerals 
by user costs. A detailed account of the stock of mineral resources of the 
local environs is a major innovation. More advances could have been 
achieved, but for various reasons it was not feasible. The authors had to 
omit the advertising and urbanisation cost items due to data problems. 
In the Province of Siena, noise pollution and ozone layer depletion are 











The technical advances of the Sienan ISEW over the US ISEW (2) are 















 c = {åGFK|Servicesfromdurablefixedpubliccapital}
 q = {dšPCmt|Disservicesofprivatecommuting}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=SienanISEWC={ae,af,al,ao,ax}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 af = {dšNoiPoll|Disservicesofnoisepollution}
 al = {ɁEnerEK|Depletionofenergyresources}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 ax = {ăInt|Netinternationalposition}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={ak}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 
Figure 5.17 shows there are three key modifications to the existing 
template and one ‘new’ extension of the cost items. Five parameters were 
omitted. Overall, there are four contributions (3 minor, 1 major). 




  –ɁEK[Mine–NatHab+Land+Futur]    (5.17)
Services(å)
PCE/(1+DI)= personalconsumptionexpendituresdividedbytheincomedistributioninequalityindex(Gini)
CDK = the stockof consumerdurables (annual flowof services fromhouses,householdappliances,
personalcomputers,mobilephones,cars)
GFK = durablefixedpubliccapital(sumofthevalueofservicesoftheroadsystem(equaltothecostof
theirmaintenance) and the value of current public expenses in urban development, water
distribution,andurbanhealth)
GheedE = nonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresinhealth(50%)andeducation(100%)
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Futur = longǦterm (future)environmentaldamage (linked toenergyuseofpetrol,diesel fuel, fueloil,
methaneandelectricityconsumption)
 
In Eq. (5.17), the wetlands component, ‘ɷNatHabEK’, appreciated in 
1999; there was an increase in wetlands in the Province of Siena because 
local authorities had implemented a project to refill part of the 
Montepulciano Lake basin. Overall, despite the good development of the 
minerals component, the authors of the Sienan ISEW duplicate the US 
ISEW (2) template. 
5.3.12 Yorkshire and Humber, Northern Way, UK ISEWs – Jackson 
et al. (2006) 
The regional (UK) ISEWs by Jackson et al. (2006) have made two major 
contributions, despite not having a theory. Long-term (future) 
environmental damage is calculated in an original way: by using a 
‘damage function’ of CO2, methane and NOx emissions to plan annual 
payments into a climate change insurance/endowment fund. This 
ensures that enough money was available to cover the costs when they 
become due in 2050. More importantly, they attempt to work out the net 
effect of the global warming problem (from a localised perspective). They 
calculate the positive contributions from carbon sequestrations and the 
negatives of greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, it is assumed that an 
increase in the annual carbon sequestration (CO2 equivalent saved) by 
various programmes results in a decrease of carbon in the atmosphere. 
Consideration of these issues is a major step forward over the existing 
ISEW template and over the prevailing empirical studies; it is a new 
variable. 
Furthermore, nine minor advances are present in this study. The 
majority of them have simply been transposed from prior studies of the 
GPI, e.g. costs of family breakdown and automobile accidents (including 
human injuries), benefits of volunteer labour, Atkinson index adjustment, 
and net investment of durable fixed (business) capital. Their air and 
water pollution items are more inclusive than the basic indicator design. 
A variety of air pollutants are used: SOx, NOx, PM-10s, VOCs, CO, plus 
(at national level only), lead, benzene, 1,3-butadeine. For calculating the 
costs of urban water pollution by measuring ‘potential defensive costs’, 













the river up to the target standard are used. Lastly, in the UK regional 
ISEWs of Yorkshire and Humber, and the Northern Way, all expenditure 
on health and tertiary education is considered a non-defensive benefit. In 
their model, defensive expenditures on health are subtracted elsewhere 
in the index, for instance by counting the health costs of crime, car 
accidents and atmospheric pollution. 
Because they adapt various elements from earlier studies, the bulk of 
the technical advances of the regional UK ISEWs over the US ISEW (2) 















 e = {åGheedE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresinhealthandeducation}
 s = {dšPBCr/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresoncrimeprevention(private+businesslevel)}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 ah = {dšWatPoll|Disservicesofurbanwaterpollution}
 au = {ɁFuturEK|LongǦterm(future)environmentaldamage}
 aw= {ăInvBFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(business)capital}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=RegionalUKISEWsC={c,o,r,ao}
 c = {åGFK|Servicesfromdurablefixedpubliccapital}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 r = {dšPheed/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={h,k}
 h = {åVolt|Servicesofvolunteerlabour}
 k = {åCSeq|Servicesofcarbonsequestrations}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={p,u}
 p = {dšAuAcc|Disservicesofautomobileaccidentsandhumaninjuries}
 u = {dšFamBr|Disservicesoffamilybreakdown}
 
In the figure above, four items were excluded; one of the omitted items is 
worthy of comment. Even though existing concentrations of CFCs 
continue to do harm, CFC emissions have almost completely ceased 
from developed countries (and thus immune from policy). Because of 
this, the authors exclude the costs of ozone depletion from their regional 
UK ISEWs. In total, there are eleven contributions (9 minor, 2 major) 
attributable to the study by Jackson et al. (2006). 
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basic template design of the GPI except for counting the benefits of 


















PCmt = privatecommuting (proportionof traveldue tocommutingvia threemain typesof transport











expenditures, such as the existing cleanǦup costs associated with the control of liquid











Obviously, the family breakdown item (FamBr) in Eq. (5.18) is limited to 
measuring the real impact of familial and social dislocation. Simply, the 
authors use the direct monetary costs of divorce. “But the true costs also 
include the emotional impact on divorcees and their families, greater 
pressure on housing stock and thus rising prices, “unnecessary” 
consumption (a married couple only need one kettle but a divorced 
couple need two), as well as the arguable and almost certainly 
unquantifiable effects on social cohesion in general” (Jackson et al. 
2006:40). Only some aspects are covered by other components of the 
ISEW: for instance, lost output will be reflected in lower consumer 













extremely multi-faceted. Nonetheless, the regional UK ISEWs by Jackson 
et al. (2006) are reasonably good contributions vis-à-vis technical aspects 
of net income indicators. 
5.3.13 Belgian ISEWs – Bleys (2006a, 2006b); (2008) 
Brent Bleys (2006a, 2006b, 2008) is the author of the ISEWs for Belgium 
who broadly follows Lawn’s (2003) theory of ‘net psychic income’. The 
‘traditional’ Belgian ISEW (1) is discussed followed by the ‘revised’ 
Belgian ISEW (2). In the Bleys (2006a, 2006b) study, only four minor 
improvements to the Belgian ISEW (1) are made over the existing 
template design. When adjusting personal consumption expenditures 
divided by the index of distribution (DI), an Atkinson index is utilised as a 
replacement for the low-quintile index. For the ‘net investment of durable 
fixed capital’ item (żInvPGFK), both private and government capital are 
included. A few additional air pollutants (CO, NVMOS) are taken into 
consideration for the ‘disservices of air pollution’ item (dšAirPoll). 
Similarly, a few supplementary ozone-depleting compounds (CFCs-
113,114,115) in addition to CFCs-11,12 are taken into consideration for 
the ‘ɷOzoneEK’ item. In short, the author has achieved four minor 
advances. 
These four technical advances of the Belgian ISEW (1) over the US 















 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 aw= {ăInvPGFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(privateandgovernment)capital}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=BelgianISEW(1)C={c,as}
 c = {åGFK|Servicesofdurablefixedpubliccapital}
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were prepared. Two items were excluded, ‘ƒGFK’, the services of durable 
fixed public capital and ‘ɷNatHabEK’, the loss of natural habitats/areas. 
Lack of good data prevented the measurement of the first item, and 
accounting for wetland loss was not applicable for Belgium. In general, 
there are four contributions (4 minor, 0 major). 
Hence, the Belgian ISEW (1) is practically the same as the measure 




  –ɁEK[Ener+Ozone+Land+Futur]    (5.19)
Services(å)
PCE*(1ǦDI)= personalconsumptionexpendituresdividedbytheindexofdistributioninequality(Atkinson)
CDK = the stock of consumer durables (annual flow of 12.5% from household appliances, private
vehiclesanddurablerecreationalgoods)
GheedE = nonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresinhealth(50%)andeducation(100%)
Hht = household labour (all time spent on homework, maintenance, shopping, purchase, use of
services,childcareandtransport)(averagewagerateofdomesticworkersviahistorical(timeǦ
varying)shadowwageratesofcleaningpersonnel)









PPoll/ = defensive expenditures onhouseholdpollution abatement in relation to the average cost to
households of processing 1000 tons of waste (the purchase of garbage bags, taxes on










Futur = longǦterm (future) environmental damage linked to greenhouse gas emissions (discounted
marginalsocialcosts)
 
There are no major advances to the existing template design in Eq. (5.19) 
above. As an isolated study, the Belgian ISEW (1) is a rather weak 
contribution to the literature considering that twelve years have passed 
since the US ISEW (2). 
However, Bleys’ (2008) intention was to compare and contrast the 
results of this “traditional” Belgian ISEW (1) with a “revised” one, the 
Belgian ISEW (2). The author has updated the valuation methods of four 
items. In terms of the relative degree of literature contribution, there are 
two minor and two major advances. Belgium is a country with a large 

307
public sector. For that reason, the author allows for a more generous 
provision of the services of non-defensive public expenditures. The ‘ƒGE’ 
item now becomes a part of the Belgian ISEW (2) study. Even though this 
is an addition to the existing template, it is not an original contribution 
because this type of adjustment has been previously included in the 
Austrian ISEW by Stockhammer et al. (1997) and in the Australian GPI 
(1b) by Hamilton and Denniss (2000) (discussed later in Section 5.4). For 
the ‘depletion of energy resources’ item, the author has omitted the 
escalation factor, arguing that more research is needed in order to 
estimate the current and future costs of a large-scale transition towards a 
renewable energy system. This is not a fresh adjustment to the basic 
ISEW construction since Neumayer (2000) already tackled this issue in 
his critique. Hence, the methodological change to the ‘ɷEnerEK’ is also a 
minor advance. 
The most important valuation changes relate to the ‘ɷOzoneEK’ and 
‘ɷFuturEK’ items. He argues against Cobb and Cobb’s (1994) method of 
cumulating the costs of ozone layer depletion and climate change. The 
US ISEW (2) uses the cumulation of emission flows to value the costs 
associated with these environmental issues. This can be a problematic 
assumption because these problems are caused by a stock of pollutants 
in the atmosphere (Bleys 2008:747). The correct interpretation is to 
account for the atmospheric lifetimes of these pollutants, since in the US 
ISEW (2) the costs of the related environmental problems are assumed 
non-decreasing. Yet the evidence suggests that the measures taken in the 
1987 Montreal Protocol have effectively reduced emission of ozone 
depleting substances to almost zero (see Brennan 2004:262). He utilises 
data on historical emission rates of the different pollutants and estimates 
of the marginal social costs attributed to the stock of CFCs and CO2. This 
revised methodology of tracking the depletion of ecological capital costs 
in the items of ‘ɷOzoneEK’ and ‘ɷFuturEK’ are major advances. 
Also, two items within the methodology of the ISEW have been 
omitted: the ‘net capital growth’ item, żInvBFK, and the ‘changes in the 
net international investment position’ item, żInt. The author, who follows 
Lawn’s interpretation of Fisher, considers that the annual changes in the 
stock of the ‘net international investment position’ are inappropriate 
because ‘żInt’ is a measure of capital (the stock of wealth), not income. 
The problem of the ‘net capital growth’ item, according to Bleys 
(2008:746), is that changes in the stock of natural capital are not 
considered within the index, whereas changes in the stock of human-
made capital are included. So he argues that separating capital stocks 
and flows of services is important to be consistent with Fisherian 
income. While these are interesting proposals, certainly worthy of further 
debate, with respect to our rating system, excluding items from the basic 












Hence, there are four technical advances in the Belgian ISEW (2) over 















 al = {ɁEnerEK|Depletionofenergyresources}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 au = {ɁFuturEK|LongǦterm(future)environmentaldamage}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=BelgianISEW(2)C={c,as,aw,ax}
 c = {åGFK|Servicesofdurablefixedpubliccapital}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofnaturalhabitats/areas}
 aw= {ăInvPGFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(privateandgovernment)capital}
 ax = {ăInt|Netinternationalposition}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={d}
 d = {åGE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpenditures}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={Ø}
 
Evident in the figure above, there is one extension to the benefit items. 
And several items were excluded for the same reasons given in the 
Belgian ISEW (1). In general, there are four contributions (2 major, 2 
minor) in the revised study. 
Hence, the Belgian ISEW (2) looks much the same as the measure 




  –ɁEK[Ener+Ozone+Land+Futur]    (5.20)
Services(å)
PCE*(1ǦDI)= personal consumptionexpendituresdividedby the indexofdistribution inequality (Atkinson,
basedonaftertaxpercapitaincomedata(deciles)






























The dashed circle delineating

























A key point is that he omits the ‘net capital growth’ item for two reasons: 
1) it does not comply with the theoretical underpinning of Fisherian 
income; 2) it is more policy relevant to monitor stocks outside the ISEW, 
suggesting that supplementary ‘stock accounts’ “can provide information 
about the durability of the current level of economic welfare” (Bleys 
2008:750). Excluding the so-called ‘stock variables’ seems to be, on the 
surface, a reasonably good advance in the literature and it shows that he 
understands some of the limitations of ISEW. But, we argue in Chapter 6 
that this suggestion may be theoretically unsound under Fisher’s 
framework because the stocks of human capital are inextricably linked to 
net psychic income (welfare) attainment. Besides, Bleys’ (2008) other 
solutions simply involve tinkering with the remaining ISEW components 
in order to fit the alleged theoretical foundation of Fisherian income. 
Overall, the combined result for the Belgian ISEWs is that there have 
been 6 minor and 2 major contributions. But how innovatory is this? 
Interestingly the author notes, “the focus in recent years has been on the 
compilation of the index in more countries and on a rebranding of the 
index in order to gain a broader acceptance among policymakers” (Bleys 
2008:746). Are the studies into the Belgian ISEWs immune to this (self-) 
criticism?188 If we employed a stricter and much less sympathetic rating 
system, we would have arrived at a different conclusion because no true 
innovations were carried out—i.e. the creation of new variables that have 
yet to be incorporated in a study. However, the main point of this chapter 
is to portray the SEWIs in their best possible light through a holistic and 
sensitive scrutiny of the technical contributions. 
 

188 As he said in the first study, “[b]uilding on the many international efforts to measure sustainable 
economic welfare, I have developed an analogous methodological framework for the calculation of 













5.3.14 Dutch ISEW (2) – Bleys (2007a, 2007b) 
The author above also constructs the Dutch ISEW (2). Bleys (2007a, 
2007b) transposes the technical advances made over the US ISEW (2) 
from his Belgian ISEW (1) study to his study of the Netherlands. The 
same minor advances relate to the following variables: distribution index 
(DI); net investment of durable fixed private and government capital 
(żInvPGFK); disservices of air pollution (dšAirPoll); and depletion of 
ozone (ɷOzoneEK). In other words, the author of the Dutch ISEW (2) 
undertakes the same key modifications to the existing template items as 
he did for his Belgian ISEW (1) study. But more items belonging to the 
basic template were omitted. This is because the author wants to 
construct a so-called Simplified Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare 
(SISEW).189 
In short, the author has achieved four minor contributions relative to 
the basic template. The four technical advances of the Dutch ISEW (2) 















 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 aw= {ăInvPGFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(privateandgovernment)capital}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=DutchISEW(2)C={b,c,l,o,ae,af,as,at}
 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 c = {åGFK|Servicesfromdurablefixedpubliccapital}
 l = {CDE|Consumerdurableexpenditures}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 af = {dšNoiPoll|Disservicesofnoisepollution}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofnaturalhabitats/areas}




Evident in the figure above, no extensions of the benefit or cost items 
were made and eight parameters were excluded in SISEW. In general, 

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there are four contributions (4 minor, 0 major) to the Dutch SISEW. 
Naturally, the Dutch ISEW (2) is a more condensed version than the 





















Futur = longǦterm (future) environmental damage linked to greenhouse gas emissions (discounted
marginalsocialcosts)
 
Unfortunately, there are no major advances to the existing template 
design in Eq. (5.21) above. In terms of literary contribution, the Dutch 
ISEW (2) is insignificant. 
5.3.15 French ISEW – Nourry (2008) 
Myriam Nourry (2008) presents results from a time-series analysis of 
eight measures of development and/or sustainability for France. Two of 
the eight indicators devised are a French ISEW and GPI. It would be 
unfair to assess this paper subject to our relative degree of technical 
contribution rating system because the ISEW and GPI only take up a small 
part of her analysis (see Nourry 2008:446-8,453-4). But a few general 
comments are necessary. Firstly, the author seems to accept Lawn’s 
(2003) theoretical interpretation of the Fisherian concept of income but 
does not link in each variable to the framework. 
Secondly, with respect to her French ISEW, the author practically 
replicates the basic template of Cobb and Cobb (1994).190 That is, she 
includes all of the variables of the US ISEW (2) in Eq. (5.4), with the 
exception of the ‘disservices of auto accident’ item. Nourry (2008) places 
a monetary value on the human lives broken from automobile accidents 

190 Several items are excluded due to lack of data (e.g. the services from roads). The loss of natural 




(rather than valuing the private defensive expenditures on vehicle 
damage). She calculates the annual number of accidents that relate to 
the categories of ‘fatal accident’, ‘slight injury’ and ‘serious injury’. This 
appears to be a good innovation. But this has already been integrated in 
former studies of the GPI (as discussed below in Section 5.4). There are a 
few other small refinements to the basic US ISEW (2) template such as 
including the impact of certain other air emissions, such as volatile 
organic compounds and carbon monoxide. Again, these adjustments are 
not innovations in relation to the prevailing empirical material. Overall, 
the French ISEW study does not make a significant contribution to the 
literature on SEWIs. How much better is Nourry’s (2008) GPI study? 
Before finding out the answer, the technical specification of the US GPI 
(1) in comparison with the US ISEW (2) is required to put the study into 
a historical context. 
5.4 Evolutionary Advances of the GPI over the Template 
ISEW 
5.4.1 The US GPI – Cobb et al. (1995) 
The US Genuine Progress Indicator by Cobb et al. (1995) is a significant 
advance over its predecessor. There is no particular theory developed 
since, as it is argued in Chapter 4, it is based on the commonsensical 
accountancy procedure. However, a whole host of social and ecological 
changes to the original US ISEW (2) template were made. The GPI is an 
important attempt to socialise the ISEW, i.e. some salient issues affecting 
social life, negatively or positively, are included. The defensive 
expenditures on crime prevention at the private level and some of the 
destruction of familial capital are built into the GPI. For crime, the value 
of stolen property, damage losses, medical costs to victims of crime, and 
the amount spent on locks, safe deposit boxes, burglar alarms and other 
electronic security systems are subtracted from personal consumption 
expenditures. For family disservices, they use two proxies to measure the 
costs of family breakdown: (1) divorce and its effects on children, and (2) 
the amount of time families spend watching television. Accounting for 
both of these issues are true innovations (major contributions). 
In addition to the services of household work, the GPI authors 
attempt to measure the benefits of volunteer labour and parenting. 
Household labour is entitled, ‘household work and parenting’. In 
principle, alteration of the headline is significant because it includes the 
positive aspects of looking after children as well as undertaking tasks in 
the home (cleaning, food preparation, maintenance etc.). But it is only a 
minor enhancement since it is calculated in the same way as the 
‘household labour’ item in the US ISEWs. Yet the inclusion of volunteer 
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labour is a major innovation; it is a new extension of the basic template. 
Private observations and social commentary of daily life in 
Corporatized America suggest that since the 1980s people have been 
saying that they work ‘too hard’. They are spending too much time on the 
job, with less time available for leisure, family and chores. Free time is 
not traded in the market in the way that labour time is. Because leisure is 
invisible, Cobb et al. (1995:21) account for the loss of leisure. This is 
another major innovation over the ISEW. 
On the other hand, many people are forced to choose leisure when 
they would like to be fully employed. This is the problem of 
underemployment. Underemployment is a more inclusive notion than 
unemployment. It refers to persons who are either unemployed, 
involuntary part-time employed (would prefer full-time work but are 
unable to find it), discouraged (gave up looking for work), or constrained 
by other factors, such as lack of transportation or childcare. There are 
individual and social costs of underemployment. The individual costs of 
underemployment fall on discouraged workers and their families. 
Community and society are affected when limited work opportunities 
may lead to frustration, suicide, violence, crime, mental illness, or 
alcoholism and other substance abuse. But, the value of such secondary 
effects of changes in the economy (e.g. erosion of social cohesion) 
resulting from unemployment is not measured in the US GPIs.191 The US 
GPIs take a more conservative approach treating each hour of 
underemployment (“the number of unprovided hours for constrained 
workers”) as a cost, just as leisure is considered a benefit. An hour of 
leisure time is a desirable objective whereas an hour of 
underemployment is a burden. The inclusion of ‘underemployment’ is 
also a considerable innovation over the ISEW. 
Furthermore, accounting for the loss of native forests is a key 
ecological innovation over the basic US ISEW (2) template. Whenever 
forestland is cut for timber or to build a road, a range of ecological values 
is lost, at least until the forest is regenerated to the same age as the 
stand that has been cut. Even if successful forest management results in 
full restocking of the same species of timber, the original forest 
ecosystem may never be renewed. Replacing complex, old-growth forests 
with monoculture tree farms creates a distorted view that a net growing 
stock can be easily managed. Yet the forests or tree farms that have 
replaced old-growth forests are not biologically equivalent. Tree farms are 
productive and profitable, at least for one or two rotations of the timber 
stock; but they do not support the range of wildlife and soil enrichment 
that can be found in old-growth forests. Forest management that focuses 

191 The US GPIs also do not deal with the effects of short-term and cyclical unemployment. 
Although such hardships are not without social consequences and costs, in the US, much of the 













chiefly on the ‘timber capital’ may preclude the species complexity and 
thus the ecosystem services of the original forest. 
Cobb et al. (1995) focus on two distinct, though interrelated, types of 
costs associated with road building and timber harvesting. One is 
resource loss: the reduction for timber that can be harvested in the 
future. The other is ecological: the destruction in species of both plants 
and animals. The estimate of nonmarket or environmental values is 
based largely on the changing stock of old-growth forest. This is a major 
innovation. Their analysis, however, focuses only on the old-growth 
forests of the Pacific Northwest, thus precluding analysis of the loss of 
ecological services that may have been realised on vast areas of other US 
forest lands, most of which are now managed and thus no longer in their 
original or old-growth state.  
In estimating the cost of losing old-growth forests, they assume that 
the foregone benefits are directly related to the cumulative erosion of the 
ecosystems comprised by these forests. The authors used rates of 
reduction of old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest over 1950–1997 
to estimate the additional cumulative cost of forest decline. This is based 
on the premise that the value of a diminishing resource for which there is 
increasing demand (in this case ecological amenities) increases at a 
growing rate as the supply declines. Each year, they added the loss of 
value to the cumulative loss up to that point because the erosion of 
ecological services from cutting an old-growth forest does not occur in 
the initial year alone, but over a period of decades. 
The technical advances of the US GPI (1) over the US ISEW (2) 
















 e = {åGheedE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresinhealthandeducation}
 f = {åHht|Servicesofhouseholdlabour}
 r = {dšPheed/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={h,j}
 h = {åVolt|Servicesofvolunteerlabour}
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 s = {dšPCr/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresoncrimeprevention(privatelevel)}
 u = {dšFamBr|Disservicesoffamilybreakdown}
 v = {dšLeist|Disservicesoflostleisuretime}
 x = {dšUdet|Disservicesofunderemployment}
 ar = {ɁForestEK|Lossofnativeforests}
 
Apart from the improvements discussed above, the US GPI (1) also 
differs to the US ISEW (2) by excluding the services of non-defensive 
public expenditures in health and education and the disservices of 
defensive expenditures on private health and education outlays. These 
items in Figure 5.22 were omitted with the intention of reducing 
arbitrariness and controversy in the index. Overall, seven innovations (1 
minor, 6 major) over the US ISEW (2) have marked the US GPI (1) as a 
big step forward in net income indicator construction. 






































A compilation of the above variables into a structured equation portrays 























  –ɁEK[Ener+Ozone+Forest+NatHab+Land+Futur]   (5.22)
Services(å)
PCE/ID*100= personalconsumptionexpendituresdividedbytheindexofdistributioninequality(lowquintile




GFK = durable fixed public capital (7.5% of the net stock of federal, state and local highways and
streets—theannualvalueofservicesisabout10%,but25%ofallvehiclemilesisassumedtobe
forcommuting(adefensiveexpenditure),whichleaves75%asnetbenefits)










PCr/ = defensiveexpendituresoncrimeprevention (private level) (valueof stolenproperty,damage
lossesandextentofmedicalcoststovictimsofcrime, inadditiontheamountspenton locks,
safedepositboxes,burglaralarmsandotherelectronicsecuritysystems)
FamBr = family breakdown visǦàǦvis the cost of divorce and its effects on children (outǦofǦpocket
expensesfor legalfees,counselling,andestablishingseparateresidences, includedappliances
for these—the totalnumberofdivorces*totalnumberofchildrenaffectedby thesedivorces),
andtheamountoftimefamiliesspendwatchingtelevision
Leist = lost leisuretime(thevalueoffreetime—timeawayfromworkminustimespentsleepingand









WatPoll = urbanwaterpollution (damagetowaterquality frompointsourcedischargessuchassewage
and industrialwastes,aswellasdamagedue tosiltation that reduces the lifeǦspaceofwater











Land = agricultural land (cumulativecostsviasoildegradationdue tourbanexpansionandpoor land
managementwhichdestroyssoil througherosion,compactionanddecompositionoforganic
matter—allofwhichgraduallyleadtoproductivityloss)
Futur = longǦterm (future) environmental damage (ecological disruption from the cumulative
consumptionoffossilfuelsandnuclearenergy)
 














consequently the benchmark for comparing US GPI (1) with other GPIs, 
as discussed in Section 5.5 below: 
5.5 Innovations Achieved over the Basic GPI Template 
and the Prevailing Empirical Material 
5.5.1 US GPIs (2, 3 & 4) – Anielski and Rowe (1999), Cobb et al. 
(1999), Cobb et al. (2000), Cobb et al. (2001), Venetoulis 
and Cobb (2004), Talberth et al. (2007) 
Six papers have been published at Redefining Progress following the US 
GPI (1) (Cobb et al. 1995). The first five papers are so closely connected 
that it would be unjustified to evaluate them individually. In this study, 
the US GPIs (2) refer to the works of Anielski and Rowe (1999), Cobb et 
al. (1999), Cobb et al. (2000), Cobb et al. (2001), and the US GPI (3) 
relates to Venetoulis and Cobb (2004). The sixth by Talberth et al. (2007) 
is a significant revision of the US GPIs (2,3), therefore their measure, the 
US GPI (4), is analysed separately below. Common to all the US GPIs, 
however, is that there is no certain theoretical underpinning. 
In comparison to the US GPI (1), one simple modification has been 
achieved in the US GPIs (2,3). The original GPI adopted the low-income 
quintile index since it gives special weight to the plight of the poorest 
members of society. Gini is specifically utilised in subsequent US GPIs. 
The use of the Gini index reflects changes in the distribution of income 
across all income groups. It provides a basis for studying how growing 
income inequality between the rich and the middle-income groups can 
lead to the erosion of social cohesion in a society as well as between the 
rich and poor. It may be more appropriate than the low-income quintile 
index. 
Hence, incorporating a Gini income inequality index leads to a minor 
technical advance in the US GPIs (2,3) over the US GPI (1), as shown in 
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Every other basic template variable remains the same. That is, no new 
extensions of the benefit or cost items are prevalent in the US GPIs 
(2,3).192 
As a result, the five studies of the US GPIs (2,3) and their respective 
identities duplicate the basic US GPI (1) template design, as shown in 









GFK = durable fixed public capital (7.5% of the net stock of federal, state and local highways and
streets—theannualvalueofservicesisabout10%,but25%ofallvehiclemilesisassumedtobe
forcommuting(adefensiveexpenditure),whichleaves75%asnetbenefits)
Volt = volunteer labour assuming the value of nonwork hours remained constant over time (total










lostwhichmighthavebeen spentonactivities suchaswith family,at leisure, sleepingorat
work)
PCr/ = defensiveexpendituresoncrimeprevention (private level) (valueof stolenproperty,damage
lossesandextentofmedical costs to victimsof crime,plus theamount spenton locks, safe
depositboxes,burglaralarmsandotherelectronicsecuritysystems)
FamBr = family breakdown visǦàǦvis the cost of divorce and its effects on children (outǦofǦpocket
expensesfor legalfees,counselling,andestablishingseparateresidences, includedappliances
for these—the totalnumberofdivorces*totalnumberofchildrenaffectedby thesedivorces),
plustheamountoftimefamiliesspendwatchingtelevision
Leist = lost leisure time assuming the value of nonwork hours remained constant over time, i.e. an





AirPoll = airpollutionofSO2,NOx,PM (applicationofanairquality index (usingrelativechanges inair

192 N.B. US GPI (3) does not differ much to the earlier US GPIs (2), but it is labelled ‘3’ in order to 
be consistent with the empirical analysis in Chapter 4. 
193 Sequentially, Eqs. (5.23), (5.24), (5.25), (5.26), (5.27) link to: Anielski and Rowe (1999); Cobb et 
al. (1999); Cobb et al. (2000); Cobb et al. (2001); and Venetoulis and Cobb (2004). 

319
quality since 1975 (the benchmark year) to the estimated costs,while assuming a constant
economiccostofthoseemissions)
WatPoll = urbanwaterpollution (damage towaterqualitybasedonpointsourcedamage to recreation,
aesthetics,ecology,propertyvalues,householdandindustrialwatersupplies,alsothedamage






Forest = native forests (the resource and ecological costs associated with road building and timber
harvesting—i.e.thereduction intheamountoftimberthatcanbeharvested inthefutureand
thedestructionofbothplantandanimalspeciesinoldǦgrowthforests)
NatHab = wetlands (annual value of ecological services lost*the acres lost*an estimate of the value
ecologicalservicesprovidedbyoneacreofwetlands—acumulativeprocess)
Land = agricultural land (cumulative costs via soil degradation—due to urbanisation and poor land
managementwhichdestroyssoilthrougherosionandcompactionleadingtoproductivityloss)




As is evident in Eqs. (5.23, ... 5.27) above, the rudimentary template of 
the GPI has remained unchanged—even after five studies (which cover 
nearly a decade of work at Redefining Progress) were devised. This may 
suggest that there are limits to improving the architecture of the GPI. 
On the other hand, Talberth et al. (2007), authors of the US GPI (4), 
come up with some interesting revisions to the basic template design. In 
particular, they transcend the standard approach to the indicator’s 
ecological aspects. For instance, a minor advance is the detail given to 
the human and ecological effects of ozone depletion. They extend the 
item to include the cumulative production of CFCs-11, 12, 113, 114, and 
115; while not new to the literature, it is an advance over the existing 
template design—the reference point used in this study (in Section 5.4). 
Another important and major contribution is the broader account of 
primary forests. The original GPI template gave attention only to the 
Pacific Northwest region. The US GPI (4) assigns ecological costs to the 
loss of longleaf pine forests in the southeastern US, old growth forests in 
the Pacific Northwest, Sierras, and southeast Alaska, and inventoried 
roadless areas on national forests. They also include costs associated 
with national forest logging roads, which are continuing sources of 
sedimentation, landslides, fires, and habitat fragmentation. While there 
are other critical forest types lost in the United States each year, these 
primary forest types are particularly rich in biological diversity, have been 
extensively studied, and have reasonable estimates of both extent and 
value on which GPI accounts can be based. Whenever primary forest land 
is cut for timber, converted into tree plantations, or cleared to build a 
road, use values are impaired or lost forever, e.g. scenic, recreational, 
and aesthetic values to nearby communities (Talberth et al. 2007:15). The 
US GPI (4) accounts measure the resource and environmental loss by 
assigning a price tag to year-by-year estimates of key primary forest 
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losses and adding such losses to the cumulative damage from previous 
years. 
The most significant advance relates to their column on climate 
change. ‘Global warming’ is a phenomenon that threatens hundreds of 
millions of lives, entire cities, and the planetary economic system. The 
United States is by far the single greatest source of (per capita) carbon 
emissions implicated in that warming. The authors of the US GPI (4) 
assign costs to a percentage of US emissions equal to the global carbon 
overshoot percentage. They also assume that marginal damage increases 
over time due to positive feedback effects. Further, marginal damage 
from carbon emissions are assumed cumulative so that costs incurred in 
one year continue to be incurred the next year. Using this approach, they 
estimate carbon emissions damage to be $1.18 trillion in 2004. This is 
the second largest cost included in the US GPI (4). This represents a 
major advance of US GPI (1), as they are the first authors to explicate the 
global nature of the “long-term (future) environmental damage” item. 
In addition, an indispensable aspect of the social economy is 
incorporated in the US GPI (4). The authors set aside the debate on the 
‘defensive’ nature of education; instead emphasise the services of non-
defensive public expenditures in education. There are large social 
spillovers from college-educated workers. They are both monetary and 
non-monetary and in the form of increases in the stock of knowledge, 
productivity of workers and capital, civic participation, job market 
efficiency, savings rates, research and development activities, charitable 
giving, and health. Ascribing positive value to education (flow variable) is 
a major advance over the template design. 
There are two other social revisions of the US GPI (4). A minor 
contribution is in relation to the way the automobile accidents (AuAcc) 
item is considered. They include ‘human injuries’ (on and off the road 
and all injuries regardless of length of disability and address wage loss, 
legal, medical, hospital) as well as ‘vehicle damage’ (physical car 
damage). Interestingly, the ‘disservices of family breakdown’ item, 
dšFamBr, is excluded in the US GPI (4). No reason or implicit clue is 
given for the omission of this item. But it is quite possible it was dropped 
from the index due to the controversy of monetising this complex social 
problem. 
The technical advances of the US GPI (4) over the US GPI (1) as 
discussed above are illustrated in Figure 5.25 on page 321. The figure 
below reveals that there are six contributions (3 minor, 3 major) in the 
US GPI (4). Besides the addition of ‘GedE’ and the subtraction of 
‘dšAuAcc’, the remaining four advances relate to the change in the 
existing template design. Thus, the overall alteration to the composition 



























 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 ar = {ɁForestEK|Lossofnativeforests}
 au = {ɁFuturEK|LongǦterm(future)environmentaldamage}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=USGPI(4)C={o,u}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 u = {dšFamBr|Disservicesoffamilybreakdown}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={e}
 e = {åGedE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresineducation}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={p}
 p = {dšAuAcc|Disservicesofautomobileaccidentsandhumaninjuries}
 
Reflecting the above modifications, the identity of the US GPI (4) is 




  –ɁEK[Ener+Ozone+Forest+NatHab+Land+Futur]   (5.29)
Services(å)
PCE/ID*100= personalconsumptionexpendituresdividedbytheindexofdistributioninequality(Gini)
CDK = the stockof consumerdurables (annual flowof22.5%of the valueof thenet stockof cars,
appliances,andfurnitureattheendofeachyear)











AuAcc = automobile accidents and human injuries (on and off the road and all injuries regardless of
lengthofdisabilityandaddresswageloss,legal,medical,hospital)
PCmt = private commuting (direct costs: the portion of nonǦcommercial vehicle miles used in
commuting including public transportation, the cost and purchase price of user operated
transport, the costofdepreciationofprivate cars) (indirect cost: the totalnumberofpeople
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AirPoll = airpollutionofSO2,NOx,PM (applicationofanairquality index (usingrelativechanges inair
quality since 1975 (the benchmark year) to the estimated costs,while assuming a constant
economiccostofthoseemissions)
WatPoll = urbanwaterpollution (damage towaterqualitybasedonpointsourcedamage to recreation,





Forest = primary forests (the resourceandecological costsassociatedwith thedamage from logging




Land = agricultural land (cumulative costsof the average annual conversionofprime farmland—the





In short, the US GPI (4) is a relatively good contribution to the literature, 
especially when compared to the five earlier efforts at Redefining Progress. 
5.5.2 Australian GPI 1 – Hamilton (1997, 1999), Hamilton and 
Denniss (2001) 
Clive Hamilton (1997, 1999) from the Australian Institute devised the first 
Australian GPI (1a). Later Hamilton and Denniss (2001) made some 
noteworthy revisions, which led to the Australian GPI (1b). Erudition is 
what the authors had in mind when developing the Australian GPIs (1a, 
1b). There is some evidence of a good theory in the Australian GPIs, 
albeit it is difficult to distinguish the advances made between theory and 
techniques. Their analyses do not specifically correspond to any one of 
SEWI theories in Chapter 3, yet the authors embrace some elements of 
each theory. With special attention to ‘sustainable consumption’, a whole 
series of new items and improved methodologies for the economic, 
social and ecological variables were instigated. The various technical 
advances of the Australian GPI (1a) relative to the basic US GPI (1) 
template are discussed below: 
In the Australian GPI (1a), at the time of their study, a new variable 
was added to the basic GPI template: non-defensive public expenditures 
(GE). Hamilton (1997, 1999) argues that the following are non-defensive: 
25% on defence and public order and safety; 50% on transport and 
communications; 50% on public health; 100% on recreation and culture; 
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and 50% on general government services. The fresh introduction of the 
‘GE’ item promotes greater specificity and thus it is a mark of distinction 
(major contribution). Another variable is subtracted to the basic GPI 
template, the disservices of defensive expenditures on private health and 
education outlays (dšPheed). However, this item is considered only a 
minor advance relative to the US GPI (1) since it already appeared in the 
US ISEWs (1, 2). 
In relation to time-based activities, the Australian GPI (1a) adopts the 
following strategy: that time devoted to voluntary activities makes a 
positive contribution to welfare while time engaged in involuntary 
activities diminishes welfare. The following activities diminish welfare in 
net terms and, as such, impose costs on the community: Involuntary 
leisure, i.e. the times when people fare unemployment but would prefer 
to be employed (including underemployment). Involuntary work, i.e. the 
times when we are doing paid work but would prefer not to be. Namely, 
‘overwork’ imposes a cost on workers and their families; this is valued at 
the average wage rate. And time spent commuting (based on foregone 
earnings). 
The inclusion of the costs of unemployment in the Australian GPI 
(1a), in this case, is a major contribution. Even though unemployment 
was first measured by Rosenberg et al. (1995) in their Dutch ISEW, the 
author of the Australian GPI (1a) has a more sophisticated analysis of the 
involuntary and voluntary nature of time-use. Besides, this item is valued 
markedly via the mental-health effects of being long-term unemployed. 
The psychological costs of unemployment are estimated because of the 
large costs “in personal terms” (Hamilton 1999:20). Likewise, the value 
of the psychological costs of ‘underemployment’ is measured by the 
number of part-time employees who want to work full-time. 
Underemployment occurs when workers’ skills are underutilised or when 
wages, productivity or other job qualities are sub-standard. But this way 
of measuring underemployment is a minor refinement to the existing US 
GPI (1) template. 
A genuinely original advance in the literature is accounting for the 
disservices of overwork. It is assumed that the value of an hour worked 
involuntarily is approximated by the average hourly wage rate. Valuing 
overwork at the average wage rate is a reasonable approximation. One 
difficulty with this is that some of the extra hours worked are paid at 
overtime rates. The additional payment might be seen as reflecting the 
additional cost in terms of leisure foregone. But, it is not valid to assume 
that workers were induced to work extra time by employers offering an 
hourly wage just high enough to compensate for lost leisure. Most 
workers have no choice but to work longer because their jobs would be 
jeopardised if they refused (Hamilton 1997). 
Note that the index does not reflect a change in the stock of leisure 
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per se, i.e. the item, ‘lost leisure time’, is omitted. Paid work is the income 
that it generates which in turn reflects the value of output produced. 
Thus, it is assumed that the GPI corresponds (if only roughly) to the 
personal consumption base and so is already counted (see Hamilton 
1999:18).194 Nor does the index reflect changes in the services of 
‘household work and parenting’ as such. Only the raw services of 
‘household labour’ are added. Yet this still represents a ‘minor advance’ 
over the template. Recall that in this study any inclusion of a variable that 
is different to the blueprint is awarded (as a minimum) a mark of ‘minor 
advance’. This method ensures that our final grade is somewhat 
conservative. Besides, the parenting aspect of the ‘household labour’ 
item is indirectly accounted for in their volunteer labour item, ‘Volt’. 
Several economic and social variables that were common to the basic 
template were also excluded. Consumer durable expenditures (CDE) and 
the services from the stock of consumer durables (ƒCDK) were omitted 
because the author deemed them unnecessary adjustments. The 
‘disservices of family breakdown’ item (dšFamBr) was left out because 
the authors argued that the indicator did not measure destruction of 
social and human capital. There was no apparent reason given for 
omitting the ‘disservices of defensive expenditures on household 
pollution abatement’ item (dšPPoll). Omission of some of the above 
variables could be considered questionable; in particular, the critical 
meaning of the service flowing from consumption seems misplaced in the 
Australian GPI (1a). Nonetheless, many other achievements compensate 
for these oversights. 
Advances have been made in linking the private and work spheres to 
the congestion- and accident-related items. The author recognises the 
wider implications of the problem of commuting. To emphasise the 
socioeconomic nature of commuting, a small adjustment to the ‘PCMt’ 
item is made by dropping the ‘private’ aspect (giving, ‘CMt’). The reason 
for not considering private commuting is that some of the congestion 
costs fall on businesses and commercial vehicles rather than final 
consumers.195 However, a large share of the travel done in business 
vehicles is in fact commuting time by employees in company cars. These 
costs fall on commuters, in the form of erosion of leisure time, rather 
than on businesses. Then again, as they fall on commuters, the value of 
each hour is that for an individual rather than for a business. The authors 
assume that two-thirds of the travel time spent in business cars (but 
none of the travel in other commercial vehicles) is expended by 

194 Hamilton (1999:19) assumes that the net psychic benefits of work (from an individual’s 
perspective) are equal to the loss of leisure. Therefore, paid work is valued simply by work-related 
income—that in turn is valued (as a proxy) by personal consumption. And likewise, lack of 
fulfilment from being unemployed offsets the benefits of increased leisure. 
195 They are considered intermediate input costs that are reflected in the national accounts through 
higher prices for goods and services. 
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commuters. This way of estimating congestion costs is more realistic, yet 
it is a minor contribution to the existing literature—it is not a radically 
new variable. 
However, key technical innovations are accomplished when the same 
line of reasoning is applied to new items. The subtraction of the ‘costs of 
industrial accidents’ (dšBWAcc) is a major innovation. The author 
incorporates the costs of pain and suffering in the workplace and the 
losses to family and community. Moreover, rather than utilising the 
‘dšPAuAcc’ item, which emphasises the private defensive expenditures 
from auto accidents, a new variable is introduced, the ‘disservices of 
automobile accidents and human injuries’, or for short, ‘dšAuAcc’. The 
emphasis with this item is on the human damage of auto accidents as 
opposed to merely measuring vehicular damage. Knowledge of the 
mingling of private with work life, therefore, leads to both of the above 
items as major innovations. 
As argued in Chapter 4, linking the principle of ‘strong sustainability’ 
(SS) to their Australian GPI (1a) was a significant conceptual 
achievement. The template variables connected to the SS principle are 
not innovatory on a technical level. Specifically, the following items are 
minor technical innovations: net investment of durable fixed capital, the 
depletion of energy resources, agricultural land, and long-term (future) 
environmental damage. The net investment of durable fixed capital 
incorporates more sectors: private, business and government. Price of 
energy depletion is measured by the costs of shifting from petroleum and 
natural gas to renewables. Price of the agricultural land item is measured 
in terms of the loss of productive potential to current and future 
generations from acidification, soil structure loss and erosion measured 
by forgone output. For the climate change item, the annual emissions of 
CO2, NOx and methane valued by future impacts on humans and 
environment are calculated. Taking a strong sustainability (SS) 
perspective on the above economic item and three ecological variables 
has led to a modest advance over the standard design. 
For the ozone depletion item, they measure the health costs 
associated with UV-B radiation in Australia. The health costs include 
damage to human health and to terrestrial and aquatic plants, and are 
directly related to the annual emissions of consumption of CFCs. Basing 
the adjustment on the SS principle, costs are assumed to fall steadily 
after 2010, reaching zero by 2030. The calculation of the human and 
environmental health effects vis-à-vis ozone depletion promotes more 
specificity than other studies. Hence, this item is a major contribution in 
the Australian GPI (1a). Also, the human and environmental effects of air 
pollution from noxious emissions are measured mainly by health costs. 
However, the disservices of air pollution were not specifically linked to 














Moreover, a new ecological item is introduced in the Australian GPI 
(1a): the ‘costs of excessive irrigation water use’ (ɷIrrigEK). The author 
links the problem of water degradation to Australia’s largest river system, 
the Murray-Darling Basin (which accounts for 75 percent of irrigation 
water). Costs of water use measured are those associated with 
environmental damage due to diversions of water for irrigation purposes 
from Australia’s river systems. To a degree, other ecological costs such 
as habitat destruction and salinity are indirectly captured in this item. 
This may explain the reason for the omission of the template item, the 
loss of natural habitats/areas (ɷNatHabEK). Regardless, accounting for 
the depletion of the stock of water vis-à-vis excessive irrigation is a major 
innovation. 
Based on the detailed analysis above, the technical advances of the 
















 q = {dšCmt|Disservicesofcommuting}
 x = {dšUdet|Disservicesofunderemployment}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 al = {ɁEnerEK|Depletionofenergyresources}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 at = {ɁLandEK|Lossofagriculturalland}
 au = {ɁFuturEK|LongǦterm(future)environmentaldamage}
 aw= {ăInvPBGFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(private,businessandgovernment)capital}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=AustralianGPI(1a)C={b,j,l,o,u,v,ae,as}
 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 j = {åHhFamt|Servicesofhouseholdworkandparenting}
 l = {CDE|Consumerdurableexpenditures}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 u = {dšFamBr|Disservicesoffamilybreakdown}
 v = {dšLeist|Disservicesoflostleisuretime}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofnaturalhabitats/areas}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={d,f}
 d = {åGE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpenditures}
 f = {åHht|Servicesofhouseholdlabour}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={p,r,w,y,z,aq}
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 r = {dšPheed/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays}
 w = {dšUet|Disservicesofunemployment}
 y = {dšOvWt|Disservicesofoverwork}
 z = {dšBWAcc|Disservicesofindustrialaccidents}
 aq = {ɁIrrigEK|Costsofexcessiveirrigationwateruse}
 
The above figure shows that the Australian GPI (1a) has sixteen 
contributions (9 minor, 7 major) to the template design. The author’s 
creativity is exceptional with the development of eight new extensions of 
the cost/benefit items, six of which are especially significant. 
Reflecting the extensive list of modifications, the identity of the 




  –ɁEK[Ener+Ozone+Irrig+Forest+Land+Futur]  (5.29)
Services(å)
PCE/DI*100= personalconsumptionexpendituresdividedby the incomedistribution index (shareof lowest
quintileintotalincome)
GFK = durablefixedpubliccapital(7%annualflow)




method (realwage rate)—excluding 100% of gardening, lawn and pool care, 50% of home
maintenance,petcare,shoppingandassociatedtravelandchildcare)
Volt = volunteer labour (hours of community worked performing each year by the housekeeper
replacementcostmethod(realwagerate))




AuAcc = automobile accidents repairs and human injuries (family and community losses, pain and




























Irrig = excessive irrigationwater use (estimating the loss in agricultural output from reductions in
waterdivertedtoirrigation,measuredbytheopportunitycostofenvironmentalflows)
Forest = oldgrowthforests(environmentalvaluesdeniedtofuturegenerationsmeasuredbytheWTP)





It is obvious that the Australian GPI (1a) is innovatory and a substantial 
modification to the basic template design. 
The Australian GPI (1b) carries all the advances from the Australian 
GPI (1a) study above. Yet to avoid double counting, any ‘major 
contribution’ made in the first study are counted as ‘minor’ in the second 
update. Only the relevant changes to the first GPI study are now 
discussed. In the revised version (1b), all personal consumption 
expenditures are divided by the index of distributional inequality, which 
the author refers to as ‘the distribution of ill-health’. The difference is the 
choice of measurement for this item, the Atkinson index over a low 
quintile index. But, this is a minor refinement given that Jackson et al. 
(1997) had already undertaken such an adjustment in their UK ISEW. 
In comparison to the US GPI (1) template design, accounting for the 
disservices of advertising and gambling are two advances in the 
Australian GPI (1b). 50 percent of the expenditure on the placement of 
advertisements in the main media is subtracted from consumption 
expenditure. This portion of advertising is assumed to provide no 
information, i.e. the amount of harm done by the placement of 
advertisements that provide disinformation. However, this is a ‘minor 
advance’ since Zolotas (1981) in his EAW and Daly and Cobb (1989) in 
their US ISEW already included a deduction item for advertising. But an 
original item is developed in the Australian GPI (1b): the disservices of 
gambling expenditures. To measure the social costs of gambling, they 
use the proportion of expenditure on gambling attributable to problem 
gamblers, which is the difference between the amount wagered and the 
amount won. The inclusion of this item is new in the literature, hence it 
is a major innovation. 
The Australian GPI (1b) estimate of the costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions is methodologically more robust. They use the amount that 
would need to be ‘set aside’ to offset or compensate for the damage from 
climate change in the next century. Setting aside money at the time of 
emission would generate a fund that would compound over time. Their 
estimate is more conservative compared to other GPIs (e.g. Cobb et al. 
1995), around thirty percent lower of the estimated costs for the ‘long-
term (future) environmental damage’ item. This has significance in view 
of Neumayer’s (1999, 2000) critique: that the climate change item has an 














major contribution since Hamilton and Denniss (2001) make good 
advances in debating this important subject matter. 
In summary, the notable differences between the first and second 
revision of the Australian GPI (1) are the inclusion of the disservices of 
advertising and gambling, and the improvement in the distributional 
inequality index and long-term (future) environmental damage items. In 
relation to the Australian GPI (1b) over US GPI (1), the technical 
advances include the four items aforesaid and a series of minor 
modifications that were accomplished in the first study, as shown in 















 q = {dšCmt|Disservicesofcommuting}
 x = {dšUdet|Disservicesofunderemployment}
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 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 j = {åHhFamt|Servicesofhouseholdworkandparenting}
 l = {CDE|Consumerdurableexpenditures}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 u = {dšFamBr|Disservicesoffamilybreakdown}
 v = {dšLeist|Disservicesoflostleisuretime}
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 p = {dšAuAcc|Disservicesofautomobileaccidentsandhumaninjuries}
 r = {dšPheed/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays}
 t = {dšAd|Disservicesofadvertising}
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 aq = {ɁIrrigEK|Costsofexcessiveirrigationwateruse}
 
In the above figure, there are nineteen advances (17 minor and 2 major). 
With only one major innovation that extended the basic template design, 
the Australian GPI (1b) makes a less significant advance than the 
previous version (1a). 
The identity of the Australian GPI (1b) reflects these modifications 














Volt = volunteer labour (hours of community worked performing each year by the housekeeper
replacementcostmethod(realwagerate))




AuAcc = automobile accidents repairs and human injuries (family and community losses, pain and





PCr/ = defensive expenditures on crime prevention (private level) (property losses, insurance costs,
andthecostsofcrimepreventionand‘targethardening’(mostlynonǦgovernment))
Ad = advertising (50% of expenditure on the placement of advertisements in the main media
(television,radio,print,outdoor,cinemas))
Uet = unemployment(valueofhoursofidlenessoftheunemployedincludingdiscouragedworkers)




GamE = gambling expenditures (proportion of expenditure on gambling (the difference between the
amountwageredandtheamountwon)attributabletoproblemgamblers)
NoiPoll = noisepollution(excessnoiselevelsvaluedbycostofreducingnoisetoanacceptablelevel,such
as the costs of building noise barriers along roads and in homes, falling property values of
homesaswellasthelossofamenity)
AirPoll = airpollution(damagetohumansandenvironmentfromnoxiousemissionsviahealthcosts)















by future impacts on humans and environment—estimated contribution of each tonne of
emissionstothedamageitisexpectedtocauseinthefuture)
 
The Australian GPI (1b) attempts to improve upon an already highly 
innovatory first version, making it a very good contribution to literature—
albeit not as innovative as version 1a. 
5.5.3 Albertan GPI – Anielski (2001) 
Notwithstanding the lack of theory, the Albertan GPI by Mark Anielski 
(2001) is the most sophisticated design yet, beginning with an analysis of 
the ‘costs of salinity’ item. Salinity limits crop growth. Poor water 
management practices (e.g. over-irrigation), poor drainage and canal 
seepage are significant causes of soil salinity. The problem occurs in 
both dryland farming and in irrigation agriculture. Dryland salinity is a 
major soil degradation problem on the Canadian prairies. The trouble 
occurs in coulee bottoms and in depressions and sloughs, where 
groundwater redistributes salts in the soil and they accumulate at the 
surface. Salinity becomes more severe after a few wet years. 
In irrigated agricultural areas, salinity results from excess water. Salts 
leach out of the soil, remaining on the surface. The water evaporates and 
the plants die. Soil salinity thus hinders plant growth. High levels of salt 
in the soil have the same effect as drought, making less water available 
for uptake by plant roots and lowering crop yields. The author has 
assumed that salinity causes an average reduction in crop yields of 25 
percent across the province and that the entire cultivated area affected by 
dryland salinity is sown to barley.196 Barley is more tolerant of salinity 
than wheat, canola, beans or peas, so it is most likely to be grown on 
saline land. Estimating the costs of salinity (ɷSalinEK) is a major 
innovation. 
Accounting for the loss of wetlands and peatlands in the ‘ɷNatHabEK’ 
item is also significant. Peatlands play a vital ecological role as a filtration 
system for water and by controlling water runoff. Peatlands absorb water 
from spring snowmelt and summer storms, thus reducing flooding, 
erosion and sedimentation, and recharging the water table in times of 
drought. They are natural filters, cleansing the water that passes through 
them. In addition they store a massive amount of carbon. Hence, the 
author assumes that a decrease in the annual carbon sequestration by 
peatlands results in an increase of carbon in the atmosphere; leading to 

196 This is a conservative estimate. In areas of high salinity, where plants will not grow at all, and in 
areas affected by moderate to severe salinity, annual yields of most cereal and oilseed crops are 
reduced by up to 50 percent (Anielski 2001). 
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an annual loss in net peatland carbon sequestration. The consideration 
of the ecological cost of this issue is a major refinement to the existing 
GPI template. 
For the social items, the author divides unpaid ‘time’ into three main 
activities: passive leisure (television viewing, reading and listening to 
music); socializing (in homes, restaurants and bars); and active leisure 
(attending and participating in entertainment and sports events). For 
instance, volunteer labour (Volt) includes some of these forms, including 
both formal and informal volunteerism but not civic work. Two of the 
basic template items are excluded: ‘household work and parenting’ and 
‘lost leisure time’. In their place, the ‘services household labour’ (Hht), 
‘services of parenting and eldercare’ (FamCaret), and the ‘services of 
leisure labour’ (Leist) are added. Household labour includes meal 
preparation, cleaning, clothing care, repair and maintenance, other 
domestic work. Parenting and eldercare includes childcare and adult care 
that takes place within the home. Leisure labour is the time that is not 
allocated to paid or unpaid work or to personal care such as sleep, meals, 
washing, dressing, relaxing and naps. Time-based activities in the 
Albertan GPI are valued at so-called replacement costs: what you would 
have to pay someone else to perform the function on your behalf. That is, 
the actual replacement value for a worker who could perform the service 
is the replacement cost. 
Accounting for parenting and eldercare is a major innovation as it 
highlights the importance of caring for younger and older generations. 
Accounting for the services of household and leisure labour are less 
significant because they are not original contributions to the literature 
(minor advances). The author also makes some minor advances in 
relation to other time-use variables: the costs of private commuting 
(PCmt) and unemployment (Uet). Following in the footsteps of the 
Australian GPI (1), Anielski (2001) incorporates a value of the leisure 
time lost due time spent commuting in a personal automobile, bus or on 
the subway and subtracts the value of time spent unemployed. 
Several items in the Albertan GPI have been simply transposed from 
the Australian GPI (1b) by Hamilton and Denniss (2001). The disservices 
of problem gambling (dšGamE) and automobile accidents and human 
injuries (dšAuAcc) are adapted for the province of Alberta.197 50 percent 
of the services of non-defensive public expenditures (ƒGE) are included 
as well. And the ‘air pollution’ item is more detailed than the US GPI (1) 
utilising a wider variety of pollutants. Similarly to the Australian study (1), 
the health and environmental costs associated with SO2, NOx, VOCs and 

197 The ‘dšPAuAcc’ variable, the disservices of auto accidents (private defensive expenditures), is 
therefore omitted. Also, the following items are excluded: dšPPoll (disservices of defensive 
expenditures on household pollution abatement); dšNoiPoll (disservices of noise pollution); and 
ɷOzoneEK (depletion of the ozone). The reason for their omission is unspecified. 
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CO2 are measured. Likewise, the measurement method of the long-term 
(future) environmental damage item (ɷFuturEK) is imitated. This item is 
measured by the global environmental and health liability cost of carbon 
emissions. The recycling of these items are not major innovations (they 
are minor refinements). 
In addition, two ecological items have been customised from the 
Australian SNBI study by Lawn and Sanders (1999). The Albertan GPI 
incorporates the depletion of timber resources (ɷTimbEK) as the cost of 
unsustainable timber resource use, i.e. loss in pulp production value. The 
disservices of municipal solid waste pollution (dšWasPoll) are subtracted 
from the index. This includes the operational costs of collection, 
transportation and disposal of waste for waste management, and 
environmental costs of solid waste in a lined landfill with leachate 
collection. Obviously, the inclusion of these items is not innovatory 
because the author has emulated a former work; they are counted as 
minor advances. 
However, Anielski (2001) does not merely replicate the works of 
others. He has devised three original variables: PDebtE, private debt 
expenditures; dšSu, disservices of suicide; and dšToxWasPoll, disservices 
of toxic waste liabilities. Private debt expenditures are household debt 
servicing based on an estimate of the interest payments on chartered 
bank consumer loans. The critical social problem of suicide is measured 
by direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are medical expenses including 
ambulance, hospital, physician, autopsy, funeral/cremation, as well as 
the ‘services’ of policy investigations. The indirect societal costs of 
suicide are calculated in terms of lost productivity. Waste disposal has 
contaminated former industrial sites and leaking underground storage 
tanks require costly replacement, therefore this item in the Albertan GPI 
is significant. Toxic waste liabilities are measured by the costs associated 
with cleaning up old industrial sites and environmental costs. The 
inclusion of private debt, the disservices of suicide and toxic waste 
liabilities are excellent advances to the literature and thus major 
innovations. 
Three miscellaneous variables are minor advances in the Albertan 
GPI. Firstly, he utilises Gini for after-tax and after-government transfer 
income for the measurement of the distribution of income (DI). 
Secondly, the author tries to link current and future well-being aspects. 
He assumes that to achieve so-called “sustainability”, the regional stock 
of public infrastructure must be enough to support the labour force on 
an ongoing basis. The capital stock must be maintained to ensure 
adequate support for the current year’s economic production. This 
ensures the ability of future generations to produce goods and services. 
In other words, when the labour force increases so too must the 
















fixed (government) capital (żInvGFK) is hence a minor refinement to an 
existing variable in the template. Thirdly, Anielski (2001) measures the 
defensive expenditures on crime prevention (policing, prison operations, 
private investigators and security, courts, corrections and legal aid, locks, 
security devices, and lost property). This small improvement in the 
technique for calculating the social (rather than individual) costs of crime 
(Cr) is also a minor advance. 
Based on the detailed analysis, the technical advances of the Albertan 















 q = {dšPCmt|Disservicesofprivatecommuting}
 s = {dšCr/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresoncrimeprevention}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofwetlandsandpeatlands}
 au = {ɁFuturEK|LongǦterm(future)environmentaldamage}
 aw= {ăInvGFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(government)capital}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=AlbertanGPIC={j,o,v,ae,af}
 j = {åHhFamt|Servicesofhouseholdworkandparenting}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 v = {dšLeist|Disservicesoflostleisuretime}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 af = {dšNoiPoll|Disservicesofnoisepollution}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={d,f,g,i}
 d = {åGE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpenditures}
 f = {åHht|Servicesofhouseholdlabour}
 g = {åFamCaret|Servicesofparentingandeldercare}
 i = {åLeist|Servicesofleisurelabour}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={m,p,w,ac,ad,ai,aj,am,ap}
 m = {PDebtE|Privatedebtexpenditures}
 p = {dšAuAcc|Disservicesofautomobileaccidentsandhumaninjuries}
 w = {dšUet|Disservicesofunemployment}
 ac = {dšGamE|Disservicesofproblemgamblingexpenditures}
 ad = {dšSu|Disservicesofsuicide}
 ai = {dšWasPoll|Disservicesofmunicipalsolidwastepollution}
 aj = {dšToxWasPoll|Disservicesoftoxicwasteliabilities}
 am= {ɁTimbEK|Depletionoftimberresources}
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The above figure shows that the Albertan GPI has twenty contributions 
(14 minor, 6 major) to the template design. He has developed four new 
extensions of the benefit items and nine new extensions of the cost 
items. And by modifying seven key variables of the US GPI (1) study, the 
author’s resourcefulness is considerable. 
Reflecting the refinements made, the identity of the Albertan GPI is 




  –ɁEK[Ener+Timb+Salin+Forest+NatHab+Land+Futur]  (5.31)
Services(å)
PCE/DI*100= personalconsumptionexpendituresdividedbythedistribution inequality index(GiniforafterǦ
taxandaftergovernmentǦtransferincome)
CDK = the stock of consumer durables (22.5% of the estimated stock value of household
infrastructure)
GFK = durable fixedpublic capital (7%of the stockvalueof roads,bridges,publiclyownedutilities,
machineryandequipment,engineeringstructuresandbuildings)
GE = nonǦdefensivepublicexpenditures(50%)
Hht = household labour includesmealpreparation, cleaning, clothing care, repairandmaintenance
and other domesticwork (pet care, for example) using replacement cost generalistmethod
(averagetimespent(hoursperpersonperyear)*imputedcosts)
FamCaret = parentingandeldercare, includes child careandadult care that takesplacewithin thehome
(averagetimespent(hoursperpersonperyear)*imputedcosts)
Volt = volunteer labour includingboth formaland informalvolunteerismbutnotcivicwork (average
timespent(hoursperpersonperyear)*imputedcosts)







PDebtE = private debt expenditures (household debt servicing based on an estimate of the interest
paymentsoncharteredbankconsumerloans)
AuAcc = automobileaccidentsandhuman injuries(directcosts includingautomobilerepairs, insurance
payouts, hospitalization, property damage, forgone income taxes, plus indirect costs of the
timevalueoflostworkandincomeduetoinjury)
PCmt = private commuting (time spent commuting (personal automobile,bus or subway) related to
unpaid work, valued at what could have been earned had the commuter spent the same
amountoftimeatwork)(andthedirectexpendituresincurred,suchasmotorvehiclepartsand
repairs,fuelsandlubricants,andautoǦrelatedservicesintravellingtoandfromwork)










Su = suicide (direct medical costs including ambulance, hospital, physician, autopsy,
funeral/cremation,andservicespolicyinvestigations,plusindirectsocietalcostsintermsoflost
productivity,notincludingattemptedsuicide)




WatPoll = urbanwaterpollution (damagetoecologyviathecontrolcostof improvingwaterquality, i.e.
estimatingtheenvironmentalcostsassociatedwithwastewatertreatmentanddisposal)
WasPoll = municipalsolidwastepollution(operationalcostsofcollection,transportationanddisposalof
waste forwastemanagement,andenvironmentalcostsof solidwaste ina lined landfillwith
leachatecollection(costpertonne*thetotalvolumeofmunicipalwasteintheparticularyear)













water; water quality; shoreline protection; groundwater; and aesthetics, recreation and
education estimated—cumulative loss) and peatlands (annual loss in net peatland carbon
sequestrationandwaterregulationservicesandthevolumeofpeatharvestedperyear)
Land = agricultural land(costoferosiononbaresoiloncultivated land(onǦsiteandoffsite), including
damagesbywinderosion toexteriorpaint, landscaping,health, recreation,etc.—utilising the
areaofAlberta’scroplandthatwasinsummerfallowonanannualbasis)
Futur = longǦterm (future)environmentaldamagemeasuredby theglobalenvironmentalandhealth
liabilitycostofcarbonemissions
 
With thirty-two variables in Eq. (5.31), the Albertan GPI is the most 
innovatory of all studies and a considerable modification to the basic 
template design. 
5.5.4 Vermont, Chittenden County and Burlington (US) GPIs – 
Costanza et al. (2004) 
In comparison with the US GPI (1), Costanza et al. (2004) in their US 
Subnational GPIs for Vermont, Chittenden County and Burlington 
undertake two simple changes, and still no theory is provided. The 
original GPI adopted the low-income quintile index since it gives special 
weight to the plight of the poorest members of society. Instead, the Gini 
index of income inequality is utilised. The other relates to the ‘disservices 
of automobile accidents and human injuries’ item (dšAuAcc). This is an 
advance over the template because of omission of the ‘private’ element 
of car accidents and the inclusion of valuing human injuries and death. 
This is a fuller accounting approach. But, this adjustment is not an 
original contribution; for instance, it was already undertaken in the Dutch 
ISEW (1) and Albertan GPI studies. Hence, incorporating a Gini index 
and the human effects of automobile accidents results in two minor 
technical advances in the US Subnational GPIs vis-à-vis the US GPI (1), 




























 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=USSubnationalGPIsC={o,ax}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 ax = {ăInt|Netinternationalposition}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={p}
 p = {dšAuAcc|Disservicesofautomobileaccidentsandhumaninjuries}
 
In the above figure, there are two contributions (2 minor, 0 major) 
attributable to the US Subnational GPIs. 
With only one minor advance that extended the basic template 
design, predictably, the identity of the US Subnational GPIs duplicates 















CDE = consumerdurableexpenditures (percapitapersonal income foreachscale*ratioofconsumer
durablestopersonalincomefromnationaldata)
AuAcc = automobile accidents (direct costs including property damage and healthcare expenditures)
andhumaninjuries(indirectcostsincludinglostwages,painandsuffering)
PCmt = private commuting (direct costs for vehicle purchase and maintenance, cost of public
transportationandanindirectcostforlosttime)
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Futur = longǦterm (future) environmental damage (cumulative oil consumption levels in barrel
equivalents*perbarreloiltax)
 
As is evident in Eq. (5.31) above, the elementary template of the US GPI 
(1) has remained unchanged. Purely in terms of the technical advances 
achieved over basic design, the US Subnational GPIs contribute 
negligibly to the literature. 
5.5.5 Victorian and Australian GPIs – Lawn and Clarke (2006a, 
2006b), Clarke and Lawn (2005, 2007)  
Many economic activities serve either a rehabilitation purpose (e.g. 
medical procedures and vehicle accident repairs) or to protect a nation’s 
citizens from the negative side-effects of past and present human 
endeavours (e.g. flood mitigation projects and crime). Defensive and 
rehabilitative expenditures are not welfare-enhancing as “they merely 
serve to maintain and restore the productive capacity of the economy” 
(Lawn and Clarke 2006b:22). Although a clear benefit emerges from such 
expenditure, the impact is not incurred in the current period but in later 
years by way of future consumption. The authors of the Victorian and 
Australian GPIs argue that it is double counting to include this type of 
defensive and rehabilitative spending. For example, welfare-reducing 
spending on tobacco products by individuals should be excluded from 
the measure of ‘personal consumption expenditures’ due to its negative 
health consequences.198 Hence, the first adjustment to private and public 
consumption considers an array of defensive, rehabilitative, and welfare-
reducing expenditures. 
An austere approach to defensive and rehabilitative expenditure 
adjustments to consumption has been adopted in the 
Victorian/Australian GPI (2). The selection of these exclusions from the 
Australian System of National Accounts is ‘normative’. When 
undertaking such adjustments, there are elements of both the entropic 
net psychic income (theory two) and the social welfare function (theory 
three). The adjustments are outlined as follows. It is assumed that half of 
the expenditure in the following categories is either defensive or 

198 Here, tobacco expenditures are private expenditures and not government health-aware 
campaigns that attempt to reduce smoking. 

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rehabilitative in nature: rent and other dwelling services; electricity, gas, 
and fuel; operation of vehicles (includes vehicle repairs and servicing); 
transport services (conducted for commuting purposes); 
communications; insurance and other financial services.  
Half of the expenditures on alcoholic beverages and food are 
assumed defensive, whereas cigarettes and tobacco are assumed to 
make no positive contribution to well-being. One-quarter of all 
expenditure in hotels, cafes, and restaurants is defensive. Finally, half of 
private and public health expenditures are defensive or rehabilitative, and 
one-quarter of government final consumption is assumed defensive. 
Therefore, the richness of the adjustments to the services from personal 
consumption expenditures item (ƒPCE) is a major contribution. Yet, the 
degree of modification to the services of non-defensive public 
expenditures item (ƒGE) is lower; hence, the addition of this variable is a 
minor advance.  
Furthermore, the authors incorporate five parameters, which are 
extensions of the cost items in the US GPI (1): disservices of 
unemployment (dšUet); depletion of mineral resources (ɷMineEK); 
depletion of timber resources (ɷTimbEK); costs of excessive irrigation 
water use (ɷIrrigEK); and an Ecosystem Health Index (EHI) adjustment. 
However, all five variables utilised to construct their Victorian/Australian 
GPI (2) are not original contributions to the literature. Therefore, they are 
counted as minor advances as they have already been incorporated in 
other studies (e.g. from the Australian SNBI, which is discussed in 
Section 5.6 below). But their crime parameter is a unique adjustment. The 
focus shifts from the ‘defensive expenditure’ aspect of crime to the 
personal harassment caused by homicide, assault, robbery, break and 
entry, motor vehicle theft, and other theft related activities. Accounting 
for the disservices of crime (dšCr) utilising this technique is a major 
advance, as the standard template procedure only takes into 
consideration the defensive outlays on consumer goods (locks, security 
doors, alarm systems etc.). 
Many parameters common to the US GPI (1) template were omitted 
in the Victorian GPI and Australian GPI (2). The authors do not provide 
reasons for their exclusions.199 It appears that setting up a comparative 
analysis of sustainable well-being between the subnational and national 
level was the paramount factor. The technical advances of the 
Victorian/Australian GPI (2) over the US GPI (1) are illustrated in Figure 
5.30 below: 

199 For instance, the authors overlook the ‘services of household work and parenting’ (ƒHhFamt) 
yet include the ‘services of household labour’ (ƒHht) instead (a minor advance). Moreover, note 
that the series of defensive and rehabilitative adjustments to personal consumption expenditures 
implicitly include the disservices of auto accidents (‘dšPAuAcc’), private commuting (‘dšPCmt’), 
and the defensive expenditures on household pollution abatement (‘dšPPoll’). However, they are 





























 a = {åPCE|Servicesfrompersonalconsumptionexpenditures}
 s = {dšCr|Disservicesofcrime}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=Victorian/AustralianGPI(2)C={j,o,q,v,ae,af,ao,ar,as,aw}
 j = {åHhFamt|Servicesofhouseholdworkandparenting}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 q = {dšPCmt|Disservicesofprivatecommuting}
 v = {dšLeist|Disservicesoflostleisuretime}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 af = {dšNoiPoll|Disservicesofnoisepollution}
 ao = {ɁOzoneEK|Depletionoftheozone}
 ar = {ɁForestEK|Lossofnativeforests}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofnaturalhabitats}
 aw= {ăInvPFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(private)capital}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={d,f}
 d = {åGE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpenditures}
 f = {åHht|Servicesofhouseholdlabour}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={w,ai,ak,am,aw,az}
 w = {dšUet|Disservicesofunemployment}
 ai = {dšWasPoll|Disservicesofmunicipalsolidwastepollution}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 am= {ɁTimbEK|Depletionoftimberresources}
 aq = {ɁIrrigEK|Costsofexcessiveirrigationwateruse}
 az = {EHI|EcosystemHealthIndex(adjustment)}
 
As shown in the figure above, three key modifications to the existing 
template items are undertaken and ten variables were excluded.200 Eight 
extensions of the benefit/cost variables are made. In short, the 
Victorian/Australian GPI (2) has eleven contributions (9 minor, 2 major) 
to the template design. 
The identities of the Victorian GPI and the Australian GPI (2) are 




200 The way the ‘DI’ variable is adjusted in the Victorian/Australian GPI (2) is a bit different from 
the standard approach in the US GPI (1). Hence, it is a minor advance. The authors adjust their 
measure essentially same way as was already done in the Fisherian Income indicator, which is 
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Timb = timber resourcesviausercost,when the rateof timberstocksharvestedexceeds thenatural
regeneration rate (separatevaluesattached tonative forest timber,woodland forest timber,
plantationtimberǦbroadleaved,andplantationtimberǦconiferous)





oil barrel equivalent—cumulative figure is equivalent to the amount needed to compensate
futuregenerationsfortheexcessiveuseofenergyresources)
EHI = Ecosystem Health Index (adjustment) (lost lifeǦsupport functions, landcover disturbance
surveys)
 
Overall, there are some good technical advances to the 
Victorian/Australian GPI (2) over the basic template, mainly due to their 
adaptations of earlier efforts and their excellent investigation of defensive 
and rehabilitative expenditures. 
5.5.6 Chinese GPIs – Wen et al. (2007) 
Wen et al. (2007), authors of the Chinese GPIs (Suzhou, Yangzhou, 
Ningbo, Guangzhou), do not develop or follow a particular theory. Yet, 
they make a few advances to the US GPI (1) template. They estimate the 
costs of health problems caused by environmental pollution and the 
expenditures of pollution control and treatment. For air pollution, they 
have utilised the average concentration of various air pollutants as a 
guide to work out the costs. In reference to the international experience, 












morbidity of a disease caused by pollution was constructed and adjusted 
based on surveys on the medical treatment cases and environmental 
quality in the four cities. For water pollution, the opportunity and 
restoration cost approaches were utilised. The opportunity cost approach 
included the costs of health loss, medical expenditures, and income loss 
for absence from work caused by water-related illness. Expenditures for 
the treatment of wastewater and the expense of construction of drainage 
pipe networks are utilised in the restoration cost method.201 
Thus, authors of the Chinese GPIs have greater specificity of the 
health costs of pollution than earlier studies. Therefore, accounting for 
the disservices of air pollution (dšAirPoll) and water pollution 
(dšWatPoll) represent major refinements. Lastly, three minor refinements 
in the Chinese GPIs prevail over the basic template: the Gini coefficient is 
used instead of the low-quintile index; crime is looked at from the private 
and public levels; and the depletion of mineral resources is calculated. 
The five technical advances of the Chinese GPIs over the US GPI (1) are 















 s = {dšPGCr|Disservicesofcrime(privateandgovernmentlevel)}
 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 ah = {dšWatPoll|Disservicesofurbanwaterpollution}




 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 
In the figure above, there are four key modifications to the existing 
template and one cost item was extended. Overall, there are five 
contributions (3 minor, 2 major). 

201 Specifically, two methods were used to calculate value of health and life vis-à-vis air and water 
pollution: Willingness-to-pay (WTP) and the Human Capital Approach (HCA). For instance, HCA 
was used in transforming these pathological losses such as hospitalisation and sick leaves into 
monetary cost. Besides the wage loss caused by premature deaths and work absence, the medical 
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The modified variables and the inclusion of the cost item (ɷMineEK, 
depletion of mineral resources) over the basic template in the Chinese 









Volt = volunteer labour (estimated annual hours allocated to volunteerwork*themarket prices of
theselocalservices)








PGCr = outlaysoncrimeprevention (private level—expendituresonproperty insurance) (government
level—budgetsofpublicsecurity,courtofjustice,procuratoractivity,andpolice)
FamBr = family breakdown (direct cost to the adults involved and the indirect cost to the children
affectedbydivorce,basedonanestimateoftheexpensesforlegalfeesandcounselling)
Leist = lost leisure time (valueofeverynonworkinghourof leisure,estimatedby theaveragewage
rate)
Udet = underemployment










be reinvested (equal to the cost of depletion) (using themarket value of extractedmineral
resourcesofcopper,iron,andzincminustheaverageextractioncost)
Ener = energyresources(vianetpricemethodwheretherentfromtheextractedresourcesisrequired
to reinvested—the rent is equal to the cost of thedepletion—themarket value of extracted
energyresourcesofcoal,crudeoil,dieselandnaturalgasesminustheaverageextractioncost)
Ozone = ozone (environmental unit cost and the accumulative amount of ozone depleting chemicals
consumptionsince1980)
Forest = nativeforests(basedonthechangeinthereserveoftheoldǦgrowthforests)
NatHab = wetlands (estimating thevalueofecological service functions lostwhenwetland’sacreage is
convertedtootherpurposes—duetotheconversiontofarmlandstoraisefoodproductivity)
Land = agricultural land(urbanization,andpoor landmanagement leadingtothedeteriorationofsoil
fromerosion,overcultivation,andlossofwater)(thecostsofthefollowinglossesproductivity
capacity;environmentalservicefunctions;preventionandcontrol;andlandrents)
Futur = longǦterm (future) environmental damage (environmental unit cost and the accumulative
amountofCO2emissions)
 
Overall, the five advances of Chinese GPIs in Eq. (5.34) are satisfactory, 
but at this stage of the research—twelve years have passed since the 
launch of the US GPI—they are mild improvements over the template 

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and over the prevailing empirical material. 
5.5.7 French GPI – Nourry (2008) 
Nourry (2008) calculates both a ISEW and GPI for France. As mentioned 
in Section 5.3.15, it would not be fair to subject this paper to our rating 
classification because the focal point of her paper is on the construction 
of six other ‘sustainable development’ indicators. She only devotes a 
small amount of writing space to the ISEW/GPI. Besides, much like 
before with her ISEW study, there are no outstanding contributions. The 
difference between the French GPI and US GPI (1) is minimal; there is 
not a single technical (major or minor) advance in the French GPI. In 
terms of the technical literary scope of SEWIs, this study represents a 
step backwards. 
5.6 Innovations Achieved over the ISEW/GPI Templates 
and the Prevailing Empirical Material 
In this final major section, two measures that are based on the ISEW and 
GPI are discussed. They are the Sustainable Net Benefit Index (SNBI) 
and Fisherian Income (YF) studies. Both of these indicators are 
calculated for Australia. Essentially, the indices are structural derivatives 
of the ISEW/GPI. Yet, as argued in Chapter 4, the theoretical 
underpinning of the SNBI and YF is probably better than the ISEW/GPI. 
But this chapter is purely concerned with the relative degree of technical 
contributions. Here, the comparative analysis centres on the major 
and/or minor technical advances made in relation to the combined 
templates of the US ISEW (1) and US GPI (1), beginning with the 
Australian SNBI by Lawn and Sanders (1999) and Lawn (2001) in Section 
5.6.1 below: 
5.6.1 Australian SNBI – Lawn and Sanders (1999), Lawn (2001) 
To calculate a SNBI, measures of psychic income, psychic outgo and the 
depletion of the stock of ecological capital are required. The psychic 
income is enjoyed from either the use and/or consumption of wealth as 
well as from the process of wealth creation itself. Consider annual 
expenditure on consumer durables. Because the life of consumer 
durables exceeds one year, the current expenditures on consumer 
durables cannot be recorded as an act of personal consumption. The 
amount paid for consumer durables reflects the psychic income 
consumers expect to enjoy over the full time it takes to consume, 
degrade, or depreciate consumer durables. As such, it is necessary to 
subtract current expenditure on consumer durables. It has been assumed 
that the value of these services is equal to an annual depreciation value 
of 15 percent per year. 

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However, only one technical advance is made in the psychic income 
account.202 They add in the psychic services of leisure labour (ƒLeist). 
Accounting for the benefits of leisure is a major contribution despite the 
fact that it was previously incorporated in the US MEW and EAW. The 
authors of the US ISEW (1) and GPI (1) avoid measuring leisure in order 
to avoid controversy. Conversely, the authors of the SNBI are the first, 
and bold enough to reintroduce the undeniable welfare aspects of leisure. 
Hence, we consider the reinsertion of this item as a major advance. 
Secondly, the disservices deplored but nonetheless experienced from 
economic activity—psychic outgo—also need to be identified and valued. 
A large portion of the human-made capital produced each year does not 
contribute to the psychic income of a nation. It is produced to prevent 
the undesirable side-effects of the economic process reducing the 
psychic income enjoyed in the future. These are “non-welfare-increasing 
expenditures”. Therefore, a range of defensive and rehabilitative 
expenditures are considered in the SNBI, such as some medical and 
dental expenditures, the cost of vehicle repairs, crime prevention 
measures, and efforts to both rehabilitate and protect the natural 
environment from the impacts of economic activity. 
In their SNBI, several of the items in the US ISEW (1) and US GPI (1) 
have been improved but nothing new has been created. The defensive 
expenditures of crime (PCr) are measured by not only the theft of 
privately owned property (excluding the cost of crime inflicted upon the 
business and public sector) but also the cost of being confined indoors 
at particular times of the day or night or to particular places. The air 
pollution variable (dšAirPoll) is divided into two accounts: the psychic 
outgo aspect and the part linked to the ecological degradation account. 
40 percent of the total cost of air pollution was assumed the appropriate 
proportion for the negative effect on people’s psyche.203 The authors 
measure the direct disamenity cost of air pollution (NO2, SO2 and PM) 
that affects urban property value, wages and urban aesthetics. They have 
incorporated an important ‘psychic disservice’ item into their SNBI: the 
costs of unemployment (Uet), which is measured by multiplying the 
number of unemployed persons seeking either full-time or part-time work 
by the average real hourly wage. These three parameters, Uet, PCr, 
dšAirPoll, are minor advances over the basic templates. 
Thirdly, constructing an ‘uncancelled cost’ account is necessary to 
ascertain the extent to which the natural environment’s source–sink and 
life-support functions have been lost during each accounting period. The 
‘uncancelled cost’ account or the ‘depletion of ecological capital’ account 

202 Linking each component to ‘psychic income’ (or to psychic outgo etc.) is not a technical 
achievement per se, but an advance in theory, which was already graded in Chapter 4. 
203 The remaining share (60 percent) of the total costs of the air pollution is assumed to be caused 
by the waste assimilative capacity of the natural environment having been exceeded. This reflects 
the loss of ecosphere’s sink function. 
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is subtracted from the index. The cost of lost natural capital services 
should include the full range of source, sink, and life-support functions 
sacrificed in supplying the throughput of matter-energy needed to keep 
the stock of human-made capital intact. Estimating the cost of sacrificed 
source and sink functions is frequently undertaken in the net income 
studies (e.g. the cost of resource depletion and pollution). However, it is 
very difficult to estimate the cost of losing some of the life-support services 
provided by critical ecosystems.  
To overcome this problem, Lawn applies an Ecosystem Health Index 
(EHI) to the ‘uncancelled cost’ account. In essence, this adjustment 
highlights the extent of ecosystem degradation. The EHI is based on the 
premise that remnant vegetation loss constitutes the greatest threat to 
biodiversity and, therefore, to ecosystem functioning. The impact of most 
resource extractive and pollutive activities is not confined to the erosion 
of the ecosphere’s source and sink functions. A good example is 
agriculture, which first requires the clearance of native vegetation. Hence, 
to account for the loss of the ecosphere’s life-support function, an EHI is 
calculated. 
The sum total of the cost of lost ecological capital services is 
weighted in line with changes in an EHI. A base index value of 100 is 
assigned to the first year of the study period and is adjusted 
corresponding to the annual changes in the area of relatively undisturbed 
land. The annual cost of lost natural capital services is then divided by 
the index value and multiplied by 100. A decrease/increase in the area of 
relatively undisturbed land results in an upward/downward weighting of 
lost natural capital services. By including an EHI adjustment, Lawn 
makes a major innovation in the literature on net income indicators as a 
whole (and hence to the existing templates of the ISEW and GPI). 
Moreover, the Australian SNBI has achieved five more major 
advances in the environmental components. Accounting for the 
disservices of the municipal solid waste pollution (dšWasPoll), which is 
an ‘ecological sink’ variable, is a new contribution to the literature. The 
other four advances are linked to the extent to which the ‘ecological 
source’ function has been lost.204 The user (depletion) cost of metallic 
and non-metallic minerals is utilised for the ‘ɷMineEK’ item.205 A net 
stock value is utilised for timber resources (ɷTimbEK) and fish resources 
(ɷFishEK). Empirically their values are negative over the period of study, 

204 The degree to which the source function has been sacrificed is determined primarily by three 
factors: (a) the rate at which both renewable and non-renewable resources have been harvested or 
mined; (b) the regeneration rate of renewable resources; and (c) the extent to which renewable 
resources have been cultivated to offset the depletion of non-renewable resources (see Lawn and 
Sanders 1999:224). 
205 The user cost or the amount of total net receipts that must be set aside to establish a 
replacement asset to ensure a perpetual income stream. In comparison to Daly and Cobb (1989), 
the authors of the SNBI measure the ‘depletion of mineral resources’ with more specificity. Hence, 















that is, the rate of timber and fish stocks harvested exceeded their natural 
regeneration rate. For timber resources, the authors attach separate 
values to native forest timber, woodland forest timber, plantation timber-
broadleaved, and plantation timber-coniferous. Fishery resources include 
the stocks of prawns, rock lobster, abalone, scallops, oysters, fish 
(excluding tuna), and tuna. Accounting for the depletion of timber and 
fishery stocks is full of originality (major innovations). For the ‘loss of 
natural habitats’ item (ɷNatHabEK), separate values are attached to the 
hectares lost or degraded wetlands, mangroves, and saltmarshes. The 
authors have made strong progress in SEWI literature with inclusion of 
the depletion of the mineral, timber, fishery, mangroves and saltmarshes 
resources in the SNBI. 
The technical advances of the Australian SNBI over the US ISEW/GPI 















 ag = {dšAirPoll|Disservicesofairpollution}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofwetlands,mangrovesandsaltmarshes}
 aw= {ăInvBFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(business)capital}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=AustralianSNBIC={j,n,t,v,ar}
 j = {åHhFamt|Servicesofhouseholdworkandparenting}
 n = {dšPUrban|Disservicesofthedisamenitiesofurbanization(privatelevel)}
 t = {dšAd|Disservicesofadvertising}
 v = {dšLeist|Disservicesoflostleisuretime}
 ar = {ɁForestEK|Lossofnativeforests}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={i}
 i = {åLeist|Servicesofleisurelabour}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={w,ai,am,an,az}
 w = {dšUet|Disservicesofunemployment}
 ai = {dšWasPoll|Disservicesofmunicipalsolidwastepollution}
 am= {ɁTimbEK|Depletionoftimberresources}
 an = {ɁFishEK|Depletionoffisheryresources}
 az = {EHI|EcosystemHealthIndex(adjustment)}
 
The author’s creativity is outstanding, especially considering the very well 
developed ecological cost items. The above figure shows that the 
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Reflecting the wide list of modifications linked to Fisher’s notion of 








GFK = durable fixed public capital an annual (imputed service (rental) flow of 11.5% for public
dwellings,roadsandhighways)
GheedE = nonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresinhealthandeducation(50%forboth)
Hht = household labour (grossopportunity costofanhourofunpaidhouseholdworkbasedon an
averagehourlyrealwage)
Volt = volunteerlabour(totalhoursofvoluntaryvolunteerwork*averageyearlyhourlyrealwage)
Leist = leisure labour (thenumberofhours in adayminus the averagedailynumberofnonǦleisure
hoursofAustraliansaged15yearsandabove(theminimumschoolǦleavingage))206









PCr/ = defensiveexpendituresoncrimeprevention (private level) (theftofprivatelyownedproperty,
and thecostofbeingconfined indoorsatparticular timesof thedayor toparticularplaces—
assumedequivalenttotheamountspentbyallformsofgovernmentonpublicorderandsafety)
FamBr = familybreakdownby the costofdivorceand itseffectson children (expenses for legal fees,







AirPoll = airpollution, impactonurbanproperty valuesandwages,andurbanaesthetics,assumed to
constitute40%ofthetotalcostofairpollution(controlanddamagecosts)
DepletionofEcologicalCapital(ɁEK)=UncancelledCosts
AirPoll = airpollution, lossof theecosphere’s sink function,assumed that60%of the totalcostofair
pollution reflects the waste assimilative capacity of the natural environment having been






Timb = timber resourcesviausercost,when the rateof timberstocksharvestedexceeds thenatural
regeneration rate (separatevaluesattached tonative forest timber,woodland forest timber,
plantationtimberǦbroadleaved,andplantationtimberǦconiferous)
Fish = fishery resourcesviausercost,when the rateof fisherystocksharvestedexceeds thenatural
regenerationrate(prawns,rocklobster,abalone,scallops,oysters,fish(excludingtuna),tuna)

206 The average weekly hours of nonleisure include the following: paid employment; unpaid work; 
commuting; resting and sleeping; getting an education; and job seeking. 
207According to Lawn and Sanders (1999:221), the private costs of the damage of vehicles are 




NatHab = natural habitats/areas (separate values attached to the hectares lost or degradedwetlands,
mangroves,andsaltmarshes—cumulativeloss)
Land = agricultural land (annual productivity loss equal to 6% of the annual value of agricultural
production,andthelossesduetourbanisation—cumulativelosses)
Futur = longǦterm(future)environmentaldamage(annualconsumptionofenergyconvertedtoacrude
oil barrel equivalent—cumulative figure is equivalent to the amount needed to compensate
futuregenerationsfortheexcessiveuseofenergyresources)
EHI = Ecosystem Health Index (adjustment) (lost lifeǦsupport functions, landcover disturbance
surveys)
 
The EHI is applied to the whole ‘uncancelled cost’ account. A high level 
of intricacy is evident in Eq. (5.36) above, encapsulating thirty-three 
unique parameters. Overall, Australian SNBI is very good contribution to 
the literature. 
5.6.2 Australian Fisherian Income (YF) – Lawn (2004b, 2006c) 
Fisherian income (YF) is concerned with sustaining productive capacity 
and the net psychic income enjoyed by a nation’s citizens. The need for a 
‘Fisherian income indicator’ was recognised by Lawn (2004, 2006d). The 
author assumes that 20 percent of all private and public consumption 
expenditure constitutes spending of a defensive and/or rehabilitative 
kind. As such, 80 percent of private and public consumption expenditure 
is enhancing welfare. This is a conservative adjustment when compared 
to similar studies. In order to calculate the ‘net psychic income’, the 
following technique is utilised: the services from personal consumption 
expenditures (ƒPCE), stock of consumer durables (ƒCDK), and non-
defensive public expenditures (ƒGE) were added together after 
subtracting consumer durable expenditures (CDE); these four items were 
then adjusted by a distribution index (DI). Then the depreciation flow of 
durable fixed business capital (ɷBFK) was added.208 The way the YF 
indicator is constructed is special but it is similar to the basic ISEW/GPI 
templates. Hence, according to the grading system, the above six ‘net 
psychic income’ variables are counted as minor contributions. 
Lawn (2004, 2006d) avoids over-complicating the calculation of the 
‘psychic outgo’ and the ‘depletion of ecological capital’ components. To 
make things simpler, he omits numerous psychic costs of economic 
activity, items such as the positive value of volunteer and household 
labour, leisure time, the costs of unemployment, noise pollution, 
commuting, crime, and family breakdown, and the change in a nation’s 
foreign debt position. Of the ecological parameters included, virtually all 
are transposed from the Hamilton and Dennis (2001) study, such as the 
costs of the loss of old growth forests, ozone depletion and long-term 
(future) environmental damage. Measuring the costs of ‘excessive 
irrigation water use’ and incorporating an ‘Ecosystem Health Index 

208 Note that the ‘ɷBFK’ variable is not new. Nordhaus and Tobin (1971) subtracted a depreciation 














(adjustment)’ are supplementary items of the basic template design. But 
these items, ‘ɷIrrigEK’ and ‘EHI’, are reiterations of a former study. Thus, 
they are counted as minor advances. 
The technical advances of the Australian YF over the US ISEW/GPI 















 a = {åPCE|Servicesfrompersonalconsumptionexpenditures}
 b = {åCDK|Servicesfromthestockofconsumerdurables}
 d = {åGE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpenditures}
 l = {CDE|Consumerdurableexpenditures}
 ay = {DI|Distributionindex(adjustment)}
Excludeditemsfromthebasictemplate=AustralianYFC={c,e,f,h,j,n,o,q,...v,x,ae,af,ak,as,aw,ax}
 c = {åGFK|Servicesfromdurablefixedpubliccapital}
 e = {åGheedE|ServicesofnonǦdefensivepublicexpendituresinhealthandeducation}
 f = {åHht|Servicesofhouseholdlabour}
 h = {åVolt|Servicesofvolunteerlabour}
 j = {åHhFamt|Servicesofhouseholdworkandparenting}
 n = {dšPUrban|Disservicesofthedisamenitiesofurbanization(privatelevel)}
 o = {dšPAuAcc/|Disservicesofautoaccidents(privatedefensiveexpenditures)}
 q = {dšPCmt|Disservicesofprivatecommuting}
 r = {dšPheed/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonprivatehealthandeducationoutlays}
 s = {dšPCr/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresoncrimeprevention(privatelevel)}
 t = {dšAd|Disservicesofadvertising}
 u = {dšFamBr|Disservicesoffamilybreakdown}
 v = {dšLeist|Disservicesoflostleisuretime}
 x = {dšUdet|Disservicesofunderemployment}
 ae = {dšPPoll/|Disservicesofdefensiveexpendituresonhouseholdpollutionabatement}
 af = {dšNoiPoll|Disservicesofnoisepollution}
 ak = {ɁMineEK|Depletionofmineralresources}
 as = {ɁNatHabEK|Lossofnaturalhabitats}
 aw= {ăInvPBGFK|Netinvestmentofdurablefixed(private,businessandgovernment)capital}
 ax = {ăInt|Netinternationalposition}
Extensionofthebenefititems=Plus\Minus={Ø}
Extensionofthecostitems=Minus\Plus={aq,av,az}
 aq = {ɁIrrigEK|Costsofexcessiveirrigationwateruse}
 av = {ɁBFK|Depreciationflowofdurablefixedbusinesscapital}
 az = {EHI|EcosystemHealthIndex(adjustment)}
 
As previously mentioned and seen in the figure below, a large number of 
variables were excluded in the YF, twenty items in total. Three variables 
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of durable fixed business capital’ (ɷBFK). Overall, there are eight 
contributions (8 minor, 0 major) in the Australian Fisherian Income 
indicator. 
The Lawn’s YF puts forward a slightly different identity to the 
























by future impacts on humans and environment—estimated contribution of each tonne of
emissionstothedamageitisexpectedtocauseinthefuture)
EHI = Ecosystem Health Index (adjustment) (lost lifeǦsupport functions, landcover disturbance
surveys)
 
Despite the strength of a theoretical foundation, amid the zero 
innovations of the Australian YF over the US ISEW/GPI (1) templates, 
the technical contribution to the literature is minimal at best. 
5.7 The Effective Rate of Replication (EROR) – Are There 
Major Limits to Redeveloping the ISEW/GPI? 
This section now summarises the results from the technical survey 
detailed in Sections 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. It was hypothesised at the beginning 
of the chapter that net income indices are innovative measures of welfare 
and capable of improvement. In this study, the validity of hypothesis four 
(H4) is partly determined by the extent of innovatory techniques 
employed by the authors of net income indices. For assessing hypothesis 
four, H4, we are especially interested in the ISEWs, GPIs, SNBI, and YF 
as a collective body. If the evidence suggests that innovations are manifold 
then there is less chance that the basic templates of ISEW/GPI have been 
replicated. On the other hand, if the evidence suggests that innovations 
are shallow then the basic templates of ISEW/GPI have probably been 

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imitated. An appropriate scale is therefore devised that incorporates the 
scores of the ‘minor’ and ‘major’ contributions (‘1’ = minor, ‘2’ = major) 
as rough proxies for measuring the degree of technical innovations. 
The scale is called the ‘Effective Rate of Replication’ (EROR). The 
EROR pertains to the degree of replication in relation to the basic 
template and to the prevailing empirical material. Founded on the 
investigator’s simple dual-score rating system, EROR is a weighted 
summation of these individual scores. The quantities of ‘minor 
contributions’ and ‘major contributions’ are derived from a critical 
analysis of the literature in the body of this chapter. As specified at the 
beginning, ‘major technical contributions’ are effectively “innovations”: a 
score is credited to the author(s) who first introduced a new variable 
and/or made a significant change in methods. ‘Minor technical 
contributions’ are not innovations per se: a lesser (minor) score is 
credited to the author(s) who integrated variables that are not found in 
the basic templates and/or moderately changed the methods that are 
found in the basic templates, applying them to their country/area of 
interest. When nothing original has been created from the prevailing 
empirical material, a minor score is awarded because the basic 
templates, i.e. US ISEW (2) and/or US GPI (1), are the reference points 
of our investigation. 
Hence, in order to capture the degree of innovations, it is assumed 
that for each study (i) of a set of thirty-three studies, a ‘major 
contribution’ (Mi) is worth four times more than a ‘minor contribution’ 
(mi). This weighting scheme is arbitrary, in much the same way as those 
employed in the literature on net income indicators.209 There are twenty-
one variables utilised in the original US ISEW (2), which is the primary 
basic template used in this study. With the number, ‘21’, and knowledge 
about the number of major (Mi) and minor (mi) contributions an EROR 
can be calculated. EROR gives a percentage of 100 percent or less, as 
shown in Eq. (5.38) below: 






Any EROR score of 90 and above, up to and including 100 means that the 
authors have virtually replicated the basic templates of the ISEW/GPI. An 
EROR score between 60 and 90 suggests that there have been good 

209 For instance, in his Fisherian income study, Lawn (2004b, 2006c) adopts the following arbitrary 
assumption: that 80% of consumption expenditures are positively contributing to well-being and 
the remaining 20% are not. 
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refinements made to the basic templates of ISEW/GPI, albeit it depends 
on where the final value falls, i.e. close to the upper or lower echelon of 
the scale. An EROR score between 30 and 60 implies that authors of 
SEWIs have employed a great deal of innovatory practices; the structure 
of ISEW/GPI is highly reformulated. Any EROR score less than 30 would 
entail a radically different ISEW/GPI model, perhaps a completely new 
measure. EROR is thus a useful proxy for determining whether the ‘Net 
Income Indices’ are innovative measures and capable of improvement 
(H4). The overall results of the dual-score rating system and EROR for 

















Diefenbacher (1994) Germany 1 0 99 
Jackson and Marks (1994) 
UK 3 3 86 
Jackson et al. (1997) 
Moffatt and Wilson (1994) Scotland 3 1 93 
Rosenberg et al. (1995) Netherlands 1 2 91 
Jackson and Stymne (1996) Sweden 3 1 93 
Stockhammer et al. (1997) Austria 6 4 79 
Guenno and Tiezzi (1998) Italy 3 1 93 
Castañeda (1999) Chile 2 0 98 
Gil and Sleszynski (2003) 
Poland 2 0 98 
Prochowicz and Sleszynski (2006) 
Clarke and Islam (2004, 2005a),  
Clarke (2006b) Thailand 7 3 82 
Pulselli et al. (2006) Siena (Italy) 3 1 93 
Jackson et al. (2006) 
Yorkshire and Humber, 
Northern Way, UK 9 2 84 
Bleys (2006a, 2006b) 
Belgium 6 2 87 
Bleys (2008) 
Bleys (2007a, 2007b) Netherlands 4 0 96 
GenuineProgressIndicators
Cobb et al. (1995) 
US 
1 6 76 
Anielski and Rowe (1999) 
1 0 99 
Cobb et al. (1999) 
Cobb et al. (2000) 
Cobb et al. (2001) 
Venetoulis and Cobb (2004) 
Talberth et al. (2007) 3 3 86 
Hamilton (1997, 1999) 
Australia 
9 7 65 
Hamilton and Denniss (2001) 17 2 76 
Anielski (2001) Alberta 14 6 64 
Costanza et al. (2004) Vermont, Chittenden County and Burlington (US) 2 0 98 
Clarke and Lawn (2005) 
Lawn and Clarke (2006a, 2006b) Victoria (Australia) 
9 2 84 
Lawn and Clarke (2006b),  
Clarke and Lawn (2007) Australia 
Wen et al. (2007) 
Suzhou, Yangzhou, 
Ningbo, and Guangzhou 
(China) 
3 2 90 
SustainableNetBenefitsIndex(SNBI)
Lawn and Sanders (1999), 
Lawn (2001) Australia 3 7 70 
FisherianIncome(YF)
Lawn (2004b, 2006c) Australia 8 0 92 




The above table indicates that the majority of authors have imitated the 
basic template of the ISEW. On the other hand, the GPI is an important 
attempt to ‘socialise’ the ISEW. The authors of the original GPI achieved 
good technical refinements in the methods used since the rebirth of 
ISEW; with an EROR of 76%, they have made some satisfactory 
refinements. However, the GPI is virtually analogous in “theory” to that 
of the original ISEW, and largely impersonates it. Therefore, as 
exemplified by the EROR of 87% for the set of thirty-three studies, 
authors of the net income indices have for the most part impersonated 
the basic template design of the ISEW. This is not a problem if the basic 
template features a solid conceptual base—which Chapter 3 argued is 
not the case. 
Hence, with respect to hypothesis four (H4), net income indices are 
not very innovative measures of welfare. As a collective body, the extent 
of innovatory techniques employed by the authors of net income indices 
is low. The high replication rate may indicate that there are major limits 
to radically (re)developing the ISEW/GPI—i.e. it has not been possible 
for advocates to attain a ‘Highly Reformulated’, low EROR score between 
30 and 60 (see Table 5.2). For example, inclusions of the obsolescence of 
consumer goods and social interdependence were noted by some 
authors at an early stage of the research material, yet they were not 
developed in any of the net income indicators. What other elements 
could have been included (or excluded)? Most importantly for this study, 
what is the relationship between the ISEW/GPI (and its derivatives) and 
the disembedded economy? The answer to such crucial questions 
warrants a final critical analysis into these net income indices. 
5.8 Conclusion 
In summary, this study has critically evaluated the authors’ relative 
degree of technical contribution vis-à-vis the basic templates of the US 
ISEW (2) by Cobb and Cobb (1994) and the US GPI (1) by Cobb et al. 
(1995), and the prevailing empirical material. With the aid of Venn 
diagrams, set theory notation and detailed equations, a scrutiny of the 
minor and major advances of the net income studies were presented. 
There are some very good contributions to the literature, such as the 
Austrian ISEW by Stockhammer et al. (1997), Albertan GPI by Anielski 
(2001), Australian GPIs by Hamilton (1997, 1999) and Hamilton and 
Denniss (2001), and the SNBI by Lawn and Sanders (1999) and Lawn 
(2001). These studies were innovatory because of new extensions of 
variables and/or considerable changes in technical methods. However, 
relatively speaking, the majority of studies have not excelled in this area. 
Many studies slavishly follow the technical methods adopted by Cobb 
and Cobb (1994) and Cobb et al. (1995). They substitute most of the 
variables of the US ISEW (2) or the US GPI (1) for their region/area of 
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interest. In the main, they merely mimicked their predecessors and in 
most cases copied the prevailing commonsensical accounting template 
without adequate critical analysis of, or improving upon earlier works. 
The high replication rate may indicate that there are inherent limits to 
redeveloping the ISEW/GPI. In other words, SEWI advocates appear to 
be stuck with a restricted set of variables to conduct their analyses of 
social and environmental welfare. H4 is thus rejected. In the next 
chapter, a fundamental critique of the net income indicators is put 
forward, arguing that an alternative measure anchored in the political 
economy of the disembedded system is a (partial) solution to the 
research problem. It is argued in the final major chapter of this study that 
the SEWIs desperately need radical theoretical reconstruction or else 











Chapter 5 examined the advocates’ relative degree of technical 
contribution. Some of these studies are quite innovatory because of their 
new extensions of variables and considerable changes in mechanical 
methods, e.g. the GPI is an important attempt to ‘socialise’ the ISEW. 
However, many studies slavishly follow the basic templates of Cobb and 
Cobb (1994) and Cobb et al. (1995). They merely imitate their 
predecessors by substituting the US ISEW or US GPI for a national, 
subnational or local area of interest. The high replication rate may 
indicate that there are limits to radically (re)developing the ISEW/GPI. 
This is not a problem if the template features a strong conceptual base. A 
deeper scrutiny of the robustness of conceptual foundations of net 
welfare indicators is now needed. 
Utilising the principles of political economy, this chapter embarks on 
such an analysis. Phillip O’Hara (2007b) defines political economy as:  
 
a realistic, interdisciplinary study of the dynamic structure, 
evolution and transformation of human action within 
socioeconomic systems, paying particular attention to the 
reproduction, functions, contradictions, and unstable 
dynamics of the institutions of production, distribution, 
and exchange of material and immaterial resources set 
within a social and ecological environment through 
historical time. [O’Hara 2007b:6] 
 
For political economy, a strong historico-institutional apparatus is critical 
for a proper view of the ecological, evolutionary and socio-political 
dimensions of global and regional dynamics. The promotion of a realistic 
dialectical analysis is the basis of pragmatic enquiry in political economy. 
Hypothesis five, H5, of this study thereby states that: 
 
H5: Understanding the political economy of capitalism will provide 
vital insights into Net Welfare Indices. 
 
There are major limitations of the approach to sustainable development 
as construed by ecological economists (the advocates of Net Welfare 
Indices). They have a tendency to view ‘society’, ‘capital’ and ‘service’ 
largely autonomous of the disembedded economy. This is a major 
problem for the Net Welfare Indices. Hence, without fundamentally 
understanding the productive, property, and power relations that define 

358
the system, applications of net income indices are futile (H5). 
This chapter develops a fundamental critique of net welfare 
indicators. Because of an extensive range of indicators in the literature, 
for specificity, the scope of analysis is delimited. But it is possible that 
the critique will pertain to the gamut of other net welfare indices. 
Nonetheless, in this study, the focus is on the following popular net 
welfare (or net income) indicators: the Index of Sustainable Economic 
Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), Sustainable Net 
Benefit Index (SNBI) and Fisherian Income (YF). These indicators are 
similar in many ways; in this study, they are described as 
“ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF”, Net Welfare Indices, or Sustainable Economic 
Welfare Indicators (SEWIs). Chapter 6 is divided into seven major 
sections to develop a panoptic critique of the measures. We will now 
summarise each major section, which begins with a synopsis of the 
nature of the problem, the critique, and the political economy principles 
utilised to develop the argument. 
Section 6.2 centres on the foremost conceptual issue within SEWIs. 
‘Net psychic income’ has been entrenched as the predominant 
theoretical basis for the aggregated measures of sustainable economic 
welfare. But is the account of net psychic income realistic and dynamic? 
We examine this question in more detail in connection with the multiple 
capital paradigm (MCP). The MCP recognises that there are 
heterogeneous durable structures (capital stocks or wealth) that 
potentially yield services and disservices. A limited view of wealth leads 
to major theoretical problems. However, ambiguity is found due to the 
advocates’ oversimplification of Irving Fisher’s notion of psychic income 
experiences and of service flows from capital. It is argued that the indices 
lack a holistic and strong theoretical foundation because of a limited 
conceptualisation of wealth, specifically ‘human-health capital’. 
The MCP principle is also utilised in Section 6.3 to underscore that 
the advocates have a limited ontology of ‘consumption’. The reference 
point for measuring economic welfare in the SEWI, i.e. personal 
consumption expenditures, is probably inadequate because of the weak 
connection between choice and social welfare in a disembedded economy. 
The disembedded economy features an inclination for economic 
relationships to dominate social relationships of affiliation and 
organisation. It is argued that several key concepts of political economy 
are unheeded in their analyses, specifically, the ignorance of producer v 
consumer sovereignty. Consumption is not necessarily for ‘inner-
directed’ (satisfaction) purposes, e.g. fashion goods. A consumer’s ‘free’ 
choice vis-à-vis their net welfare is convoluted because of the uselessness 
of obsolescence and of conspicuous consumption and emulation. These 
abstractions from reality further support the argument that the SEWIs 
have a soft theoretical base. 
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Section 6.4 represents the backbone of this chapter. Advocates of 
SEWIs have primarily considered only two forms of capital, artefact (such 
as consumer goods) and ecological (such as natural resources) capitals. 
Regrettably, they have tarnished other critical forms of wealth, namely, 
human-health capital and social capital by superficially counting these 
forms of wealth in their net welfare indicators. Subsequently, it is argued 
that their conception of capital is simplistic. Their restricted view of 
social capital inhibits the conceptual and empirical analysis. It leads 
potentially to the destruction of vital forms of wealth because they are 
abstracted from the analysis. But, the greatest fault by advocates is the 
lack of connecting their view of wealth with the principle of ‘multiple 
contradictions of the disembedded economy’. It becomes evident that 
advocates have not properly understood the concept of contradiction, 
which entails scrutinising the positive and negative features of 
socioeconomic systems that are endogenously ingrained in the fabric of 
various processes, institutions and relationships. 
The advocates of SEWIs focus mainly on the contradiction between 
the natural environment and consumption goods. They are obsessed 
with the natural environment; yet only handle society to a limited degree. 
They are in a one-and-a-half contradiction world; they see primarily one 
contradiction and a partial social reality. Yet, in the global disembedded 
economy, all areas of life are both relatively autonomous yet 
interconnected. The creation of markets and new products often occur 
through the destruction of non-market relations. Consequently, the so-
called ‘service’ from consumption in the SEWIs is not genuine, because 
culture and tradition are potentially being destroyed in the process. It is 
necessary to transcend the ‘one-and-a-half contradiction world’ and have 
a broader view of wealth. The root of the problem is that the vast majority 
of net income studies concentrated on accounting techniques, rather 
than solving these vital theoretical concerns. 
The reference point of ‘consumption’ in SEWIs is not only a problem 
in itself but also one of misplaced concreteness of monetary 
imputations, as argued in Section 6.5. Monetary measures ignore 
important personal, social and cultural perceptions. Sometimes the 
actual flow of the disservice is not known with certainty, because of 
imperfect information. Many people are not fully informed about the 
health implications of a whole range of ‘goods’. Thus, the validity of the 
link between price, money, value and the psychic services/disservices is 
challenged. There is imperfect knowledge not only about ecological 
systems, but also about unexplained phenomena and uncertainty in all 
forms and aspects of life processes. It is impossible to infer an ‘optimal 
value’ of net welfare purely in monetary terms. There must be a rejection 
of theory based on optimality. Questions are thus raised about the 
competence of SEWIs to deal with real-world problems in an 
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environment of uncertainty and lack of information. 
Thus, it is not very meaningful to construct indicators where ‘price’ is 
the leading measure of welfare. More importantly, as Section 6.6 argues, 
solitary restriction to ‘price’ in the SEWIs (subjugated by consumption) 
buttresses the doctrine of the disembedded economy, because there is 
no social sustainability basis. Non-market relationships and social relations 
of power are abstracted in such studies—in part the ideology of 
disembeddedness is now manifested within the framework of SEWIs. The 
process of constructing an aggregated net-consumption index without 
scrutinising the monetary evaluations in the context of a dynamic 
capitalist system downplays societal processes. There is an 
indeterminate and qualitative character of service/psychic-income and 
disservice/psychic-outgo generation from wealth. It is impracticable to 
scrutinise the dynamic processes of a capitalist society in a single index. 
Section 6.7 argues that we cannot consider the sum of incomes 
(services) flowing from commodities as the most important quality. 
Foremost, we must decipher under what conditions who receives the 
service, because of moral or institutional constraints. That is, one cannot 
simply consider the service flowing from a commodity without 
interpreting distributional aspects. For instance, there is a potential 
trade-off between individual and social welfare, where the interests of the 
individual are satisfied at the expense of societal welfare. Utilising the 
holistic method, the role (if any) of the individual and the social entity in 
the net psychic income index (by advocates) is critically assessed in this 
section. There are more complications with SEWIs, especially when the 
relationship between the global political economy and individual welfare 
is complex. Complexity prevails because social structures and dominant 
institutions shape the social filters, which include attitudes, beliefs, 
judgements, values, habits, and behaviours. 
It is argued in Section 6.8 that SEWIs prevent fruitful net welfare 
analysis of heterogeneous agents. The principle of heterogeneous agents 
states that there are multiple positions and diverse roles in which 
individuals and species function in the economy. For example, the ability 
of parents to influence the intergenerational transfer of resources to their 
offspring (children) is a crucial determinant of the material and cultural 
advantages they will bring to bear on the future. High levels of education 
among the community and key job and economic connections (social 
linkages) are common for people from families with more control of 
wealth. Merely summating the income of individuals in an index would 
therefore trivialise important asymmetric distributional problems in the 
market economy. They have a distributional element but it is too general 
to provide an instructive analysis. 
Therefore, it is doubtful that SEWIs are describing and measuring 
accurately social and ecological change, because significant conceptual, 
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methodological, and technical inconsistencies mar the results. The raw 
ecological economistic approach limits the study. There is a need to 
transcend it. As a point of departure, it is best to have a global social and 
ecological political economy approach. Section 6.9 concludes the chapter 
by summarising the critical appraisal of the outlook for SEWIs. Direction 
for this study is discussed: the need for a radical theoretical 
reconstruction ingrained in strong socio-institutional analysis. Succinctly, 
the fundamental critique of SEWIs from a political economy viewpoint 
has significance, because numerous flaws and vital oversights have 
surprisingly been overlooked in the net welfare/income literature. 
6.2  Is the Account of Net Psychic Income Realistic and 
Dynamic? 
According to Philip A. Lawn, SEWIs are pecuniary measures of the 
“welfare a nation enjoys at a particular point in time given the impact of 
past and present activities” (Lawn 2003:106, 2005:187-8). That is, the 
SEWI for a particular year is an estimation of the economic welfare being 
experienced by a nation’s citizens in that year. Lawn (2004b, 2006c) 
argues that the monetary measures are based on Irving Fisher’s (1906) 
definition of “net psychic income”. He details each price-based item 
within the ISEW, GPI, SNBI and YF and links it to the Fisherian concept 
of income and capital. He evaluates some criticisms raised against the 
indicators and thus puts Fisher’s notion of income embedded in a 
‘sustainable development’ framework into perspective (see Lawn 2001, 
2006a). For example, he has integrated, rather well, ‘service’ and 
‘disservice’ into the sustainable development paradigm (see Lawn and 
Sanders 1999:215-6). Quintessentially, Lawn argues that SEWIs in 
principle provide a first-rate income statement of the ability to achieve 
sustainable economic welfare when depleting the source, sink, and life-
support services provided by ecological capital. 
Lawn’s ‘ecologising’ of Irving Fisher’s concept of income and capital 
is an outstanding contribution to the literature. Particularly, he has 
justified the applicability of the Fisherian worldview in accounting for loss 
of natural capital services as a consequence of the accumulation of final 
artefact, durable fixed business and public capital services. One 
concludes after a critical examination of his works that Lawn has 
undertaken an ‘entry point’ into the complex wealth–welfare equation. 
Hence, the single contradiction he implicitly identifies is the loss of 
ecological capital and the accumulation of ‘human-made capital’. The 
contradiction of ‘environmental protection and durable fixed business 
capital’ is a critical problem, as the public goods of a clean environment 
and climate stability have deteriorated in the pro-market economy. The 
contradictory nature of capitalism results in high social costs, mass 
environmental waste and biodiversity loss, which reduce sustainable 
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economic welfare (Brennan 2004, Muir and Zegarac 2001). 
However, SEWIs are partial measures of sustainability.210 For 
instance, only a portion of the total resource costs associated with 
natural resource depletion is deducted. Empirically, the focus of SEWIs is 
on maintaining non-declining welfare itself (services) in the present.211 
Maintaining the capacity to provide non-declining welfare in the future 
(embodied in capital) is apparently not the focus point of SEWIs. Dietz 
and Neumayer (2007) argue that by assuming the diverse components of 
comprehensive utility can be simply added together in arriving at an 
overall indicator, they are a measure of weak-sustainability, not strong-
sustainability. “The underlying assumption is that an increase in one 
component can compensate for a decrease in another” (Dietz and 
Neumayer 2007:621). Yet, as argued in Chapter 3, the theoretical 
foundations of SEWIs are in principle based on strong-sustainability (vis-
à-vis the contradiction of ecological and human-made capital). 
The idea of ‘strong sustainability’ requires us to acknowledge the 
trade-offs (if any) in other forms of capital.212 With strong sustainability, 
reversibility is not possible when certain critical stocks of ecological 
capital are destroyed. In terms of the multiple capital paradigm (MCP), 
there are various forms of durable structures such as private business, 
public, final artefact, ecological, human and social capitals (see O’Hara 
2001a). These categories are heterogeneous and not easily reduced to a 
common measure of value, e.g. human capital is mainly dependent upon 
social, cultural and organisational capital. In essence, the many forms of 
capital are a “stock of durable structures” (be they machines, knowledge, 
norms, trust, relationships, or organisations), which have a flow of 
services (potentially at least) over time. Capital stocks can provide 
services in many ways, such as providing friendship, relations of 
marriage, knowledge, skills, organisational solutions, trust, or beauty. 
Investment therefore takes many forms, namely, being the build-up of 
such specific durable structures through time. Consumption of capitals is 
destruction when the market-system destroys specific capitals in order to 
create “services”. With respect to hypothesis five (H5), the MCP is crucial 

210 “The ISEW … attempt[s] to account for future sustainability by incorporating measures of the 
economic impacts of resource depletion, and the long-term impacts of environmental damage. … 
[But,] ISEW should be regarded only as a de minimus indicator of sustainability or unsustainability 
of past actions, and not as any kind of insurance policy against the future” (Jackson and Marks 
1994:35). 
211 For example, in the case of ozone depletion, long-term environmental damage, and lost old-
growth forests, the impact on the sustainable economic welfare in a given year depends primarily 
on what has happened in the past. The total monetary cost in any given year reflects the amount 
required to compensate a nation’s citizens in that year—in a sense, a compensatory fund—for the 
cumulative impact on the ozone layer, climate change and old-growth forests of past as well as 
present economic activities. 
212 In general, sustainability of a global or local system can be understood as the compatibility 
among social, economic, and cultural dynamics and environmental resources in the present and 
the future (Pol 1996:28, Uzzell et al. 2002). 
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for a realistic study of the dynamic material and immaterial durable 
structures and transformations of human welfare. 
But is the account of net psychic income realistic and dynamic? How are 
the advocates trying to comprehend the underlying processes at work in 
the structures of capital/service? What is the corollary of Lawn’s entry 
point into the complex wealth–welfare equation? A limited view of wealth 
leads to serious theoretical questions. It is not that Fisher’s concept of 
psychic income or psychic service should be entirely discarded, but a 
scrutiny of the multifaceted nature of psychic income is required. For 
instance, Lawn states, “one of the key implications of the Fisherian 
concept of income and capital is that additions to the stock of human-
made capital should not be counted as income” (see Lawn 2005:201).213 
However, because of the limited worldview of ‘wealth’, the following 
important question remains unanswered: Does not a major part of the 
processing of ‘psychic flux’ modify the stock of “human-health capital” 
over real historical time? This question centres on the human psyche, 
which will be examined systematically below, following a short review of 
psychic income/service.214 
Closer analysis of Kenneth Boulding’s “A Reconstruction of 
Economics” (1950) reveals important information regarding the analysis 
of the durability of capital stocks and the important link to psychic 
income. According to Boulding (1950:139-41), it can be doubted that any 
non-durable goods exist when one considers psychic capital. Even 
services, for example movies, engender psychic capital with a limited rate 
of depreciation. As moviegoers, people go to produce a mental state. 
One purchases this mental state (a commodity) with the admission 
prices. This commodity depreciates like any other commodity. There is 
rapid depreciation for some people, so that it has to be replaced in a 
week or less. For other people the rate of depreciation is slower and so 

213 According to Lawn, investment-demand that renders (potential) services in future years is not 
part of the current flow of income. This is because the current flow of ‘income’ is based on the 
investment-demand undertaken in the past. For instance, the SNBI ensures that additions to the 
stock of human-made capital should not be counted as income by subtracting current expenditure 
on consumer durables and by not adding current government expenditure on human-made capital. 
214 Lawn (2001:3) following Georgescu-Roegen (1971) agrees that human welfare depends, not on 
the rate of a physical flow, but on a psychic flux—the psychic enjoyment of life. “[T]he service 
yielded by the stock is a ‘psychic flux’ and, with no physical dimension of its own, cannot be 
accumulated (Daly 1979:[80])” (Lawn 2001:79). According to Lawn, a flux rather than a stock or 
flow is a ‘service’ that closely corresponds to Fisher’s (1906) notion of psychic income. That is, the 
psychic flux cannot be experienced per se without the existence of physical goods (and labour)—the 
intensity with which physical commodities are able to service humankind’s ‘ultimate end’ depends 
on their individual service-yielding qualities. The psychic enjoyment of life is determined primarily 
by the quantity of the stock of human-made capital (at least up to a certain amount), the quality of 
the stock, and its ownership distribution (Lawn 2006b:37). Surprisingly, in all of Lawn’s works, at 
least up to the time of writing (April 2009), he neither defines with specificity nor critically 
evaluates the concept of ‘psychic flux’, even supposing it is paramount in the SEWI’s theoretical 
framework. Besides, Lawn (2003) develops Fisher’s notion of ‘psychic income’ in SEWIs—not the 
so-called ‘psychic flux’. For the purposes of this critique, the ‘psychic flux’ is directly interpreted as 
meaning Fisher’s notion of psychic income, the psychic enjoyment of life. 
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they do not go to another movie for a month or even less frequently. 
Applying Boulding’s analysis to Fisher’s capital and income framework, 
welfare is enhanced not by a direct increase in money income or output, 
but from the durable capital stock, which eventually equates to psychic 
income. Therefore, if the capital stock is less durable, the satisfactions 
derived from ‘consumer goods’ (i.e. final artefact capital) are short lived. 
That is, the intensity of the service derived depreciates rapidly over a 
period of time. Boulding argues for a more durable form of capital that 
sustains long-lasting satisfactions, because the true measure of 
economic well-being is derived from the enjoyment of the capital stock. 
Critically, however, Boulding recognises the inseparability between 
well-being and net psychic income attainment. The following passage 
from “What is Economic Progress?” illustrates the case: 
 
The satisfaction [that] we received from our houses, our 
furniture, and our clothing for instance is derived from 
their use not from their consumption. It is really [a 
misfortune or system-function] that houses depreciate, 
that furniture wears out, and clothing becomes shabby. 
The same principle actually applies to all items of 
consumption, even those we usually think of [as] services. 
We eat lunch because breakfast has depreciated. We go to 
a concert because the psychic capital produced in [the] 
mind by the last concert has faded. Well-being in this view is 
regarded as a state of the human organism, a state [that] 
continually depreciates and has to be restored. It is a state also 
which we hope in some sense can grow or improve. ... The 
more corruptible is human well-being and the less durable 
the material things with which that well-being is defended 
the more production we will have to have. In this view it 
would seem that the less consumption is necessary in 
order to maintain a given state of well-being the better, and 
therefore, also, the less production the better. [Boulding 
1961:149, emphases added] 
 
Lawn identifies only partially with Boulding’s (1961) analysis. The 
dynamic and complex interactions between stocks, funds, flows and 
psychic income are undetected by Lawn: the human psyche is capable of 
experiencing ‘growth’.215 An individual’s mind (e.g. their memory or 

215 A flow may result either from the decumulation of a stock or from the transformation made by 
the production process. (A flow is a stock spread out over a time interval.) A fund provides its 
services in several processes that occur over time; it cannot be decumulated in an instant (i.e. the 
total service of a commodity is not used immediately). According to Georgescu-Roegen’s (1965, 
1969) understanding of commodity production, fund elements represent the ‘unchangeable 
agents’ that transform inflows into the outflows. The same commodity may be a flow in one 
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knowledge), health, or soul is capable of experiencing radical 
transformation (e.g. relapsing or maturing) over historical time. 
Knowledge, for instance, accumulates over time, spreads from 
generation to generation, and spreads across the world.216 Especially 
from a long-term perspective, according to Brian Lin (2006:328) 
“knowledge is a special type of international public good … [and] the 
knowledge fund has grown and modern people have consequently been 
endowed with greater intellectual capacity and capital”. In other words, 
each human generation potentially enjoys the benefits of knowledge 
transmitted from preceding human generations. Thus, psychic income 
and outgo experienced are inextricably linked with the state of the human 
mind, body and soul—the condition of a person’s well-being.217 Fisher 
would probably agree because he had a zeal for a healthy constitution. 
Fisher was not exclusively interested in physical phenomena, unlike, 
he believed, most economists (see Barber 1997:vol.2,204). Fisher was 
highly judgemental of those people chasing luxurious and enervating 
devices usually connoted by “wealth” at the expense of their health. 
Concentrating on ‘superficial objective phenomena’ circumvents truly 
capturing the quality-of-life. Accounting for so-called objective 
phenomena leaves out a significant part of the growth and development 
equation, especially the condition of human health and disease: 
 
A large part of our subjective income is due to our 
conditions of health or disease. A man [or woman] with a 
good constitution has a more agreeable stream of 
consciousness, or subjective income, than one without. 
The pains and sufferings of illness here find a place in the 
complete accounts of income and outgo. … [But] a healthy 
body is absolutely essential for receiving and enjoying the 
income from external wealth. … [T]he most essential 
element of all [is] the vigor of human life. The true “wealth 
of nations” is the health of its individuals. [Fisher 1906:176, 
emphases added] 
 
Therefore, a person’s health was probably the most important 
constituent to Fisher. Fisher’s courageous victorious spell with 

process and a fund in another. The mental and physical capabilities of human beings are probably 
characterised as a ‘fund’ (less so than a ‘stock’), but it is argued as social beings they are, to a 
degree, changeable (or mouldable) agents. 
216 Austrian economists, for instance, recognise that the economic problem of society centres on 
an understanding of the limited knowledge of heterogeneous individuals (e.g. Hayek 1945:519-20). 
217 The problem is even more complex when we realise that human capital formation is inextricably 
linked to sustainable well-being. For example, Lin (2007) argues that achieving global sustainability 
is possible but it must entail an equitable distribution of knowledge capital, i.e. a relatively 




tuberculosis left him with a passionate lifelong personal and intellectual 
interest in hygiene (Nordhaus 2005, Tobin 2005a). He believed that a 
healthy body is vital for enjoying and receiving the income from external 
wealth—modern hygiene, exercise, sanitation, diet, and preventative 
medicine are essential to enable a greater enjoyment of daily living and 
working. Hence, the durability of a healthy human life, particularly 
genetically, was most elementary (e.g. see Fisher 1906:176, 1976). 
A good stock of internal wealth (i.e. a good state of health) is 
paramount for agents receiving their ‘psychic income’. Remember, 
according to Fisher, capital (or wealth) embraces all stocks of material 
objects that yield services that human beings like. A literal interpretation 
of The Nature of Capital and Income suggests that he denied the existence 
of ‘intangible assets’ or ‘immaterial wealth’ under his definition of 
“capital” (see Fisher 1906:39). But as shown by James Tobin (2005a), 
under the stock of capital, Fisher would include,  
 
land and other natural resources as well as reproducible 
goods; objects owned by households and governments as 
well as by businesses; houses and other consumer durable 
goods as well as producers’ durables; objects whose yields 
are always in kind, like houses occupied by their owners, as 
well as those whose yields are marketed for cash; the bodies 
of human beings—perhaps their minds too—as well as 
nonhuman objects. [Tobin 2005a:211, emphasis added] 
 
However, “[w]hile Fisher thought and cared deeply about index 
numbers, measurement of income, utility theory, and health, he never 
connected these different concepts” (Nordhaus 2005:368). Therefore, 
what type of indicator would Irving Fisher probably have developed? 
Naturally, to Fisher, a person’s constitution partly meant a high-quality 
psychic income, because when the service (income) or disservice (outgo) 
enters the stream of consciousness it is termed ‘psychic’; hence psychic 
income and psychic outgo. The services flowing from improved health 
capital and infrastructure (such as larger investments in health education 
or improvements in emergency response services) as well as the 
disservices, such as defensive and rehabilitative expenditures, would be 
the critical flows to identify in Fisher’s well-being indicator. Principally, 
but incompletely, SEWIs account for some of these types of health 
services and disservices that flow from the stocks of external wealth 
(from final artefact, durable fixed public and business capitals).218 
On the other hand, it could be argued from Fisher’s position that a 

218 Clarke and Islam (2005b), authors of the Thai ISEW, develop a health-adjusted national income 
(HANI) indicator of social welfare. HANI is supported by normative social choice theory and not by 
Fisher’s net psychic income. HANI is different from a typical SEWI, as it is based on the premise 
that economic growth may have negative externalities that reduce human health. 

367
SEWI would not merely be the income and outgo flowing from external 
wealth to the psyche. The heart of Fisher’s well-being indicator would be 
foremost to consider the status of their constitution (the state of one’s 
internal wealth in mind, body and soul), that is, in modern parlance, the 
stock of human capital, e.g. knowledge, bodily, mental and spiritual 
health etc. In this study, ‘human capital’ i.e. human-health capital 
encompasses a much broader and richer interpretation of the welfare-
relevant aspects of the person-in-the-community.219 On the contrary to 
the probable eminence of mental health in Fisher’s well-being indicator, 
the heart of SEWIs is the psychic income and outgo flowing from 
“personal consumption expenditures” vis-à-vis the market economy. In 
other words, Fisher’s ‘Index of Net-Health-Welfare’ is actually ill 
conceived/unfathomed in the SEWIs, because of identifying merely the 
income and outgo flowing from external wealth to the mind. 
The conception of ‘psychic flux’ in SEWIs is limited. To some extent, it 
might be true that “[o]f all the past enjoyment of life an individual 
preserves only a memory of varying vividness” (Georgescu-Roegen 
1971:284).220 But this does not rule out the fact that the psyche is clearly 
changed in some respects as a result of actions individuals undertake. 
SEWI advocates observe a one-way production process of the stock of 
materials (commodities) whose consumption may lead to need 
satisfaction. External wealth is a general fund from which specific needs 
may be exogenously satisfied (subject to the “ultimate” availability of low 
entropy). Yet in SEWI, the mind is seen as a blank register of simple 
qualities supplied by experience to be processed in fixed and standard 
ways. That is, information on psychic satisfactions is a type of fluid that 
can be poured from one individual into another. However, the human 
mind creates (processes) information and a person does not just 
passively absorb information from the environment (see Twomey 
1998:437-44). 
Schumpeter (1911:83) believed the average person partly operates 
under conditions of habitual activity: s/he is a being operating under a 
system in which past (psychic) experience forms the heart of present 
action. Habit is a propensity to behave in particular ways in a particular 
class of situations. Our habits help to make up our preferences and 
dispositions. When new habits are acquired or existing habits change, 

219 This definition of ‘human capital’ separates itself from orthodox economics; it aligns to some 
extent with the neo-Marxian radical view of the social relations of production. As Bowles and Gintis 
(1975) critique, “human capital theorists have put forth a one-dimensional normative framework 
[that] ... has no reasonable relationship to human welfare cogency” (Bowles and Gintis 1975:82, 
emphases added). Human capital accumulation is thus a social activity because capital 
development is a social learning (and ongoing) process as people learn by doing and acquire new 
knowledge. 
220 He argues that the enjoyment of life can be enhanced (with longer leisure time) or diminished 




then our preferences alter. Habit does not deny choice; there is scope for 
decision and will. Yet, institutions constrain our behaviour and develop 
our habits in specific ways that can be good or bad for social welfare (see 
Hodgson 2003:163).221 Institutions are conditioned by and dependent 
upon individuals and their habits. From their habits, instincts, social 
norms, conscience, and volitions a person stores the fruits of past 
experience in an attempt to economise effort and simplify action. In 
other words, the whole of a person’s organism is an active recipient and 
participant of economic life and life’s enjoyment based on his/her 
experiences. Therefore, the crux of the problem: the theoretical apparatus 
of SEWI ignores the dynamic changes in the human psyche (whole 
person) and ignores the changing relationships between the psyche and 
psychic flux. 
Then again, one of the well-known disadvantages of the ISEW is that 
it does not fully account for the stock of human capital (see England 
1998:101). Many authors have noted some of the important limitations 
of SEWIs, i.e. that it does not include human capital (e.g. Neumayer 
1999:87-8). Of course, Daly and Cobb (1989:404) explicitly stated they 
have excluded any accounting of human capital, improvements in the 
human physical (health), intellectual (educational) and emotional 
resources. Advocates acknowledge that SEWIs exclude human capital 
(e.g. Makino 2008:163).222 For instance, Lawn (2003:115) concludes, “it 
is impossible to incorporate all welfare-related factors into a single index. 
Nevertheless, it may be beneficial to replace some of the lesser items 
currently included in the calculation of the ISEW, GPI, and SNBI with 
items that can be clearly identified as having greater welfare 
significance”. “So long as the GPI is able to capture the most important 
benefits and costs” (Lawn and Clarke 2008b:70). Effectively, it is 
perceived as ‘too difficult’ to account for the change in the stock of 
human capital in SEWIs. 
Undoubtedly, any empirical well-being index is fraught with 
measurement problems. But as Paul Baran (1957:36) in The Political 
Economy of Growth noted early on: “[d]ifficulties encountered in the 
measurement of a phenomenon should not be permitted to obscure the 
existence of the phenomenon itself”. And so hypothesis H5 is significant 
to this analysis. Political economy seeks to eschew abstractions from the 
system to develop a pragmatic framework for analysing endogenous 

221 For instance, in mature capitalist economies, the growing stock of unhealthy human bodies is 
an agency–structure problem. While lack of personal responsibility is an element of the problem 
(especially for men), reaching healthier goals in a disembedded system is fraught with difficulty. 
The rapid increase in obesity over past 30 years in the West strongly suggests that influences from 
the cultural-surroundings are responsible for this rising trend (Mann 2008:175, Wakefield 2004). 
Current institutions promote a sedentary lifestyle, such as residential density, land use mix, and 
automotive commuting time (Frank et al. 2004). 
222 Although, Talberth et al. (2007) and Jackson et al. (2006) are some authors (of a handful) to 
ascribe full positive value to education in their SEWI. 
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processes through real time (Downward et al. 2002). The system includes 
real societies and human agents (persons) who undergo phases of 
development. Socioeconomic systems create new products and 
perceptions and create and re-create individuals: “[t]he individual not 
only changes his/her purposes and preferences, but also revises his/her 
skills and his/her perceptions of his/her needs. In terms of both 
capacities and beliefs, the individual is changed in the process” (Hodgson 
2003:162, emphasis added). The individual is reconstituted by learning, 
which can change their psychic preferences, goals, capacities, skills and 
values. Learning is the reconstitution of individual capacities and 
preferences; this is equivalent to a change in individual personality or 
their ‘cultural capital’. But the authors of SEWIs have accepted that the 
stock of human (and cultural) capital is held constant in their measures. 
This assumption is inconceivable with reality. 
This vital oversight of excluding the ‘stock’ of human capital has 
empirical and conceptual insinuations for the SEWIs. For example, 
Nordhaus noted that in a health-income measure one must eventually 
consider the “extent to which improvements arise from improved basic 
knowledge (such as the germ theory of disease, the discovery of 
antibiotics, or the DNA revolution)” (Nordhaus 2005:389). Progress in 
the medical treatment of sick individuals advanced dramatically in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, i.e. global life expectancy rose from 46 
years in 1950–1955 to 65 years in 2005 (UNDP-DESA 2008). Increased 
longevity is a result of improved nutrition, sanitation and hygiene, 
knowledge of health conditions, and the quick spread of medical 
knowledge and its application in health-care practices. Another measure 
of technological advance is the fact that many diseases that were not 
curable in the past can now be effectively controlled by diagnostic 
capabilities, medical procedures, equipment and pharmaceuticals 
(UNDESA 2007:115). Thus, Nordhaus may be right, but the extent to 
which the SEWI can integrate these very real and yet qualitative health 
dimensions into a net income measure is the critical question. 
At the time of writing (April 2009), SEWIs do not account for the 
length of life or quality of the population’s health. Crafts shows the 
empirical implications for not including an adjustment of life expectancy 
in ISEW (see Crafts 2002:87-95). Also, Nordhaus (2005:374-5) believes 
that including health status in income is particularly important when a 
large and growing fraction of the economy is devoted to health care. His 
results show life expectancy improvements are about as large as the 
value of all other consumption goods and services put together: 
“[l]ooking at the entire 20th century, the contribution of the increase in life 
expectancy [in the US] was between 59% and 126% of the contribution of 
income from all sources combined” (Nordhaus 2005:385-6,389). It is 
fascinating that the authors of Sustainable Welfare in the Asia-Pacific 
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(edited by Lawn and Clarke 2008d) realise the significant progress over 
the last couple of decades in life expectancy for most of the nations in the 
region. Yet, the authors do not mention or attempt to incorporate an 
adjustment of such a critical well-being variable in their GPIs. 
Consequently, incorporating an adjustment of life expectancy in SEWIs 
would dramatically alter the empirical account of the trend patterns (as 
told by SEWI advocates) and as shown in Chapter 4. 
At the conceptual level, with the assumption of holding the stock of 
human capital constant, by definition, advocates of SEWIs cannot 
adequately account for the degree of human health or knowledge, 
because human capital is not their reference point. But, by not 
accounting for these changes in the net stock of human capital, one 
must rely on whimsical assumptions that the individual (or region, or 
nation, or local area) must possess perfect knowledge, perfect foresight, 
access to perfect information, and a stable constitution over time. These 
abstract assumptions are problematic to understanding the political 
economy of capitalism (H5). Therefore, one cannot claim both 
imperviousness from excluding the stock of human or health capital (as 
all advocates do) and theoretically cementing the SEWIs in Fisher’s 
notion of net psychic income. This is because psychic income/outgo 
experiences are inextricably linked with the actual quality and perceived 
state of the mind, body, soul and knowledge. Because it is unwarranted 
to exclude the stock of human capital from the net psychic income index, 
a theoretical limitation of SEWIs has been disclosed. 
On a related point, Robert Eisner (1994:100) said that it is difficult to 
make much of the measure of ‘net capital growth’ because the ISEW 
does not factor-in measures of investment and depreciation of human 
capital. Knowledge capital, for example, does not wear and tear like 
machines do, but instead becomes obsolete with the creation of new 
knowledge that displaces the old. The development of knowledge (such 
as R&D stocks) is a process of creative destruction; old knowledge is 
depreciated through the emergence of new knowledge (e.g. see Bitzer 
2005). However, additions to or subtractions from the human capital 
fund vis-à-vis the ‘flux’ of net psychic income are not accounted for in the 
theory of SEWIs. 
Rather than being concerned with the formation and change of 
knowledge, health and psychic preferences through real historical time, 
advocates have started with ceteris paribus assumptions where medium 
and long-term processes are not affecting the socioeconomic system. But 
in relation to hypothesis H5, for a realistic study the critical factors at 
work need to be endogenised. Human needs and preferences are not 
fixed, but culturally and individually changing over time and space. Brent 
Bleys (2008) recently argued against including the ‘net capital growth’ 
item in the ISEW for the reason that it is not compatible with Fisherian 
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income. But, the problem is that he has not thoroughly questioned the 
theory of net psychic income. It is argued that under Fisher’s framework, 
the keystone of the indicator is a theory that specifies accounting for 
some sort of change in the stock of human-health capital. Yet, the 
removal the foundation stone, as somehow proposed by Bleys (2008), 
inescapably leads to a theoretical impasse for the ISEW. 
In précis, closer reflection on these complex issues is needed before 
one can (fallaciously) conclude, as Philip Lawn does, that SEWIs are 
realistic and strong, theoretically. It emerges that in the process of 
attempting to theoretically ensconce the SEWIs in Fisher’s idea of net 
psychic income, Lawn mistakenly reduces the conceptual soundness of 
the measures. Therefore, Lawn and some other authors have over-
simplified the conceptual position of psychic income integrated as the 
primary ingredient within the ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF. 
6.3  Theoretical Incongruities of a Limited Ontology of 
‘Consumption’ in a Disembedded Economy 
It is now appropriate to clarify further one potentially valid weakness 
raised against Fisher’s psychic income logic regarding consumption. 
That is, within Fisher’s psychic income notion embedded in the SEWI, it 
may be tacitly assumed that “consumption” (in the ‘using-up’ sense) is 
directly related to welfare (e.g. Costanza et al. 2002). But, Fisher would 
disagree with this statement. Parallel to Boulding, Fisher (1939) too was 
careful to differentiate “consumption” between ‘service’.223 “So-called 
“consumption” is only a special case of service. Even the term 
consumption is misleading, for it implies that destruction is an essential 
result of service[.] … “[C]onsumption”, in the sense of literal destruction, 
does not help our analysis at all. Only service helps” (Fisher 1939:359-60, 
emphasis added). 
While Fisher focused his research on services yielded from final 
artefact capital, he was probably open to a deeper interpretation: “[i]f the 
event is one which cannot be connected with purchasable commodities, 
it is necessary to imagine an exchange, even when actual exchange is 
impossible” (Fisher 1906:177). Fisher’s concept of “yield income” (flow 
of service) was not only limited to ‘consumption’ as one of his critics 
(Graves 1939) thought. “[V]irtue in my analysis of income ... lies in its 
applicability to ... many sorts and combinations of services[:] … 
[c]onsumption is ... significant ... but it is ... not the starting point” 
(Fisher 1939:358-9). However, the implicit value judgement inherent in 
the SEWIs is that personal consumption expenditures, i.e. services 
flowing from final artefact capital, are the focal point surrounding 

223 Boulding’s (1945:2) literal interpretation of the word, ‘consumption’, is the “destruction of ... 
valuable things—in the way in which they were intended to be destroyed”. 
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existence and well-being. This premise is contrary to Fisher’s hypothetical 
“Index of Net-Health-Welfare” above (Section 6.2), where it is argued 
‘health’ would be the starting point not ‘consumption’. Yet, in essence, 
the SEWIs are centred on the benefits and costs associated with personal 
consumption expenditures (final artefact capital), rather than centred on 
the totality of benefits (services) and costs (disservices) flowing from 
multiple capitals. 
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi (1944) argues that an extensive 
assemblage of technological and institutional change (with a calculated 
movement by the state during the nineteenth century) commenced an 
operation that enlarged the market paradigm. The inclination of markets 
to overrule and erode social, moral and religious capitals is known as the 
‘disembedded economy’. The disembedded economy is an autonomous 
sphere of human activity, self-regulated by an organisation of price-
making markets, self-motivated by greed or the threat of hunger, and 
hence entirely based on self-interest, “dependent on non-pecuniary 
preferences, which it is intrinsically incapable of delivering” (Rodrigues 
2004:195). In relation to hypothesis H5, this means that—for any study 
into sustainable well-being—the key focus is the effect of the market 
economic institutions on society. But, how do we differentiate between 
‘services’ and ‘disservices’ of consumption in the disembedded 
economy? 
Perhaps there are good reasons why SEWI advocates decided to have 
‘consumption’—a major component of GDP—as the starting point. A 
proportion of consumption involves acquiring some kind of gratification 
or avoiding some kind of impoverishment. This consumption is generally 
thought to give something internal to the individual consumer because 
of some intrinsic characteristic of the commodity consumed (e.g. use 
value). This is an inner-directed process, where consumption is for 
personal satisfaction—in Fisher’s terms, the “psychic income”. SEWI 
authors recognise the consumption associated with the so-called psychic 
service gained. But, to the extent that growing income and consumption 
is a function of declining health, status competition and addictive 
behaviour, then it does not reflect growing satisfaction. These are vital 
considerations, because a major assumption in the SEWIs is that well-
being increases at the same rate as consumption expenditures. Several 
advocates have dealt with some of these issues in their measure (e.g. 
Lawn and Clarke 2006b), however, there is much more room for 
improvement.224 
Overall, advocates ignore the existence of useless conspicuous goods 
in SEWIs.225 In The Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen (1899) argued that 

224 Lawn and Clarke (2008b:72) admit the more needs to be done to deal with the “qualitative 
dimension of consumption”. 
225 As noted in Chapter 4, several advocates examine conspicuous consumption (à la ‘positional 
goods’) (see Cobb et al. 2000:9, Talberth et al. 2007:3). 
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“conspicuous consumption” is different from inner-directed 
consumption—an outer directed process—done to impress others or to 
avoid others’ condemnation. Conspicuous consumption is driven 
through emulation rather than by internal satisfaction derived from the 
intrinsic character of the commodity consumed (e.g. Dugger 1989). 
Emulation itself is the attempt to gain prestige in the eyes of others by 
displaying a higher than average ability to pay. That is, in conspicuous 
consumption and emulation, the psychic income of one consumer is 
affected by the consumption of other consumers (i.e. relative to the other 
person). Therefore, without consideration of conspicuous goods in 
SEWIs the summation of each person’s absolute psychic income would 
give distorted results. 
This is because the economy can be understood as an “instituted 
process” of social interaction (Polanyi 1992), i.e. a collection of culturally 
determined institutional arrangements by which the heterogeneous 
agents receive their psychic income and secure their social reproduction. 
On this basis, an understanding of the political economy of capitalism is 
significant to give us vital insights into Net Welfare Indices (H5). 
Rodrigues (2004:192) argues that the individual motivations and 
preferences cannot be understood without reference to the institutional 
context that (partly) shapes and defines them.226 If people are (relatively 
more) charitable in one place and egocentric in another, it is not human 
nature that differs but the social, moral or community organisation. 
Preferences learned under one set of circumstances can become 
generalised reasons for behaviour. Economic institutions may induce 
specific behaviours—for example, self-regarding, opportunistic, or 
cooperative—which then become part of the behavioural repertoire of the 
individual. Markets affect human behaviour and our preferences are 
internalised (endogenised) because allocation rules along with 
institutions partly determine what one must do or be to acquire one’s 
livelihood (Bowles 1998). Individual preferences are thus endogenous 
because the socio-political environment to a degree shapes them. But, 
for the SEWIs, individual preferences are not conceived to be in any way 
endogenous. 
In a conspicuous consumption world (where preferences are 
endogenous), it is not so much people’s absolute living standards, their 
basic needs or physical comforts, but their position in the income and 
wealth hierarchy that matters. The income differentials are therefore 
more indicative of psychic wants than physical wants, but psychic wants 
based on outer-directed processes. Because the income comparisons are 
invidious, they can invoke envy and resentment. Duesenberry’s (1949) 
relative income hypothesis makes it harder to vindicate the traditional 
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226 “Preferences are reasons for behavior, that is, attributes of individuals that (along with their 
beliefs and capacities) account for the actions they take in a given situation” (Bowles 1998:78). 
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concern with income distribution in SEWIs (other than what little is 
necessary to remedy any residual hardcore destitution—less justifiable in 
already affluent countries). People are often more sensitive to changes in 
income than to absolute levels of income because tastes and preferences 
are altered as they acquire new lifestyles. Yet, private consumption 
expenditure adjusted by an index of income inequality is the reference 
point of measuring socioeconomic welfare (by most advocates of SEWI). 
This might be an unreasonable assumption in a world of conspicuous 
consumption.227 
Psychic income is influenced by business entities as well as other 
person’s wants.228 Wants are partly contrived for people frequently 
because they are subject to the forces of advertising and emulation. 
Wants are themselves both inactively and purposely the fruits of the 
process by which they are satisfied. In The Affluent Society, Galbraith 
(1958) argues that the wants-creating process governs the wants-
satisfying or needs-based mechanism, viz. the “[inter]dependence effect”. 
A subpart of this so-called wants-satisfying mechanism involves 
consuming symbolic meanings of objects rather than the satisfaction of 
genuine needs or the use value obtained from them (Shipman 2004). In 
the disembedded economy vis-à-vis hypothesis H5, the enterprise system 
tends to concentrate more on the individual as consumer while paying 
less attention to their satisfaction as worker, parent, and carer. The 
market feeds off the constant production of difference; this is the 
problem of producer vs. consumer sovereignty. 
Shipman (2001) and Holt (2002) criticise the supposed newfound 
celebration of “consumer sovereignty”: the consumers’ ability to make 
creative and even subversive (e.g. “nonconformists”) use of the 
marketplace equating to emancipation. Gallaway (2005) argues that 
producer sovereignty is more effective when it creates an opportunity 
where power can be effectively wielded in multiple spheres (e.g. with the 
other domains of public, competitive and household sectors). Producer 
sovereignty is more powerful when it diverts resources away from public, 
family, churches, community, and work toward its own ends within the 
marketplace, and when it takes business away from small independent 
businesses—characteristics of the disembedded economy. There is some 
agreement in the literature that “consumer sovereignty” is largely a myth 
(e.g. Sirgy and Su 2000, Strasser 2002).229 In any case, SEWI advocates 
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227 However, it could be argued that the trend of Gini over real historical time is a good proxy for 
the degree of ‘conspicuous consumption’, as the wealthy spend the majority of their surplus labour 
(or leisure) on status-based assets/capitals, easily exceeding that which is needed for subsistence. 
228 Lee (1979:326) points out that “Fisher regarded business entities as devices by which human 
beings could obtain enjoyment from consumption”. 
229 On the other hand, Rezabakhsh et al. (2006) show that increase in the use of Internet has 
created increased levels of consumer market transparency and their power. But, the producer–
consumer power imbalance is complex to differentiate; it is difficult to cause a schism (split) 
between a “consumer sovereignty vs. producer sovereignty” world (see Thompson 2004). 
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have ignored the relevant discourse on producer/consumer sovereignty 
(e.g. Haigh and Jones 2006, Knox 2005). They have implicitly 
(unjustifiably) assumed constancy over time in the power imbalances 
between producers and consumers.230 
How reasonable is it for Lawn and Clarke (2006b:104) “to assume 
that, through technological progress, the welfare-yielding qualities of 
most goods will continue to increase for some time to come”? In relation 
to SEWIs, part of the problem with this worldview is that obsolescence is 
not taken into account. Obsolescence is the physical or psychic process 
(‘obsolescence of desirability’) of becoming obsolete, outmoded or old-
fashioned. Baran and Sweezy (1966) argue that a person’s welfare as a 
‘consumer’ can be unfavourably affected by continuous product 
innovation and obsolescence. Even informed consumers do not need 
obsolescence but receive it anyway because of the wants-creating system. 
In a modern techno-secular culture, the nature of the problem is more 
psychic than physical obsolescence: people will often buy a newer version 
of the latest portable audio/visual player even when their previous player 
survives subsequent generations; and cell phones built to last five years 
are now retired after only eighteen months of use. But, there is no real 
attempt to account for the potential costs of built-in obsolescence in 
SEWIs, as indicated by Anielski and Rowe (1999:10), although “[s]uch a 
study would be a worthwhile albeit hypothetical inquiry”. Studies show 
that fashion obsolescence vis-à-vis ever-improving design style and 
incrementally improved features has a significant (yet subtle and 
indirect) effect on well-being (Brown 2002, 2004). Therefore, it is 
somewhat problematic to argue that through technological progress 
service benefits always increase for the ultimate consumer or to society 
in general.231 
Under the Fordist and post-Fordist modes of regulation, the meaning 
and nature of consumption in these societies equates individual 
expression with material possession.232 The empirical evidence 
presented by Andrea Migone (2007) and others suggest that 
consumption became increasingly self-referencing, more segmented and 
unequal since the early 1970s (especially in the US). High levels of 
private debt via the credit system during the early-to-mid 2000s in the 
West lead to the transformation of consumerism to hedonistic 
consumerism (Migone 2007:177). “Hedonistic consumerism” is the 
seeking of spiritual and ego satisfaction in consumption, where self-

230 It is inexcusable of the SEWI advocates to ignore producer v. consumer sovereignty. “[T]he 
concept of national income and related national accounting measures are inseparably associated 
with the assumption of consumer sovereignty” (Dowrick and Quiggin 1998:95-6, emphasis added). 
231 The perceived decline in the durability of satisfaction may be reflected in changes in tastes 
towards flexibility and fashion and the need for novelty (see Dolfsma 2004). 
232 This is known as ‘consumerism’—the possession/consumption of increasing quantities of 
commodities so that human beings can achieve self-development and self-fulfilment. 
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referencing wants are relentlessly stimulated and consistently excited: 
 
A self-replicating cycle of dream, desire, acquisition, and 
disillusionment is then established within which the search 
for novel products is really a proxy for the quest for 
psychological satisfaction of the desire. Because of the 
nature of the process, disillusionment sets in after 
consumption, and new products must be found and 
consumed. [Migone 2007:183, emphasis added]  
 
SEWI advocates identify partly with the internal contradictions of 
hedonistic consumerism. They see the negatives of ecological crisis of 
consumption. Yet, the misallocation of scarce resources toward the 
individual psychic ‘satisfaction’ of self-referencing consumption (rather 
than meeting real needs) is not imbedded in their conceptual framework. 
The process of choosing is in itself a time-consuming process, which 
is made harder by the trend towards more rapid obsolescence of existing 
models, and by variations in price at different times and in different 
places. Hamilton (2003:ch.4) and Mishan (1967) furnished significant 
detail to the relationship between the ‘free’ choices people face in 
decisions relating to their well-being and the consequent dissatisfactions 
associated with consumer goods.233 In Growth Fetish, Hamilton argues 
that it is a weary effort to have to choose from a large range of products 
advertised intensively when their qualities are mainly beyond our ability 
to assess. For most people, it would certainly be less costly and less 
demanding to be subject to fashion that changes less frequently. The crux 
of Mishan’s (1967) argument in The Costs of Economic Growth is that 
there can be no presumption in an already affluent society that an 
increase in the area of choice increases human welfare. He argues that 
many important choices made by a person at some moment of time 
come to be regretted soon afterward. This is problematic because 
ordinary people become anxious about the increasing possibilities of 
choosing the wrong thing as the pace of fashion accelerates, as goods 
become technically more complex and the mixture flourishes (Mishan 
1967:158). Thus, according to Mishan and Hamilton’s analyses of 
consumer “free” choice, the community is not genuinely receiving 
psychic income, but, rather, experiences psychic outgo. 
In a culture obsessed with appearance (e.g. in the US), as Jonalyn 
Grace Fincher argues, women are far less free in a system thriving on the 
“Creed of Materialism”. It asks us to derive our meaning and our sense 
of worth from the unbidden reactions in other people’s faces: 
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233 It is significant to note the abnormal dynamic that makes the “chronic dissatisfaction” that 
Veblen (1899) refers to. Vicious downward circular and cumulative effects occur, which are the 
attempt to overcome this chronic dissatisfaction (i.e. psychic outgo) by acquiring more 




I may be free to vote and free to learn, free to teach and 
free to travel, but I am not free to be fashionable and 
disregard that sexy look. Thanks to marketing, clothing 
cuts, models, and actresses who double as sex kittens, 
fashion and sexiness have become inextricably linked. Trained 
to criticize other bodies, we gradually turn our critical, dark 
eyes on ourselves. And that is where many of us are—
distracted, discouraged, and embarrassed over our bodies, 
convinced that we have much to be ashamed of, plenty to 
suppress. How many women do you know who like trying 
on swimsuits? [Fincher 2007:41, emphases added] 
 
In other words, fashion is bad when it fosters spiteful competition 
between women because it distorts the real (true) meaning of 
womanhood and their freedom. With too much time and money spent 
on ‘beauty’, the material-fashion message of society is promoting 
destructive (envious) desires—so characteristic of present-day 
disembedded economies. 
In summary, SEWI advocates do not account for conspicuous 
consumption, psychic obsolescence (linked to fashion), and the psychic 
outgoes (dissatisfactions) endured from an abundance of choice of 
consumer goods. This is a surprising result. These aspects are significant 
to our modern consumer culture, particularly in the West during the 
1950s–2000s (à la Galbraith, Mishan, Hamilton). Moreover, as argued in 
Chapter 2, a large extent of the GDP growth is probably a good proxy for 
conspicuous waste, the social preference of Veblen or fashion goods, 
particularly in a highly disembedded system. GDP is the very measure 
advocates wish to take away from the policy limelight. Yet, by not 
accounting for these negative forms of consumption in their analyses, 
the link between real welfare in the disembedded economy and the ‘net 
psychic income’ in SEWIs is distorted and hence questioned. With 
respect to hypothesis H5, the advocates have not solved these more 
weighty theoretical problems in the SEWIs, because they have a weak 
socio-historical institutional apparatus. Given this flaw, what are other 
‘ceteris paribus’ assumptions of the capital stocks entrenched in SEWIs? 
6.4 The Conceptual Problems of a ‘One-and-a-Half 
Contradiction World’ under Commonsensical 
Accountancy 
The primary concern of the MCP “is to incorporate in theory and 
empirical analysis a role for community relationships, the social foundations 
of wealth, and the possible negative influence of durable business capital 
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on the environment and society” (O’Hara 2001a:122, emphasis added). 
The MCP’s scrutiny of the social foundations of wealth is, at heart, much 
aligned with Daly and Cobb’s (1989:379) economics for community. Out of 
all the heterogeneous forms of wealth (capital), these social foundations 
would entail a discussion of services/disservices flowing from social 
capital. This is because social capital formation depends on “the quality 
of the set of relationships of a social group” (Szreter 2000:57). 
The principal services or welfare benefits of social capital are in the 
form of trust and sociality. Everyday interactions between people in a 
community (in which the family is situated) build trust and reciprocity: 
the durability of community bonds frequently determines its resilience 
and cohesion (Stone 2001). The investment of people transforming their 
relationships for the better, that is, when these relationships become 
more loving, compassionate, and joyful, involves increasing well-being 
and beneficial services (Tomer 2002). However, there are negative events 
associated with a lack of social capital—‘anti-social capital’ (Streeton 
2002)—such as the defensive costs (disservices) associated with 
distrust, disconnectedness and inhibited sociality. For example, the costs 
associated with forming legally binding (formal) social contracts rather 
than engaging in acts of informal good will; the increased time in 
transactions taking precautionary and repetitive measures to build trust 
or repair distrust in personal relationships; or the public costs of setting 
up investigations of commissions into anti-trust-corruption crises. In 
essence, social capital engenders qualitative activities that create social 
relationships that potentially provide lasting productive or personal 
capacity. 
There are dynamic linkages between persons-in-community in the 
systemic circuit of social capital (O’Hara 2008a). The problem with 
characterising a Fisherian well-being indicator is that “[he] took the view 
that the world is deterministic, that it is only our ignorance of nature’s laws 
that makes events unpredictable” (Tobin 2005a:210, emphasis added). In 
an overdeterministic world (Resnick and Wolff 2001), complexity is the 
case when the development of psychic income is promoted or inhibited 
by the surrounding socioeconomic conditions and institutional 
framework. For instance, personal development depends on a liveable 
and trustworthy society; some studies (e.g. Helliwell 2000) have shown 
that trust is one of the most significant aspects of social capital. In the 
process of wealth creation, particular forms of capital (e.g. ecological, 
human and social capital) may unsustainably degrade or sustainably be 
enhanced over time. In other words, a potential dialectical contradiction 
that needs to be explored in Daly and Cobb’s ‘economics for community’ 
framework is between the accumulation of final artefact capital (in the 
form of disservices) and the lost services of social capital. ISEW, for 
example, is designed to account for the ‘future welfare reductions’ of the 
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ecological capital services lost.234 Why not, in a similar fashion, measure 
the ‘future welfare reductions’ of the social capital services lost? 
Therefore, the crucial question for the SEWI advocates is: To what extent 
does social disservice items permeate the ‘sustainability’ of society?  
To some degree, Cobb et al. (1995) from Redefining Progress have 
contemplated these matters concerning society’s well-being and updated 
the ISEW framework to include social dimensions. For instance, they 
include the additions of volunteer labour, and deduct costs of 
unemployment, underemployment, and involuntary leisure. In addition, 
GPI accounts for some ‘social capital’ aspects that are 
quantitative/monetary-based. For instance, the physical accounting of 
social capital includes crime rates and divorce rates (a proxy for family 
breakdown). The quality of the social capital stock may also be gauged in 
GPI: i.e. adding the benefits of household, parenting and volunteer 
labour and subtracting the costs of divorce and crime. The “net quality of 
relationships” (Daly and Cobb 1989:161) is possibly captured in their 
measure. Subsequently, albeit in a limited and circuitous way, the GPI 
observes the potential contradiction between the capital accumulation 
process and short and long-term social decay. 
To what extent does the inclusion of the “new” social variables 
genuinely reflect this contradiction between economic activity and the 
community’s social structure? Not much—unsustainable social 
disservices to the community are monolithic, and, for instance, merely 
accounting for them through measures of ‘television watching’ and 
‘divorce rates’ is vastly blinkered, and highlights the limitations of the 
exercise. At least the authors of the US GPI acknowledge that their 
estimate is conservative because “they do not include the informal 
neighborliness that does not involve a volunteer program or agency” 
(Anielski and Rowe 1999:8,15).235 But advocates are unaware of asocial 
forms of social capital under “volunteer labour”. For example, durable 
anti-social capital such as the Ku Klux Klan, organised crime, terrorist 
networks, and war mongering. Additionally, all SEWI analyses exclude 
mutual trust and reciprocity because of their weak definition of ‘wealth’. 
Therefore, another underlying assumption of SEWIs is ‘holding constant’ 
the stocks of social and human capital, which treats all the basic forms of 
capital as separate non-interrelated entities, which is obviously not the case 
(e.g. see Bourdieu 1983:183-98, Cochrane 2006). 
This oversight of excluding critical forms of capital has conceptual 
implications for SEWIs. Advocates need to be mindful of Mishan’s (1994) 
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234 According to Stockhammer et al. (1997:21), ‘future welfare reductions’ (i.e. the depletion of 
ecological capital) are “costs that will probably arise normally without any exact knowledge 
available as to when they will occur and in what magnitude”. 
235 Interestingly, in a recent study of the US GPI, Talberth et al. (2007) exclude the disservices of 
family breakdown. No reason or implicit clue is given for the omission of this item; yet it was 





The more we begin to reflect about the incidental but far-
reaching consequences of rapid industrial progress upon 
the many intimate aspects of human welfare, the more we 
become prey to searching doubts about the possibility of 
constructing a welfare index. For in the process of adapting 
our lives to cope with rapid scientific and technological 
change, so much is happening simultaneously to our routines, 
to our tastes, to our manners, to our conduct, to our self-
regard, to our character and our values, and therefore, 
inevitably also to our capacity to enjoy life, that any index of 
the changes in the amounts of goods available to consumers 
would seem quite incidental to trends in the over-all experience 
of welfare. I have to confess, then that I find it hard to avoid 
feeling oppressed by an enervating sense of the futility of 
such an exercise: as if one were engaged in a desperate but 
foredoomed attempt to extend the dimensions of an already 
crumbling edifice. [Mishan 1994:190,191, emphases added] 
 
In relation to hypothesis H5, the critical point that Mishan (1994) raises 
above is what Polanyi (1944) argued, i.e. the quandary in SEWIs of 
implicitly assuming no negative effects on mutual relationships, values, 
character, self-regard, conduct, manners when consumption rises (and 
markets expand) over time in the disembedded economy. The raw substance 
of this section’s fundamental critique is thus: That the cost of the lost 
social capital services (i.e. the weakening of existing patterns of social 
relationships) is almost unascertainable in SEWIs because certain 
implausible assumptions are utilised about the linkage between 
consumption and societal decay/progress. 
It is instructive to consider Schumpeter’s (1943:ch.7) significant 
concept of “creative destruction”: capitalism is unavoidably a 
simultaneous process of creativity and destruction. In principle, the 
SEWIs are relatively good at methodically gauging the destruction of 
ecological capital for the creation of services from human-made capital 
(vis-à-vis competitive innovation). For example, because of innovation, 
the individual/society is able to benefit from the services derived from 
various forms of artefact capital: e.g. the Internet, more powerful 
computers, wind turbines for electricity generation, or recyclable pro-
consumer products. In principle, these created services are found in the 
‘person consumption expenditures’ component of SEWIs. Yet, in a 
production society, there are throughput costs (such as pollution) and 
other permanent environmental losses (e.g. old growth forest). The 
SEWIs measure these destructive costs in the ‘depletion of ecological 
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capital’ account. Thus, they identify one crucial contradictory dynamic of 
capitalism: the contradiction between environmental production 
(protecting the public goods of clean climate) and business. 
A critical principle of political economy is that one must assess the 
multiple contradictions of the disembedded economy. The notion of 
contradiction is defined as something endogenous to the system, that is 
both central to its positive operational dynamics as well as being a 
necessary negative outcome (O’Hara 2007a). There are positive and 
negative features of socioeconomic systems that are endogenously 
entrenched in the fabric of various processes, institutions and 
relationships. In short, capitalism has negative and positive effects on 
social well-being; it destroys and creates. We thus cannot separate the 
destruction of economic values and habits from the social lives of people 
in a measure of sustainable economic welfare, such as the (superficial) 
“Genuine Progress Indicator”. 
An additional hypothesis (H5.1) is therefore raised: 
 
H5.1:  Multiple contradictions assess the complexity of the 
disembedded economy better than single contradictions. 
 
There are multiple contradictions of capitalism to be explored, but it is 
hard to link all of them in one index. While contradictions are relatively 
autonomous, it is problematic to treat one dialectical contradiction as 
completely independent of the others. The notion of the disembedded 
economy is critical to understanding the multiple contradictions of global 
capitalism, and it links to various problems in all areas of the social 
economy (H5.1). 
The SEWI advocates focus mainly on the contradiction (i.e. the trade-
off) between the natural environment and consumption goods. They are 
obsessed with the natural environment; yet only handle society to a 
limited degree. They are in a one-and-a-half contradiction world; they see 
primarily one contradiction and a partial social reality. Yet, in the global 
disembedded economy, all areas of life are both relatively autonomous 
yet interconnected (e.g. Stanfield 1986:ch.4). Because neoliberal 
capitalism creates markets and relentlessly expands its sphere of 
influence, the creation of markets and new products often occurs 
through the destruction of non-market relations—the vital contradiction 
misplaced in SEWIs. 
Because creative-destructive processes predominate in the 
macrocosm of capitalism, there are implications for SEWI advocates rapt 
in a one-and-a-half contradiction world. The SEWIs effectively hold all 
other contradictions constant: the inextricable linkages are invisible to 
advocates. Displacing the contradictions of the disembedded economy in 
the analysis is theoretically incongruous with the reality of social life in a 
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market-dominated economy (H5.1). In the disembedded economy, the 
market society must not place family, friendship, or community 
relationships ahead of pecuniary success; they must acquiesce in the 
market society. As a result, services derived from social capital decline in 
quality as they become consumeristic and pre-packaged, thus losing 
much of their spontaneity and their capacity to satisfy fundamental 
human needs (Stanfield 1995:ch.6). The breakdown of this dynamic 
function of nurturing people who can share (with discipline by being 
faithful) in supportive social relationships is the “Nurturance Gap”. 
Stanfield and Stanfield (1997) argue that there are adverse effects from 
the market society of strong individualism, including a breakdown in 
society, the inability of people to trust one another, and a decline in 
nurturance and love. 
Of course, SEWIs measure a range of regrettable social-disservices, 
which historically do little to add to welfare, but merely maintain welfare. 
Defensive and rehabilitative expenditures are not welfare enhancing as 
“they merely serve to maintain and restore the productive capacity of the 
economy” (Lawn and Clarke 2006b:22). For example, authors of the 
original ISEW have excluded the majority of government expenditures: 
“[t]he growth of government programs does not so much add to net 
welfare as prevent the deterioration of well-being by maintaining security, 
environmental health, and the capacity to continue commerce” (Daly and 
Cobb 1989:467). However, innumerable social-disservices are not 
accounted for in SEWIs, yet they are detrimental to one’s current well-
being, i.e. the agencies that come into corporeal being in response to 
public demand to relieve anxieties; such ‘services’ were not needed in the 
earlier economy of small towns and villages (Mishan 1994:191). The so-
called services begin to exist and flourish as people are more mobile and 
more alienated, as city areas increase to unmanageable proportions, and 
as people’s manner of living become more complex and uncertain as a 
result of material possessions. The disembedded economy innately 
reproduces these (dis)services.  
In conclusion, there has been an over-simplification of the role of 
society, and a deficient analysis of the contradictions of capitalism in 
SEWIs. Lawn seems to have mastered ‘current and future welfare 
reductions’ relating to ecological dimensions, but he and others have 
insufficiently detailed how social dimensions relate to sustainability in a 
disembedded economy (H5.1). The SEWIs cannot answer the following 
crucial question: In a path-dependent economy, what are the medium 
and long-term actual disservices flowing from social capital degradation? 
Advocates have not dealt adequately with the possibility of social 
(un)sustainability in their measures. 
Why? As argued in Chapter 4, advocates of SEWIs use common-sense 
operational procedures anchored in a simple plus-minus technique. 
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While common sense is important in social economics, and central to 
justify social values (see Hobson 1914:320-22, Moore 1959:52-9), the 
sensible plus-minus technique founded on the GPI specifically gives 
attention to method, not theory. The authors’ accountancy scheme must 
rely upon ad-hoc changes because there is no strong theoretical socio-
historical institutional framework to act as guidance. The problem is 
when ad-hoc techniques override the building of a solid theoretical 
foundation. There needs to be detail that provides a theoretical avenue 
for the SEWIs, even though advocates submit that ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF 
are only a first step in the process of understanding activities 
contributing to and depleting well-being.  
But as a result of the lack of a concrete theoretical (social) 
foundation, the SEWIs do not—and therefore cannot—satisfactorily 
answer the following crucial question that Cobb et al. (1995:45, emphasis 
added) proposed: “How do the activities of the market affect the 
sustaining matrix of the social structure and natural habitat?” Because ad-
hoc commonsensical accountancy prevails, the authors are inadequately 
accounting for the present well-being effects on the social structure, and 
do not consistently, as done for ecological capital depreciation, value the 
future generational costs (lost services) of an (un)sustainable social capital 
and human capital base. Obviously, this is a difficult task because of 
uncertainty and measurement issues—and thus one does not completely 
know the path-dependent effects of social un-sustainability. 
6.5 Misplaced Concreteness of Solitary Restriction to 
Monetary Imputations under Uncertainty: The Break 
between Psyche and Income 
Part of the controversy of Fisher’s psychic income concept is due to the 
problem of translatability into units capable of statistical measurement. 
How do we measure ‘psychic income’? According to the mathematically 
gifted Fisher, every intermediate transaction involves both the receipt and 
an expenditure of equal magnitude, which cancel out in arriving at the 
total income. There is no further exchange of monies once a final 
consumer has obtained the serviceable good.236 The satisfaction yielded 
to the consumer by this capital asset is the ‘net result’ of all gross 
transformations and transactions that went before. But, this so-called 
uncancelled figure must be diminished either to a greater or to a lesser 
extent by the psychic disservices acquired. This ‘final uncancelled’ 
amount is the net psychic income. Hence, for Fisher, net psychic income 
is the final net benefits of economic activity. Fisher (1906:177) thinks it is 
easily achievable to measure net psychic income by monetary prices, and 
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236 But as argued in Sections 6.2 and 6.4, individuals or persons (i.e. as final consumers) can 
change over historical time when they have obtained the serviceable good. 
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Lawn would agree. Explicitly, Fisher would concur that over a wide area of 
life, market price supplies us with some sort of standard of relative 
values, which is ‘objective’, at least to the partial degree that it results 
from an accord of a multitude of (market) valuations. 
However, the market price of a good is often a poor indicator of its 
marginal value to society. Benefits conferred and damages inflicted on 
other members of society in the process of producing or using particular 
goods often do not enter the calculation of market price. For instance, 
the destruction of fisheries or increased mortalities from respiratory and 
heart disease (e.g. see Steingraber 1998) do not enter into the profit-and-
loss calculations of economic enterprise, which get their signals and 
incentives from market prices.237 The ‘market forces’ of the private 
enterprise system do not guarantee ecological sustainability of the 
throughput (see Daly 1996). Most ecosystem services (i.e. ecological 
capital) are greatly undervalued, if not accounted for at all. Ecosystems, 
such as wetlands, are considered non-existent markets, and the current 
structure is one of an open access regime, especially in relation to the 
ocean (Costanza 1999). 
On an encouraging note, SEWI adherents recognise some of the 
problems above in utilising price. Stockhammer et al. (1997) advise 
caution regarding the use of monetary values, and, Castañeda (1999:243) 
provides a critique of market prices and valuing ecosystem loss. Lawn 
(2004a, 2007a:ch.5) also converses about ‘price’, but argues that there 
are means to which a market society can measure better the monetary 
value of unaccounted service flows. Indeed, SEWIs convincingly measure 
a sizeable part of the depletion of ecological capital because they are 
based on well-substantiated empirical computations.238 Lawn adopts the 
somewhat reasonable assumption (at least applying to the 
microeconomic level) that “[p]eople will generally pay a higher price for a 
commodity embodying superior service-yielding qualities. Consequently, 
a measure of psychic income can be approximated with the use of market 
prices” (Lawn 2001:223, 2005:194).239 The tacit assumption by Lawn is 
that markets are voluntary exchanges that reveal concrete choices and 
place a monetary value on that choice (i.e. the agreed upon price). 
However, subjecting and justifying an indicator of net welfare to 
monetary evaluations only spoils the effectiveness of the indicator in 
other ways. Monetary assessment is about using prices as an expression 
of what things are worth, but not all prices reflect the real worth of things 
(Røpke 1999). Rees and Wackernagel (1999) affirm: 
 
Money-based approaches can seriously mislead[.] ... 
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237 There is an attempt to measure the negative externalities from the production process in the 
SEWIs, but these disservices are measured by monetary prices also. 
238 For example, El Serafy’s user cost of capital is a good method (see Dietz and Neumayer 2006a). 
239 See also Lawn and Clarke (2008b:72-3). 
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[P]rices ... do not ... reflect ... unaccounted service flows, or 
informed social preferences. This insight should be seen as a 
fundamental premise of ecological economics. The over-riding 
problem here is really one of misplaced concreteness. People 
tend to forget that money per se is an abstraction, a 
convenient stand-in for (usually tangible) things of value. 
[Rees and Wackernagal 1999:47, emphases added] 
 
Moreover, in the words of Andri Stahel (2005), use- or exchange-value is 
“an emergent, context dependent relational property. ... It is only within 
this larger framework that the net effect of any particular commodity in 
terms of social and ecological wealth creation ... can be assessed” (Stahel 
2005:373,377). Hence, the validity of the link between price, money, value 
and the services/disservices is challenged. 
Price equates little or nothing with value or the benefit itself. Fisher 
for the most part accepted the opposite of that claim; i.e. price is a good 
proxy for value. Value is the product of an observed quantity and an 
observed unit price, and has subjective causes (Fisher 1906:14-5). For 
most items, he sees the tapestry involved in the generation of psychic 
income as simply calculable in money terms, because the diversity of 
quantities of services and disservices is reduced to homogeneity in value 
terms by multiplying quantities by their several prices (see Fisher 
1906:120-2). He, and of course Lawn who followed him, believed that 
money receipts are good proxies for psychic income (see Fisher 
1906:137). 
Herbert Frankel supposedly disclosed a fallacy in Fisher’s logic, 
namely, the logical distinction between evaluating ‘objective’ accounting 
concepts (recorded transactions) and evaluating the subjective processes 
in a person’s own mind. Fisher, according to Frankel (1952:11,14), has to 
invent a bridge between “two logically different and incompatible 
categories of thought” to reconcile all the aspects of income. One that 
exists in the marketplace when the satisfactions are derived from 
consumption (those that flow through the cash drawer) and others that 
do not, e.g. those that occur in human relationships, or from the comfort 
derived from their own furniture, or the shelter derived from a person’s 
own house. These latter forms of (psychic) income are passed beyond 
the cash drawer and are those that occur, as Fisher says, ‘inner to the 
mind’. 
Of course, SEWIs (and GDP) are only approximations of value 
because “a measure of” a value is not the same as the value itself. SEWI 
is best thought of as practical approximation of welfare. However, SEWI 
advocates are satisfied with a ‘depreciation rate’ via market prices to 
represent the psychic services from goods. Consider the following 
example that portrays the dilemma of accepting market prices as rough 
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proxies for the ‘psychic income’ derived from final artefact capital. The 
psychic income yielded from an imaginative novel or a holy book, say, 
lent by a friend, purchased at a second-hand bookstore, or even if full 
retail price is paid, could be astronomically higher than the ‘market price’ 
or the depreciation rate given. The ‘consumer surplus’ for the individual 
is said to be great. One could have a life-changing experience from these 
desirable events, i.e. incredible ‘in-the-mind’ experiences (of the psychic 
service). But the probable results are positive, circular and cumulative 
effects on society: increases in the durability of social and cultural capital, 
and ultimately a higher level of net psychic income. Again, this example 
highlights the inseparable connection between psychic income 
generation and other forms of capital stock (H5). 
Still, Fisher realised that market prices are sometimes poor 
substitutes for the actual value of services yielded. For example, because 
of his interest in the health of persons, he was cognizant that if the value 
of real services of artefact capital or money spent on them to make human 
beings unwell, as so often do dark-room tenements or drug addictions, 
their value is a figment of the imagination and a trap, however great their 
market value or perceived benefits (Fisher 1937:29). In Fisher’s logic, the 
actual intensity of the service benefit in terms of psychic income is less 
than the monetary receipts for the artefact capital (i.e. consumer capital 
goods). The monetary receipts of, for instance, conspicuous fashionable 
items or unhealthy processed foods are poor measures of the ‘true’ value 
of psychic income. That is, the psychic income received (as superficially 
measured by monetary receipts) would be overestimated or wrongly 
interpreted as psychic income in the first place. 
If one were to utilise Fisher’s net psychic income empirically as a 
socioeconomic indicator of welfare then these artificial and 
overestimated satisfactions should be accounted for. Addictive 
behaviours such as excessive consumption of alcohol, smoking and fast 
foods are destructive (waste) disservices to the individual human body 
and society (e.g. see Schor 2005). These negative phenomena 
demonstrate empirically that there is ambiguity of measuring psychic 
income and explicating them in a monetary-based SEWI. SEWIs already 
include items to capture some of the costs of undesirable forms of 
consumption (e.g. the impact of additional health costs and reduced 
productivity) (Lawn 2001:260). “There is ... the potential to double-count 
some of the costs by omitting a certain percentage of all consumption 
expenditures on the assumption they provide few if any benefits. Clearly, 
there is a need for further debate on this issue” (Lawn 2005:193). 
However, Lawn does not explicitly recognise the problem of price and the 
undervaluation/overvaluation of the psychic service and disservice. 
A further dilemma now encountered is the problem of an unknown 
future in the ‘depletion of ecological capital’ component. We are by no 
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means certain that net consumption per capita will be increasing or 
decreasing over the next one or two decades. A great deal depends inter 
alia on success in controlling effluent, pollution, resource depletion, the 
scale of illegal immigration, crime abatement, and conflict avoidance. 
These are important considerations, because Lawn expands on Daly and 
Cobb’s (1989) idea of ‘optimal scale’ to provide a theoretical foundation 
for SEWIs (e.g. see Lawn 2007a:30-4). “Knowledge of where an economy 
is in relation to the optimal scale—where a decline in the GPI [or ISEW] 
represents growth beyond the optimum—can serve as an important 
indicator of impending unsustainability” (Lawn 2009:1899). 
But, what is the actual optimal path at which we shall grow, given that 
SEWIs are purely pecuniary-based indicators? There are many incidences 
where nature has proven to be incredibly resilient, and nature can fully 
regenerate from human restoration projects even after significant long-
term degradation (see Flannery 1994, Suzuki 2002). Indeed, in an 
uncertain world, we simply do not know. For illustration, Keynes was very 
interested in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, as he said 
there is a need to make decisions with insufficient or uncertain knowledge, 
such as investment decisions (see Minsky 1975). Keynes used ‘subjective 
probabilities’, that is, a person’s own idea of what they think is going to 
happen. These can change quite rapidly and, under uncertainty, people 
do not know (for example) the price of silver or the interest rate in twenty 
years time (Keynes 1936:ch.12). In another viewpoint, post-Keynesians 
(Harvey 2001) say that due to lack of information for investment 
decision-making, investors need to rely on the present circumstances as 
being a reliable guide to the future—although the investor knows they are 
not. In a non-ergodic, uncertain world in which processes do change over 
time, it is impossible to infer accurately from the past about the future, 
especially to building probability distributions or calculating optimal 
values (Lavoie 1992).240 
There must be a rejection of the idea of “optimality”, even if adhering 
to the precautionary principle. There is imperfect knowledge not only 
about ecological systems, but also about unexplained phenomena and 
uncertainty in all forms and aspects of life processes. Sometimes the 
actual flow of the disservice is not known with certainty, because of 
asymmetric information and moral hazard (Stiglitz 2004). Many people 
are not fully informed about the health implications of a whole range of 
environmental toxins (see Thomas 2003), such as fluoride (Bryson 2004) 
and pesticides (Pimentel et al. 2004). In combination with a myriad of 
untested potential carcinogens every year flowing to human beings 
through the market, on top of polluted air and water sources, there are 
multifaceted affects on the health of humans (Eyles and Consitt 2004). 
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Fred Hirsch’s (1976:26,40) concept of the ‘‘tyranny of small decisions’’ 
captures the idea that uncertainty and incompleteness pervade individual 
choice within a market context. Individual choice is not always the best 
guide to appraise what individuals would have preferred if they could take 
into account all the consequences of their combined isolated actions. 
Questions are thus raised about the competence of SEWIs to deal with 
real-world problems in an environment of uncertainty and lack of 
information. 
There can be situations where psychic outgo is undervalued or not 
accounted for at all in the final price or monetary sale of artefacts. 
Consider the outgo undervalued in such artefacts directly produced by 
slaves (or through extremely undesirable labour conditions) and exported 
to Australasia, Europe, and North America. For example, toys from 
China, where up to 70 percent of the world’s toys are made (HKCIC 
Bezlova 2002, 2003), and metal goods such as steel made into the cars, 
and car parts which make up a quarter of all Brazil’s exports are often 
produced by ‘new’ forms of slavery (see Bales 2004:25). We have the 
situation where the enslaved person experiences the psychic outgo 
(deplorable labour conditions), but the individual buying the artefacts 
(toys or a car) receives psychic income and does not experience the 
actual disservice generated. This raises some critical questions for the 
advocates of SEWIs: Are the global and regional dynamics of net welfare 
adequately captured in the SEWIs? Are we interested in individual or 
societal well-being? The lesson here is that despite the recent calling for 
an “Open [Ecological-] Economy GPI” (e.g. Clarke 2007) many questions 
remain unanswered.241 
The crucial point is that an individual human being does not always 
have perfect information or knowledge about the authenticity a service or 
disservice may be providing them, society or the environment. 
(Speculative bubbles are also an example). The sheer quantity of 
available artefacts—brought about by economic growth—engulfs the 
human ability to make responsible choices. The difference between the 
actual disservices generated and the unaccounted-for psychic outgo is 
due to multiple factors, e.g. social filters and institutions, but probably 
awareness issues and contradictory worldviews are the most important. 
Human beings do not have time to research the living and labour 
conditions of the people who produce everything that they buy. Thus, 
human beings do not always behave rationally and think like ‘homo-
economics’ agents. They behave habitually as hetero socio-economicus 
beings (see O’Boyle 2000).242 
This is partially why the idea of striving for some sort of ‘optimum 
level’ of sustainable development, as measured in a monetary-composite 
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241 These issues are explored in Section 6.7 below. 
242 Edward O’Boyle utilises the term, ‘homo’ socio-economicus. 
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indicator of sustainable economic welfare, such as Lawn and Sanders’ 
(1999) and Lawn’s (2006b:39) SNBI, is contentious.243 In relation to 
hypothesis H5, in the current system that endeavours to ensure people 
change their wants as rapidly as possible, the economic system is quite 
capable of creating perpetual dissatisfaction, à la ‘psychic outgo’. We are 
not in a position to measure in monetary-terms over time an “optimal 
level” of net psychic income. Although it is preferred, humans will never 
know how much an empirically calculated optimal value of net psychic 
income differs from the ‘true’ optimal or satisfied level. In summary, no 
advocates observe the issues of asymmetric information and the 
undervaluation or overvaluation of the psychic income explicitly as an 
intangible tenet within SEWIs. The problems of linking price to welfare 
(which the advocates ignore) are critically evaluated in Section 6.6: 
6.6 Beyond Mere Measurement Problems in Price and 
Welfare: A Systematic Understanding of the Political 
Economy of Capitalism is Needed 
It is argued that part of the problem for SEWIs is the stringent reliance 
upon monetization—prices multiplied by quantities—as the only proxy 
for dimensions of psychic income and well-being. While Lawn notes that 
human-made capital includes ‘labour’, which could include an 
innumerable number of social services and disservices, he conceals the 
problem of valuing such services via ‘price’, simply because he does not 
consider them in the conjectural analysis of the SEWI. Once again 
Mishan’s (1994) words of wisdom seem to be neglected; for that reason, 
they are worthy of an aide-mémoire.244 To be consistent, any freely 
proffered personal service may be evaluated by reference to the market 
price of a surrogate service. However, a value so attributed could be a 
gross under- or over-estimate: “[f]or the worth of the service to the 
recipient depends, or should depend, upon the spirit in which it is offered 
and the spirit in which it is accepted” (Mishan 1994:188-9, emphasis 
added). 
With respect to hypothesis H5, a thorough analysis of economic 
processes acknowledges the psychic income generated within non-
exchange relationships. Reciprocal and redistributive transactions are a 
significant element of the social economy; they are different from market 
exchanges (Polanyi 1944). The nature of real services engendered within 

243 However, Lawn (2006b:39) says that in a coevolutionary world such an optimal macroeconomic 
scale “would not precisely exist nor be precisely attained”. The author states that SEWIs must be 
supplemented by a satellite account of natural capital to determine whether the changing level of 
economic welfare is ecologically sustainable. 
244 In all of Lawn’s works (at least up to the time of writing, April 2009), there is no evidence of 
him openly discussing Mishan’s (1994) critiques. However, occasionally Lawn does allude to the 
problem of ‘quality’ versus ‘quantity’ in the GPI. 
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them is critical. Generally, the personal services that others give us as a 
free offering can be regarded potentially of great value, because they 
come from a sense of responsibility, of reciprocity or of charity; otherwise 
from love, affection, esteem or tenderness. One can readily extend the 
same reasoning to the entertainment and affection that one enjoys when 
providing or receiving hospitality: and extend it as well to games with 
friends, to the counsel and comfort they sometimes give us, and even to 
accommodation and assistance in needy times. There are substitutes for 
such voluntary and friendly services, for instance from television 
programs, counselling and other agencies. However, in every case, the 
market surrogate is only formally compatible, because it cannot give the 
sympathy of a friend or relation, nor can it engender the flow of feeling 
coming from services generously given and received. Yet, time being 
money and money being the ecumenical calculation of worth, advocates 
are constrained to a narrow selection of social services and social 
disservices within their SEWI—restricted by not measuring the true 
character of service/disservice. 
For this reason, a monetary dominated index of net welfare, such as 
the ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF,—by design—eschews any social sustainability 
foundation. Advocates obviously concur that so-called nonmarket 
production exists, but is this regarded seriously? Are nonmarket 
transactions examined on their own terms, or given secondary treatment 
as an instance of exchange with less than explicit relative prices? They are 
indeed treated as an afterthought; that the nonpecuniary is priceless and 
therefore worthless. Because the measure of welfare is chiefly restricted to 
the monetary value of goods consumed, these incalculable services cannot 
be included. Yet, such social services and disservices are elementary for 
critically evaluating the multiple contradictions of capitalism in a 
disembedded economy (H5.1). As Hirsch (1976:87) argues, the forms of 
informal exchange, mutual obligation, altruism, love and so on are 
critical to the inquiry into the sustainable social welfare effects of 
universal commodification. To some extent, the ideology of 
disembeddedness—now infiltrated within the framework of SEWIs—both 
excludes and disparages social problems and democracy, and tries to 
make them irrelevant. In relation to hypothesis H5.1, they are now 
permanently wedged in a ‘one-and-a-half contradiction world’. Therefore, 
solitary restriction to a constant (real) price and quantity-based measure 
in the SEWIs (subjugated by consumption) buttresses the doctrine of the 
disembedded economy, because there is no social sustainability basis. 
Political economists emphasise that there is a wider meaning of 
economic welfare than found in the ideology of disembeddedness. 
Throughout human history, particularly in a disembedded economy, the 
inherent social message of ‘money’ is exchange and substitutability; e.g. 
substitutability in nature for industrial inputs, social relationships for 
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impersonal market exchanges (Hansson and Wackernagel 1999:205). 
Viewed from this angle, if the substitutes are easily measurable and 
‘rightly’ valued, then monetary valuations would be adequate. But, we 
tend to lose confidence in the index of net consumption (i.e. the SEWI), 
when we place a money value on all services (Mishan 1994:181). This is 
because of the problems of putting a money value on factors not 
included in commodity production. “Yet having decided to cut the 
Gordian knot by adopting the device of measuring changes in welfare by 
changes in net consumption, we are exempted from bringing these 
incidental satisfactions into the [SEWIs]” (Mishan 1994:176).245 In 
summary, the celestial point of ‘consumption’ in the SEWIs is not only a 
problem in itself (as discussed above in Section 6.3), but also one of 
misplaced concreteness of money and nonmarket exchange in a 
disembedded economy. 
The reasons for the ISEW/GPI/SNBI/YF not including the services 
and disservices qualities of human and social capitals should now be 
obvious: How does one instrumentally place a monetary value on such 
forms of wealth not part of the market system? The simple answer is that 
it can place a price value on such forms of wealth not part of the market 
system, but it does not do it well (see Okun 1971:129-30). The advocates 
have a rare faith in numbers (Castles 1998:46).246 The GPI, for instance, 
attaches monetary values to the non-market activities of unpaid work 
(e.g. household and volunteer labour). Hamilton (2003) critiques the 
indicator’s separatism of ‘unpaid labour’ from paid labour 
(employment). He argues that both forms of labour are productive 
activities and both should be treated as purposeful and self-fulfilling 
activities, which have value beyond monetary assessments.247 As Marilyn 
Waring (2009:174-5) shows, there is a loss of detail and specificity in 
policy analysis resulting from ascribing monetary values to labour (time). 
Thus, the argument against the relevance of price with the ‘true’ value of 
psychic income is an easy target for exposing the major weaknesses in 
SEWIs. Some advocates may judge this argument as unfair because of 
the assorted data problems and practical limitations involved with the 
construction of (any) empirical measure of net welfare. However, one is 
circumspect regarding practical limitations as the lone problem.248 
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245 He poetically adds: “it is at the point of undertaking the calculation of net consumption—that 
is, net of all incidental goods and ‘bads’ that escape the price mechanism—that we cross the 
Rubicon, there to discover, as we press on, how tortuous and impenetrable is the welfare territory 
we seek to conquer” (Mishan 1994:171). Thus, the stronger and the more far-reaching are the 
consequences on citizens’ welfare the less tangible and the less measurable they are likely to be. 
246 Mamalakis (1996) examines the conceptual, analytical and measurement issues associated with 
trying to link production, income and consumption, as defined by the System of National Accounts, 
to welfare, as perceived subjectively by members of a society. 
247 Despite his criticism, Hamilton (2003:60) believes that GPI is still good at challenging the 
Western world’s growth fetishism. 
248 Of course, there are measurement problems. Lawn and Clarke (2006b:101-2) defend GPI: “the 
omission of crucial benefit and cost items is often attributable to the lack of available data sources 
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Critically absent from every SEWI analysis is a systematic understanding 
of the political economy and system dynamics of capitalism. Anitra Nelson 
(2001) for instance, argues that Marx presents value and price as cultural 
categories premeditated to secure production and exchange, 
reproduction and expanding accumulation of a particular form of social 
power. As far as monetary values and prices are attributed to human and 
nonhuman natures, they provide a one-dimensional and purely 
marketbased point of comparison that effaces other social and ecological 
qualities: 
 
The dominance of the exchange value dimension in a 
capitalist society encourages both alienation from nature 
and an instrumental view of nature. … [Therefore,] 
[e]cological economists must question: whose interests 
price making serves; what prices represent; and why 
money and monetary evaluation are considered so useful 
and persuasive as a sign of ultimate worth. … However 
they arise, prices are abstractions created by humans and 
presumably are intended to collectively represent patterns 
that ensure rational reproduction of an economic system. 
The pragmatic ecological economists’ view that prices are 
just instruments to use to achieve desired outcomes fails 
to acknowledge that pricing and monetary systems are so 
complex that tinkering with individual prices in ignorance of 
systematic interactions invites unintended and undesirable 
(and even uncontrollable) consequences. [Nelson 503,504, 
emphases added] 
 
Thus, the process of constructing an aggregated net-consumption index 
without scrutinising the monetary evaluations in the context of a dynamic 
capitalist system grossly downplays societal processes.249 Without 
fundamentally understanding the social power relations that define the 
system’s reproduction, applications of Net Welfare Indices are ineffective 
(H5). 
6.7 The (Dis)embedding of Individual–Society in the 
Global, Regional and National Environment 
Critical doubts are raised about the usefulness of the function of 
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required to make reliable monetary estimates of certain items”; and there are inadequate valuation 
methods available for capturing qualitative features of various good and services consumed. They 
realise that SEWIs overlook many welfare-related factors, e.g. disutility of work and existence values 
of natural capital, and ascertaining monetary estimates for some of the items involves a great deal 
of ‘subjectivity’. 
249 Paul Burkett critically evaluates (with great specificity) the problem of monetization and 
marketization of nature (see Burkett 2006:chs.1-4). 
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Fisherian Income in SEWIs. Are not the services and disservices 
experienced (i.e. the net psychic income) flowing to the individual human 
being? Are the SEWI components beneficial to the household, society, or 
the individual? More specifically, are defensive expenditures a social or 
individual phenomenon? Is a separation necessary? The above 
reservations are important for the ‘persons-in-community’ framework as 
outlined by Daly and Cobb (1989). 
It is important to study the dual nature of individual and social 
welfare. Clarke and Islam (2004, 2005a), authors of the Thai ISEW, 
examine some individual and social aspects in their social welfare 
function.250 The social welfare function for the SEWI embodies relating 
social preference (or decisions) to the set of individual preferences. For 
example, corruption and commercial sex work may ‘benefit’ a few 
individuals, but the social welfare costs of these activities are real in terms 
of distributional justice, poverty, and intergenerational equity. In other 
words, an individual’s choice can be in opposition to the social choice. 
“Social choice” is about relating social judgements to the views and 
interests of the individuals who make up the society. That is, individual 
preferences are not necessarily welfare (or utility) enhancing choices (see 
Clarke and Islam 2004:13). Thus, at least one of the SEWI theories makes 
a concerted effort to account for the relationship between individual and 
social welfare. 
However taken as a whole, careful inspection of the SEWI studies 
divulges that authors have combined in a murky way the following 
general areas to construct the indicator: ‘economic’, ‘individual’, ‘social’, 
‘ecological’, and ‘sustainability’. Take for instance, Redefining Progress’ 
perception on the issue: “GPI takes personal consumption spending by 
individuals on marketed goods and services as the starting point of 
welfare measurement, and assumes that an increase in this spending 
represents, ceteris paribus, a corresponding increase in welfare” (Anielski 
and Rowe 1999:15, emphasis added). For items of ‘personal 
consumption’, the consideration is on individuals, not the community. 
Also, crime is sometimes referred to as private (i.e. individual) defensive 
expenditures; other times it is a ‘social cost’ or a proxy for ‘social capital’. 
In other words, most of the SEWI studies mingle together individual and 
social costs/benefits.251 It appears that there is no specific analysis of the 
relation between ‘individual’ and ‘social’ aspects and no awareness of the 
crucial dynamic interdependences between them (e.g. see Lawson 1989, 
1997). 
A crucial unanswered question arises, is psychic income or psychic 
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250 As put forward in Chapter 3, the social welfare function integrates cost-benefit analysis with 
social choice theory, which incorporates various social concerns about welfare that are not 
adequately captured by individuals within the market place. 




outgo “experienced” (Lawn and Sanders 1999:220) by the individual 
entity or society? Observing Irving Fisher’s work reveals that he was 
chiefly interested in the individual and their net psychic income, not as 
much as the “social income”. Hence, psychic income is an individual 
experience of the service in the stream of one’s consciousness (see Fisher 
1906:167,168). “A service rendered by an asset belonging to a given 
person is an event desirable to that person and occurring by means of the 
asset” (Fisher 1939:359, emphasis added). According to Tobin 
(2005a:211), Fisher was partly concerned with the so-called “social 
income” of the nation, albeit it simply consisted of adding together the 
subjective utilities of individuals. Thus, probably because of his solid 
background in general equilibrium theory (see Tobin 2005b:25-31), 
Fisher knew of no conceptual distinction between an individual’s psychic 
income and the larger social whole (besides the obvious disparity in the 
summation). Similarly, there is no difference between individual and 
social psychic income in the SEWIs. 
However, the distinction between methodological individualism and 
collectivism (Hodgson 2004, O’Neill 1973) and the study of agency and 
structure (Davis 2003) would certainly matter in the theoretical 
underpinning of a welfare measure based on the summing up of 
individuals’ psychic income. Social economics, for instance, is based on 
the presumption that the economy is an extremely complex matrix of 
interactive behavioural variables. A system of such complexity should be 
conceived only as an organic whole and analysed only at the social level 
of generalisation. Yet, the welfare of an individual human being is a 
critical focus of social economists (e.g. see O’Boyle 2005). They are 
interested in the relationship between society and individual and the 
affirmative or negative impact of collective action on (and from) the 
individual (or person). On the other hand, Lawn and others have simply 
assumed away these complexities of individual and social phenomena by 
largely accepting that one can simply summate the psychic incomes of 
individuals to construct the nation’s psychic income.252 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971:284) points out that the act of consumption 
has a temporal dimension (i.e. a duration) but denies that temporal 
additivity of the psychic flux is possible.253 But is the SEWI empirically 
relevant even supposing a pseudo-measure of collective psychic income 
is possible? Advocates have forgotten Veblen’s (1908) critique of Fisher. 
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252 Social economists emphasise that normative value judgements are necessary intellectual tools 
for any social scientist who aspires to be both empirically relevant and socially responsible. 
According to Hill (1990:157,158), social economists circumvent the alternative errors of preserving 
the bad or destroying the good. Their purpose is to preserve and perpetuate goodness and justice, 
but to eliminate and eradicate evil and injustice. Support for a normative social choice theory (à la 
Clarke and Islam) is strong. However, the argument centres on the aggregation of individualised 
‘psychic incomes’. 




Firstly, he argues Fisher has misconstrued the reality of incomplete 
property rights of immaterial ‘capital’ (intangible assets) in the conduct 
of modern affairs (Veblen 1908:116). Secondly, the redefinition of income 
as a hedonistic-taxonomic system of theory is problematic. “[E]conomic 
life in a modern community runs in terms of pecuniary, not of hedonistic 
magnitudes. ... In this light, the competitive struggle is seen to work out 
as, in effect, a friendly rivalry in the service of mankind at large, with an 
eye single to the greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Veblen 
1908:120,124). The behaviour of an individual is not driven by a single, 
simple hedonistic mechanism.254 
In The Theory of Business Enterprise, Veblen (1904:177) put forward a 
different meaning of economic welfare as “whether the community’s 
work was adequate to supply the community’s needs”. He reasons that 
humans have innate constructive instincts, which, for instance, reach 
past one’s own children to become a “concern for the life and comfort of 
the community at large, and particularly for the community’s future 
welfare” (Veblen 1914:27). As argued in The Engineers and the Price 
System (1921), the community through its joint stock of knowledge was 
the source of value and growing production (not in the absentee owner). 
This implies a definition of the common good that “turns on the notion 
of sufficient output for the entire community and on an adequate portion 
of that output distributed to each member of the community” (Champlin 
and Knoedler 2002:878). Veblen saw the individual as embedded in 
society. “He … is a coherent structure of propensities and habits which 
seek realisation and expression in an unfolding activity” (Veblen 
1898:319). The essence of Veblen’s enlightening works emphasised a 
holistic account of the service qualities from the stock of social capital. 
Therefore, one is inclined to believe that Lawn and other advocates 
have lapsed on the holistic method (e.g. see O’Hara 2000), that is, the 
‘whole’ (community welfare) is not only greater than the sum of the parts 
(an individual’s psychic income), but that the parts are related in such a 
way that their functioning is conditioned by their relationship to each 
other.255 Gunnar Myrdal well observed in An American Dilemma (1944) 
and Asian Drama (1968) the need for a concatenated theory with its 
various sections and subsections providing a multifarious, complex 
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254 Even supposing hedonistic consumerism is the spirit of modern capitalism. 
255 It is important to point out that Phil Lawn probably does have a holistic understanding of 
ecological and socioeconomic issues (e.g. see Lawn 2006b:29-31). He converses on the 
degradation of moral capital induced by the market’s individualistic ethos, and that the role of 
property in most contemporary societies serves as an instrument for the acquisition of pecuniary 
gain/exercise of power; problems that call for the re-embedding of community and the need for 
participatory democracy (e.g. see Lawn 2001:154,166,283,301-3). Also, Lawn (2008d:72,75) 
mentions in passing institutional decay and the need for a framework linked to the GPI (but not to 
GDP). In short, he covers a wide spectrum of policy issues in his many published works. But, his 
theory is limited when critically evaluating the SEWI from the perspective of creative-destructive 




picture of the subject matter. He analysed “Negro race relations” as well 
as their well-being in the US, and found that to get to the root of the 
problem we must examine all interrelated factors (such as education, 
wages, health/nutrition, discrimination, stereotyping, cultural traits—and 
understand the interdependencies) in order to impede further rising 
ethnic inequalities. With circular and cumulative causation, there are 
tendencies for positive feedback changes in values to have a significant 
and non-linear impact on the system as a whole. Therefore, the 
relationship between the agent (individual) and structure (society) is one 
of complex interdependence, and one that needs to be addressed 
holistically by SEWI advocates. 
Moreover, the majority of SEWIs are geared to the country of origin. 
Their analyses are good when examining the trade-off between natural 
and physical assets, but the problem is viewed in a national-centric 
fashion. All local systems (e.g. national, subnational) share the same 
planet, climate, air and water cycles. They are also part of the larger, 
increasingly globalised informational economy. Nonetheless, global 
system sustainability is not necessarily a product of sustainable parts, i.e. 
the whole is more than the sum of parts (the hierarchy of sustainable 
subsystems). Voinov and Farley (2007:109) argue that isolating certain 
subsystems and sustaining them in separation from the global system as 
a whole is futile and hardly feasible. This is particularly true if we attempt 
to sustain specific ecosystems along with economic growth. Local, 
national and regional goals and priorities may conflict with global ones. 
Therefore, there is a need to transcend the purely national; because 
the nation is relatively autonomous yet interlinked with global, regional 
and local systems. The United States, for instance, currently the world’s 
largest economic superpower, has a vast influence on Western (and 
Third World) growth and culture. The regional growth and profitability of 
the large US transnational corporations are imperative for the continuity 
and stability of the whole system. Only a perspective that examines the 
global system within a regional and (where relevant) national and local 
environments is appropriate to such problems. Understanding 
qualitative social and ecological changes of the system “begins ... by 
considering it as a whole, in its manifold manifestations and in its global 
impact” (Baran and Sweezy 1968:292). There is a need to go beyond (or 
explain) mere surface phenomena through recognising the complexity of 
the interactions and evolution. An analysis of tendencies, complexities 
and alternative geographic dynamics of the institutional fabric is a 
speciality of political economy (H5). 
Often a first mover advantage and cultural modernity are better than 
the disadvantage of not making the first effort at change. In the global 
system, such rapid changes leave many nations comparatively backward 
as they struggle to keep up with the rest of the world. As O’Hara 
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(2006c:xviii) argues, uneven development is thus a necessary part of the 
motion, whether caused by colonial and imperial dislocation and 
oppression, the excessive pace of change, the hegemonic rules of the 
game, geographical and spatial factors, or a lack of social or human 
capital. Therefore, there are processes at work that help explain the 
relative success of the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ and the reinforcement of 
inequality between them (at many levels). The rate of growth of the core 
(advanced capitalist) nations tends to promote uneven patterns of 
income, productivity and quality of life.256 The periphery lags behind as 
poverty, lack of human capital and inadequate investment generate 
underdevelopment. Subsequently, there are endemic system problems 
when only several regions belonging to the periphery grow and develop. 
A characteristic of the disembedded economy is that the market 
system of capitalism primarily seeks to benefit from the exploitation of 
the stock of wealth (e.g. information, knowledge, and income). For 
example, vast forest areas are sacrificed in the periphery to produce fuel 
for the core. As non-renewable energy becomes scarcer, there will be 
more interest in producing biofuel. Oil from palm trees is a likely source. 
In Sumatra and Borneo, some 4 million hectares of forest have been 
converted to palm farms. Now a further 6 million hectares are scheduled 
for clearance in Malaysia, and 16.5 million in Indonesia (Monbiot 2005). 
Thus, the core utilise their economic-cultural advantages to exploit the 
periphery. This process penetrates all spheres of life, such as the 
individual, society, and the natural environment. However, the extent of 
penetration depends on the balance of the positive and negative forces 
working under capitalism. A suitable measure (or measures) of these 
forces is (are) thus required to present an alternative praxis to SEWIs. Are 
SEWIs part of the solution? 
If SEWIs are to be useful then a crucial question arises for the 
advocates: What is the relationship between individual and society? In a 
structure–agency framework, the embedded individual is of central 
importance to heterodox economics.257 John B. Davis (2003:111) writes, 
embedded individuals “are acted upon by society”, but “are also 
themselves agents who act upon and change society”. This means that an 
individual is simultaneously a product of society/culture and a producer 
of change in that culture. This individual is also self-reflective because 
they possess a capacity to act upon and influence social structures, 
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256 Through economies of scale, learning-by-doing and a more optimistic state of expectations, the 
core can perform better in a global expansionary environment than the periphery (Ocampo 2005). 
257 Davis (2003) considers “the individual” as identifiable. The individual can be identified in two 
ways. It must be possible to identify a particular individual from among others; this is the 
individuation problem. Individuation concerns whether an individual can be identified as different 
and unique from other individuals. It must also be possible to track, and thus reidentify the 
individual over time and/or changes in any of the relevant variables; this is the reidentification 




including language. As argued above in Section 6.2, real individuals may 
develop and change substantially, both in their character and in their 
fundamental tastes, whose actions can then in principle affect and 
change society. 
A person is relatively autonomous yet also interdependent with 
others; s/he has personality (or ‘individuality’)—a unique individual 
mind, body and soul with a complex set of emotions, feelings, beliefs, 
loves. Individuality rests in identifying with others (i.e. in relationships) 
rather than distinguishing ourselves from others. Individuals, who as 
socially embedded beings, cannot be reduced to their group identities, 
and yet group identities impose significant constraints upon individuals. 
Individual identity is continually created and re-created in terms of 
external group associations. That is, as Hodgson (2004) argues, 
individuals and the nature of individuality might be endogenous to the 
economic process, since they are born into a world of pre-existing 
institutions, and institutions evolve as a consequence of the past actions 
of individuals. 
It is critical to realise, especially for social welfare analysis, that 
individuals are to a degree independent agents, but often the scope of 
independent action is highly circumscribed. An individual in the affluent 
West can change for the better the practice of market activity through 
their interaction (e.g. as the demand for fair-trade commodities and 
organic foods shows). However, the more individualistic and 
disembedded s/he becomes, the less “individual” they really are. Hirsch 
(1976:106, emphasis added) suggests that “the market economy is 
institutionally focused on the wants of the individual in his isolated 
capacity”. In a socioeconomic system where the market is the dominant 
institution, he finds that a tendency for a self-reinforcing interaction 
between individual private decisions and the expansion of the 
commercial sector, mediated by an erosion of nonmarket institutional 
arrangements and values. While individuals act upon the social structure 
when they evaluate their socially constituted first-order preferences, they 
are also acted upon by society in particular when the market limits and 
constrains that evaluative capacity. 
The post-Fordist economy is increasingly relying on “subsistence 
labourers” (for instance). “These take up the low-skill, highly unregulated 
(if not illegal) and flexible jobs that form the underbelly of the glitzy new 
economy” (Migone 2007:189-90). They are the single mothers and the 
inner-city youths or the deskilled industrial workers of the US Rust Belt; 
in addition they are the illegal migrants in California agribusiness, the 
Chinese and Indonesian women who assemble clothing in North 
American sweatshops, the Asian caregivers and maids, and the flood of 
sextrade workers from Asian and Eastern European countries. These 
individuals are not able to “freely” choose the groups to which they 

399
belong—this means “most individuals over time lose or never develop 
this capacity, and are consequently not reidentifiable as distinct 
individuals across change” (Davis 2003:157). 
For example, the apparel industry is a good illustration of the need for 
deeper reflection on the individual–society in the global and regional 
system. A study of the apparel industry is vital because it is one of the 
world’s largest manufacturing industries and is among a handful of 
industries where extreme exploitation of vulnerable labour is central to 
the labour process and to the chain of profit making. A combination of 
political, economic, and social trends has come together to create 
working conditions that are abominable, and it is chiefly apparent in the 
apparel industry (see Ross 2004:20,21,23,178). Sweatshops in the United 
States, for instance, violate multiple employment standards as laid down 
in the US Fair Labor Standards Act (Rosen 2002:226). Also, in China’s 
export factories, often the labouring hours are in excess of eighty hours, 
workers toil in forbidding and hazardous compounds, and union rights 
are nonexistent—the laws are fine but enforcement scant (e.g. Chan and 
Wang 2004/2005, Ridder 2006). Clearly, sweatshops are seriously 
distressing examples of what Fisher (1906:174, 1937:34) referred to as 
the ‘psychic outgo’, the undesirable subjective efforts put forth by human 
beings in order that non-conspicuous satisfactions derived from clothing 
may accrue. 
Nowadays, individuals in Western nations are receiving psychic 
incomes from clothing capital more than they could in the past because 
they can buy more items of clothing at a lower cost per item.258 
Consequently, an individual in the affluent West may enjoy the psychic 
income from clothing apparel imported from any of these areas, but not 
endure the psychic outgo experienced (e.g. the mental stress associated 
with sweatshop conditions). The price paid ignores the sweatshop 
conditions (which the system inherently supports). Yet, the moral and 
social implications of the generation of services and disservices are 
significant in a measure of sustainable well-being. It must be deciphered 
under what conditions who receives the service, because of moral or 
institutional constraints. A political economist cannot simply consider 
the service flowing from a commodity without interpreting the social or 
moral consequences of the exchange.259 These are crucial considerations 
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258 For instance, American families today are paying less (in real terms) for clothing than they were 
twenty-five years ago (Rosen 2002:231). Low apparel prices (and higher profits for retailers) are 
obtained because trade liberalisation and competitive pressures to find ever-cheaper pools of 
labour lowers costs of production. Subsequently, Western retailers source in places like China, 
Bangladesh (Roddick 2004:23-7), or Haiti (Ross 2004:37). 
259 The key here is for the political economist to employ a research design that is participatory 
rather than distanced. The main argument by Sabine O’Hara is that the selection of indicator 
categories and the evaluation of trade-offs between them must be flexible enough to allow for 
context specific conditions and variations (see O’Hara 2009:186-91). “Non-credentialled experts”, 
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for calculating SEWIs. Traditionally, the SEWIs have not accounted for 
these non-ecological cross-boundary or intra-peripheral influences on the 
net psychic income of an area. 
Lawn and Sanders (1999) assume and/or accept that the net value of 
services and disservices is equal to net psychic income. That is, ‘psychic 
income’ is also known as ‘service’ in their analyses.260 Because agents 
possess imperfect information, we need to ask whether there should be a 
distinction between the individual evaluation of ‘psychic income’ and the 
socially evaluated ‘service’, likewise, ‘psychic outgo’ and ‘disservice’? If 
there is real distinction, then individual well-being may increase, but the 
net welfare of society may decrease. Continuing with our sweatshop 
example, the service (social welfare) would be lower because of the 
unjust labour conditions, even supposing the ‘psychic income’ of an 
individual (who purchased and wears the apparel) increases. Thus, there 
is a contradiction between individual and society, where the interests of 
the individual are satisfied at the expense of social well-being. 
Furthermore, the psychic outgo experienced from sweatshop 
conditions is unevenly distributed among people of a particular ethnicity, 
gender and class. US sweatshops primarily employ women without 
sufficient education, or women immigrants, both legal and illegal, who 
lack language skills (Ross 2004:35). Pay is very low and even when 
minimum wage standards are met, the level of earnings seldom allows 
for a satisfactory standard of living, because genuine living costs require 
higher daily wage earnings. “Americans have yet to see the link between 
the growth of apparel sweatshops and domestic retailing, which has 
generated a new group of low-wage women workers in the United States” 
(Rosen 2002:235, emphasis added). The consequence of a combination 
of low individual, social and structural capacities will be passive, 
underprivileged classes who have low incomes and little control over 
their destinies, denying them (low-wage women) full participation in 
society.261 In relation to hypothesis H5, understanding the political 
economy of capitalism entails a study of the individual–society 
contradiction, but it is hard to link all the evaluation problems of 
individual and social welfare in one national-centric index. 
In conclusion, to belong to a certain group is to play an informal role 
(whether or not one wishes to) and experience its advantages and 
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in this case, the marginalised sweatshop workers, are (to a degree) quite capable of articulating 
their own standpoint (the problems they face).
260 For example, regarding the annual services yielded by the stock of consumer durables: “the 
value of the services (psychic income) derived from their part ‘consumption’” (Lawn and Sanders 
1999:220, emphasis added). 
261 Our discussion rightly focuses on real-time spatial scale implications of individual versus group 
identities, which were missing from the vast majority of the aggregate indices of ISEW and GPI. 
Yet, illustrating the value-feedbacks and tensions between individual and group and society in 
more rigorous depth would require a similar application to intergenerational equity (i.e. examining 
the current and future welfare effects). 
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drawbacks. In Veblen’s holistic vision of the ‘individual’, social 
relationships are embedded in individuals rather than individuals being 
embedded in social (group) relations. “If individuals are so heavily 
influenced by group membership, individuation is difficult without 
freedom of movement between groups. Such a lack of freedom exists under 
[disembedded] capitalism and frustration about it can be seen in Veblen’s 
writings” (Wunder 2007:834, emphasis added). The lack of mobility 
between groups may actually result in the retardation of individuation. 
Only through free association can individuation be achieved. Yet, as 
Timothy Wunder (2007:834) points out, “the fact that individuals rarely 
have the choice of free association means that individuation may never 
form in the first place”.262 Some important questions arise. How would 
we measure the net welfare of different groups in a SEWI? Can SEWIs 
adequately measure the net welfare of groups? These types of issues 
need further investigation, especially in relation to the asymmetric 
distribution of welfare to heterogeneous agents, now discussed in Section 
6.8 below: 
6.8 The Imperceptibility of Heterogeneous Agents and 
their Asymmetric Distribution of Power/Resources 
A part of the problem is that composite indices such as the SEWIs, only 
present information in a form that is more expedient, more 
understandable, and more amenable to some forms of analysis. “But in 
the process, much useful information may be lost. This loss should be 
weighed against the gain from avoidance of the trouble of handling a large 
set of data” (Chakraborty 2002:1199, emphases added). When looking at 
inequality (for instance), Chakraborty (2001, 2002) argues that it would 
be more meaningful to examine inequality among socio-demographic 
groups, like gender disparity or rural–urban disparity as opposed to 
inequality across individuals, such as with Gini indices.263 In relation to 
inequality in non-distributable conditions, such as health or knowledge 
and skills, of which it is not possible to transfer units between persons, 
Chakraborty explains that the analysis becomes more meaningful when 
we study inequality between groups rather than between individuals.264 
However, the SEWI tends to aggregate income inequality aspects for the 
population as a whole and in doing so treats people as individuals rather 
than also as groups of people, e.g. an average is calculated. What is more 
meaningful in net welfare analysis is to examine the heterogeneity of 
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262 However, Jackson (2005) demonstrates that conflicts between agency and structure will affect 
certain individuals and groups but will not be spread throughout the whole population. 
263 However, if inequality is large, the Gini potentially tells us that there are classes—from which 
we could explain them in more detail. 
264 To study the distribution of physical disabilities, for instance, over the population at large has 
sparse meaning. “[I]t would be more meaningful if we could show that physical disability on 




When assessing the complexity of class, gender and ethnic well-
being, and species, the control of more durable and secure sources of 
capital stocks becomes vital. Fisher (1906:117) says that useful services 
are often derived from a person who owns the capital stock. Ownership 
may be necessary to enjoy the service for certain types of artefact capital, 
which may enable one to experience other, more durable kinds of 
capital.265 Control or ownership of the wealth, rather than money income 
per se is a significant variable for equity and distribution considerations 
among heterogeneous agents. 
According to O’Hara (2007b), the principle of heterogeneous agents 
(or people) states that: 
 
there are multiple roles played by agents in the [systematic 
circuit of social capital], due to asymmetric distribution of 
power and resources. Individual preferences and resources 
are affected by their institutional, cultural and biological 
environmental, including genetical makeup and family 
background, occupational and income status, ethnic and 
class positions, as well as gender disposition. These 
multiple roles are also affected by corporate, media and 
party-political institutions. Individuals do not exist as an 
island, but interact and are affected by other individuals, 
friends, family, groups, organizations and systems of belief 
and valuation. In this system of influences, class, ethnicity, 
gender and species are critical. [O’Hara 2007:13] 
 
To the extent that behaviours are learned, they are transmitted by culture 
and society through our families and social groups, e.g. when we are 
young, we learn from our parents and caregivers. A person’s place within 
social structures determines their ability to act: personal relations and 
networks that diminish those of non-members magnify the powers of 
network members. This is because of the asymmetric distribution of 
power and resources to heterogeneous agents. 
The sub-hypothesis, H5.2, is also raised: 
 
H5.2:  Composite net income indicators inadequately measure 
distribution. 
 
One’s class, ethnicity and gender shadow family background, as the 
resources offered by families, friends and relations necessarily shadow 

265 The service may be privately enjoyed from unowned forms of wealth, for instance, if the nature 
of the capital stock is a public or social good (e.g. the ocean or government infrastructure) or is not 
normally owned as such (e.g. the stock of trust). 
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the value of parental guidance, school attendance and occupation. The 
ability of parents to influence the intergenerational transfer of resources 
to their offspring is a crucial determinant of the material and cultural 
advantages they will bring to bear on the future (Bourdieu 1997). High 
levels of education among the community and key job and economic 
connections (social linkages) are common for people from families with 
more privileged backgrounds (Bourdieu 1997, Bourdieu and Passeron 
1977). Hence, merely summating the psychic income of individuals in an 
index would therefore trivialise important distributional problems in the 
market economy. Hypothesis H5.2 says that we need to scrutinise the 
moral and social implications of the generation of services/disservices. 
This is because welfare may be unevenly distributed amongst people of a 
particular class, ethnicity and/or gender. SEWIs are restricted to an 
impartial measure of these problems. 
The composite indicator presents the observer with limited 
information concerning heterogeneous agents. Nonetheless, advocates 
do consider ‘groups’ to some extent as the SEWI takes the effects of 
inequality of income amongst the distribution of the ‘lowest quintile’ in 
total income (e.g. US ISEW, Daly and Cobb 1989) as well as the welfare 
costs associated with long-term unemployed people, problem gamblers 
(e.g. Australian GPI, Hamilton and Denniss 2001) and prostitutes (Thai 
ISEW, Clarke and Islam 2004) when addressing net welfare. But, 
Costanza’s et al. (2004) study into subnational GPIs, for instance, offer 
only criticism of measurement problems, and no attention is paid to the 
fact that the heterogeneity of a population is not limited to geographical 
units. Overall, however, explicitly accounting for the control of wealth 
amongst heterogeneous people is not embedded enough in the SEWI 
framework: rather the focus is on the monetary welfare across individuals. 
That is, there is no explicit class, gender or ethnic analysis of the 
asymmetric distribution of psychic income and outgo in the net welfare 
indices: for example, noise, air or water pollution or crime. It would be 
more meaningful and useful if there were a more detailed component 
analysis of the various dimensions of societal welfare because of the 
inherent limitations of single-money composite index (H5.2). 
To illustrate, consider a private (residential) rental situation. Under 
Fisher’s logic, the persons’ renting receive useful services from the house 
(e.g. shelter). The owner of the rental property only gains the flow of 
‘money income’ (if they are saved)—unless, of course, the rental money 
funds are immediately utilised for consumption spending (i.e. not saved) 
then the owner may gain useful psychic income services. For Fisher, if 
the rental funds are saved or stored then the situation is different, 
because the accumulation of money income as savings is not to be 
included under current ‘psychic income’. Capital goods and monetary 
income saved ‘yield’ no present service; savings only represent control 
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over future services that will/may later arise. To apply Fisher’s argument (a 
static i.e. deterministic analysis): money and interest made from 
variously owned capital stocks (e.g. property ‘investments’) can only be a 
potential quality of the service, which is yielded/experienced only when a 
useful service is obtained by the owner. 
However, in reality, Fisher’s version of current service and savings 
has some limitations vis-à-vis heterogeneous agents. Because, people 
who own more property than others (e.g. the affluent bourgeoisie) are, in 
effect, limiting the distribution of the higher flow quality of the psychic 
income to people who do not own property (e.g. the working poor).266 
Owning a house frees the owner from the obligation of paying rent, 
leaving more resources for spending on other needs. For instance, 
upper-class people who can afford the ownership of housing capital may 
enjoy a higher level of psychic income than the lower-class tenants, 
because of the higher level of present and future security—‘locking in’ 
the service yielded.267 Rather than adjusting SEWIs by the Gini 
coefficient, it might be more useful to have a wealth-adjusted income 
measure instead. Wolff and Zacharias (2007) find that (in the US, 1983–
2001) ‘wealth inequality’ is far more severe than income inequality and 
this has consequences for economic security. Certainly, in the multiple 
capital paradigm (MCP), the upper-classes have greater access (for 
current well-being) and privilege (security for future well-being) to highly 
durable forms of social, human and artefact capital (see Bankston III and 
Zhou 2002, Lareau 2002). 
The analysis above challenges Neumayer’s (2004) argument, viz: 
“Contrary to well-being itself, which has an orientation towards the 
present, sustainability is a future-oriented concept. ... [C]urrent well-being 
is affected by the way in which current total capital is used. Sustainability 
is only affected if the total capital stock itself is affected” (Neumayer 
2004:1,4). He suggests that intra- and inter-generational distribution can 
conflict with each other; e.g. there is a poor link between income 
distribution and sustainability. But Neumayer’s major point is 
questionable because providing resources to lower classes can increase 
their potential inclusion in society (i.e. enhancing their future welfare). The 
growth and development experiences in East Asia (especially, China), 
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) demonstrate that the 
distribution of ‘welfare’ and its ‘social sustainability’ are interrelated.  
China’s reform of rural and agricultural institutions that had begun in 
the late 1970s laid the foundation for its current economic and health 

266 Therefore, social safeguarding of the stock becomes important (such as increasing the role of 
protection by a democratic state). 
267 While ‘savings’ according to Fisher do not yield psychic income, they are a function of the 
control of wealth and hence have the potential to yield income. Nonetheless, not all of the psychic 
income is derived from artefact capital; hence, the upper classes may not enjoy an overall net 
psychic ‘advantage’ over other classes. 
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achievements (UNDESA 2006:46,135). Designed with a pragmatic vision, 
institutional reform in China has laid down long-term economic 
development as the ultimate goal, but ensuring that the resulting economic 
affluence is shared by a growing number of recipients. Despite some social 
and economic volatility and rising urban–rural inequality since 1995, its 
economic achievement has lifted tens of millions of people out of 
extreme poverty in the last two decades—in comparison to the little 
progress of poverty reduction for 99 countries (93% of the population in 
low- and middle-income nations) (see Chen and Ravallion 2007:4). The 
Chinese experience confirms that during 1980–2007 the social 
redistribution of capitals (particularly land) has led to sustainable gains in 
economic welfare. 
Sustained poverty reduction (in the ‘relative’ and ‘weak absolute’ 
sense) depends on a fast pace of GDP growth together with social 
structural reforms. The failure to build up various capitals explains (in 
part) why Latin America and SSA (excluding South Africa) have fallen 
behind the East Asian countries during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s—
these Asian economies invested more in the quality and coverage of 
infrastructure (machinery, equipment) and in human (education, health) 
capital (Arias 2006:167-8).268 The scourge of malnutrition and inequality 
hinders children’s physical, mental and social development with life-long 
harming effects (UNESC 2008). Evidently, a persistent uneven 
distribution of the stock of wealth and income has reduced current and 
future levels of social welfare in SSA (and the periphery in general). 
Hence, contrary to Neumayer’s position, it is argued—and the empirical 
evidence confirms it—that there is a strong relationship between income 
distribution and sustainability. 
A common problem to all areas (regions or nations) is that the 
psychic outgo may be unevenly distributed towards poorer people 
because of, say, their class, which limits their ownership of and their 
power over wealth.269 Research provides support for the linkage of people 
on low incomes with exposure to chronic noise and overcrowding (e.g. 
see Ulrich 2002). For instance, low-income children are on average more 
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268 Although rates of primary and secondary education are up in many Latin American countries, 
the quality of education is appalling (and only modest improvement at the tertiary level)—
“probably the single most important source of Latin America’s lagging economic 
competitiveness”, as Francis Fukuyama (2007) remarks. However, there is a great deal of social 
change brewing under the surface as a result of reformist left-of-centre democratic leaders across 
Latin America since 2003—part of a new development agenda that is still in the making. The main 
message of this study is how imperative and sustainable these domestic measures of social policy 
really are vis-à-vis future socioeconomic welfare—i.e. in the form of early land reform and heavy 
investments in basic education was to East Asia’s success. 
269 Class as an economic concept is an entry point and focus in political economy. ‘Class’ is one 
particular social process among the many that comprise social life—hence, ‘class’ is no less 
determinant of social life than any other aspect (Resnick and Wolff 1987:25,87). Class analysis is 
important for the capitalist system, because of the conflict between the interests of capital owners 
and the common good, where the ‘common good’ of sustainable well-being should prevail. 
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vulnerable than middle-income children to adopting learned 
helplessness. In addition, utilising national household survey statistics, 
Evans and Kantrowitz (2002) find that households in major US 
metropolitan areas with household incomes below $10,000 had average 
levels of sound exposure about 10 decibels higher than households with 
incomes above $20,000. Low-income residents in these urban 
neighbourhoods also reported “neighborhood noise as bothersome” 
nearly twice as often as families not living in poverty. And, noise 
pollution research also indicates the link between residential crowding 
and low income (e.g. see Evans and Kantrowitz 2002). Households with 
fewer rooms in low-income neighbourhoods in the United States, 
Mexico, and England had considerably less access to a park or a private 
garden—poorer people do not experience vital ‘psychic’ services from 
infrastructure and ecological capital. And clearly in the above noise 
pollution example, their level of health would be relatively lower. 
In other words, the intensity of the psychic income or service 
experienced by less-privileged people is relatively lower because an 
inferior, insecure and less-durable stock of capital is rented/owned. 
Human needs (and wants) are satisfied by the existing capital stock, but 
not by the unavoidable but regrettable characteristic of the stock to 
become worn out or all used up. Human welfare is not a function of 
consumption per se, but of the capital stocks—yet the control and power 
of the durable wealth may be unevenly distributed which potentially 
privileges particular groups in society. In some respects, use of Gini or 
Atkinson index or analysis of the lowest 10% decile in SEWIs alludes to 
the distribution of sustainable welfare between classes over time. 
However, only a few authors of SEWIs have considered specific 
distributional effects. For instance, Stockhammer et al. (1997) regard 
welfare as a social phenomenon and adjust their raw-ISEW for Austria by 
an income-and-work distribution index (see Stockhammer et al. 
1997:25,30). Overall, however, a lack of inter-group analysis vis-à-vis the 
aggregated composite indicators by advocates grossly oversimplifies 
reality. 
Several advocates provide a good socio-historical institutional 
analysis of heterogeneous agents and their role in the social economy. 
For instance, Cobb et al. (1999:36) examine the emotional problems 
faced by the modern youth of America, i.e. children on drugs, heavy 
drinking, smoking and mood-altering substances. However, their GPI 
does not break down the allotment in which heterogeneous people (in 
this case, the children) are affected. They have not excluded any of these 
items from the ‘personal consumption expenditure’ column in their US 
GPI. The GPI authors have raised valid critiques against GDP, but how 
does one judge the claims above, professed under “Column A, personal 
consumption expenditures”, in the overall index? Yet as argued in 
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Chapter 4, they inadvertently show the limitations of constructing an all-
in-one indicator of “genuine progress”: the authors had a far superior 
disaggregated account of real socioeconomic institutions to their 
aggregated inquiry. In other words, pivotal limits of monetary-composite 
indices concerning the heterogeneity character of persons-in-community 
have been self-exposed (H5.2). 
Then again, some of the SEWIs indirectly detect the contradiction 
between heterogeneous species, e.g. between human beings and non-
humans. Lawn, for instance, separates (a) socioeconomic and 
environmental effects on ‘human welfare’ from (b) the negative 
socioeconomic effects on the ‘natural environment’.270 There has been 
an overt separation between the (a) socioeconomic effects on ecological 
capital influencing the human-welfare of the household, and (b) 
socioeconomic effects on ecological capital degrading the natural 
environment as such. The first case, (a), is primarily a human—
environment—human-welfare interaction problem, and the second case, 
(b), is a human—environment—environmental-welfare interaction 
problem. Yet, ultimately, the SEWIs are measures of human welfare, not 
environmental welfare. Thus, the cost of the lost source, sink, and life-
support services provided by ecological capital is from the perspective of 
maintaining the human habitability of the planet. 
However, Lawn acknowledges that SEWIs do not account for the 
existence value of ecological capital. In his definition of sustainable 
development: there is a need to recognise the intrinsic value of sentient 
non-human beings and extend the principle of justice to include the 
dignified and, where plausible, cruelty-free treatment of sentient non-
human beings. Rights could accrue to creatures other than ourselves 
that, if supported, limit humankind’s share of the planet. Lawn 
(2007a:28) possesses a biocentric view of the world. He believes that 
humankind knows enough about the value of biodiversity (e.g. 
diminution begets further diminutions) to operate on the (precautionary) 
principle that all reductions in biodiversity must be avoided, because of 
the potential threats to ecosystem functioning and its life-support role for 
all species. Therefore, in principle, Lawn’s SNBI accounts for non-human 
species (with the adjustment of an ecosystem health index), but does so 
indirectly. 
On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that a monetary-based SEWI 
could manage the complexity of heterogeneous species by summating 
the totality of biodiversity destruction via a simple index. Relating to 
hypothesis H5.2, SEWI aggregates ignore distribution of power between 
species. The same arguments put forward for the diverse human groups 
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270 This distinction between ‘human’ and ‘ecological’ welfare affects is clearer in Eq. (5.36) (Chapter 




above could be transferred to the role of individual or groups of non-
human species (so finely interconnected in the web of life). It would be 
more meaningful and useful if there were a more detailed component 
analysis of the various dimensions of ecological welfare (e.g. see 
Hajkowicz 2006, Munda 2005, O’Connor et al. 1996), because of the 
inherent limitations of the monetised composite index. Of course, we 
would have more faith in the SEWIs if they were not fraught with 
conceptual problems, and they were more complete in multiple 
contradictory analysis. 
6.9 Conclusion. Beyond the Veil of Constructing SEWIs—
Radical Theoretical Reconstruction Needed 
The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Progress 
Indicator (GPI), Sustainable Net Benefit Index (SNBI) and Fisherian 
Income (YF) are no saviours for GDP-adjusted indices because of the 
lack of a strong theoretical framework and socio-historical institutional 
analysis—a linked systems view of the social and ecological conditions in 
the disembedded economy is missing. In Sections 6.2–6.8, it is argued 
that various over-simplified assumptions are employed, particularly 
regarding the metamorphosis of human and social capitals vis-à-vis 
psychic income; the connotative acceptance of monetary evaluation as a 
solitary good measure of ‘optimal net welfare’; the ignorance of 
heterogeneous agents; and the implicit acceptance of personal 
consumption as the reference point of well-being. Overall, ad-hoc 
commonsensical accountancy from a nation-centric perspective prevails. 
The correctness of measuring sustainable economic welfare is 
unconvincing because SEWI advocates have not adequately detailed the 
theoretical fundamentals of ‘psychic income generation’ over real 
historical time—the very nature of personal and social development 
processes is qualitative in nature and furthermore cannot simply be 
summarised in monetary terms. Thus, I argue that the aggregated 
national (or subnational) indicators do not get to the heart of solving real 
issues (vis-à-vis H5, H5.1, H5.2), because there is an inadequate 
understanding of the political economy system. 
E. J. Mishan (1994) was the first, of a handful of authors, to assert 
that the SEWI was probably a foredoomed project. Still, one has the 
impression that his astuteness is ancient history, i.e. there is general 
acceptance that the SEWIs are workable, with good prospects. The 
wounds Mishan once inflicted to the ‘net consumption’ indicator are now 
healed; also, complete immunity from Eric Neumayer’s (1999) virulent 
blow looks certain. For instance, in Indicators for Sustainable Development, 
Richard England (2006:218, emphasis added) states: “[f]rom the 
standpoint of research strategy, it is preferable that ecological 
economists refine their measurements of ... ISEW”. Thus, the labyrinth of 

409
the social-biospherical reality is reduced to “refin[ing] their [ad-hoc 
commonsensical techniques]”. 
Of course, advocates of SEWIs point out that their measures are far 
from perfect, and never once did they explicitly believe they were in any 
case. Yet, they must consider it necessarily important to go through with 
the statistical calculations. Clarke (2006b:181) and Clarke and Lawn 
(2008:575) regard the whole exercise as a fruitful process despite its 
imperfections in terms of adjustments, methodologies and value 
judgements: “whilst the seriousness of [these] weakness[es] should not 
be underestimated, it is not enough to condemn the [ISEW or GPI] to 
redundancy”. Thus, we need to consider the imperfect areas of 
recognised incomplete and narrowly defined sustainable development 
indicators within SEWIs. Au fond, the advocates have concentrated on the 
shallower imperfections associated with their arithmetical operations. 
The emerging debate surrounding SEWIs still appears saturated in so-
called methodological (i.e. measurement or ‘construction’) limitations, 
not the theoretical underpinning. This chapter argues that advocates did 
not adequately undertake a self-critical analysis of their SEWIs. 
The measures are imperfect in so many other ways. The SEWIs were 
problematic to begin with because of a limited ontology of ‘wealth’. This 
constricted view leads to the destruction of critical forms of wealth, 
particularly human-health and social capital, as they are abstracted from 
the analysis. When drawing inference from everyday social interactions 
and personal experiences in a community—e.g. the time, risk and 
expenditure invested by many people in endeavours to discover another 
human being who is willing to show love, tenderness, understanding, 
consideration and sympathy—such types of personal services are valued 
very highly on the scale of welfare. Paradoxically, the SEWIs cannot be 
developed or improved any further to incorporate such services, and 
thus, because of the misplaced concreteness of money and the 
prominence of consumption, by no means can realise their full potential. 
It is now axiomatic that an ‘economics for community’ framework, 
developed by the authors of the original ISEW (Daly and Cobb 1989), 
cannot be integrated into the measure. There are major limits to the 
monetary composite indices. It is necessary to transcend the one-and-a-half 
contradiction world and have a broad view of wealth. 
Ultimately, there was blindness to the social (and moral) consequence 
of market institutions in SEWIs; a deficient multi-criteria analysis of the 
contradictions of capitalism’s creative-destructive processes was a lack of 
judgement on the advocate’s behalf. In the disembedded economy, due 
to obsolescence, the hurried pace of technical change, and the wider 
range of options available, consumption upholds net social and community 
welfare loss. This is because the market extends to all facets of social life. 
Life outside of business life (corporations and markets) is dismantled by 
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the incessant transformation and disarrangement of free market 
capitalism—i.e. market transactions increase at the expense of 
reciprocity and redistribution. Hence, the extensiveness of market 
exchange, combined with increasing intensity of material consumption, 
has occurred at the expense of intensity in human relationships. 
Moreover, it is argued that displacing the multiple contradictions in the 
analysis of sustainable well-being is theoretically incongruous with the 
reality of social life in a market-dominated economy. 
In conclusion, the majority of the SEWI studies act in a syncretic 
fashion and trivialise the realities. The way SEWIs are calculated is a 
highly sensitive operational procedure due to summarising the 
complexity of the system in, what Mishan (1994) labelled, the “grand 
computation”. The use of any single composite indicator to describe and 
perceive the subtle patterns of the total socio-ecological system is very 
difficult. In his devastating critique of orthodox economics in “The 
Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics”, Nicholas Kaldor’s analysis could 
well apply to the literature on SEWIs: 
 
The process of removing the “scaffolding,” as the saying 
goes,—in other words of relaxing the unreal basic 
assumptions—has not yet started. Indeed, the scaffolding 
gets thicker and more impenetrable with every successive 
reformulation of the [‘]theory[’], with growing uncertainty as 
to whether there is a solid building underneath. [Kaldor 
1972:1239, emphasis added] 
 
Advocates became excited about the prospect of debasing GDP from the 
socio-political spectrum, but alas, this was executed in an ill-conceived, 
innocent and hasty manner. There was simply not enough energy put 
into the “solid building underneath” and unification in the SEWIs, and 
hence, “further indicator supplementation for the ISEW, GPI or SNBI” 
(Lawn 2006a:162) would not be useful. This is because of the soft 
theoretical base—no conceptual specifications on the interconnected 
realms of wealth, service, psychic-income, sustainable well-being for the 
individual, society, and community were known. The measures come 
crashing down once one establishes the major conceptual, empirical and 
technical defects. 
Therefore, it is doubtful that SEWIs are describing and measuring 
accurately social and ecological change, because significant conceptual, 
methodological, and technical inconsistencies mar the results. The raw 
ecological economistic approach limits the study. There is a need to 
transcend it. A more detailed and broader approach to net welfare is 
needed to find the root of social and environmental problems. As a point 
of departure, it is suggested that it is best to have a social and ecological 
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political economy approach—only a perspective that examines the global 
system within a regional and (where relevant) national and local 
environment is appropriate to such problems. Political economy is well 
positioned to handle the processes of social and ecological change, 
accepts the principle of holism, and thus realises that a detailed socio-
historical institutional analysis is needed. Chapter 7 concludes this study, 
proposing that further study of an alternative measure anchored in the 
political economy of the disembedded system is a (partial) solution to 









This study has critically evaluated six socioeconomic and environmental 
indicators, which were introduced in Chapter 1: Measure of Economic 
Welfare (MEW), Economic Aspects of Welfare (EAW), Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), Genuine Progress Indicator 
(GPI), the Sustainable Net Benefits Index (SNBI) and Fisherian Income 
(YF). Following in the footsteps of Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) and 
Zolotas (1981), Daly and Cobb (1989) in their landmark book, For the 
Common Good, pioneered early work into developing the earliest 
measure of net welfare to include distribution, defensive costs, and 
sustainability (e.g. the costs of long-term environmental damage) in the 
one index. GPI, SNBI, YF and further ISEW studies have subsequently 
followed suit. Collectively, these composite measures may be referred to 
as ‘Net Income Indices’ or Sustainable Economic Welfare Indicators 
(SEWIs) since they are designed for assessing aspects of sustainability 
and welfare. Commencing in 1972 and ending in April 2009, there have 
been forty-five individual studies involving construction of a SEWI at the 
national, subnational and local levels. Subject to data availability, each 
analyst has obtained estimates of the variables required to compute their 
indicator for the nation/place of interest, utilising multiple sources such 
as government reports and the System of National Accounts. Overall, 
SEWI advocates attempt to demonstrate the limitations of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by devising a single composite measure of the 
positive and negative contributions of economic activity to sustainable 
well-being. 
No author in the literature has undertaken a meticulous study of each 
work for the SEWIs from the perspective of political economy. The task of 
political economy is to continue exploring the modus operandi of 
capitalism with a view to ascertaining the changing forms in which the 
system manifests itself. The market extends to all facets of social life; life 
outside of business life is dismantled by the incessant transformation 
and disarrangement of free market capitalism. The implication is that for 
any study into sustainable well-being the key focus is the effects of market 
institutions on society. Having embarked on a systematic, detailed and 
scholarly examination of the conclusions drawn in the literature, our 
findings in relation to the hypotheses raised in Chapters 2–6 are now 
summarised below. 
Chapter 2 gave a historical overview of accounting for income and 
welfare. This inquiry was guided by hypothesis one, H1, that economic 
growth provides a good measure of wealth and welfare. H1 is valid to some 
extent, since we found that economic growth or levels of income (GDP) 
have historically been good concepts for understanding (changes in) net 
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welfare. Economic growth was understood by some of the founders of 
accounting, such as Irving Fisher and Simon Kuznets, as a sustained 
increase in its magnitude of services over a long-term trend. But a dilemma is 
that in practice it is very difficult to make the idea of ‘service’ (welfare) 
operational in a system of income and product accounts. Some 
compromises were made. Coinciding with the development of the 1953 
United Nations System of National Accounts (UNSNA), ‘economic growth’ 
no longer stands for a measure of ‘net income’ (genuine welfare of 
society). Because a ‘business’ worldview was enshrined in UNSNA, 
“economic growth” chiefly signifies market-based production activities. 
Hence, the narrowly defined measure of ‘production’, Gross Domestic 
‘Product’ (GDP), was born and to this day remains the principal indicator 
of economic performance for developed and developing regions of the 
world. GDP is simply a measure of the final value of marketed goods and 
services produced. 
There is a plus side to this route—yet commonly overlooked in the 
literature on SEWIs—because GDP growth is useful for comprehending 
the rate of expansion of market relationships. In this thesis, it is argued 
that historical trends of GDP provide a good understanding of the workings of 
the capitalist system. Gaining insight from Marx, Veblen, Keynes and 
Schumpeter, we learn that a critical evaluation of GDP from a systems 
perspective is critical. The great four political economists saw the system 
as being potentially unstable, with recession (or depression) as likely as 
sustained periods of GDP growth. Capitalist institutions include 
production only for market exchange, a monetary economy, and 
production motivated mainly by profit. All of these institutions make 
possible the business cycle—because if there is insufficient monetary 
demand to buy the supply at a price including a profit a contraction may 
occur. GDP growth must therefore be scrutinised in the context of the 
cyclical movements and long waves by having a detailed historical 
analysis, from which we can gain a reasonably good insight into (changes 
in) net welfare (H1). 
However, there are many unresolved socio-ecological problems with 
GDP, which make the stronger overall case for rejecting H1. It is true that 
the negatives of GDP have been evaluated in the literature to a 
considerable extent. Yet the inquiry into this issue is indispensible since 
it provided the context of determining the extent to which the SEWI 
advocates contend with these factors in their replacement GDP-type 
measures. Six limitations (three social, three ecological) that make GDP 
a weak indicator of net welfare were recognised. The operation of GDP 
concepts in practice generates social problems, especially in relation to 
consumption. Conspicuous consumption, waste and fashion are not 
specifically identified in GDP accounting—and thereby it is difficult to 
ascertain its net welfare effects on society. Under the existing 
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institutional arrangement and the rise of individualism, particularly in the 
West, empirical evidence suggests that the durability of social, cultural, 
familial and community capitals is being destroyed by GDP growth. GDP 
also excludes the durability of artefact/consumer capital; therefore 
maximising economic growth in the consumption (destruction) or 
production (creation) sense provides no indication of the enhancement 
or deterioration of real wealth and welfare. 
Singly, GDP provides little indication of any ecological barriers or 
limitations under capitalism. As prominent social-ecological economists 
Kenneth Boulding and Herman Daly attest, GDP does not differentiate 
between growth (quantity of the service and disservice) and sustainable 
development (quality of the service), and leaves out ecological capital 
depletion. The current economic accounts implicitly encourage over-
consumption, since the welfare-orientated variables of ‘service’ and 
‘disservice’ are not explicated in the newer system of green accounts 
(SEEA-2003). That is, “economic growth” in the greener accounting 
system is still narrowly defined as real GDP growth, not sustainable 
development, green GDP or net income. The heart of the problem is when 
GDP becomes a single indicator obsession. Ultimately, GDP may need to be 
modified as it provides an inadequate measure of social and 
environmental waste in the economic system—H1 is therefore rejected. 
It is at this point of the study we entered into the territory of net income 
indicators, which entails devising a method of accounting for the costs 
and benefits of economic growth. 
It is useful to see through the lens of those committed to developing 
and processing these GDP-adjusted indicators of sustainable economic 
welfare. In order to rectify some of the shortcomings of GDP, they argue 
that it is important to combine the benefits and costs of market and non-
market activity into a single monetary-based account, so that net welfare 
effects can be ascertained. Their conceptual argument is founded on the 
premise that there would be no tendency to use GDP as a surrogate 
measure of economic welfare if an alternative were developed to perform 
that function more adequately than GDP. The main thread of their 
empirical argument is that a comparative analysis of the historical trends 
between GDP and SEWI is fruitful in demonstrating the weakness of 
economic growth as a measure of wealth and welfare (the inverse of H1). 
The sympathetic view of their technical cause is a simple human truth: 
the world’s complexity engulfs us if we have no clear, simple goals. This 
is especially valid with respect to the natural environment. There are 
multiple issues to track and too many contending targets. Accounting is 
a proven tool for dealing with this quandary: it helps us distil complicated 
factors into a few principles on which we can focus. 
Good measures can offer vital insights where there may be conflict 
between the various spheres of economy, society and ecology. If SEWI is 
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to be a meaningful indicator, a solid conceptual foundation that 
describes the prevailing socioeconomic system is essential. In Chapter 3 
we interpreted and applied theory—presenting the SEWIs in their best 
possible light—but also offered a reasonable critique. The investigation 
revolved around scrutinising hypothesis two, H2, that the ISEW has 
strong theoretical foundations. Such an inquest is significant since we are 
the first in the literature to pool together the fragmented and missing 
elements of the theoretical puzzle. Contrary to the interpretations of 
some critics such as Eric Neumayer (1999, 2004, 2007), we found that 
there are convincing theoretical and experiential reasons for undertaking 
such studies. It is argued that there are three underlying and qualitatively 
different theories of SEWIs. 
The first theory is Daly and Cobb’s (1989) conceptual “economics for 
community” oikonomia model for ISEW, which considers the costs and 
benefits to the whole community, not merely individual agents involved 
in a transaction. The second theory links Fisher’s concept of income to 
entropy: entropic net psychic income. This theory, which is largely 
supported (and specially commissioned) by Philip Lawn (2003, 2008d), 
specifies that it is a cost to replacing worn out producer goods such as 
plant, machinery, and equipment. Based mainly on the readings of 
Matthew Clarke, the third theory suggests that ISEW (or GPI) is 
conceptually based on a social welfare function (e.g. Clarke and Islam 
2004, Clarke and Shaw 2008). Utilising some principles of welfare 
economics, the ISEW integrates cost-benefit analysis with social choice 
theory, which incorporates various social concerns about welfare that are 
not adequately captured by individuals within the market place. The 
establishment of these three theories is an important result because it 
charts a clear elucidation of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
conceptual foundations of ISEW and related indicators in the literature 
(H2). 
On the other hand, there are major limitations in the approach to 
sustainable development as construed by the advocates of ISEW (and its 
related variants). Market capitalism has an inner general contradiction 
associated with periodic major instability, conflict and irregularity—
known as the systemic contradiction of the disembedded economy (Polanyi 
1944). It is argued that the conceptual foundations of the oikonomia 
model, entropic net psychic income, and the social welfare function are 
problematic, because there is no underlying linked systems view of 
creative-destructive processes of capitalism. They have a tendency to view 
‘society’, ‘capital’ and ‘service’ as largely autonomous of any specific 
socioeconomic system. That is, the three theories include some major 
aspects, but have partial, underdeveloped explanations of the 
benefits/costs generated in the socioeconomic system. Because they 
failed to incorporate an understanding of the historical socioeconomic 
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system of capitalism, as the fundamental background condition, the 
theoretical robustness of ISEW et al. is significantly reduced—H2 is 
questionable. It emerged that the SEWI project is seemingly on the 
wrong path. 
Yet to be fair, these measures are worthy of a more detailed review 
because it is generally accepted that the net income indices are 
necessary, workable and adequate measures of sustainable 
socioeconomic welfare. Chapters four and five critically evaluated the 
underlying assumptions behind the empirics and techniques of the net 
income studies. For a realistic appraisal, the literature survey had to be 
split into two chapters, where the objective was to show how the good 
points and core problems of SEWI manifest in the critical empirical and 
technical investigations. This ensured an adequate reflection and 
appreciation of the complexity, diversity and technical scope of the net 
income studies. A critical review of the literature was necessary and is 
significant, as to our knowledge no such document exists. 
Chapter 4 provided a comprehensive survey of the net income indices 
from the perspective of political economy. In this, the first literature 
survey, we examined the subtext of hypothesis three, H3, which is stated 
as follows: net income indices are good measures of environmental and 
social welfare. Each study was chronologically assessed, where we 
examined the degree to which the advocates showed expertise and 
originality—viz.: 1) the conceptual groundwork; and 2) socio-historical 
institutional analysis. We scrutinised whether the authors followed or 
developed Daly and Cobb’s oikonomia model, integrated a version of 
entropic net psychic income, or applied social choice theory. Additionally, 
we dissected the authors’ trends concerning the indicators (where 
possible), focusing on the calibre of their historical specificity vis-à-vis 
business cycles and institutional dynamics. After an exhaustive 
investigation, this study found that in relation to hypothesis three (H3) 
the conceptual-empirical applications of net income indices by SEWI 
advocates have been unsuccessful, as discussed below: 
In all of the ISEW studies we evaluated, there was no conceptual 
support given to the empirical and historical applications of Daly and 
Cobb’s (1989) persons-in-community theory. Only a few studies (e.g. the 
SNBI and YF, both devised by Lawn) have contributed to the SEWI’s 
theoretical foundations, namely an ecologised version of Fisher’s net 
psychic income. But the majority of empirical studies have not 
theoretically advanced their ISEW since For The Common Good (1989). 
Moreover, we found that the main ‘theory’ of the national GPI is based 
on a bookkeeping procedure of commonsensical accountancy. The 
theoretics behind the subnational GPIs are also based on the same 
mechanical operations, which are derived from a simple plus-minus 
technique. Consequently, there are zero theoretical advances in almost 
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all cases of the GPIs. The authors’ accountancy scheme must rely upon 
ad-hoc changes because there is no strong theoretical socio-historical 
institutional framework to act as guidance. The problem is when ad-hoc 
techniques override the building of a solid theoretical foundation. 
GDP is the very measure advocates of SEWIs wish to minimise from 
the policy spotlight. Yet, the growth rate of GDP in a historical context is 
relatively good at both depicting the stage of the business cycle and any 
effective demand problems emanating (endogenously) from the system. 
The majority of the authors’ empirical applications have delinked an analysis 
of GDP growth from the capitalist system. A lack of historical specificity vis-
à-vis the cyclical situation leaves the reader uninformed about how 
degradation or enhancement of social and environmental development is 
panning out during these times. A rash application of the real 
socioeconomic processes of capitalism is the outcome when there is too 
much focus on ‘the gap’ between GDP and the SEWI. We showed that 
without an institutional explanation and decomposition, the results of 
SEWIs could practically suggest anything. The net income indices are not 
very good measures of social (predominantly) and environmental 
welfare. H3 is thus opposed. 
Anchored in good critical thinking, we graded the overall contribution 
of SEWIs on the Degree of Literary Contribution Scale (DLCS). DLCS 
gives a mark between 0 and 10 (inclusive). Taken as a whole, the thirty-
seven SEWI studies assessed scored 2.9 out of 10 for the conceptual 
framework building and 5.2 out of 10 for the socio-historical institutional 
analysis. Sure, there were several good studies with above average marks, 
such as the Austrian ISEW by Stockhammer et al. (1997) and the 
Australian GPI by Lawn and Clarke (2006b). Yet a high calibre of research 
was an uncommon characteristic, i.e. no study achieved a score of 9 and 
above in either category (e.g. a strong socio-historical institutional 
account was not presented). Besides, most authors had a far superior 
disaggregated account of real socioeconomic institutions to their 
aggregated inquiry. Disaggregating the SEWI components and utilising 
socio-historical evidence yield more interesting results when observing 
social groups than adhering strictly to the indicator as a whole. However, 
the same thorough treatment for the disaggregated account did not 
transfer to their aggregated level of investigation of sustainable well-
being. 
It is better to have more specificity than the SEWI analyses, by 
examining world and regional changes in real GDP per capita over 
historical time. Rather than downplaying GDP or strongly modifying it, 
there is a strong argument that we could continue using it (even if GDP is 
a single monetary indicator). This is because an understanding of the 
system dynamics of capitalism necessitates a detailed scrutiny of the way 
GDP ebbs and flows through real historical time. However, the most 

419
fundamental thing is not about the indicator itself but having a strong 
socio-institutional analysis—an indicator (this includes GDP) is 
completely futile without a detailed explanation substantiating the 
results—institutional theory must guide the statistical work. The historical-
institutional material is very important, which was missing from the vast 
majority of the aggregate indices of ISEW and GPI. There is a tendency in 
the SEWI literature to engage in quantification for the sake of 
quantification, but this will not aid our understanding of sustainable 
socioeconomic welfare. H3 is looking shakier. 
A deeper scrutiny of the technical foundations of the net income 
indices was carried out in Chapter 5. This, the second literature survey, 
was now guided by hypothesis four (H4), viz. net income indices are 
innovative measures of welfare and capable of improvement. We provided a 
detailed historical-evolutionary account of the a priori inclusion and 
exclusion of variables in the SEWIs. This meant working out the level of 
innovatory contributions undertaken for thirty-three SEWI studies 
published in the period from 1989 to April 2009. The scale and scope of 
innovation (an invention and implementation of a new way or idea of 
doing something) is a key sub-genre that no author has critically 
examined. The revised version of the US ISEW by Cobb and Cobb (1994) 
and the US GPI by Cobb et al. (1995) were central to our inquiry. Since 
these are the two foundational studies in the SEWI literature, they were 
classified in this study as the ‘basic templates’. We developed a simple 
dual-score (‘minor’ or ‘major’) rating system to measure the technical 
advances of other studies in relation to these basic templates and to the 
prevailing empirical material. This rating system is founded on a 
thorough investigation of the technical literature on SEWIs. The relative 
degree of contribution is thus determined by the extent to which new 
extensions of variables and/or considerable changes in technical 
methods are devised. 
There are some very good contributions to the literature. Some of the 
studies are quite innovatory because of their new extensions of variables 
and considerable changes in valuational methods, e.g. the original GPI is 
an important attempt to ‘socialise’ the ISEW, where the costs of family 
breakdown, crime, underemployment, lost leisure time, and the benefits 
of volunteer labour are incorporated. However, relatively speaking, the 
majority of other studies have not excelled in this area. Many studies 
slavishly followed the basic templates of Cobb and Cobb (1994) and 
Cobb et al. (1995). We found that a large number of these studies 
essentially replicated the basic accounting template developed 20 years 
ago by Daly and Cobb (1989). They merely imitated their predecessors by 
substituting most of the variables of the US ISEW or the US GPI for their 
region/area of interest. In most cases, they copied the popular 
commonsensical accounting template without adequate critical analysis 
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of, or improving upon earlier works. 
A final score (100 percent or less) in relation to the Effective Rate of 
Replication (EROR) was imputed for each study. The EROR pertains to 
the degree of replication relative to the basic template and to the former 
studies, based on our dual-score rating system. Interestingly, the overall 
result for the ISEWs, GPIs, SNBI, and YF as a collective body is an EROR 
of about 87%. This implies that there is a low degree of innovatory 
practice, and this high replication rate may indicate that there are 
inherent limits to radically (re)developing the ISEW/GPI, symptomatic of 
weak measures of handling environmental and social welfare problems 
(challenging H4). It is argued that there are major limits to which ISEW 
et al. can be transformed within the context of a political economy 
critique, because SEWI advocates appear to be stuck with a restricted set of 
variables to conduct their analyses of changes in net welfare. H4 is 
rejected outright as these blemishes are virtually permanent. In short, a 
tendency for the literature to abstract from real trends in the economy is 
apparent because of the weak apparatus, mechanical applications, and 
empirical inconsistencies. 
Chapter 6 put forward the fundamental critique of the SEWI 
approaches, and this is the first study to do so utilising the principles of 
political economy. Critically absent from every SEWI analysis is a 
systematic understanding of the political economy and system dynamics of 
capitalism. This led to hypothesis five, H5, which states: understanding the 
political economy of capitalism will provide vital insights into Net Welfare 
Indices. As Polanyi (1944) showed in The Great Transformation, reciprocal 
and redistributive transactions are a significant element of the social 
economy; they are different from market exchanges. A thorough analysis 
of economic processes therefore must acknowledge the services (and 
disservices) generated within non-exchange relationships. The nature of 
real services engendered within them is critical. However, advocates of 
SEWIs try to monetarise everything and in the process ineffectually 
measure certain ‘services’ transmitted from the multiple forms of capital. 
This was especially true for the entropic net psychic income version, the 
dominant theory in the literature. 
A major conceptual and empirical shortcoming is that SEWIs do not 
account for the length of life or quality of the population’s health as well 
as their knowledge, other than the contributions to human welfare from 
non-defensive expenditures. A well-known limitation of SEWI is that it 
does not factor-in measures of investment and depreciation of ‘human-
health capital’—yet this is a critical aspect of sustainable well-being. It is 
argued that under Fisher’s psychic income framework, the bedrock of the 
indicator is a theory that specifies accounting for some sort of change in 
the human psyche, i.e. the stock of ‘human-health capital’. However, with 
the conjecture of holding the stock of human-health capital constant, by 
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definition, advocates of SEWIs cannot adequately account for the degree 
of human health or knowledge, because this is not their reference point 
(‘personal consumption expenditures’ is their reference point). But, by 
not accounting for these changes in the net stock of human capital, 
advocates must rely on far-fetched assumptions that the individual must 
possess perfect knowledge, perfect foresight, access to perfect 
information, and a stable constitution over time. It was shown that these 
abstract assumptions are problematic to understanding the political 
economy of capitalism (H5). For a realistic study the critical factors at 
work need to be endogenised. 
Human needs and preferences are not fixed, but culturally and 
individually changing over time and space. Conversely, SEWI advocates 
have started with ceteris paribus assumptions where medium and long-
term processes are not affecting the socioeconomic system (H5). We 
found that they do not account for conspicuous consumption, psychic 
obsolescence (linked to fashion), and the psychic outgoes 
(dissatisfactions) endured from an abundance of choice of consumer 
goods. Such forms of consumption support net social and community 
welfare loss. Yet, by not accounting for these negative forms of 
consumption in their analyses, the link between real welfare in the 
disembedded economy and the ‘net psychic income’ in SEWIs is 
distorted and hence questioned. 
In addition, advocates of SEWIs seem to have mastered ‘current and 
future welfare reductions’ relating to ecological dimensions, but they 
have insufficiently detailed how financial, individual, social, family, and 
community dimensions relate to a disembedded economy (H5). Because 
ad-hoc commonsensical accountancy prevails, the authors are 
inadequately accounting for the present well-being effects on the social 
structure, and do not consistently, as done for ecological capital 
depreciation, value the future generational costs (lost services) of an 
(un)sustainable social capital and human-health capital base. SEWI restricts 
the analysis to a few monetary variables and thereby it is too inflexible 
and not very helpful. Yet, such social services and disservices are 
elementary for critically evaluating the multiple contradictions of 
capitalism in a disembedded economy. 
An additional sub-hypothesis, H5.1, was therefore raised: multiple 
contradictions assess the complexity of the disembedded economy better than 
single contradictions. SEWI advocates focus mainly on the contradiction 
between the natural environment and consumption goods, and their 
inquiry is, at the most, limited to the national level. It is argued that they 
are in a one-and-a-half contradiction world; they see primarily one 
contradiction and a partial social reality from a very nationalistic 
perspective. In the global disembedded economy, all areas of life are 
both relatively autonomous yet interconnected. There are multiple 
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contradictions of capitalism to be explored, but it is hard to link all of 
them in one index. The SEWIs effectively held all other contradictions 
constant: the inextricable linkages were invisible to advocates. Displacing 
the contradictions of the disembedded economy in the analysis is 
theoretically incongruous with the reality of social life in a market-dominated 
economy (H5.1). It is necessary to transcend the one-and-a-half 
contradiction world and have a broad view of wealth. 
It is difficult to determine the true nature of the “service” and its 
distribution to persons-in-community in an exclusive aggregated net 
income index. The sub-hypothesis, H5.2, was also raised: composite net 
income indicators inadequately measure distribution. Merely summating the 
psychic income of individuals in an index trivialises important 
distributional problems in the market economy. It is argued that we need 
to scrutinise the moral and social implications of the generation of 
services/disservices. This is because welfare may be unevenly distributed 
amongst people of a particular class, ethnicity and/or gender. SEWIs are 
restricted to an impartial measure of these problems. It would be more 
meaningful and useful if there were a more detailed component analysis 
of the various dimensions of societal welfare because of the inherent 
limitations of the single-money composite index (H5.2). Without 
fundamentally understanding the heterogeneous power relations that 
define the system’s reproduction, applications of Net Welfare Indices are 
ineffective. 
In summary, various over-simplified assumptions are employed, 
particularly regarding the metamorphosis of human and social capitals 
vis-à-vis psychic income; the connotative acceptance of monetary 
evaluation as a solitary good measure of ‘optimal net welfare’; the 
ignorance of heterogeneous agents; and the implicit acceptance of 
personal consumption as the reference point of well-being. It is argued 
that the aggregated national (or subnational) indicators do not get to the 
heart of solving real issues, because there is an inadequate 
understanding of the political economy system. H5, H5.1, and H5.2 are 
highly relevant. The emerging debate in the literature on indicators of 
sustainable economic welfare is still saturated in so-called 
methodological (i.e. measurement or ‘construction’) limitations, not the 
theoretical underpinning. In essence, this study argued that advocates 
did not adequately undertake a self-critical analysis of their SEWIs. 
GDP and similar variables ignore certain things, as the ISEW and GPI 
rightly point out. While these measures (ISEW, GPI etc.) try to aggregate 
the impact of some of the other factors into the overall statistic, this is 
problematic since there are qualitative differences between GDP and 
related ‘economic’ variables, and between health–knowledge, individual–
social, industrial–financial, and environmental–business capital factors. 
Nevertheless, GDP accounting has a certain “objectivity” because it 
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reflects the value accountancy of capital itself, however irrational from a 
wider sustainable outlook. It is this close relationship of GDP to 
capitalism, which is the background to the ISEW and other indicators. 
Yet, SEWI advocates do not recognise the extent to which GDP 
accounting is an inherent reflection of the system of economic power or 
how difficult it would be to change things. They essentially start with 
GDP and try to modify it, letting standard accounting under the 
prevailing system set the agenda. There may not be any practical 
alternative to this. Still, a political economy approach would be a solid 
critique of GDP, not an attempt to add to or reform it, recognising that 
the real issue is the system of which it is merely an index. 
The question then naturally becomes, in the context of the political 
economy critique offered by this study: How might one reconstruct and 
extend these models, explicitly taking into account the dominant 
socioeconomic relations? The best theoretical model of ISEW seems to 
be ‘persons-in-community’. This approach acknowledges the importance 
of community and the diversity of the individual. The person-in-
community notion is significant because each human being is 
constituted by relationships to others, and this pattern of relationships is 
at least as important as the possession of commodities. “The goal of an 
economics for community is as much to provide meaningful and 
personally satisfying work as to provide adequate goods and services” 
(Daly and Cobb 1989:165, emphasis added). However, the theory is 
largely undeveloped and the groundwork of “person-in-community” is 
effectually isolated from the authors’ analysis of ISEW trends. My study is 
in agreement with Ziegler (2007): that the ISEW is not systematically 
built from the theory developed by the Daly and Cobb (1989). 
Therefore, one possibility would be to try to build more consistently 
than Cobb and Daly themselves do on the persons-in-community 
analysis, in order to inform the ISEW. Firstly, this involves working out 
the most important philosophical and ethical questions that relate to the 
meaning of life itself. For Cobb and Daly, meaningfulness is not found 
when more accumulation of private wealth occurs at the expense of good 
relationships, community and personhood. Instead of being driven by 
our consumer culture, meaningful lifestyles—particularly for the relatively 
well-off in our present day affluent societies—are about keeping 
possessions within limits. This provides us with more free time to enjoy 
our social relations and to share our non-commodified commons, 
conserving ecology, and reducing the stress, confusion and difficulties 
associated with having too many goods. This is genuine achievement 
towards sustainable socioeconomic welfare. 
Secondly, when revamping the persons-in-community model, the 
critical thing is to scrutinise the processes in the system that we currently 
have. Commerce (à la chrematistics) is the main way in which modern 
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human societies order their economic process. For instance, in a 
technological age when the accomplishment of tasks in a quick and 
efficient manner is considered the greatest good, it is easy to see why so 
many of us are busy yet terribly lonely. If companionship is a true good, 
then labour that alienates oneself can only impoverish no matter what 
the material gain may be. So much of what is accomplished is motivated 
by rivalry or envy, and yet this hard-charging atmosphere caused by 
driven, ambitious people leaves little time for meaningful relationships. 
This is the antithesis of true companionship, and this problem relates to 
the ‘time contradictions of capitalism’ (see Stahel 1999). 
Thus, developing a more realistic persons-in-community framework 
entails a comparative empirico-theoretical analysis of the positives of 
non-market relations and the negatives of life marketization. The inquiry 
centres on two fundamental questions, which are in tension with each 
other: what is genuinely being achieved to have meaningful lives vs. how 
society is working towards commodified goods and labour? This is akin to 
the notion of examining the differentials between GDP growth and ISEW. 
But this approach in the literature is too homogenous as it subjects the 
whole account to prices, thereby marketising the sustainable well-being 
variables. To deal with the problem of homogeneity, the alternative must 
embrace heterogeneity, which will offer a much broader and richer 
interpretation of the welfare-relevant aspects of the person-in-the-
community. 
Alternatively, my own approach to provide a more practical alternative 
to ISEW/GPI would be to utilise the sound and more developed 
theoretical analysis put forward in this thesis. Accepting the principle of 
heterogeneity, this study points to important areas that are neglected in 
the indicators development of the past two decades, including persons-
in-community, political, social, historical, institutional dimensions and so 
on. In light of this study, the best line of attack is to follow in the 
footsteps of Karl Polanyi and have a lucid inquiry into the disembedded 
system. In his classical analysis, Polanyi (1944) stressed that markets 
have always been secondary to the wider social and cultural logic. 
However, with the rise of the modern market economy, the idea of 
ordering the social and economic life on purely exchange-value logic has 
been established. Society as a whole is restructured into a ‘market 
society’ in order to allow for the supposedly smooth functioning of the 
market competition–based economic process. Faced with the 
contradictions brought forth by its own dynamics, the system exhibits an 
enormous flexibility and ability to try to neutralise these contradictions by 
way of converting them into its own chrematistic terms (Stahel 
2006:378). This is the ‘disembedded economy’, and in such a 




To support the argument that political economy of the disembedded 
system is the superior and more viable alternative to ISEW/GPI, I will 
provide a few concrete examples, followed by a critique of the existing 
models. Developing a holistic view of the positive and negative elements 
of the system entails a historical-institutional analysis of the contradictions 
of capitalism. Contradictions are the principle causes of the dynamics and 
motion of capitalism, which has a positive and a negative side. In order 
to know an object we must study, embrace and understand the 
characteristics of both aspects of a contradiction. This means that the key 
elements of the contradiction are regarded and identified together but 
cannot be aggregated into the one unit. Contradictions are intended to 
handle specially the sensory and active workings of the institutions, 
groups and processes participating in the system. By analysing and 
explaining empirically the contemporary dynamics of the system in a 
historical context, we can measure to some degree of accuracy the net value 
of each specific contradiction. Because the contradictions are relatively 
autonomous yet intimately related to each other, the advantage is that 
one avoids the problems associated with lumping together everything in 
a unitary aggregated index. 
At least a couple of good proxy indicators are prerequisites to 
ascertain both aspects of the contradiction. As an example, consider the 
individual–family contradiction. On the one hand, the “Economic 
Freedom of the World index” (EFW) by The Fraser Institute is a reasonable 
(albeit inadequate) proxy for individual freedom. EFW quantifies the 
multiple rights and liberties associated with various institutions (e.g. 
business, government, labour) that a country enjoys. EFW is useful 
because historical data dating from the 1970s are available for many 
nations. On the other hand, the ratio of divorces to marriages 
(unweighted average percent) over real historical time could be utilised 
as a rough proxy for assessing the value of familial capital. Historical data 
dating from the 1950s are available for a number of nations, from various 
issues of the Demographic Yearbook by the United Nations (Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs). Clearly, the divorces/marriages ratio is 
not a sufficient proxy for the quality of relationships; it should be 
supplemented with several other measures such as social trust. 
Notwithstanding, the key message is that in order to serve as a viable 
alternative to the ISEW/GPI framework, the time-series data on such non-
aggregative variables need to be organised in a sophisticated and 
meaningful way. 
This is where the Brennan Illustrative Figure (BIF) can help (which 
was introduced in Chapter 4, Section 4.10). Recall that the BIF is a dual-
window figure that combines a table and a graph in one diagram, and 
shows a specific critical value (or values) of importance. The BIF can be 
utilised to show the progression or regression in each dimension and the 
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associated trend averages, expressed in terms of percent change. This 
method posits that the scholar must critically evaluate the destruction 
and creation of the various forms of capitals, identifying a specific value 
(or range of values) of fundamental importance as historically 
determined. The scholar then undertakes an extensive comparative 
analysis between regions and nations, measuring in absolute and relative 
terms, flows and stocks, long- and short-run movements. In the case 
above, for instance, we might find that after a certain plateau of 
individual freedom is reached (as defined by EFW) family commitments 
disintegrate. Linking to Polanyi’s (1944) thesis, an increasing degree of 
disembeddedness is apparent: pursuits of the individual are in tension 
with family stability. In other words, depending on the actual weight of 
evidence the contradiction may not be in balance. 
The political economy approach overcomes one of the major 
problems of the net income indicators, which erroneously treat capitals 
as statistically aggregative. For example, advocates of the GPI calculated 
only pecuniary costs of family breakdown. However, once the aggregated 
indicator has been computed, assessing the societal damage of divorce 
is in effect very difficult to determine, as it accounts for a relatively small 
value compared to other cost items such as ‘long-term environmental 
damage’. It is more effective to separate such complex social phenomena 
and scrutinise the pertinent ‘trade-offs’ i.e. the contradictions 
independently. Moreover, advocates of SEWIs ignored a measure of the 
consumption (destruction) of social capital. It is difficult to tell how well 
society is going in a SEWI. ‘Society’ is lost in translation because SEWI 
advocates are obsessed with the ecological sphere. A similar problem 
arises if all our vigour is devoted simply to social or family capitals. 
Whatever the spheres of interest, the key is to have a strong socio-historical 
institutional analysis of the multiple contradictions of capitalism. 
What is the ‘minimum standard’ that would be needed to be a part of 
these non-monetary, multi-indicators? In relation to this study, there 
needs to be a specific focus on systemic unevenness. The fulcrum of 
unevenness is the differential return on investment that creation and/or 
destruction of social-environmental structures offer to different kinds of 
investors with different time horizons. Countries with poorer initial 
conditions can face greater difficulties to benefit from world growth and 
development than countries with richer endowments. For example, the 
politics of neoliberal capital in Africa is about dispossession. State power 
is needed for establishing a solid legislative framework, and to eliminate 
people from land, to crush informal and artisanal modes of mining, to 
ensure the removal of resources from land, and to smother rebellions 
and resistance (Bush 2008:361). In relation to Polanyi’s (1944) thesis, the 
redistribution of land and raw materials to capital and the dislocation of 
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people and their existing livelihoods point to ‘disembeddedness’ in their 
economies. 
Hence, examining the distributional aspects of core–periphery (and 
semi-periphery) relations is significant when we are interested in 
undertaking a local, regional and global analysis of capitalism. Indeed, 
some interesting works are emerging in the political economy literature, 
which will provide impetus for further research. For instance, O’Hara 
(2010) wants to a gain a broader understanding of the dynamic motion 
of uneven development in the real world, by linking economic with social 
and environmental factors in a holistic way. The author realises the need 
for qualitative inquiry where relevant and taking into account deficiencies 
of statistics. Accepting the teaching of heterogeneity, he then examines 
the quantitative changes in the multiple forms of capital that represent 
“institutional investment” (increases in capital) or “institutional 
consumption” (decline in capital). His analysis reveals that we need to 
have a global approach to continental, national and even sub-national 
political economy issues, since there is a tendency for uneven 
development in capitalism (and also for many of the other processes). A 
comparative approach is thus required for exploring the current and 
future course of global capitalism in a historical and institutional context, 
paying particular attention to measurement as much as possible. In 
summary, by utilising the political economy approach and a BIF (or some 
equivalent) the degree of disembeddedness between core–periphery can 
be ascertained. 
This accounts for critically important social and environmental 
dimensions, while leaving enough flexibility regarding the specifics so 
that context specific relevance could be taken into account. A major 
argument of this thesis is that there is a need to transcend the purely 
national; since the nation is relatively autonomous yet interlinked with 
global, regional and local systems. This is so critical for distributional 
matters and public policy. Environmental integrity and social justice are 
difficult to achieve, when we are up against a seemingly immutable 
capitalist system that is globally driven by the contradictory dynamics of 
uneven development. We need to go beyond a mechanical operational 
procedure employed by the vast majority of SEWI studies because many of 
the more critical aspects are non-aggregative and heterogeneous. SEWIs will 
likely not help very much, but political economy will enlighten us on how 
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